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Chapter 2

Sports Diplomacy as an Activity for Shaping Positive Relations between States

This chapter aims to review and analyze selected cases of positive sports diplomacy between hostile or estranged countries. Sports diplomacy perceived this way is supposed to serve the state’s interests connected to political rapprochement with other countries. Within the research, two hypotheses were verified. The first one assumes that sport may serve as a useful tool for shaping international relations by creating favorable circumstances. According to the second one, there is no direct correlation between the type of sport used in sports diplomacy for political rapprochement and its effectiveness—it was tested based on quality factors that allow ascertaining whether sports contacts have brought lasting improvement of bilateral relations.

The research included employment of case-study protocols and individual cases have been investigated concerning several variables:

• Sports contact necessary to establish political contact,

• Improvement or lack of improvement of political relations as a result of sports contact,

• Correlation between the consistency of sports exchanges and the current state of political relations,

• Existence of formal agreements sanctioning sports diplomacy,

• Sports exchanges arranged or coincidental,

• The importance attached to sports victories during the exchanges,

• High-level or grassroots character of the sports exchanges,

Findings are supposed to enable the proposition of models describing typical ways of acting within sports diplomacy perceived this way.

Ping-Pong Diplomacy between the People’s Republic of China and the United States

Ping-pong diplomacy between the People’s Republic of China and the United States is one of the best-known cases of sports diplomacy. Communist China is one of the two Chinese states formed as a result of civil war. Republic of China (Taiwan) was recognized by Western countries, while communist countries established close relations with the PRC, which referred to the same ideology.¹ However, after some time Sino-Soviet alliance began to fall apart. China cooperated with the nonaligned states, but opening to the West appeared to be the natural hence risky solution to escape from isolation. Improving relations with the United States was also crucial for China concerning its desire to join the United Nations and to initiate trade with the United States, and possibly to solve the problem with Taiwan favorably.² It would also improve China’s strategic situation concerning the cooling of the relationship with the USSR.

The United States was also interested in rapprochement with China, particularly when Richard Nixon became the president. He believed America should reorient its China’s policy. Nixon believed that better relations with China might strengthen the US position concerning the USSR and wanted to be remembered as the president who began the dialogue with China.³ American goals included avoiding a potentially dangerous escalation of the Sino-Soviet conflict as well.⁴ Apparently, both sides were interested in rapprochement, but several obstacles were preventing it, starting with the ideological conflict. It blocked the possibility of establishing contacts through traditional diplomatic channels, although such attempts were also made, for example, via diplomatic representatives in Geneva or ambassadors to Poland.⁵ American relations with Taiwan where a US military base was located posed another difficulty. Because of hostility between representatives of both Chinese states, Americans had to act very carefully.

Given this circumstance, from the early 1970s efforts were made to arrange a secret high-level meeting between China and the United States.⁶ Both sides were also making goodwill gestures. In December 1970 Chinese People’s Daily published a picture of Mao Zedong and American journalist Edgar Snow on Tiananmen Square with a comment “The people of the world, including the American people, are our friends,”⁷ while Americans relaxed some restrictions concerning traveling to China and trade. These steps were commented on as the “diplomacy of smiles”⁸ and reveal the essence of sports diplomacy as an instrument of establishing diplomatic contacts. Because of various reasons, it was difficult for both countries to initiate open and transparent contacts. An extraordinary step was needed, and ping-pong diplomacy became an answer to this need.

An introduction to future ping-pong diplomacy took place during the table tennis world championships in Nagoya in April 1971. Communist China generally did not compete in international sport but retained membership in the International Table Tennis Federation. After relevant negotiations held by China’s prime minister Zhou Enlai, it was decided that China shall compete in the world championships.⁹ Before leaving, the Chinese team was instructed by Zhou to respect the principle “friendship first, competitions second.” The Chinese government issued instructions for the athletes on how to behave in contacts with Americans, for example, they were not allowed to greet them or talk with them first and were not permitted to exchange flags but could shake hands.¹⁰ The instructions might be surprising considering future developments and suggest that the invitation for American players was not planned.

During the championships, American player Glenn Cowan was given a ride by the Chinese team after being late for his team’s bus. He met with Chinese champion Zhuang Zedong who supposedly has proposed the organization of Chinese-American table tennis matches in China.¹¹ Details on the form of the invitation remain unclear though. According to some authors, it was the Americans who strived to be invited.¹² According to Stuart Murray, shortly after Cowan and Zedong met, American NGO National Committee on USA-China relations proposed the visit of Americans to China.¹³ Lack of precise information might have been part of the plan to maintain a low profile.

Officially, the American team was invited to tour China on April 6, 1971, after the head of Chinese delegation Song Zhong visited Americans in their hotel to ask how they would respond to an invitation to China. He also promised to cover all the costs of the exchange. The trip was approved by a specialist on China in the American embassy in Tokyo. Nixon immediately recommended issuing visas to journalists so that they could cover the tour.¹⁴ Even though the governmental engagement was explicit, the whole initiative had a grassroots level, at least from the American perspective, which is typical for this form of sports diplomacy.

The American team’s tour to China began on April 10. They visited Beijing, Shanghai, and Hangzhou and played two friendly matches.¹⁵ The team was received very enthusiastically and friendly. During a meeting in the Great Hall of the People, Zhou Enlai said that the American visit had “opened a new chapter in the history of relations between Chinese and American peoples,” which marked the culmination of the tour.¹⁶ It was symbolic, also because many Western diplomats to Beijing were not allowed to participate in such a meeting at the time.¹⁷ A few hours later Washington announced five new measures concerning China, including termination of the trade embargo, permitting trade in commodities nearly equivalent to those traded with the USSR, ending currency control related to China, and expediting visas for Chinese who wanted to visit the United States.¹⁸

From that time, political developments were happening very quickly. In 1971 US secretary of state Henry Kissinger made two visits to China. Soon China’s authorities run a campaign to explain to society the change in relations with the United States. The famous visit by Richard Nixon to China began on February 21, 1972. During his visit, the Shanghai communique, an informal strategic agreement between the two countries, was signed.¹⁹ Already in 1971, the PRC was admitted to United Nations replacing Taiwan. The political consequences and change in the shape of mutual relations were therefore remarkable.

Ping-pong diplomacy is usually recognized as a one-off event in 1971. However, one year later, the exchange was repeated. In spring 1972 Chinese table tennis national team visited the United States.²⁰ Arrangements concerning the visit were made mostly on the nongovernmental level, with the minor engagement of the White House. Despite some difficulties, a series of friendly matches called “Friendship First” was held in the United States in April 1972.²¹ The most symbolical part of the tour—a game in the UN headquarters—took place on April 19.²² In the same year, the US basketball team visited China.²³ Sports contacts were therefore developed alongside political rapprochement.

Events related to ping-pong diplomacy were recognized as a significant diplomatic success, and the majority of experts share the view that it was an essential step toward full normalization eight years later.²⁴ As Zhou Enlai stated, “Never before in history has sport been used so effectively as a tool of international diplomacy.”²⁵ The events led to an evident change in the political climate between the United States and the PRC. Formerly the only contacts were held through secret diplomacy. Table tennis world championships in Japan constituted a convenient opportunity that both sides used. It should not be forgotten though, that China employed sport in maintaining friendly relations with other states before 1971. Ping-pong diplomacy was extraordinary because it was held between initially hostile nations.

According to Stuart Murray and Geoffrey Pigman, ping-pong diplomacy was meant to test whether public opinion in both countries would have accepted the opening of the frozen relations.²⁶ It is also claimed that the goal was to prepare Chinese society for a change in relations with the United States.²⁷ For many years the United States was identified in China as the enemy. In this context, ping-pong diplomacy had an internal dimension apart from the external one, which is typical for sports diplomacy, both directed at international rapprochement and shaping the international image of a state. The public aspect of the objectives of the exchange also suggests that it was an example of public diplomacy, even though it was also about facilitating an opportunity for traditional diplomats to get in touch.

A question might arise whether table tennis exchange was a proper means of fostering political rapprochement between the United States and China. According to some authors, the selection of table tennis was not coincidental, because Chinese wins were expected. On the other hand, in the following year, China was visited by American basketball players, and this time a win by Americans was anticipated. Such results would not be regarded as a loss of face.²⁸ The choice of table tennis as a means of rapprochement for various reasons appears to have been correct, but most likely it was a matter of coincidence since it was during the table tennis championships that the initial contact was made.

Cricket Diplomacy between India and Pakistan

An interesting example of sports diplomacy directed at rapprochement between hostile states refers to relations between India and Pakistan. Since 1947 when both countries gained independence, they went to war four times.²⁹ The tension is increased by the fact that both states possess nuclear weapons. However, despite strong antagonism, both societies also have certain common features, such as a passion for cricket.

Cricket is considered as the second to football most often practiced sport worldwide. The emotions it evokes in South Asia are sometimes compared to those during military conflicts.³⁰ Not surprisingly, contacts in such a popular sport are attributed with strong political significance. They attract both societies, but on the other hand, they might arise unnecessary emotions concerning the positive diplomatic objectives.

The first attempts to use cricket in shaping India-Pakistan relations were held in 1952, despite tensions concerning the border in Kashmir. At the time Pakistani national team for the first time visited India to play a series of five test matches. The people of Delhi were reported to have welcomed Pakistani players very warmly.³¹ Similar reciprocal meetings were held in the years that followed, although they were interrupted at the times of increased political estrangement. A longer pause in cricket exchanges took place between 1961 and 1978.³² Worth mentioning, suspending sports contacts may be considered as a diplomatic weapon, in the context of negative sports diplomacy.

A particularly important chapter of cricket diplomacy was held in 1987. It was preceded by tensions connected with military “operation Brasstacks.” Pakistani president Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq decided to employ sports contacts to improve relations. Using the opportunity that Indo-Pakistan Joint Management Committee responsible for organizing the cricket World Cup in India and Pakistan held a meeting, Zia sent a message through Pakistani delegates expressing his willingness to watch a cricket match between both countries in India. India’s prime minister Rajiv Gandhi was surprised but agreed for Zia’s visit. When two leaders met at the airport, Zia symbolically embraced Gandhi instead of a handshake.³³ Zia said that “cricket for peace is my mission” and that he “wanted to watch good cricket and see how we could solve our problems.” It might be claimed that at the time of Zia’s visit, the crisis in bilateral relations was slowly fading, but his presence at the stadium is believed to have additionally calmed the tensions. During the visit a declaration of not attacking each other’s nuclear installations was made, officially confirmed in December 1988.³⁴

Cricket diplomacy initiated by Zia is a very typical example of sports diplomacy. Sports contacts were used as an opportunity to arrange direct talks between political representatives of estranged countries. Because of the political situation, such a meeting would normally be challenging to organize. Owing to the theoretically nonpolitical character of the sport, political leaders could arrange a meeting without the risk of losing face. It should be underlined that the whole contact was initiated by one side—Pakistan—while India agreed to hold the talks.

Easing of the relations between India and Pakistan allowed sustaining cricket exchanges. In 1987 and 1989 India’s team played a series of matches in Pakistan. They were organized within an initiative “Cricket for Peace” declared by Zia, with the goal of creating an atmosphere of mutual trust.³⁵ However, as a result of the deterioration of political relations, cricket exchanges were later limited. A few one-day matches were successfully organized in 1997, but soon the relations got worse again after both countries conducted nuclear tests. In 1999 cricket exchanges were resumed, and despite certain doubts, a series of exhibition matches was organized in January and February in India,³⁶ during which Pakistani players received a standing ovation from Indian supporters,³⁷ which demonstrates the true potential of sport in overcoming hostility between nations. Unfortunately, new political tensions appeared soon after an Indian aircraft was hijacked by Islamic radicals from Pakistan, jeopardizing successes of cricket diplomacy of 1999.³⁸

Relations between India and Pakistan kept deteriorating, and in 2002 another crisis in Kashmir almost led to war. In 2004 both governments decided to organize bilateral series of cricket matches to calm the tension and to test the possibilities of normalization, the opening of the border and resuming direct security negotiations.³⁹ At the time bilateral relations were slowly improving, so there were concerns that any incident during the exchange might jeopardize this progress. On the other hand, canceling the series could have led to even worse results. The “Friendship Series”⁴⁰ was eventually organized and the Indian cricket team toured Pakistan in March and April 2004. Before departure, Indian players were told by the prime minister to care not only about the sports result but also about the reception by local fans. Interestingly, the first match in Karachi on March 13 was won by India by a very narrow margin 3:2 (349 to 344), while the other three matches also were very even.⁴¹ Such results were claimed as the best possible concerning the diplomatic objectives. The most important thing was to affect public opinion concerning mutual rapprochement, not to win in the exchange.

The 2004 India-Pakistan cricket diplomacy is believed to have helped to improve relations between both countries.⁴² Another exchange was scheduled for the following year. Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf announced through the media his willingness to visit India to watch a cricket match and hold political talks. India responded with an invitation. Musharraf and India’s prime minister Manmohan Singh during their meeting declared that the peace process was irreversible.⁴³ The exchange was assessed as helpful in consolidating peace and allowed both leaders to hold informal talks that accelerated the process of normalization.⁴⁴

The success of cricket exchanges in 2005 led to further initiatives. In January and February 2005 a tour of the Indian team to Pakistan was organized.⁴⁵ However, in 2008 Indo-Pakistani relations deteriorated again after the terrorist attacks in Mumbai. Cricket once again proved to be useful in such a situation. In 2011 Pakistani prime minister Yousaf Raza Gilani accepted an invitation from his Indian counterpart Singh to watch cricket World Cup semifinal in Molahi between India and Pakistan together. The initiative was commented as an attempt to create a better political climate between both countries, which contributed to the initiation of talks between ministries of foreign affairs in 2011 and the gradual normalization of relations.⁴⁶ Once again, cricket exchanges helped to ease tensions. Interestingly, it was the first time when the Indian side came forward with such a proposal. Another new thing is that sports diplomacy stemmed from international cricket competition rather than from arranged exhibition matches.

India and Pakistan keep employing cricket as a tool of diplomacy. In 2013 cricket exchanges were resumed, and a series of three matches was organized in India.⁴⁷ In turn, the opening of the cricket World Cup in 2015 allowed political leaders from both countries to talk despite another diplomatic deadlock. India’s prime minister Narendra Modi called his Pakistani counterpart Nawaz Sharif to wish good luck to the Pakistani team. During the conversation, Modi offered to send a new foreign secretary to Islamabad.⁴⁸ Modi called leaders of other states competing in the World Cup as well, so his gesture could be perceived as the behavior of a good host. The context of India-Pakistan relations made the conversation significant from the diplomatic perspective, though.

Cricket diplomacy between India and Pakistan had several forms. They included a series of exhibition matches and using the opportunity of cricket matches/exchanges to arrange contacts between political leaders. Some of the exchanges were part of the general détente tendencies, while others were established at the times of increased tensions to initiate relaxation of bilateral relations.

The eventual effectiveness of cricket diplomacy is strongly connected to cricket’s popularity in India and Pakistan. People from both countries love their players and perceive them as “good ambassadors of peace.”⁴⁹ The use of cricket as a tool of political rapprochement between both states, therefore, appears as the right choice despite the risk of arising nationalist sentiments. Organizers of the exchanges were aware of this risk—one of them recalled that his job was to persuade local (Pakistani) fans to treat the matches as sports events and not as the struggle between hostile nations.⁵⁰ This and similar attempts proved to be successful, and cricket diplomacy over the years was somewhat effective in supplementing traditional diplomacy. It did not bring a lasting rapprochement though but was capable of creating circumstances for this. This appears to be a common observation concerning the use of sport to shape positive relations with other states. Its effectiveness is strongly dependent on external factors.

It is important to underline the fact that sports events were used by political leaders to meet, even though cricket diplomacy as a process is much wider and also includes other ways of employing cricket in order to bring both states closer together. This type of diplomatic employment of sport, which Stuart Murray described as the informal sports diplomacy summit,⁵¹ most of all utilizes the fact that establishing contact through sport is easier, and often safer comparing to traditional diplomacy. In case of a failure of the initiative, an explicitly nonpolitical character of a sports event allows state leaders to save their faces. Apart from that, the atmosphere of a sports event may facilitate friendlier and more open contact.

We should also refer to the sports diplomacy against public diplomacy debate. Political leaders were using cricket exchanges for diplomatic reasons in a traditional way as opportunities to hold meetings. On the other hand, cricket diplomacy in principle was meant to build more positive emotions between the two estranged nations so its public diplomacy dimension is also evident.

Football Diplomacy between Turkey and Armenia

Football diplomacy (or soccer diplomacy) between Turkey and Armenia was another example of a situation when sport was employed to foster international rapprochement and to create an opportunity for political leaders to meet. Both states did not have diplomatic relations, so traditional diplomatic contacts were difficult to establish. Estranged relations between Turkey and Armenia have a historical background and connects to territorial conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh. Turkey backed Azerbaijan and closed its border with Armenia. Another contentious issue refers to Turkish denial to recognize the events in 1915 in the Ottoman Empire as genocide. According to some authors, another problem relates to Armenian territorial claims against Turkey concerning western provinces of “historical Armenia.” However, it is claimed that normalization would be beneficial for both sides.⁵²

Certain attempts to bring both states closer were observed in 2002 when AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi) party assumed power in Turkey, and Abdullah Gül became minister of foreign affairs. Gül met several times with his Armenian counterpart Vartan Oskanian during international conferences in 2003 and 2004. Later Turkish prime minister Recep Erdoğan exchanged letters with Armenian president Robert Kocharyan. More significant developments took place in 2008. In February Serzh Sargsyan was elected as new president of Armenia. Turkish president since August 2007 Gül decided to send him a congratulatory letter, expressing his hope that relations between both states would be normalized.⁵³ Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs claimed that the letter “broke the ice, extending a new hand to the Armenian side.”⁵⁴ At the time, other goodwill gestures were made as well; for example, illegal immigrants from Armenia were allowed to work in Turkey.⁵⁵ Apparently, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, the attitudes concerning Turkish-Armenian relations have changed to some extent.

In response to the congratulatory letter, Sargsyan invited Gül in July 2008 to watch a football match between both national teams in FIFA World Cup 2010 qualifications together.⁵⁶ The visit of Turkish president to Armenia was not confirmed for a long time due to numerous protests of Turkish opposition⁵⁷ and because of security matters. Only a week before the match it was announced that the presidents would watch it together. After accepting the invitation, Gül said he hoped his visit would “be instrumental in removing the barriers blocking rapprochement between the two peoples with a common history.”⁵⁸ Importantly, his decision was not fully supported by Turkish society, which was one of the reasons for the subsequent failure of the whole attempt to bring both states closer.

The match was held on September 6, 2008.⁵⁹ The presidents’ meeting marked the first visit of Turkish president to Armenia ever.⁶⁰ For obvious reasons, it was preceded by a series of secret diplomatic negotiations in Switzerland and Armenia.⁶¹ Secrecy of the negotiations confirms one of the assumptions that this form of sports diplomacy is useful when societies of the engaged countries have negative attitudes toward each other, and straightforward establishment of transparent diplomatic contacts is difficult or impossible. Sports contact is seemingly nonpolitical and may help the societies to accept diplomatic breakthrough.

Both presidents claimed the meeting was successful. Sargsyan expressed his hope that it would create the possibility to establish contacts and that he had already received an invitation to watch the rematch in Turkey. Gül said that according to him, the meeting would allow removing obstacles that block the rapprochement of both nations and that both presidents agreed that to make a step forward both sides need to step down from their positions.⁶²

The meeting provoked Azerbaijan’s reaction. It even threatened to limit the supply of energy resources to Turkey. Shortly afterward Gül visited Baku to assure normalization with Armenia would only be possible after the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh is settled.⁶³ Engagement of a third party, for which rapprochement between Turkey and Armenia was detrimental, could, therefore, be observed.

After the match in Armenia, Turkish minister of foreign affairs Ali Babacan who accompanied Gül stayed in Yerevan to hold a meeting with Armenian counterpart Edward Nalbandian. It was the first of a whole series of bilateral talks until April 2009.⁶⁴ On November 24, Nalbandian declared during the meeting of the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation in Istanbul that Armenia was ready to establish diplomatic relations with Turkey without preconditions.⁶⁵ In the following months, numerous meetings between representatives of both countries were held, on different levels, for example, Turkish prime minister Erdoğan met with Sargsyan in Davos in January 2009 during the World Economic Forum.⁶⁶ The meeting of the two presidents at the occasion of a football match initiated an unprecedented intensification of bilateral diplomatic contacts.

The whole process resulted in an agreement upon a road map to normalize Turkish-Armenian relations in April 2009, while political negotiations began on September 31, 2009.⁶⁷ As a result, two protocols concerning establishing diplomatic relations and developing relations were prepared.⁶⁸ They included provisions on respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity and the mutual recognition of the existing border. It was also decided to open a common border and to conduct “impartial and scientific examination of the historical records and archives.”⁶⁹ Interestingly, many of the most sensitive issues were not undertaken, while the problem concerning the 1915 events was treated very generally.

Sargsyan initially claimed that his visit to Turkey to see the football rematch depended on the progress of the talks concerning opening the border, but later declared that he saw no reasons for not accepting the invitation.⁷⁰ Either way, a few days before the match, the protocols were signed. During the meeting, Turkish president announced that history was being made.⁷¹ Admittedly, both states have never had diplomatic relations, and at the time reciprocal visits of presidents were held and shortly before the second of them protocols concerning the development of relations and opening the common border were signed. From the context of this research, it should be reminded that the whole process was initiated owing to the opportunity provided by the sport.

Shortly after Sargsyan’s visit to Turkey, the whole situation changed dramatically. Protocols were not ratified, while Turkey demanded Armenia to withdraw its troops from Nagorno-Karabakh as a precondition for opening the border.⁷² It was a consequence of the Turkish prime minister’s visit to Baku and the declarations he made there.⁷³ On the other hand, the Armenian opposition criticized the government for not referring directly to the Armenian genocide in 1915 in the protocols.⁷⁴ The whole rapprochement process built with the use of sports diplomacy was squandered. It appears that both societies were not ready for the opening, although the role of the third party—Azerbaijan—should not be overlooked. Its capabilities of affecting Turkey have proved to be stronger than, for example, Taiwan’s concerning the United States in the 1970s.

Sports diplomacy between Turkey and Armenia was pursued with the use of football. It should be noted that Armenia is not particularly strong in this sport.⁷⁵ The level of football is much higher in Turkey, both concerning the national team and the club teams. Both of the matches were won by Turkey 2-0,⁷⁶ which did not bring any emotional reactions, probably because it was the favorite to have won. From this perspective, football was an appropriate medium for contacts between both states, although the whole process was the result of a draw in FIFA World Cup qualifiers. Even though this attempt to use sport for political rapprochement was not successful, it did allow a political breakthrough, which would not be possible under different circumstances. It appears to be the essence of sports diplomacy aimed at bringing states closer together—to create circumstances, which may or may not be transferred into actual political rapprochement.

American-Soviet Sports Exchanges

When relations between the United States and the Soviet Union are considered, the sport was not necessary as a means of facilitating diplomatic contacts. Despite the ideological conflict, both states have never broken off diplomatic relations and maintained diplomatic missions in another country. Apart from that, they could use other channels of dialogue, such as the UN Security Council.

Regardless of the availability of diplomatic channels, both sides began to express willingness to establish some form of sports exchange already in the early 1950s. First talks were held shortly after Soviet debut in the Olympic Games in Helsinki in 1952,⁷⁷ while the US president Dwight Eisenhower discussed it with Soviet prime minister Nikolai Bulganin during their meeting in Geneva in 1955.⁷⁸ However, several obstacles were preventing the realization of these arrangements. Most importantly, the Immigration and Nationality Act, also known as the McCarran Act, assumed that fingerprints should be taken from all citizens of the Soviet Union and other communist states upon their arrival in the United States.⁷⁹ Soviet officials did not agree to such behavior in relation to athletes. The legislation was abolished by Congress in 1957, in response to Eisenhower’s administration’s claims that establishing sports exchanges with the USSR might be useful in communicating to its people about the success of American democracy and capitalism.⁸⁰ American motivation was therefore not only about the rapprochement with the Cold War rival, but it was also an attempt to hit it in a typically Cold War manner.

From the Soviet perspective, the establishment of cultural contacts with the West is believed to have been a consequence of the changes the Soviet Union underwent after the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and its leaders’ desire to intensify contacts with the West. One of the main Soviet objectives was about preparing the society for resignation from explicitly confrontational doctrine. Formal negotiations with the United States concerning bilateral cultural exchanges were initiated in October 1957 and finalized on January 27, 1958.⁸¹ The Cultural Agreement was signed for a two-year duration, but in the future, it was renewed numerous times. It assumed exchanges in areas such as science and technology, agriculture, radio, television, youth, sport, medicine, public health, culture, and tourism. Exchanges were also planned on the parliamentary level, and both sides agreed to open direct flight connections.⁸²

From the American perspective, the agreement was to facilitate access to until now closed Soviet society and to increase its knowledge about American politics and lifestyle. It was also meant to allow to understand the Soviet lifestyle better, to intensify contacts between citizens and to secure relevant governmental control over exchanges through diplomatic channels and insisting on reciprocity within exchanges.⁸³

Signing the US-USSR Cultural Agreement began a long period of sports exchanges between both states, although the first of them was organized already in June 1955 when American weightlifters visited Moscow and Leningrad. Sports exchanges were meant to symbolize rapprochement, but there were also more selfish motivations. They involved contacts in many sports and had a variety of forms, although from the diplomatic perspective track and field and basketball exchanges are believed to have been the most important.

Track and Field Exchanges

The Cultural Agreement from 1958 assumed the organization of two track and field meets: the first one in Moscow in 1958, the second in the United States in the following year.⁸⁴ From the American side, negotiations were conducted by privately financed Amateur Athletic Union (AAU) and from the Soviet side by Physical Culture and Sports Committee of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, an agency with ministerial status. The formula included twenty-two men and ten women events, with two representatives of each country in every event. In the relay races, the competition included one team from each country. Scoring and the way the winner was determined were subject to disputes, similarly as the issue of men and women competition. Americans opted for a separate contest for each gender, bearing in mind a higher level of women’s sport in the USSR. Soviet negotiators, on the other hand, wanted to count points jointly, hoping that its advantage in women’s events would allow the USSR to succeed in the overall classification. Even though the ultimate objective of the exchanges was to foster the idea of peaceful coexistence, both sides strived to win in these events perceiving them in a prestigious way.⁸⁵

The first of the series of track and field meets was held in Moscow in July 1958 and lasted for two days. During the exchange, peaceful symbolism could be observed in several ways. For example, Soviet newspaper Pravda assessed the meet as a part of the principle of peaceful coexistence, while Soviet fans cheered for athletes from both countries.⁸⁶ Such hospitability and the desire to stress positive emotions appear to be typical for this type of sports diplomacy. Given the governmental control over the press in the Soviet Union, the situation reveals that the goal of fostering peaceful relations between Cold War superpowers was implemented. The exchange was meant to create a more positive image of the United States among the people of the Soviet Union, which would have been compatible with the new line of the Communist Party.

The Soviet press identified the meet in Moscow as “the match of a Century.” Track and field was popular in both countries, and this popularity was meant to ensure that both nations would receive the public diplomacy message according to its intentions.⁸⁷ Exchange in such an important sport also indicated that both states would have cared about the victory. One the one hand, it could have led to adverse effects of the exchange, but on the other hand, only exchange in popular sport could have been effective in realizing the objectives above.

Both sides evaluated the result of the meet differently. The USSR won in the total score (172-170), while for the United States it was the men’s competition (in which it won) that mattered. As a result, each of the sides perceived themselves as winners.⁸⁸ The same scheme was also present during future exchanges. Both the United States and the USSR were trying to use them diplomatically in two ways—as a tool of exposing the possibility to cooperate and as a means of presenting their superiority in sport. This paradox could be observed already when the track and field exchanges were negotiated.

In the years that followed Soviet-American track and field meets were held annually, alternately in the USSR and the United States. An event in Stanford in July 1962, when 153,000 tickets were sold for a two-day competition, is described as one of the most meaningful.⁸⁹ Such a significant interest in the exchange was resulting from the popularity of the sport. It should be remembered that unlike today, international sports contacts were much more limited in the 1950s and 1960s, and any chance to see Americans competing with the Soviets was awaking interest.

The series of annual track and field meets lasted until 1966 despite political tensions, such as the Berlin Crisis or the Cuban Crisis. In response to the Vietnam War, the Soviet Union decided to withdraw from the event in Los Angeles in 1966. The decision, described as a spontaneous demonstration of Soviet athletes against American policy, was announced two weeks before the event.⁹⁰ The revival of track and field exchanges was not simple since AAU demanded compensation for the canceled meet. An agreement was reached during the Olympics in Mexico City when the Soviet side agreed to compensate AAU’s loss.⁹¹

The second stage of the dual meets lasted between 1969 and 1985. In this period exchanges were expanded with indoor, youth and all-around competitions. At the time, the popularity of professional track and field was raising, while the popularity of team meets was diminishing. What is more, the International Amateur Athletic Federation (IAAF) attempted to organize world championships (first such event was held in 1977). All this led to lowering the level of US-USSR dual meets and its political significance. It was also difficult to arrange dates of the meets because of the increasing number of other international track and field events—for that reason a meet in 1979 was canceled. The next meets were organized in 1981, 1982, and 1985, although the last one was, in fact, a tripartite competition held in Japan with separate US-USSR scoring.⁹² The diplomatic significance of the track and field exchanges was gradually diminishing and eventually abandoned.

American-Soviet bilateral track and field exchanges have all the hallmarks of positive sports diplomacy as a tool of realizing states’ foreign policy goals, which in this case was about mutual opening between the Cold War superpowers. Particularly in its first stage, it might be assessed as having positive effects, even though there were some controversies and protests and that one of the objectives of both sides was to defeat the rival.⁹³ Such a dichotomy of goals was characteristic of the Soviet-American sports exchanges. They were supposed to show the societies that peace and dialogue were possible, but at the same time, both sides did not resign from ideological rivalry. Exchanges were not capable of overcoming political crises, but at times they were held despite such odds.

Basketball Exchanges

American-Soviet sports diplomacy directed at mutual rapprochement was also conducted through exchanges in basketball, a sport popular in both countries. The possibility of establishing such exchanges was discussed since the Olympic Games in Helsinki in 1952.⁹⁴ They were eventually sanctioned by the Cultural Agreement in 1958. Just as in track and field, from the American side, they were negotiated by AAU despite being financed by the Department of State.⁹⁵ The first exchange was held in the Soviet Union in 1958. Americans played six matches in Moscow, Tbilisi, and Leningrad. Soviet fans were reported to have created a great atmosphere, particularly during the first two matches in Moscow. The US team managed to win all of the games, although two of them against the Soviet national team and one against a team of Leningrad were very even.⁹⁶ The further exchanges were supposed to be held in the United States and the USSR alternately.

Contrary to track and field meets in their first stage, the schedule of annual basketball exchanges was not kept very strictly. The second series of matches was held in 1960. The Soviet national team played six matches against the best teams of the NIBL league (a member of the AAU).⁹⁷ The USSR won four out of six games. Americans claimed these results were insignificant, whereas the Soviet Union attempted to use them as proof of their superiority.⁹⁸

Even though basketball was very popular in both countries, the series of matches did not receive particular attention in the United States, particularly in the early years. Despite that, there was a considerable political significance attached to them, particularly in the Soviet Union where victories in this typically American sport were appreciated. For this purpose, a program of development of basketball was initiated to create a strong and successful national team.⁹⁹ From this perspective, the attitude of the American side might be surprising.

Subsequent basketball series were held in the following years. In 1962 Soviet team visited the United States and won two out of six games. Because of organizational issues, the United States was represented by weaker teams, leading to an even lesser interest in the matches by local fans. At the same time, Americans indicated numerous reasons for their losses,¹⁰⁰ which was typical for the Cold War sports rivalry: victories were supposed to be proofs for national superiority, while losses were caused by external factors.

Cultural exchanges between the United States and the USSR were disrupted as a result of the Cuban crisis. A basketball series to be held in the United States was canceled. It was claimed that the series might upset American society, lead to protests and violence, and that continuation of exchanges would increase the tensions instead of defusing them. Still, both sides negotiated the continuation of exchanges since both John Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev believed that culture provided a bridge to understanding even at the most turbulent moments in the Cold War.¹⁰¹ Basketball exchanges were resumed, but in general, they were more sensitive to political crises and tensions comparing to track and field exchanges.

In the initial period of basketball exchanges, Americans often failed to put their best players against the Soviet national team. This attitude has changed after the controversial loss to the USSR in the Olympic final in Munich in 1972. In the United States it was regarded as a national tragedy. As a result, there was a substantial increase in interest in the friendly series with the Soviet Union. The ticket sales for the matches increased, similarly as the media attention.¹⁰² In contrast to earlier exchanges, the American team was composed of decent players from the NCAA league. In total, 17,500 spectators watched the opening match in Los Angeles.¹⁰³ The massive change of the US attitude after the dramatic loss in Munich could, therefore, be observed both in the general interest in the exchange and in the quality of the players selected to participate in the series.

The 1973 series in the United States was very even, while individual games were ruthless and full of fouls. The whole series was won by Americans 4-2 and is assessed as one of the most meaningful. It is claimed that American players were more interested in winning on the court than sustaining the spirit of détente. On the other hand, as Kevin Witherspoon observed, players from both countries had the opportunity to meet and despite the rough play, they had respect for the others. In most of their comments, they spoke about the goodwill within the games. Such a dichotomy of emotions was also conveyed by the media.¹⁰⁴

The era of détente in the 1970s generally brought an intensification of American-Soviet exchanges. For example, a visit by Richard Nixon to Moscow in 1972 was preceded by a display tour of Soviet gymnasts including Olga Korbut and Ludmilla Tourischeva in the United States. In the same year, the USA-USSR Treaty on Contacts, Exchanges and Cooperation was signed in Moscow with a clause on sports exchanges (Article XIII). As Sovetskii sport commented, “The foreign policy of our party and government is reflected in international sports relations which must play their part in establishing firm foundations of mutual understanding between our peoples.”¹⁰⁵ Even though basketball exchanges often included fierce competition for the win, in the general context of sports exchanges between the two Cold War superpowers, their primary role of fostering peaceful coexistence appeared to has been maintained.

US-USSR basketball series were also organized in subsequent years, but their significance appeared to be decreasing. As before, they were disrupted as a result of political tensions, for example, after the Korean airliner was shot down over Sakhalin in 1983.¹⁰⁶ On the other hand, there were new forms of competitions, for example, in 1988 professional NBA team Atlanta Hawks played a preseason match in Tbilisi against the Soviet national team.¹⁰⁷

The diplomatic significance of the American-Soviet basketball exchanges is believed to be more modest comparing to track and field dual meets. For many years Americans appeared to have treated them negligently, unlike the Soviets, but with time they also began to notice the prestigious potential of the matches against the Soviet Union, particularly after a controversial loss to the Soviets in the Olympic final in 1972. It is one of the main differences comparing to the track and field exchanges, in which at least at the beginning both sides were attaching importance to the result of sport competition. Of course, the main objective of the exchanges was to promote the idea of peaceful coexistence among both societies, which was visible even in the times of more fierce sports competition or more tensed political relations.

American-Soviet sports exchanges are a clear example of using sport within public diplomacy. Both states recognized the need to engage in soft exchanges to step away from the explicitly confrontational tone in bilateral relations. This was to be reached through engaging respective societies, and sport appeared to be a perfect tool to achieve this goal. However, those possibly idealistic objectives were often covered by a typically Cold War competition—the desire to win against the rival proving one’s own superiority. This, alongside issues such as ruthless behavior of the players (in case of basketball exchanges), might have ruined the eventual positive diplomatic outcomes. For sure the exchanges were an example of what Murray calls traditional sports diplomacy, which does not erase their public character.

Baseball Diplomacy between the United States and Cuba

Cuba and the United States did not maintain diplomatic relations since 1961 (they were resumed in 2015). Cuban leader Fidel Castro accepted Soviet aid in 1959, whereas in April 1961 American government organized an unsuccessful invasion of an anti-Communist brigade of Cuban immigrants in the Bay of Pigs.¹⁰⁸ As a result, relations between the United States and Cuba were tensed since the 1960s. However, despite political differences, both nations had many cultural links, including interest in baseball, a sport brought to Cuba by Americans.¹⁰⁹ Cuban society remained under the influence of American culture despite the hostility of its leaders against the United States.¹¹⁰ All those circumstances determined the shape of sports diplomacy between both nations. It will be analyzed by the example of baseball exchanges, although it should be noted that both states used other sports for the same purposes, for instance, basketball. Baseball diplomacy was not a one-off event, but a long-time process of establishing and breaking baseball contacts.

Despite tensed relations between the United States and Cuba, there were numerous initiatives to use sports contacts to foster political rapprochement. Baseball appeared to be a perfect medium taking into account that in the United States it became a civil religion, with political and diplomatic significance.¹¹¹ It is also very popular in Cuba where it is perceived as a political and cultural symbol of independence.¹¹² Both countries traditionally maintained very intensive baseball contacts. Then they were limited after the Cuban Revolution. However, in 1971 Cuban-born manager of San Diego Padres Preston Gómez announced his plan to take to Cuba an all-star team composed of Cuban MLB players in March that year. A series of matches was supposed to be a symbol of goodwill similar to the visit of table tennis players to China. MLB Commissioner Bowie Kuhn and Cuban officials became interested in the initiative.¹¹³ The idea was a visible result of the success of ping-pong diplomacy. At the time, a high potential of sport in promoting peace and rapprochement between estranged states was recognized in the United States, and the plan was its obvious consequence.

The US Department of State did not agree for the exchange though. It claimed that a high-level baseball contact would have put Nixon’s administration in a difficult position since he would need to justify rapprochement with an enemy.¹¹⁴ It should be noted that failures of the initiatives of organizing baseball exchanges did not mean there were no baseball contacts between both countries at all since teams from both countries played against each other within regular international baseball competition, including matches in the United States and Cuba. However, the majority of authors do not classify such games as the baseball diplomacy between the United States and Cuba.

Preston Gómez’s failed attempt to organize a baseball tour in Cuba was not the only such initiative in that period. Cuban baseball players were invited to the United States, or American baseball officials traveled to Cuba, but none of these activities was developed toward a sports exchange. It appears that at the time US administration including Nixon himself was not ready for such opening to Cuba.¹¹⁵ However, over time, the political climate started to change, and American politicians began to accept the need to ease the relations with Cuba.

At the beginning of 1975, another initiative of baseball exchange between the United States and Cuba was raised by Preston Gómez and Bowie Kuhn. It assumed a series of friendly matches between Cubans playing in MLB and Cuban teams. Cuban officials were interested in the idea.¹¹⁶ It should be noted that this and other attempts to establish baseball exchanges with Cuba were initiated on a grassroots level. They were proposed by people associated with American baseball clubs or the MLB league. Such a mechanism is typical for new public diplomacy, which is often pursued directly by individuals or social organizations. Such mechanisms can also be associated with democratic countries with active civil societies. It should also be noted that despite the declared motivation of fostering friendship and goodwill between the United States and Cuba, another, possibly a more important motivation of the initiators of the exchange was to obtain talented Cuban players to play in American teams.

The new initiative led to an intensive exchange of correspondence between Kuhn, the assistant secretary of the US Department of State William Rogers, and the secretary of state Henry Kissinger. Within his attempts to arrange the exchange Kuhn even met with Cuban officials in Mexico in February 1975 to discuss the details. Rogers appeared to be in favor of the exchange, whereas Kissinger was opposing.¹¹⁷ The major problem for the Department of State was the lack of goodwill gestures from Cuba. Nonetheless, the US Department of State seemed to have been seriously considering such a possibility. Eventually, on February 24, 1975, Kissinger canceled the exchange, probably to avoid pressure by the anti-Cuban republican lobby.¹¹⁸ Another initiative by Barrie Kuhn assumed the organization of two exhibition matches in Cuba in March 1976 between MLB teams which practiced in Florida at the time. Once again, it failed after Kissinger opposed in connection with Cuban military engagement in Angola. Despite various difficulties and odds, new ideas of organizing baseball exchanges between the United States and Cuba kept appearing. The possibility of turning them into reality appeared after the change of American administration. When Jimmy Carter became the US president in January 1977 American relations with Cuba improved, for example, a travel ban between both countries was abolished. At the time, a visit of the New York Yankees to Cuba was proposed.¹¹⁹ The team was to play three matches against the Cuban national team in Havana, but after other MLB clubs opposed fearing that Yankees would get an unfair advantage in scouting talented Cuban players MLB commissioner Bowie Kuhn blocked the visit and proposed sending MLB all-star team instead. In response, Cubans canceled their invitation.¹²⁰ This situation demonstrates the observation mentioned earlier that initiatives of US-Cuban baseball exchanges had bottom-up nature and their primary goal was to acquire talented Cuban players. Nevertheless, the effects of possible exchanges were expected to have diplomatic significance and this is how they were justified by the initiators.

Despite no success in arranging baseball exchanges until the mid-1970s, both states managed to arrange contacts in other sports. For example, in March 1977 Department of State agreed that a team of basketball players from the University of South Dakota and South Dakota State University would travel to Cuba in the following month.¹²¹ About baseball diplomacy, a proposition was raised by Cleveland Indians in 1978. The team wanted to play a series of exhibition matches against Cuba in Tucson, Arizona. The idea was not accepted by MLB executive council though, while Kuhn was reported to have received mixed signals from the Carter administration.¹²² All this shows that there were numerous attempts to establish friendly baseball contacts between the United States and Cuba in the 1970s. For various reasons they have failed, often because of political issues. The chances of successful arrangement of baseball exchange between both countries diminished along with the end of the détente period of the 1970s.

In 1987 Pan American Games were held in Indianapolis, and Cuba decided to participate. Before the Games, American amateur national baseball team played a series of five exhibition matches in Cuba. The Cubans, including Fidel Castro himself, gave Americans a friendly reception. A year later the series was repeated in the United States,¹²³ and the exchanges were continued in the years that followed. During the events, fans from both countries were behaving very kindly to the visiting players.¹²⁴ The diplomatic significance of the exchanges was therefore quite clear.

The annual amateur baseball series were organized until 1996 and did not avoid problems, such as the protests by Cuban immigrants. It is claimed that many of the matches were held in Millington, Tennessee, to limit the number of protesters because it was far from big cities. Defections of Cuban players who wanted to play in American clubs were another problem.¹²⁵ In 1996 the tension in bilateral relations rose after Cubans shot down two American aircrafts which were dropping flyers to Cuba, and shortly after Clinton’s administration passed the Helms-Burton Act which tightened the embargo imposed on Cuba.¹²⁶ In July 1997 Cuban national team was supposed to play eight matches in the United States, but the tour was canceled under controversial circumstances. The annual exchanges were never resumed.¹²⁷

Another change of the attitude of the American government concerning Cuba took place after the visit of John Paul II to Cuba in 1998.¹²⁸ In January 1999, the US government agreed to intensify people-to-people contacts and cultural exchanges with Cuba. This gave an opportunity for the establishment of sports relations between MLB and Cuba, although according to Justin Turner, these initiatives were not directed at rapprochement between both countries, but to “aid Cuban people and hasten Castro’s downfall, through fostering discord in Cuba as a result of increased exposure to American people, prosperity, and culture.”¹²⁹

The owner of Baltimore Orioles Peter Angelos who was looking for a possibility to play against the Cuban national team for a couple of years took advantage of those new circumstances. The US government agreed to his proposition that Orioles would play against Cuba: one match in Havana and a rematch in the United States, but it required that the Cuban government would not benefit economically from the matches. In response to protests of organizations of Cuban immigrants the US administration also declared that it was not an introduction to normalization and that the matches were to help promote democracy in Cuba.¹³⁰ Of course, the positive effect of people-to-people relations should also be taken into account. Even if the actual objective of establishing baseball contacts was to acquire players (in case of American clubs) or to dismantle the political system of another country (as was declared by the US administration), a sports contact might lead to the rapprochement between nations anyway. The motivation of the US administration is not entirely clear, and the declarations on striking the Cuban regime might well have been directed at responding to the domestic protesters rather than expressing actual objectives.

The first match between Baltimore Orioles and the Cuban national team was held in Havana in March 1999. The American team won by a narrow margin 3-2, whereas the Cuban team won spectacularly in Baltimore in May (12-6).¹³¹ Gerald Gems described this result as probably the most satisfying sports achievement of Cuba in recent years.¹³² When the players returned to Cuba, Fidel Castro personally congratulated Andy Morales whose home run delivered Cuba’s victory.¹³³ Castro was also present at the stadium during the match in Havana and visited the Cuban team during its preparations for the rematch. On the other hand, the American government was trying to avoid mixing the matches with politics. Neither Bill Clinton nor any other representative of his administration attended the game in Baltimore.¹³⁴ Thomas Garofalo summarized this claiming that from the US perspective baseball diplomacy with Cuba was held “in spite of government policies, not because of them.”¹³⁵ Admittedly, both sides suggested they were willing to lead to political opening, but each of them had their motivations as well. Cuba was interested in increasing its national prestige, whereas the Americans wanted to use the exchange to hit the Cuban regime. In general, though, rapprochement appeared to be at least one of the few goals of the exchange.

According to Robert Elias, baseball diplomacy associated with matches between Orioles and the Cuban national team gave hope for an improvement of mutual relations.¹³⁶ In the following years baseball exchanges on the lower level were organized. This included visits of American university teams to Cuba and exchanges on the youth level.¹³⁷ Contacts on higher levels were resumed under Obama’s administration. A prominent example of baseball diplomacy is connected to an exhibition match in Havana in March 2016 between the Cuban national team and Tampa Bay Rays. The game was attended by Barack Obama and Cuban president Raul Castro,¹³⁸ although it was not the basic reason for their meeting, rather a culmination of the historic visit of American president to Cuba. No official statement was made in reference to the meeting, but it was a clear symbol that despite political differences sport was something that both countries had in common.¹³⁹

American-Cuban baseball diplomacy is not a complete process. Since the relations between both states still are not friendly, it appears that there is a need to use this popular sport as a channel to political rapprochement. It is also hard to anticipate the further evolution of rapprochement between both countries under Donald Trump’s administration.

It should be stressed that baseball diplomacy between the United States and Cuba was realized through a sport which is very popular in both countries. As a result, particularly the Cuban side attempted to use the exchanges to increase its prestige, whereas individual American administrations were reluctant about such sports exchanges. On the other hand, from the perspective of possible rapprochement the sport was appropriate because it generated interest of both societies. Similarly to the cases of this type of sports diplomacy described earlier in this chapter, baseball exchanges were usually initiated on the grassroots level from the American perspective, but the US government was reluctant to making diplomatic utility out of them. A very distinct approach might be also observed among the US and Cuban authorities, with a more careful attitude of the Americans.

Canadian-Soviet Hockey Diplomacy

Hockey diplomacy between Canada and the Soviet Union is another example of employing sport to bring states closer. Ice hockey is very important in Canada. It is commonly associated with this country and plays a significant role in Canadian public diplomacy.¹⁴⁰ Hockey traditions in the USSR are more modest, but Soviet society was enthusiastic about the sport as well.¹⁴¹ Thus, hockey exchanges had strong potential in shaping relations between both countries, although the popularity of the sport also meant various difficulties in successfully using the exchanges for rapprochement.

In 1968 Pierre Trudeau became Canada’s prime minister. Improving relations with the Soviet Union was one of his foreign policy goals. It was supposed to increase Canada’s self-reliance in international relations.¹⁴² Trudeau believed that since both states were successful in hockey, it was a logical tool for developing closer relations.¹⁴³ The Soviet side was also ready to redefine relations with Canada.¹⁴⁴

In 1971 Trudeau visited the USSR and met with Soviet prime minister Alexei Kosygin. Their meeting was commented as very successful in the context of strengthening bilateral relations. Shortly afterward, Kosygin was invited to visit Canada. Traditional diplomatic contacts included talks on hockey relations.¹⁴⁵ The future exchanges were initiated as a result of an article in Izvestia mentioning boredom of constant wins of the Soviet national team in international hockey and a need for new challenges. Canadian diplomats in Moscow took it as a suggestion and met with the author of the article Boris Fedosov who expressed Soviet willingness to organize matches against Canadian NHL players.¹⁴⁶ The planned exchange was supposed to create a chance for political rapprochement. Soviet acceptance to compete against professionals suggests that it attached lesser importance to the sports result (contrary to sports diplomacies with the United States), which can be explained by Canada’s different status.

Negotiations concerning the hockey exchanges were held at the occasion of talks between Canadian officials and IIHF concerning Canada’s return to international competition after its withdrawal in 1970 as a result of disagreement concerning the right of Canadian professional players to compete. The agreement was reached in April 1972 with the support of Soviet officials. During the same meeting, the decision was made to organize a series of eight matches between teams from both countries in September:¹⁴⁷ four in Canadian cities and four in Moscow.¹⁴⁸ Canada established a special body in the Department of External Affairs—International Sports Relations Desk¹⁴⁹ to coordinate preparations, negotiations, and the protocol of the exchange.¹⁵⁰ It suggests that the Canadian government cared a lot about improving relations with the Soviet Union and wanted to avoid any unnecessary controversies.

The Canadian-Soviet ice hockey exchange also known as the 1972 Summit Series between the Soviet national team and a team of Canadian NHL stars was held in autumn 1972.¹⁵¹ Within their preparations, Soviet players lived according to Canadian time for two weeks before the first matches. Canadians, on the other hand, had some problems with completing the squad since some of the clubs did not allow their players to participate in the series.¹⁵² Still, Canadians were regarded as the favorite to win since for the first time professionals were allowed to compete against the Soviet team. In a way, this embodied earlier Canadian requests to allow professionals to compete in international ice hockey.

The Canadian team won the Summit Series, although by a very narrow margin thanks to a goal in the last seconds of the last match in Moscow. Canada won four matches, the USSR three, and there was one tie.¹⁵³ Within the exchange meetings between politicians from both countries were organized. As the US ambassador to Moscow recalled, all this resulted in greater interest in Canada in the USSR and the improvement of diplomatic relations.¹⁵⁴

Both sides tried hard to win the series, but the prime motivation of the exchange was to improve bilateral relations. Hockey exchange was supposed to affect both societies according to the assumption that more people are interested in sports than in international relations.¹⁵⁵ Such an attitude in general lies behind the usefulness of sports diplomacy in affecting international relations. Still, there were several setbacks for achieving this objective. A very aggressive style of play of the Canadians was one of them. Numerous fouls led to a situation that instead of friendship, the matches were arousing dislike or even hostility against Canadians. Of course, Soviet players were not entirely blameless,¹⁵⁶ but it were the Canadians who played particularly roughly. Generally, though, it is believed that the exchange was beneficial, particularly from the Canadian perspective, since it gained higher status and recognition within the USSR.¹⁵⁷

The 1972 Summit Series is commented as the most crucial act of Canada-USSR hockey diplomacy, but hockey exchanges were arranged later as well. For example, in 1974 newly established World Hockey Association (WHA) which competed with NHL and sought to improve its status organized a series of matches between Canadians playing in WHA and the Soviet national team. The format of the exchange was similar to the 1972 series. Soviets won four matches, there were three ties, and the WHA team won once. It should be noted that despite the lower status of WHA comparing to NHL its squad was composed of some of the players who participated in the 1972 series.¹⁵⁸ According to John Soares, this dimension of hockey diplomacy fitted in Trudeau’s efforts to improve relations with the USSR and to reduce the tensions.¹⁵⁹ Considering these goals, an aggressive Canadian style of play was an obstacle. There were also controversies concerning organizational issues. For example, there was a threat of breaking the series after Canadians chartered an aircraft instead of using commercial flights to travel between Canadian cities (as was agreed). In turn, Canadian officials boycotted one of the matches in Moscow because they were upset with the seats they received. According to the report by the Canadian embassy to Moscow, the 1972 series probably improved bilateral relations, but “at the conclusion of the second series it is more difficult to draw a balance sheet.”¹⁶⁰ It demonstrates that sports diplomacy directed at bringing hostile or estranged states closer is a tool that should be used very carefully, and it is very easy to jeopardize its positive effects. In this case, controversies were connected to the aggressive style of players (similarly as in some matches of the US-USSR basketball exchanges) and organizational issues, but a similar problem might be connected to the risk of stimulating nationalist emotions, something that, for instance, organizers of cricket exchanges between India and Pakistan were afraid of.

Canada-USSR hockey exchanges also included other contacts in ice hockey. For example, in late 1975 and early 1976 Soviet Central Army Club (CSKA) of Moscow and Wings of the Soviet traveled to America to play friendly matches against American and Canadian teams. Particularly worth mentioning is one of the games between CSKA, the Soviet champion and nucleus of the national team, and Montreal Canadiens, the NHL four-time champion between 1976 and 1979. The match ended in a tie 3-3. In 1976 Canada hosted first of a series of hockey tournaments called Canada Cup, with Soviet and Czechoslovak national teams and teams of professionals from the United States and Canada, and occasionally others such as the Swedish national team. Another exchange was held in 1979 when a series called the Challenge Cup between NHL stars and the Soviet national team was organized. After two matches there was a draw, while the third one was won by the Soviet team 6-0. In Canada, some people perceived it as a loss of democracy.¹⁶¹ It was not purely a Canadian-Soviet exchange since American players were also playing in the NHL team, but to some extent, it can also be classified as a form of Canada-USSR hockey diplomacy. The diplomatic effect of these exchanges was much more modest though comparing to the 1972 Summit Series.

The hockey diplomacy was not necessary to arrange traditional diplomatic contacts between Canada and the Soviet Union. Its fundamental goal was to develop cooperation and to build more considerable sympathy toward another country in respective societies in a way typical for public diplomacy. The primary obstacle was the aggressive behavior of Canadian players. With this in mind, hockey diplomacy can be assessed as a mixed success. Canada managed to receive more recognition in the Soviet concepts concerning international relations and became more recognizable among Soviet society but on the other hand, various controversies limited the diplomatic benefits.