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Preface

The original manuscript of A Culture of Conspiracy was virtually complete in September 2001, when the World Trade Center and the Pentagon were attacked. In the time that remained before the manuscript had to be submitted, I added chapter 10 (along with interpolations of brief passages in some other chapters), which describes the reactions of what might be termed “professional” conspiracy theorists. But the book went to press well before the 9/11 conspiracy subculture had developed.

That would not prove to be, of course, the only development on the conspiracy scene over the next decade or so. Rather, the following ten years witnessed conspiracism more complex and widespread than anything I had anticipated when I began this project. The spectacular growth of American conspiracism after the first publication of this book eventually convinced me that an expanded edition was necessary, although the four new chapters, 11 through 14, provide only a glimpse into some of the new dimensions in conspiracist thinking. In short, the new sections should be regarded as representative snapshots rather than encyclopedic surveys. The sheer volume of talk and activity about plots and cabals might otherwise have turned each chapter into a full-blown volume of its own.

The 9/11 attacks were surely one catalyst of these developments. Another was the election of Barack Obama, the first African-American president. While conspiracy theories have almost always been woven around chief executives, including Bill Clinton and both Bushes, the Obama theories stand out for their number, their variety, and their spread into the general society, particularly in the case of the so-called “birther” theories that for a while became part of the wider political conversation.

The influence of the Internet, which I discussed in the conclusion to the first edition, has if anything been magnified, and has played a significant role in recent conspiracy-linked violence, including potential and actual activities by militias and so-called lone wolves. The year 2012 turned out to be a year much loved by conspiracists, even more freighted with apocalyptic expectations than the year 2000. There were, first of all, international events that were believed to be the focus of plots, notably the London Olympics, although they passed peacefully. And the year itself possessed a special quality to many through the wide diffusion of beliefs that the ancient Mayan calendar supposedly gave it apocalyptic significance. This was yet another example of a phenomenon mentioned in the original conclusions about the capacity of modern communications to insert what once would have been fringe beliefs into the cultural mainstream.

I am grateful to Kevin A. Whitesides for sharing material about the Mayan-calendar phenomenon. Special thanks as well go to Christopher Graveline, who took time out of a busy schedule to read and comment on sections of chapter 13.

A note on Internet sources: Book and periodical sources cited in the first edition can presumably still be found. Unfortunately, that is not necessarily true of Internet citations. The websites cited here have had uneven lifespans. Many are still “alive,” but others may have disappeared and their contents with them. All remain in the notes and bibliography, however, as indications of the sources I used.

Michael Barkun