Читать книгу How the Social Sciences Think about the World's Social - Michael Kuhn - Страница 8

Global social thought in the social sciences that detects the world's social and that crosses the borders of the national social is the assemblage of the secluded knowledge about nation state socials.

If social science thinking crosses the borders of its national social biotopes—it continues to look at the world's social as an agglomeration of nation state social theories and becomes "inter-national" by comparing their nationally constructed thought, theories created from the very state science thinking view on the social within their state biotopes.

What elsewhere would be considered as violating the most fundamental rules of social sciences theorizing and rejected also within the social sciences as nationally "biased" thought, thinking in national "perspectives" is ordinary practice in international social science activities. The national social is not only the unit of analysis but an explanatory framework through which social science thinking theorizes about the national social. Presenting social thought under headlines like "…..from a Chinese perspective", are not rejected as obviously biased knowledge, but very welcome as enriching the assemblage of theories, not only constructed about nationally confined knowledge, but knowledge constructed through the pre-supposed thinking of a nationally biased view about any topics.

Assembling knowledge by preferably carrying out and comparing country studies, inter-national theorizing in the social sciences, consists of additive knowledge about multiple nation state socials that is lacking any commensurability. Since such knowledge assemblage compares nation state social without knowing any tertium comparation is the nation state socials share and against which they could be compared, the result of these studies is to detect a never ending round-about of non-understood divergences. How could they? Since social sciences only know how to think about the individual nation states social, they have no concepts of what a nation state essentially is, and are thus unable to identify and distinguish what nation states and national societies across the world share and what not.

As a result, thinking in nation state "perspectives" introduces any national, mostly historical peculiarities of nation states, as an imperative theoretical means needed to theorize about the nation state socials—and discloses the extent to which international social science theorizing drowns theorizing in the monstrous cognitive circle, that provides to share the nationally peculiar constructs and categories, the national "perspectives" as a pre-conditional means to understand them. To give just one example of this dead end road thinking in such international comparative country studies:

"These difficulties are not only due to the difference between English and French. They probably also reflect the French conception of knowledge, which puts an emphasis on explicit and scientific knowledge, and the French conception of learning, which traditionally puts the emphasis on formal education and training."[11]

Since social science have no clue about what the essentials of a nation state social is and, hence, have no categories theorizing about a nation state social, they cannot distinguish between any essential of a nation state social as such and their historic peculiarities. Hence, social science thinking considers any social phenomenon in any individual nation state social as a unique phenomenon of any individual nation state social.

Thus, any general features of the nature of humans, essentials of the construct of nation states or historical peculiarities of a particular nation state are undistinguishable for social science thinking. Hence, social science thinking not only knows things like a "French conception of knowledge". Nation states undoubtedly craft the living conditions and the life of humans and do this to an extend that made Marx talk about his notion of a "Charaktermaske", critiquing that the most liberate inhabitants of the nation state societies without having a clue about this only execute what they are forced to do by law and consider this as only executing their most individual peculiar views and life agendas Thus, do the social sciences, when they assemble knowledge about nation state socials and when they compare them, identifying the historical peculiarities of their nation state social with what their nation state social is: Unlike China, France is the French "manifestation" of the French nation state

Undoubtedly, humans have created different concepts of what they consider as knowledge. However, imagining a concept of knowledge, that defines a nationally peculiar mode to construct thinking, a national concept of what is human's nature, can only be imagined by thinkers for whom the nation state is the almighty power even able to implant a nation state view on humans, here on how humans think, as a second, quasi national human nature.

Once any national peculiarities are identified as the particular nature of a nation state social, for social science theorizing looking beyond the borders of their national social requires to share these nationally unique concepts as a precondition to understand them in the comparative view on the world's national socials. Not surprisingly these studies ever end up in the complaints among all the inter-nationally thinking social scientists, that the others are never understood by the others.

Theorizing in national perspectives and assembling such nationally constructed knowledge, is the only way social science know to creating social thought namely in the rightly called inter-national science encounters, that has indeed so much internalized the constructs of state constructed societies, that the naturalization of these state constructs only allow them to recognize the national peculiarities, the historically particular interpretations of these constructs as the essentials of the individual nation states and, hence lead to a new version of globalized ignorance among social sciences about the other national socials.

As in our example about an international comparative view on the sphere of education, social science thinking is not able to see what this particular national systems essentially shares with the education systems of the countries against which it is compared, but, falsely—locked in their thinking in comparative national "perspectives"—identifies the particularism of the national interpretation of the state education system, here the French education with the nature of education in France, what is only the peculiar variation of the way to interpret essentially the same education system, the French education shares with the education systems against which it is compared. Excluding the systemic fundaments from reflecting about education in thinking in national "perspectives", results in considering the peculiarities of the nation state constructs as their essentials and creates the, indeed, very national view not only this French scholar advocates as the key to understand education in this country and across the world's national state socials.[12] The global indifference among social sciences about the other nation state social is thus the inevitable consequence of theorizing about the world's social through thinking in national "perspectives" about the national socials, the particularisms of nationally constructed categories, presenting a nationally peculiar concept of humans as the essential of a nationally constructed human nature—the elementary "enlightened" form of a theoretical racism in social science thinking.