Читать книгу New Perspectives on Older Language Learners - Miriam Neigert - Страница 18

Of certain fallacies to which the psychologist is exposed by reason of his peculiar point of view – that of being a reporter of subjective as well as of objective facts,

we must presently speak.

- James, 1890: 184f. -

Due to a long history of research in the area of self, a “potpourri” (Klein & Gangi 2010: 2) of terms related to this phenomenon has evolved over the centuries. Most of the self-x terms, such as self-esteem, self-worth, self-awareness or self-confidence, we – as laypersons – tend to use interchangeably in everyday parlance. This may be because we are constantly and naturally preoccupied with our self from an early age and throughout our lives (Hattie 1992: 1f.; Marsh & Hattie 1996b: 446ff.; Mercer 2014: 160). Mummendey (2006: 17) nicely illustrates this with an example for the usage of the term Selbst (self) by ordinary people on a daily basis:

Monika muss mal wieder etwas für ihr Selbst tun, Klaus hat immer noch nicht zu seinem Selbst gefunden, Inge scheint erhebliche Probleme mit dem Selbst zu haben, überhaupt haben Frauen oft immer noch ein schwächeres Selbst als Männer […].1

According to him, the use of Selbst in these situations actually refers to various psychological phenomena such as a general change of lifestyle, self-esteem, or self-confidence. Mummendey (2006: 16f.) points out that keeping in mind that these people are not professional psychologists, the way they (mis-)use the term self is no problem. When it comes to researchers in the field, however, the usage of self-related terms is a different story and he cautions researchers to avoid such reification of psychological phenomena. Even though taking caution with the use of terminology as a researcher is justified, it may in turn erroneously lead to thinking that the two worlds of lay persons’ usage and researchers’ usage of psychological terminology are to remain separate entities which are never meant to impinge upon each other.

But research does not exist in a vacuum and those two worlds do in fact collide at times. This happens, for example, when laypersons are participants in research studies. Researchers such as Mercer (2014) have taken this issue into account by adapting instructions for their studies to participants’ everyday or lay understanding of the self or self-concept: “They [the pilot study participants] were shown the video and asked to evaluate their feelings of confidence. This self-construct was chosen because of its easy comprehensibility for the participants and relatively broad scope.” (ibid.: 166) She used the term ‘confidence’ when instructing participants in her study when, in fact, she was investigating ‘dynamics of the self’. In what ways I have adapted my research instruments (questionnaire and interview) to the self-understanding of my participants, and how this may or may not have an impact on the ethical dimensions of my research will be discussed in chapter four.

Going back to the latter quote by Mummendey, he nevertheless does make a valid point when warning about substantialisiertes Denkgebilde or “reification” (2006: 14). As with the usage of the term Seele (soul), which has been used more widely in research before the 20^th century, Mummendey (2006: 18) sees a similar development of reification of the self in psychology, which may trick us into thinking of it as an independently acting entity. He then lists numerous examples of formulations in scientific articles and books, which imply an active role of the self. Other researchers in the field, such as William James (1890: chapter XII.) and John Hattie (1992), also remind their readers of this fallacy. In his book Self-Concept (1992: 242), Hattie takes up Ryle’s (1949) phrase ‘ghost in the machine’ to exemplify how not to approach psychological terms – in this case, self-concept:

The intention is not to reify self-concept. Self-concept is not a ‘ghost in the machine.’ There is no hidden homunculus that sits inside our body that drives our view of the world. The psychological term ‘self-concept’ is no more real than are the notions of locus of control, intelligence, gravity, or electricity. Self-concept exists only in its manifestations.

Even though it may not always be possible to refrain from lending the words ‘self’ or ‘self-concept’ a sense of agency in my formulations, the issue of reification is important to bear in mind when trying to grasp the aforementioned complexity of self-terminology. It is exactly this complexity which requires me – just like other researchers at the beginning of their research – to provide clear-cut boundaries of the terms self-concept and self within the framework of my research. Just as a surgeon needs a sharp knife to perform accurately, a theoretical foundation with sharp edges is required for easy navigation through one’s research project.

So, to start sharpening my terminological edges in this chapter, I will give an overview of some central characteristics of self-concept by, firstly, summarising suggestions regarding its structure taken from relevant research literature; and, secondly, contrasting it with some commonly (mis-)used terms in the areas of second language acquisition (SLA) research and psychology.