Читать книгу Military Career of Napoleon the Great - Montgomery B. Gibbs - Страница 8

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When Napoleon set out from Paris on the 21st of March 1796, to take command of the Army of Italy, after a honeymoon of but three days, he traversed France with the swiftness of a courier, turning aside but a few hours at Marseilles with his mother and family, whom he was now able to provide for in an adequate manner. His letters to Josephine were full of passionate expressions of tenderness, and regret at their separation. But after paying his tribute to the affections, his heart was speedily filled with exultation and triumph. For the first time he was chief in command; the power within him was now free to direct his actions, unhampered by the restraint he had so long felt in the capital. He was extremely anxious to commence the career to which Fate called him, by placing himself at the head of the Army of Italy at once.

It would not be difficult to imagine with what delight this young general—then scarcely twenty-six years old—advanced to an independent field of glory and conquest, confident in his own powers, and in the perfect knowledge of the country which he had previously acquired. He had under his command such men, already distinguished in war by success and bravery as: Augereau, Massena, Serrurier, Joubert, Lannes, Murat, La Harpe, Stengel and Kilmaine, all of whom were astonished at the youthful appearance of their new commander.

It was not without some discontent that the old generals beheld a young man, lately their inferior, taking the command over their heads,—to which each supposed he had a prior claim, and reaping the benefits of a plan of operations they did not imagine to have originated with himself. As he rode along the ranks the soldiers observed that he did not sit well on horseback, and complained that a "mere boy" had been sent to command them. The young general, however, soon obtained that respect for his character, which had been denied to his physical constitution. The firmness he exhibited, soon put a stop to the insubordination which had prevailed in the army; and, even before they had conquered under him, the troops became as submissive as at any subsequent period, when his character was fully established.

Some years before, when Bonaparte was conversing at Toulon with M. de Volney, the well-known Corsican traveler and literary man, at a dinner given to the two friends by Turreau, then in command of the military force at Nice, a campaign in Italy was suggested. After the dessert was brought in Napoleon said to Turreau: "Don't you think it's altogether too bad to have 10,000 men lying idle here at Nice when the Republic could make such excellent use of them in Italy?"

"Possibly," replied Turreau, "but we can do nothing; we have no order to move from the Committee of Public Safety."

"Then," said Napoleon, "it is your duty to make the committee ashamed of its inactivity."

"What would you do if you could act as you pleased?" asked Turreau. Napoleon promised to give a reply the next evening. At the time fixed he came prepared with a complete plan of campaign written out and classified under seventeen heads. It involved the invasion and conquest of Italy on almost the same lines that he was now about to undertake, and the outgrowth partially of that meeting, for Turreau forwarded the plan to the Committee of Public Safety at Paris on condition that it be put in the hands of Carnot, in whose judgment Napoleon had confidence. Carnot looked over the plan and was delighted. He was unable to secure immediate action, but two years later, when the invasion of Italy was determined upon, he had sufficient influence to see that Napoleon was put in charge of it.

Bonaparte arrived at the headquarters of the army at Nice on the 27th of March, 1796. The French Army of Italy, which amounted to 31,000 available men, had endured great hardships and privations, were destitute of shoes, clothing, and almost everything which their comfort demanded. The cavalry was wretchedly mounted and they were very deficient in artillery. To silence their complaints, and reconcile them to their situation, as well as to endear them to himself, Napoleon lived familiarly with his soldiers, participated in their hardships and privations, and redressed many of their grievances. "My brave fellows," he said to them on one occasion, while endeavoring to revive their spirits; "although you suffer great privations, you have no reason to be dissatisfied; everything yields to power; if we are victorious, the provisions and the supplies of the enemy become ours; if we are vanquished, we have already too much to lose."

The allies, Austrian and Sardinian, were a greatly superior force, numbering as they did 80,000 men, were well equipped with supplies, and occupied in their own, or a friendly country, all the heights and passes of the Alps. Berthier, then on Napoleon's staff as major-general, took great pleasure in showing as a curiosity in after years a general order by which three louis-d'or were granted as a great supply for an outfit to each general of division, and dated on the very day of the victory at Albinga.

On the 8th of April Napoleon wrote to the Directory: "I found this army, not only destitute, but without discipline; their insubordination and discontent were such that the malcontents had formed a party for the Dauphin, and were singing songs opposed to the tenets of the Revolution. You may, however, rest assured that peace and order will be re-established; by the time you receive this letter, we shall have come to an engagement."

It was under such circumstances that Bonaparte proposed forcing a passage to Italy and converting the richest territory of the enemy into the theatre of war. "Soldiers," said he to his destitute and disheartened men, "you are naked and ill-fed; the Republic owes you much, but she has nothing with which to pay her debts. Your endurance and patience amidst these barren rocks deserves admiration; but it brings you no glory. I come to lead you into the most fertile plains the sun shines upon. Rich provinces, and great cities will soon be in your power; there you will reap riches and glory—they will be at your disposal. Soldiers of Italy! with such a prospect before you, can you fail in courage and perseverance?"

This was the commander's first address to the army, and the words of encouragement which he gave them shot martial enthusiasm through their veins like electric fire. Under the incompetent management of Scherer the army, which had obtained some success against the Austrian general, De Vins, had been without glory, although their battalions were headed by valiant officers whose leader had neglected to improve his good fortune. The French soldiers were thirsting for a commander capable of leading them on to fame and glory, the conquest of Italy, therefore, seemed reserved for General Bonaparte.

Napoleon's system of tactics, although then unknown even to his officers, were a fixity with him. They appear to have been grounded on the principle that "the commander will be victorious who assembles the greatest number of forces upon the same point at the same moment, notwithstanding an inferiority of numbers to the enemy when the general force is computed on both sides." He eminently possessed the power of calculation and combination necessary to exercise these decisive manoeuvres.

Napoleon's career of victory began, as it continued, in defiance of the established rules of warfare, and what distinguished him above all his contemporaries was his ability to convert the most unfavorable circumstances into the means of success. He perceived that the time was come for turning a new leaf in the history of war. With such numbers of troops as the impoverished Republic could afford him, he soon saw that no considerable advantages could be obtained against the vast and highly-disciplined armies of Austria and her allies unless the established rules of etiquette and strategy were abandoned. It was only by such rapidity of motion as should utterly surprise the superior numbers of his adversaries that he could hope to concentrate the entire energy of a small force, such as he commanded, upon some point of a much greater force, and thus defeat them. He knew he would have to deal with veteran soldiers and experienced generals—men who had learned the art of war before he was born. He therefore resolved that every movement should be made with celerity, and every blow be leveled where it was least expected.

To effect such rapid marches as he had determined upon, it was necessary that the soldiery should make up their minds to consider tents and baggage as idle luxuries; and that instead of a long and complicated chain of reserves and stores, they should dare to rely wholly for the means of sustenance on the countries into which their venturesome leader might conduct them.

The objects of Napoleon's expedition were to compel the king of Sardinia, who maintained a powerful army in the field, to abandon the alliance of Austria; to compel Austria to concentrate her forces in her Italian provinces, thus obliging her to withdraw them from the bank of the Rhine where they had long hovered. It was hoped, also, to humble the power of the Vatican and break the prestige of its Jesuitical diplomacy forever. He had as yet achieved no fame in the field and not a general in Europe would have blamed him if he had only succeeded in holding the territory of Nice and Savoy, which France had already won.

Napoleon's plan of reaching the fair regions of Italy differed from that of all former conquerors; they had uniformly penetrated the Alps at some point of access in that mighty range of mountains; he judged that the same end might be accomplished more easily by advancing along the narrow strip of comparatively level country that intervenes between those enormous barriers and the shores of the Mediterranean Sea, and forcing a passage at the point where the last or southern extremity of the Alps melt, as it were, into the first and lowest of the Appenine range.

No sooner did he begin to concentrate his troops towards this region than Beaulieu, the Austrian general, took measures for protecting Genoa and the entrance of Italy with a powerful, disciplined and well-appointed army. He posted himself with one column at Voltri, a town on the sea some ten miles west of Genoa; D'Argenteau, with another column occupied the heights of Montenotte, while the Sardinians, led by General Colli, formed the right of the line at Ceva. This disposition was made in compliance with the old system of tactics; but it was powerless before new strategy. The French could not advance towards Genoa but by confronting some one of the three armies and these Beaulieu supposed were too strongly posted to be dislodged.

On the morning of the 12th of April, 1796, when D'Argenteau advanced from Montenotte to attack the column of Rampon, he found that by skillful manoeuvres during the night Napoleon had completely surrounded him—a man who had fancied there was nothing new to be done in warfare.

On the previous day the Austrians had driven in all the outposts of the French and appeared before the redoubt of Montenotte. This redoubt, the last of the intrenchments, was defended by 1,500 men commanded by Rampon who made his soldiers take an oath, during the heat of the attack, to defend it or perish in the intrenchments, to the last man. The repeated assaults of the French were without avail, their advancement was checked and they were kept the whole night at the distance of a pistol shot, 400 men being killed by the fire of their musketry alone.

At daybreak, the following morning, Bonaparte then being at the head of the French forces, and having introduced two pieces of cannon into the redoubt during the night, the action was recommenced with great vigor and with varying success. The contest had continued for sometime, when Bonaparte, with Berthier and Massena appearing suddenly with the centre and left wing of the army upon the rear and flank of the enemy, at once commenced a furious attack, filled them with terror and confusion, and decided the fate of the day. D'Argenteau, who commanded the rear, had fought gallantly, but seeing that to continue the battle would only end in total destruction, he fled, leaving his colors and cannon, a thousand killed and two thousand prisoners.

Thus was the centre of the great Austrian army completely routed before either its commander-in-chief at the left, or General Colli at the right, knew that a battle had begun. It was from this battle, the first of Napoleon's victories, that the French Emperor told the Emperor of Austria, some years later, that he dated his nobility. "Ancestors?" said Napoleon, "I, sir, am an ancestor myself; my title of nobility dates from Montenotte!"

This victory enabled the French, under La Harpe, to advance to Cairo, and placed them on that side of the Alps which slopes toward Lombardy.

Beaulieu now fell back on Dego, where he could open his communication with Colli, who had retreated to Millessimo, a small town about nine miles from Dego. Here the two commanders hoped to unite their forces. They were soon strongly posted, and dispatching couriers to Milan for reinforcements, intended to await their arrival before risking another battle. It was their object to keep fast in these positions until succor could come from Lombardy; but Napoleon had no intention of giving them such a respite; his tactics were not those of other generals.

The morning after the victory of Montenotte Bonaparte dispatched Augereau to attack Millessimo; Massena to fall on Dego, and La Harpe to turn the flank of Beaulieu.

Massena carried the heights of Biestro at the point of the bayonet, while La Harpe dislodged the Austrian general from his position, which separated him hopelessly from the Sardinian commander and put him to precipitate flight. By these movements Bonaparte was in such a position, that, though they had not traversed, his army had at all events scaled the Alps.

Meanwhile Augereau had seized the outposts of Millessimo and cut off Provera, with 2,000 Austrians who occupied an eminence upon the mountain of Cossaria, from the main body of Colli's army. Provera took refuge in a ruined castle which he defended with great bravery, hoping to receive assistance from Colli.

The next morning Napoleon, who had arrived in the night, forced Colli to battle and compelled him to retreat towards Ceva. Provera imitated the gallant example of Colonel Rampon in his defense, but not with the same success. He was compelled to surrender his sword to Bonaparte at discretion, after a loss of 10,000 in killed and prisoners, twenty-two cannon and fifteen standards. The French found on the summit of the Alps every species of ammunition and other necessities which the celerity of their march had prevented them from carrying.

Dego, situated at the summit of the Alps, secured the entrance of the French into Italy, cut off the communications between the Austrian and Sardinian armies, and placed the conqueror in a situation to crush them in succession one after the other. Beaulieu, fully sensible of the danger of his situation, collected the best troops in his army, and at break of day on the 15th of April, retook Dego at the head of 7,000 men.

The Austrians stood two attacks headed by Napoleon, but at the third Causse rushed forward, holding his plumed hat on the point of his sword, and Dego was soon again in possession of the French. For this piece of gallantry he immediately received the rank of brigadier-general. Here also, Lannes, who lived to be a marshal of the Empire, first attracted the notice of Napoleon, and was promoted from lieutenant-colonel to colonel. The triumph, however, was purchased with the life of the brave General Causse. He was carried out of the mêlée mortally wounded. Napoleon passed near him as he lay. "Is Dego retaken?" asked the dying officer. "It is ours," replied Napoleon. "Then long live the Republic!" cried Causse, "I die content."

Hotly pursued by the victors, Colli rallied his fugitives at Mondovi, where they again yielded to the irrisistible onset of the French, the Sardinian commander leaving his best troops, baggage and cannon on the field. The action was a most severe one in which, among others, the French general, Stengel, a brave and excellent officer, was killed, and the cavalry would have been overpowered but for the desperate valor of Murat.

The Sardinians lost ten stands of colors and fifteen hundred prisoners, among whom were three generals. The Sardinian army had now ceased to exist, and the Austrians were flying to the frontiers of Lombardy.

Napoleon, following up his advantage, entered Cherasco, a strong place about ten miles from Turin, as a conqueror. Here he dictated the terms by which the Sardinian king could still wear a crown. From the castle where he stood, and looking off on the garden-fields of Lombardy—which had gladdened the eyes of so many conquerors—with the Alps behind him, glittering in their perennial snows, Napoleon said to his officers: "Hannibal forced the Alps—we have turned them." To his soldiers, whom he addressed in a proclamation, he said: "In fifteen days you have gained six victories, taken twenty-one stands of colors, fifty-five pieces of cannon, several fortresses, and conquered the richest part of Piedmont: you have made 15,000 prisoners, killed or wounded upwards of 10,000 men. Hitherto you have fought for barren rocks, rendered famous by your valor, but useless to your country. Your services now equal those of the victorious army of Holland and the Rhine. You have provided yourselves with everything of which you were destitute. You have gained battles without cannon! passed rivers without bridges! made forced marches without shoes! bivouacked without strong liquors and often without bread! Republican phalanxes, Soldiers of Liberty, only, could have endured all this. Thanks for your perseverance! If your conquest of Toulon presaged the immortal campaign of 1793, your present victories presage a still nobler. But, soldiers, you have done nothing while so much remains to be done; neither Turin or Milan are yours. The ashes of the Conquerors of the Tarquins are still trampled by the assassins of Basseville."

To the Italians Napoleon said: "People of Italy! The French army comes to break your chains. The people of France are the friends of all nations—confide in them. Your property, your religion and your customs shall be respected. We make war with those tyrants alone who enslave you."

The French soldiers, flushed with victory, were eager to continue their march, and the people of Italy hailed Napoleon as their deliverer. The Sardinian king did not long survive the humiliation of the loss of his crown—he died of a broken heart within a few days after signing the treaty of Cherasco.

In the meantime the couriers of Napoleon were almost every hour riding into Paris with the news of his victories, and five times in six days the Representatives of France had decreed that the Army of Italy deserved well of their country.

Murat was sent to Paris bearing the news of the capitulation of the king of Sardinia, and twenty-one stands of colors. His arrival caused great joy in the capital.

The consummate genius of this brief campaign could not be disputed, and the modest language of the young general's dispatches to the Directory lent additional grace to his fame. All the eyes of Europe were fixed in admiration on his career.

In less than a month's campaign Napoleon laid the gates of Italy open before him; reduced the Austrians to inaction; utterly destroyed the Sardinian king's army, and took two great fortresses called "the keys to the Alps!"

To effect the rapid movements required for such results, everything was sacrificed that came in the way, not only on this occasion, but on every other. Baggage, stragglers, the wounded, the artillery—all were left behind, rather than the column should fail to reach the destined place at the destined time. Napoleon made no allowance for accidents or impediments. Things until now reckoned essential to an army were dispensed with; and, for the first time, troops were seen to take the field without tents, camp equipage, magazines of provisions, and military hospitals. Such a system naturally aggravated the horrors of war. The soldiers were, necessarily, marauders, and committed terrible excesses at this first stage of the campaign; but every effort was made, and with much success, to prevent this evil after conquest had put the means of regular supply within the power of the commander-in-chief. The wounded were frequently left behind for want of the means of conveyance. According to one authority, the loss by the disorders inseparable from this means of war was four times as great as by the fire or the sword of the enemy.

The army, nevertheless, adored its fortunate general, and it still doted upon him even when undeceived respecting his providence for it. "To be able to solve this enigma," says General Foy, "it was requisite to have known Napoleon, the life of camp and of glory, and, above all, one must have a French head and heart." With the sufferings of the army, he never failed to show an active sympathy when it did not tend to the compromise of his plans. The hours, too, spent by Napoleon on the field after a battle, endeared him to his followers. He visited the hospitals in person and made his officers, after his example, take the utmost interest in this duty. His hand was applied to the wounds; his voice cheered the sick. All who recovered could relate individual acts of kindness experienced from him by themselves or their comrades.

It was at this period that a medal of Napoleon was struck at Paris as conqueror of Montenotte. The face is extremely thin, with long, straight hair. On the reverse, a figure of Victory is represented flying over the Alps, bearing a palm branch, a wreath of laurel and a drawn sword. It was the first of the splendid series designed by Denon to record the victories and honors of France's great warrior.

Napoleon determined to advance without delay, giving Tuscany, Venice, and the other Italian States no time to take up a hostile attitude. After accomplishing so much, a general of less enterprise might have thought it right to rest awhile and wait for reinforcements before attempting further conquest, but not so with Napoleon. The French army, to which recruits were now flocking from every hospital and depot within reach, was ordered to prepare for instant motion.

It was after one of the successful movements of this period that an old Hungarian officer was brought prisoner to Bonaparte, who entered into conversation with him, and among other matters asked what he thought of the state of the war. "Nothing," replied the prisoner, who did not know he was addressing the commander-in-chief, "nothing can be worse. Here is a young man who knows absolutely nothing of the regular rules of war; to-day he is in our rear, to-morrow on our flank, the next day again in our front. Such violations of the principles of the art of war are intolerable sir, and we do not know how to proceed!"