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CHAPTER 2


Terrorism, Trade, and Visa Restrictions

Visas and Border Control

In the previous chapter, I argued that border closure will be more likely in the face of transnational terrorism, especially when attacks are directed against a state’s territory and citizens. Economic ties will offset the impact of security concerns and make for open borders. This chapter will explore the observable implications of the theoretical framework for visa restrictions.

Visa restrictions comprise an important, albeit understudied, component of migration and border control. A visa is defined as a “document issued in the country of origin (or residence) of the individual by the authorities of the state to which he or she wishes to go” (Guild 2009, 118). If a state has imposed a visa requirement against an origin state, the citizens of the origin state need to apply for a visa to legally gain entry. Visas thus constitute an upstream form of control, in the sense that they regulate and monitor migrants before they have gained entrance to the destination state. Travelers apply for permission to legally enter destination states’ territories at consulates and embassies abroad. The upstream aspect of visa controls permits states to push border controls outward, beyond physical borders, both into cyberspace and into foreign space (Bigo 2011). At the same time, governments enlist third parties, for example, obliging private agents such as transport companies, in monitoring travel. Legal entry often requires varying degrees of documentation, depending on the host, origin state, and visa category (Hobolth 2013). Importantly, the visa does not guarantee admittance but merely allows travelers to legally ask for permission to enter destination states’ territories. This grants border officials some discretion when monitoring border crossings.

However, sometimes states also utilize visa controls at border ports as an on-site mechanism of control over border crossings. Sometimes referred to as the “sticker visa,” this policy instrument does not require that travelers obtain legal permission to enter destination state territories beforehand. Hence, the visa at the border does not embody the screening goal that the more common upstream visa requirement serves (Neumayer 2006). Instead, the visa-at-the-border generates revenue by requiring a nominal fee from border crossings, similar to the toll on an interstate highway in the United States. As such, the analyses herein focus on the upstream visa instrument.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights stipulates a right of exit and entry to one’s own country (Article 13) but not a right to enter foreign space. States have the prerogative to arbitrate who gains access to their territories. Visas and border controls are important tools for states to exercise control. They are also historically intertwined with the emergence of the modern territorial state. With the development of standing armies, the state took over the legitimate means of coercion. Concomitantly and similarly, the modern state has monopolized the legitimate means of mobility, restricting entry and exit across international frontiers (Torpey 2000a). Identity cards and codes, and eventually the passport, were essential for documenting membership and developing mechanisms to distinguish among them for administrative purposes. Visa restrictions are, relatively speaking, a modern invention. Together with the passport, visas and biometric identity documents uphold the mobility regime (Huysmans 2006).

Visas monitor short-term mobility. In the empirical analysis that follows, we will address visa controls as they pertain to short-term territorial access. The next chapter also examines visa applications for different categories of short-term migration, including work, study, business, and tourism. Importantly, however, visa policies impact other dimensions of migration control. For example, states tighten visa policies in order to ward off prospective asylum seekers (Finotelli and Sciortino 2013). For precisely this reason, migration scholars consider the visa regime an important component of the state’s overall asylum and refugee-control regime (Czaika and Hobolth 2016). Visa restrictions thus dissuade prospective asylum seekers and divert them to states with softer border-control policies.

Visas also are essential for reducing illegal migration. Contrary to popular belief about migrants slipping across borders unnoticed, visa violations are one of the primary ways in which people gain illegal access to advanced democracies (Jordan and Düvell 2002; Torpey 1998). According to the Department of Homeland Security, for example, in 2015, of the 10.9 million illegal migrants in the United States, 40 percent gained access via visa transgression (Attanasio 2016). Neumayer (2006) contends that visa overstay is one of the primary causes of irregular migration into Europe, where clandestine border crossings have been traditionally less frequent than along the U.S.-Mexico border. In general, stricter visa regimes compel migrants to seek irregular ways of gaining access to and staying in destination states. Czaika and Hobolth (2016) find a 4–7 percent jump in the irregular migration rate into the European Union following a 10 percent spike in the visa rejection rate.

States use visas to regulate entry into destination state territories.1 Visa restrictions perform a screening function, acting as “the first line of defense” against the entry of undesirables (Torpey 1998, 252), which include prospective undocumented migrants as well as security risks. States design visa regimes to lower the ex ante probability of migrants transgressing the terms of the visa. To do this, they must be able to weed out individuals most likely to overstay and thereby transition into illegal status. For this reason, for instance, origin states that generate a high volume of undocumented migration typically confront a higher likelihood of visa requirements from advanced democracies (Neumayer 2006). Visas also have a preselection function. Czaika and Haas (2013) argue that, in general, migration control aims to distinguish between desirable and unwelcome migrants. Through selective controls, states target the composition of flows, usually in terms of skill but sometimes in terms of ethnicity and religion. Similarly, visa controls allow governments to encourage the mobility of some while inhibiting and deterring the mobility of others.

Boehmer and Peña (2012) conceptualize border openness as a continuum, reflected in the amount of documentation the destination state requires for legal entry. Fully open borders allow passage with minimal documentation; the Schengen zone has heretofore permitted citizens of Schengen member countries to travel without a passport. In other instances, states may have a separate category of origin states from which they demand only an identity card in lieu of a passport to gain entry. The requirement of a passport to gain admittance indicates a stricter approach. To illustrate, in 2009, the United States introduced the requirement that individuals carry a passport to enter from Canada, a development that signified the tightening of border controls in NAFTA. Visa requirements are a more restrictive requirement, representing a step toward border closure. Not surprisingly, there are no cases where states impose a visa for travel without a passport.

The global visa regime has become more permissive over time. However, this liberalization has proceeded in an uneven fashion (Mau et al. 2015; Neumayer 2006). While the citizens of advanced Western democracies gained visa-free travel privileges to a greater number of countries, the rest of the world’s citizens encountered new restrictions. In other words, visa policies are not necessary reciprocal. Where reciprocity applies, it is restricted to a smaller set of advanced democracies. What we do not yet know is whether and how transnational terrorism contributed to this bifurcation in the global visa system.

Empirical Implications of the Theory

This section develops a set of testable propositions concerning bilateral visa restrictions that serve as the basis of the empirical analysis. The first set of hypotheses ties transnational terrorism to visa policies. Under what conditions does terrorism impel stricter visa policies? First, we can envisage a global effect. By design, visa requirements are a tool for defending against security risks. Nevertheless, there are several ways that visa policies can be used more or less discriminately. We expect states to capitalize on the preselection, screening, and deterrent roles of visa controls to regulate territorial access. Prospective migrants who are exempt from visa requirements are deemed nonthreatening and those facing restrictions undergo additional scrutiny and background checks (Neumayer 2006).

The previous chapter argued that states confront an endemic type of uncertainty with respect to transnational terrorist groups. Asymmetric informational disadvantages make it more difficult for states to detect and ferret out transnational militants. Through clandestine access, terrorist actors can flout states’ surveillance technologies. Terrorist groups make up in secrecy and surprise what they lack in military power. By organizing across states, they place states at an operational disadvantage. Hence, uncertainty over the where and when of terrorist violence reinforces the importance of visa controls. If visa policies are the first line of defense against potential threats, as Torpey (1998) surmises, then states should capitalize on visa controls to address this type of uncertainty.

Hypothesis 1: Global Effect

States will enact restrictive visa policies against origin states whose nationals have perpetrated incidents of transnational terrorism.

One possible response is to restrict mobility from terror-exporting origin states. If we conceptualize transnational terrorism as a flow of violence, then states whose nationals have been involved in a high volume of incidents worldwide are significant exporters of terrorism (Muller 2010). I label this policy response the global effect of transnational terrorism. Namely, destination countries are attentive to whether the nationals of an origin state have frequently executed transnational terrorist events. This expectation is consonant with the notion that in the current security climate, states respond to individuals as threats (Salehyan 2008a). States may place restrictions on certain countries even if there is no animosity toward their home governments. From a slightly different perspective, the rogue-state framework that gained currency post-9/11 labels specific countries as pariahs because of their purported support of terrorism (Caprioli and Trumbore 2005). The international community may cast blame upon terror-rich states for turning a blind eye to their nationals’ involvement in worldwide terror.2

The contagion of terrorist violence across borders magnifies the global effect on policies. Transnational terrorist events may spill over into neighboring states even if the grievances are homegrown (Braithwaite and Li 2007). Alternatively, terrorist groups strategically target softer targets (Enders and Sandler 2006). Hence, proximate states’ more stringent policies may redirect terrorist violence toward states with more permissive conditions for violence. Thus events in other states inspire heightened perceived probability of future violence. Even if the state in question is not targeted in attacks, violence in other countries increases the perceived security risks of human mobility. In sum, we expect states to tighten visa policies in response to attacks elsewhere.

Hypothesis 2: Targeted Effect

States whose citizens or territory have been harmed in incidents of terrorism will enact restrictive visa policies against origin states whose nationals were associated with these incidents.

The global effect is selective in the sense that states tailor policies to specific countries, imposing restrictions on terror-rich origin states. That is, it does not imply a wholesale response whereby attacks abroad drive destination states to enact more stringent policies against all sending states. However, it is somewhat less discriminate in that it means stricter policies against origin states, regardless of whether the destination state has been directly harmed by these attacks. We can imagine a more selective type of policy whereby states respond to attacks by origin-country nationals only if their national security interests were involved in these attacks. Incidents that harm the state’s citizens, or take place on the territory of the state, directly threaten its national security. I refer to this as the targeted effect of terrorism.

Targeted events also more directly activate the fear-management aspect of border controls. Friedman (2011) argues that responding to terrorism is mostly about managing perceived vulnerability to attacks. Targeted assaults generate a sense of vulnerability, propelling states to calibrate policies according to the possible harm rather than to precise risk. However, Andreas (2009) contends that policy stringency is, to an extent, an outgrowth of public demand. Regardless of the objective efficacy of policies, restricting territorial access to outsiders also fulfills domestic demand. Policymakers also utilize draconian measures to symbolically assert their commitment and ability to insulate the citizenry from external threats.

The symbolic aspect is muted when it comes to visa controls because the public is not always cognizant of visa restrictions. The government may make much ado about imposing visas on terror-exporting states, but even then the visa requirement is physically not salient. That said, insofar as attacks on the country’s soil or involving its citizens elevate threat perception, they inspire the public to demand that the government take action.

Furthermore, targeted attacks compound the securitization of human mobility, which pivots on countries reframing migration as a threat to physical integrity (Lavenex 2001). Terrorist events on the state’s own soil directly allow securitization of short-term mobility. Targeted attacks muster public backing of harder policies by creating widespread fears of being victimized. In addition, they agitate the public into demanding tighter policies. In effect, the public push allows governments to put aside the objective efficacy of policies. Additionally, terrorist events tend to cluster together spatially and temporally (Braithwaite and Li 2007; Gelpi and Avdan 2015). Put simply, unlike lightning, terrorist events do strike the same locale twice. Hence, it is logical to expect states that have suffered violence at the hands of origin-country citizens to selectively curb human mobility from these states.

Hypothesis 3: Economic Interdependence

Economically interdependent states will be less likely to pursue restrictive visa policies with respect to their economic partners’ citizens.

At the heart of the theoretical framework is the argument that economic ties make for more liberal policies. They do so through direct and indirect effects; that is, by affecting migration policies and by conditioning the impact of terrorism. Insofar as stiffer visa policies degrade economic exchange, we’d expect opportunity costs to matter in states’ decision making. That is, anticipating revenue from economic exchange to shrink, states will be less willing to implement stringent policies. Reduced travel is a detriment to economic exchange to the extent that trade and foreign direct investment rest on face-to-face contact. The same characteristics of visa controls that augment security can inhibit travel. Visa restrictions raise the costs of travel as a result of the wait time, paperwork, fees, and uncertainty involved in the application process. Not surprisingly, visa requirements may discourage prospective travelers. In addition, tougher visa policies significantly dampen tourism. Neumayer (2010) demonstrates that, on average, visa controls decrease travel between pairs of states by 52–63 percent.

We may contend that tourism-dependent destination countries are more likely than other states to hesitate to impose restrictions.3 However, this misses the strong positive correlation between travel and commerce. As O’Bryne notes, “Freedom of travel is freedom to trade” (2001, 409). Visa requirements function akin to non-tariff barriers to trade because while goods and capital can circulate, the producers of goods and owners of capital cannot. We can further unpack the wisdom behind these words if we consider that even in the electronic age, the physical presence of investors encourages the establishment and preservation of business interlinkages. Neumayer (2011) reports the reductive impact of visa restrictions on the flow of goods and capital. He argues that primarily by hampering personal contact across borders, visa restrictions significantly lower bilateral trade and foreign direct investment (FDI). He finds that visa restrictions result in a drop of 21–32 percent in bilateral trade and a moderately higher drop of 33–38 percent in bilateral FDI.

Neumayer’s (2011) findings point to the direct negative correlation between restrictive visa policies and economic transactions. Stricter visa policies can erode the dyad’s economic relationship through an alternative mechanism: to the degree that draconian policies are viewed by the commercial partner as an antagonistic signal, we might expect a backlash. After all, restrictions on mobility are antithetical to liberal tenets and collide with shared norms between trade partners (Flynn 2003). Consequently, restrictions might anger economic partners. To illustrate, in response to the Euro pean Union’s controversial proposal to impose visa restrictions on the citizens of the United States and Canada, critics were quick to voice concern over the breakdown of transatlantic relations (Kanter 2016). Additionally, the commercial partner may retaliate by enacting tougher legislation, further stifling economic revenue. Neumayer’s (2010) empirical analysis validates this intuition, showing that reciprocal visa restrictions reduce capital flows between states by 6–12 percent more than unilateral visa requirements.

Reprisals can also manifest as weaker economic ties, either because investors become reticent to continue doing business in the partner state or because the state revokes economic privileges. Key domestic actors in the origin state may also feel slighted by stiff policies. By inhibiting face-to-face communication and contact, restrictive policies will undercut mutual affinity. Turkey’s response to severe visa requirements by Schengen states is a case in point (Kirișçi 2007).4 Pro-trade lobbies and business in Turkey have time and again castigated the European Union for tough visa legislation that contravenes the spirit (and, to some extent, the legal framework) of the European Customs Union. These concerns prompt commercial lobbies at home to champion liberal visa policies toward economic partners. In sum, states will consider the opportunity costs of reduction in trade and capital investment when devising visa policies. Policymakers will also be attuned to vested interests favoring liberal policies.

Hypothesis 4: Conditioning Effect

Economic ties will decrease the impact of transnational terrorism on visa policies.

Economic interlinkages also impose indirect effects by modulating the impact of security imperatives. Material incentives carry more weight than security imperatives in trading states’ grand strategy (Rosecrance 1986; Rudolph 2003). Societal actors that stand to lose from tighter policies may boost the salience of material concerns in the state’s calculus. For example, trade lobbies and multinational corporations have admonished the U.S. government for tough policies that stymie and slow down trade (Yu 2010). Trade groups in particular raise the concern that visa restrictions risk rechanneling business to economic competitors of the United States, such as Brazil, China, and India. Even when the visa is granted, it might have a cooling-down effect and divert foreign business abroad, thus weakening a country’s competitive edge over its economic rivals. Domestic coalitions with internationalist preferences may forge cross-national bonds, facilitating economic interdependence and prosperity (Solingen 1998). These ties in turn significantly shape foreign policy attitudes, both among political elites and at the public level (Fordham and Kleinberg 2009). Economic exchange inculcates mutual trust, which in turn should temper fears associated with economic partners’ citizens. Hence, we expect economic interests to downplay the impact of transnational terrorism: the positive impact of transnational terrorism on policy stringency declines with the strength of economic ties.

Measuring the Concepts

The hypotheses pertain to visa policies in general. This chapter focuses on visa restrictions; the subsequent chapter proceeds to visa rejection rates and documentation requirements. The dependent variable (DV) employed in the analyses that follow is coded 1 if the destination state has a visa requirement in place for the citizens of the origin state and 0 otherwise. The data cover 189 member states of the United Nations and 18 nonmember political territories.5 This yields information on bilateral visa restrictions for 36,300 directed dyads. Directed-dyad design allows each state to appear once as destination (recipient) and once as origin (sending) state. That is, the data differentiate between a visa in force by state A against state B and vice versa. The directed-dyad design is appropriate for this study because visa reciprocity is not guaranteed. To illustrate, 32 percent of states do not reciprocate visa waivers; reciprocity is more common among Western democracies and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) member states. Put another way, 68 percent of states do reciprocate policies, but this figure also includes reciprocating by imposing visa restrictions (close to 25 percent).

Visas and Walls

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