Читать книгу The Liquidation of Russia. Who Helped the Reds to Win the Civil War? - Николай Стариков - Страница 4

Having received the money from the Germans, Lenin promised them to take Russia out of the war. And then Lenin concluded a peace treaty, which was advantageous for Germany. This is the logic of those who "reckon" our revolution to be the credit of the German intelligence. In fact, nothing could dispel this myth about Bolsheviks, who allegedly were German spies, easier than the main proof, the main accusation against Lenin – the predatory Peace Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. We need to take a closer look at the sequence of events during the negotiations in order to understand whose tunes the leaders of the Russian Revolution were dancing to. Then a lot will be clearer and more understandable…

Which were the outside forces that were playing their game on the territory of the Russian Republic swept over by chaos?[39] These were Germany and the Entente. The historical pulse rate was twice as high as usual at that time. The terrible World War 1 was approaching its end, while nobody wanted to lose. The Entente was ready to put its last but strongest trump card on the table – the military involvement of the USA. The history gave the last chance to Germany too. It was a long chance, but it did exist. This chance supposed immediate peace treaty with Russia, withdrawal of all the troops from the occupied territories, and the speediest troop projection to the west, the main strike against the British and the French forces, before the American forces appeared in the theatre of operation. This was the most important condition of World War 1 ending in a draw for Germany. Germany could not win.

The novelty of the Bolsheviks' peace proposal was not that they were the first to start talking about a peace treaty, it was the way how they proposed it. Having published his Decree on Peace, Lenin demanded that Commander-in-Chief General Dukhonin immediately made a truce agreement with the Germans. Dukhonin refused and was unseated by the Sovnarkom[40] and then killed by the amok sailors.[41] The warrant officer Krylenko was appointed for this position. The new commander-in-chief suggested that the Russian military small units should make truce agreements with each specific confronting enemy unit. This was getting odd. If Bolsheviks are the German agents, why are they trying to provoke the German forces to breach the chain of command? The questions regarding peace and war were being discussed not by the soldiers in a meeting, but by the generals in Berlin. If the German soldiers, sitting in the opposite trenches, are suggested peace, they might start to disobey the military authorities. One gets the impression that Bolsheviks don't want to make peace with the Germans, and that their goal is to create the following logical chain in the heads of the German soldiers: peace – generals and the Kaiser who don't want peace – breaking the regime which opposes peace.

Isn't this behaviour odd for the German spies? And the most important question is who would gain of this situation? The Entente, of course, Britain and France. We shall come across this surprising (as long as we don't understand its reasons) behaviour of the Leninists once again…

After having "realized" his mistake, Krylenko addressed the German military authorities with the truce proposal. Here we notice another odd thing. Germany needs peace like air. A successful German "agent" Ulyanov, who made an unexpectedly great success in Russia, suggests the truce, gearing up for the peace treaty. The decisions should be made at lightning speed. The German politicians and generals should be happy and open the bottles of champagne, and pour the sparkling wine into their glasses. Yet, everything turned out differently in the real world. The actual Commander-in-Chief of the German Army General Ludendorff calls the Commander of the Headquarters of the Eastern Front General Hoffmann and asks him just one question, "Is it possible to deal with the new Russian government?"[42]General Hoffmann gave him a positive answer, "The Leninists can be dealt with." Meanwhile, in his memoirs he shared his doubts with us, "I thought a lot whether it should have been better to waive the negotiations with Bolsheviks for the German government… By giving Bolsheviks the possibility to end the war and thus to satisfy the Russian people's yearning for peace, we have practically helped them to keep the power."[43]

And it is not only the fate of Russia, but also the future of Germany that is at stake. One can't help saying, "You should have thought first!" These questions should have been discussed before Lenin was sent to Russia. If he really is a "German agent," of course. There is another aspect of this question. There is no other government in Russia except the government of Bolsheviks, and no other government is in view. Germany needs peace. And there are no other authorities than the Sovnarkom that the peace treaty could be signed with. Is here anything else to think about?

Coming back from the brown study, the Germans agree to the negotiations with the Bolsheviks. The Austrians implore the Germans to "satisfy Russia as soon as possible."[44]

The country of mazurkas and waltzes is running out of provisions, and the resoluteness of the Cabinet Council in Vienna disappears along with the bread and butter.

Brest-Litovsk occupied by the German troops is chosen as the place for the peace negotiations. The blindfolded empowered and authorized representatives of the Soviet Russia pass through the German lines of defence. The first step to the global peace has been taken. It's time to take the second and the third steps to stop the carnage as soon as possible…

Let's stop for a minute and speculate. The modern historical studies have just two explanations of Bolsheviks' further actions. The first, "Soviet," point of view reads that Lenin's desire for global peace was so great, and the Germans' desire to "grab" the Russian territories was so strong that the Peace Treaty was the result of these two straight lines crossing. The Peace Treaty was predatory and thuggish, and Russia lost a significant part of its territory. Due to the shortage of forces in the young "Red" Republic Bolsheviks reluctantly had to sign it. The second, more modern point of view reads that Lenin paid the Germans for the "sealed railway car" and their financial support for the destruction of the Russian state. Both versions are good, and both have been refined by many writers and historians to a high level of excellence.

However, can they really explain why Vladimir Ilyich has signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk? The answer to this question can be found in the very course of these negotiations. They developed absolutely not in the way we are used to believe. At the lead of the German delegation was Foreign Secretary Richard von Kuhlman, the Austrian delegation was led by Foreign Secretary Count Ottokar von Czernin. Comrade Adolph Joffe was at the head of the Russian delegation. His hair long and dirty, his beard greasy and uncombed, a worn-out hat on his head. The composition of the delegation is comical – among Lenin's diplomats there are a worker, a sailor, and a peasant, the images from a poster of those days. The last one was included in the delegation at the last moment. Bolsheviks thought it over and decided to include a peasant. The workers' and peasants' delegation couldn't do without a peasant.

So, comrade Joffe announces the Soviet conditions for the military operations to stop.

1. A truce period of 6 months.

2. Riga should be cleared from the German troops, as well as the strategically important Moonsund Archipelago, which they first occupied in October 1917.

Finally, Joffe announces the third Soviet condition, which brings the Germans in a state of shock.

3. The Germans have to oblige NOT TO MOVE TROOPS TO THE WESTERN FRONT![45]

What is the reason for such odd behaviour pattern demonstrated by comrade Joffe (or rather dictated to him by Lenin and Trotsky)? Why does a Soviet diplomat make such appalling demands? It is clear that it is absolutely unacceptable for the Germans to refuse moving their troops freely in any direction. A peace treaty of this kind doesn't make any sense for the Germans. The key to winning the war for any of the involved parties is in Russia. If the Germans move their best troops from the east to the west, they will still have a chance to avoid the defeat; if they keep the soldiers in Russia, Germany will collapse in a few months. It will collapse under the influence of the propaganda of Bolsheviks and the Entente.

The German authorities prepare the offensive at the Western Front in spring. To do so, they need to dislocate their troops, to conclude peace with Russia and to move their soldiers to France, Belgium, and Turkey. The goal of the intelligence services of the "allies" is polar opposite. The Germans should not dislocate their troops from the east to the west. This should be prevented at any cost. They should make Germany stay in Russia. The most important point is not to let the real peace come by any means…

Let's agree upon the fact that the demands made by the "German agent" Lenin are odd, to put it mildly. Neither do they make sense if Lenin acts as a "protector" of the interests of the emerging revolution. Why would Bolsheviks artificially hold back the German troops at the borders of the revolutionary Russia? Indeed, being so close, the monarchic German Army is a permanent threat to Red Petrograd and Moscow. And vice-versa, the more German soldiers move to France and Belgium, the quicker Lenin and Trotsky will be able to disseminate the Bolshevism in the global environment. If Ilyich had had the interests of the revolution at his heart, he would have asked the German diplomats and military men not to keep their military units but to move them away as soon as possible. And generally speaking, why should the government of Russia bother about the unengaged German divisions? Don't they have anything else to care about?

Indeed, the Communist power has a lot of other concerns. The representatives of the "allies" Jacques Sadoul and Bruce Lockhart have a common big headache, too: under no circumstances the German troops should be dislocated to the Western Front. And an "odd" demand of Bolsheviks wouldn't look that odd if we knew the following:

• right after the October, the Germans started to dislocate their troops to the west;

• 30% of the German troops were concentrated in the Eastern Front (there were about 80 divisions);

• the dislocation of the troops was still going on in November.[46]

How can the dislocation be stopped? You've guessed right – by announcing "peace initiatives" and by totally confusing the Germans! The calculation of the allied curators turned out to be correct. The Germans took the bait and agreed to stop the dislocation of their troops from the east to the west!

Reflecting upon the conditions of Bolsheviks, we can figure up to what extent the Leninist government was under the influence of the British intelligence.

You be the judge. The German troops are at one snap the distance from Red Petrograd. It was not without a reason that Ilyich himself wrote in September about the threat of abandoning Petrograd to the Germans by Kerensky. The Germans are really close by, and they can really strangle the new revolutionary power. There are practically no British, French, or American troops on the territory of Russia, and they are neither able to stop the Germans from strangling Bolsheviks, nor to help them do this.

What is danger № 1 for the revolution? It's Germany.

Who should Bolsheviks negotiate first and foremost with? With Germany.

And Lenin's terms are admittedly unacceptable for the Germans, but very much needed by the "allies." It may seem illogical and foolish – if we consider that Bolsheviks had no relations with the British and French intelligence services. And vice-versa, if we are aware that Lenin "was making" his revolution in a close contact with them, while Germany was only playing a role of the paymaster, everything gets clear and fair enough.

The "allied" emissaries urged Bolsheviks to start the negotiations and demand the Germans to stop the dislocation of their troops to other fronts.

So, then why does Lenin agree to set forth these admittedly unacceptable requirements, while he should be interested in the success of the negotiations more than anyone else? This is exactly the difference between a good tactician and a bad one. A good tactician has a good grasp of the situation. The plan is as follows: firstly one has to set forth such a condition for Germany that would satisfy the British, secondly – one can never tell, the Germans might accept it. This is next to impossible, but there still is a chance. The possibility that the Germans may reject the negotiations suits Lenin, too. He is clear in front of the British (we have tried!) and has a perfect explanation of the internal problems and the failure of his own experimental steps – the external threat. Rally around the government to repel the external aggression! Revolution is in danger!

Yet, this situation is very dangerous. Bravado is permissible only until the Germans start fighting their cunning "spy" for real. Lenin is aware that Bolsheviks lack the military power at the moment. He perfectly understands that in case Bolsheviks continue to irritate the Germans with their foolish demands, the Germans would swat the young Soviet Republic like a hornet. It is not possible to totally obey the "allies," because they are constantly trying to provoke a conflict between Russia and Germany, and what is more, by leading the Soviet delegation from behind.

Might Lenin have had no commitments to Germany? I don't have an answer to this question. There are no records of secret negotiations, all the agreements made were never put in writing. The evidence of Lenin's cooperation with the Germans is ludicrous. From the period before the February Revolution there is only one (!) receipt signed by A. Parvus (not even by Lenin!) regarding a million rubles received for staging the strike. And several bank statements from the later period regarding the payments to the accounts of legal and private persons, though, other than Lenin. In other words, there is no direct evidence of Lenin's cooperation with Germany.

The grave accusation of betraying his motherland is imputed to Lenin due to the logic of his behaviour and his travel to Russia in the "sealed railway car." That's what the heart of the matter is. Germany's cooperation with Vladimir Ulyanov resulted in its defeat in World War 1, not in the victory. This is a fact. It lost the war not in the battlefield. Having repeated the scenario of the Russian Empire's collapse, Germany lost the war, because it was totally demoralized by the revolution in the rear.

The Entente, on the contrary, has won the war. It has smashed its main opponent – Germany, as well as Russia, which was its permanent geopolitical rival in the 19 century. If we sequentially analyze Lenin's actions, we shall come to the point that the Bolshevik leaders worked closely with the intelligence services of the "allies," not the Germans. This cooperation was much more serious than "espionage in favour of Germany" otherwise, the history of the revolution would again turn into a blend of surprising coincidences, inexplicable stupidity, and odd conducts. Vladimir Ilyich is walking on a very thin ice. As long as the revolution is really weak, he has to be friends with both the "allies" and the Germans. His guiding idea for the future is to bury both under the debris of capitalism destroyed on a worldwide scale. The world revolution isn't here yet, Ilyich has to manoeuvre.