Читать книгу The British Battleship - Norman Friedman - Страница 11

CHAPTER 2

THE APPROACH TO THE DREADNOUGHT REVOLUTION

HMS Dreadnought combined a new kind of main battery – all big guns – with a new standard of strategic mobility achieved using steam turbines. The change in battleship armament was already in the air when Dreadnought was built; she merely accelerated it. Steam turbine mobility may have been the more shocking achievement.

Between about 1890 and 1900, a standard type of battleship emerged, armed with four heavy guns in twin mounts, a battery of ten to fourteen quick-firing guns of roughly 6in calibre, lighter anti-torpedo (boat) guns and torpedo tubes, plus machine guns which could be used against exposed enemy personnel at short battle ranges. Initially the logic of such a design was connected with the nature of battleship armour. It took very thick, hence very heavy, armour to resist the most powerful shells. A ship of affordable size (12,000–14,000 tons) could not carry much side armour beyond a waterline belt, which was associated with a protective deck. In battle, the slow-firing heavy guns (firing a shell every few minutes) would attack the belt and thus the ship’s vitals. The quick-firing guns, of roughly 6in calibre, would attack the unarmoured side of the ship.

At the battle of the Yalu in 1894, Japanese cruisers armed with quick-firing guns overwhelmed Chinese battleships protected only against heavy but very slow-firing guns. Many naval officers now argued that medium-calibre quick-firing guns could overwhelm battleships, particularly those whose armour was limited to a heavy waterline belt. As C-in-C Mediterranean from 1899 to 1901, Admiral Fisher added another argument. He considered it suicidal to close to within enemy torpedo range, which he thought would soon reach 3000 yds (it would already reach that in a stern chase). On this basis he argued that ‘the armament we require is the greatest number of the largest quick-firing guns in protected positions. They call it the secondary armament; it really is the primary armament’.¹ Fisher argued that slow-firing heavy guns were useless against fast-moving ships; they were ‘as obsolete as the foot soldier in the Boer War’. In his view, the decisive phase of battle would be the destruction of the entire unarmoured part of an enemy ship by 6in quick-firers hitting from outside enemy torpedo range, at ranges perhaps as great as 5000 or 6000 yds. At this time the standard range for prize firings was 1400 to 1600 yds and Fisher wrote elsewhere that he wanted to fight at 3000 to 4000 yds. Any approach inside 2000 yds would invite torpedo attack (or within 3000 yds in a stern chase). At this point guns were still individually aimed, although Fisher had initiated fire-control experiments leading to salvo fire and to concerted fire control. Thus his Mediterranean Fleet papers included a table of hitting probabilities at various ranges. The table showed that a numerous fast-firing 6in battery had an excellent chance of hitting at the extended ranges he had in mind. It is no surprise that initial British attempts to improve battle range (about 1901) focussed not on the heavy guns (in theory the main battery) but on the quick-firing ones.

HMS Hibernia is shown in July 1908, with fire-control tops placed on her two masts so that one should be either above or below her funnel smoke in any case (Dreadnought’s after control position was very low for the same reason). The upper pole on her mainmast was a wireless gaff to support a high antenna, a common fitting at the time, but soon eliminated. Other ships of the class had semaphores at the maintop; a semaphore is visible abaft Hibernia’s bridge, near what appears to be a 24in signal light (the two searchlights on the bridge wings are the new 36in type then being introduced; this type would be superseded by twin 24in projectors). Hibernia could be distinguished from most of her sisters by her square control tops (only Britannia also had such tops). In this photo she did not yet have the range repeaters later added to her tops.

This argument for greater battle ranges was coupled with Fisher’s demand for higher tactical speed. An enemy would not submit to being torn apart by a shower of 6in shells. He would try to close the range. Only higher speed would enable a British fleet to choose its battle range so as to force an enemy to submit to a pounding he could not effectively return. Higher speed would also enable a British fleet to catch a fleeing enemy fleet. If the whole British fleet did not enjoy superior speed, it needed a fast wing capable of catching and slowing the enemy fleet. These two considerations explain Fisher’s fascination with high speed and his desire to merge the battleship and armoured cruiser categories of warships. They also make it obvious that Fisher would not and could not divorce fast armoured cruisers (battlecruisers) from a battle fleet tactical (as well as scouting) role.

At the same time armour was improving, offering the same protection in much smaller thicknesses – hence in much less weight per square foot. To remain competitive, the quick-firing battery had to gain punch. The Royal Navy and others adopted ‘semi-quick-firing’ guns of greater power (in the British case, 7.5in and then 9.2in guns). At the same time, the firing rate of the heaviest guns improved, as did their ability to hit accurately at greater ranges. The initial boost in gunnery had come from ‘continuous aim’, which could be applied to a 6in QF gun but not to a heavier slower-firing weapon. However, Fisher’s effort to improve battle range resulted in a new method of firing. Guns fired in salvos and their aim was corrected by a spotter aloft working with calculators in a transmitting station under armour. Heavy guns fired on the roll, a technique substantially inferior to continuous aim, but errors in a salvo averaged out enough to improve hitting at ranges formerly available only to medium-calibre guns. Moreover, the higher rate of fire achieved by newer heavy guns made salvo firing effective. In 1901 Fisher wrote that officers preferred the 10in to the 12in gun because of its higher rate of fire, though clearly he preferred 6in guns. By 1904, Fisher was advocating a battleship armed with sixteen 10in guns. Later in the year his associate and friend Captain Bacon convinced him that 12in guns now fired so rapidly that they could be substituted.²

The King Edward VII class were the first British semi-dreadnoughts, the first step on the path to the all-big-gun ship. Replacing some 6in quick-firing guns with 9.2in guns could be considered either a simple change in battery or the beginning of a momentous shift towards uniform calibre main armament. This is HMS Hindustan. The small turret abeam the bridge holds a 9.2in gun; the other secondary guns are all 6in and were intended to engage the same ships as the heavier weapons. The ship had smaller guns (12pdrs) to fight off attacking torpedo boats. They are just visible on the shelter deck under the starboard bridge wing. Torpedo craft were expected to attack mainly at night, so searchlights were an important element of torpedo defence. Those on board this ship were 24in in diameter. Two can be seen at the ends of the bridge wings, with another on the small platform under the foretop and another on a platform aft. Note the wireless gaff rigged on the mainmast and the identification bands on her funnels.

HMS Hibernia was another of the King Edward VII class. Three of her 12pdrs are clearly visible just above the rear end of her after 12in turret. These ships had a total of fourteen 12pdrs and fourteen 3pdrs, the latter conceived as anti-personnel complements to the 12pdrs (early destroyers also had a mix of 12pdrs and 3pdrs). She had four 12pdrs forward under her bridge wings and two more aft, plus two in an upper-deck battery on each side and two more on each side of the deck above. Two of her 3pdrs were mounted atop each turret, but they are not very visible here. This photograph was taken in July 1908.

Faster-firing heavy guns were not a peculiarly British development; they were appearing at the same time in most of the major navies. However, the argument for longer battle ranges and for sufficient speed to impose them seems to have been unique. Thus for many navies, once guns of near-full calibre were accepted as part of the normal secondary battery, the leap to uniform main armament was not too difficult. It can be found in US sketch designs as early as 1903 and it may have been proposed before that. Several navies built ships with mixed batteries including 9.2in or 10in secondaries. They were later called ‘semi-dreadnoughts’. From the point of view of the jump in size and cost associated with entirely new kinds of battleships, semi-dreadnoughts offered nearly the same shock effect as the full dreadnoughts which closely followed them. The British got to an all-big-gun armament first, but the most unique feature of HMS Dreadnought was probably the turbine powerplant which gave her unparalleled strategic and tactical mobility.

Hibernia shows 3pdrs atop her forward turret and her forward starboard 9.2in turret.

The key development pushing the Royal Navy to adopt heavy secondary guns seems to have been the US decision to provide its new battleships with an 8in battery in addition to the usual 6in rapid-fire guns. Ironically, this decision had nothing to do with changes in battleship protection. In the past, the US Navy had provided its battleships with an intermediate battery of 8in guns, probably mainly because it could not manufacture rapid-fire 6in weapons. These guns performed relatively well during the Spanish-American War in 1898, meaning that they did better than the extremely mediocre heavy guns. A modern 8in gun was therefore included in the battery of the post-war US battleship, which in 1899 was provisionally named Pennsylvania (in fact this name was applied to a large armoured cruiser; the design was the Virginia class).³ To British observers, Pennsylvania was the most powerfully-armed battleship in the world, with eight 8in and the usual 6in battery (twelve guns). Other foreign navies seemed poised to adopt intermediate batteries.⁴ They also seemed to be adopting higher speeds than the 18 knots (on eight-hour trials) standard in the Royal Navy.

DNC Sir William White proposed eight 7.5in guns and twelve 6in as a reasonable equivalent to the Pennsylvania secondary battery. Captain William H May, CO of the gunnery school HMS Excellent, considered it pointless to retain 6in guns, which could not penetrate their main objectives, the casemates protecting foreign secondary batteries. Better to make the jump to an all-7.5in secondary battery of fourteen guns. A 7.5in AP shell could penetrate 6in KNC armour at 2000 yds, compared to 5in for a 6in shell. If the 7.5in could fire at least two rounds per minute and roughly double the number of 6in could be carried, the rate of hitting would be as 1 to 6, but a proportion of the 6in would explode outside the enemy’s casemate armour (all the 7.5in would penetrate it). The 7.5in shell had twice the burster weight, hence would be far more effective against unarmoured parts of an enemy ship. DNO considered the 7.5in gun under-rated; it was credited with 1½ rounds per minute (like an 8in gun), but as of August 1900, it had been loaded and fired six times in one minute. This improvement much affected any comparison with foreign ships. Controller (A K Wilson) rejected the DNO proposal on the grounds that 7.5in guns could not be mounted in main deck casemates because of their great length. He therefore preferred eight 7.5in in twin hydraulic turrets plus twelve 6in in main deck casemates.

White saw the new single 9.2in/46.7 cal gun being mounted in armoured cruisers (Cressy and Drake classes) might be an alternative to the twin 7.5in. With its greater energy and larger-capacity shell, it would be more effective against armour of moderate thickness. With equal protection, a single 9.2in turret would weigh about as much as a twin 7.5in, and ammunition for the larger gun would be more difficult to transport and it would make a considerably larger demand on deck space. Controller stayed with 7.5in guns. Meanwhile, DNO was pressing for 9.2in guns (at least in cruisers) as the only effective means of penetrating the usual 6in protection of foreign secondary batteries (and cruisers). He argued as early as 1897 that even 6in AP shell would fail to penetrate standard casemates. On that basis Controller (Captain ‘Jacky’ Fisher) asked Elswick for a design (Vickers had proposed one in January 1897). It seems likely that this experience demonstrated to Fisher that there was a definite trend towards heavier guns to deal with the extensive lightweight armour now appearing on board battleships and cruisers.

White also argued for greater speed: ‘the great increase being made in the numbers of Armoured Cruisers which may take part in an action with Battleships and the tendency to increase Battleship speeds abroad make it appear desirable to aim at a greater speed than the 18 knots approved for Formidable class’. The Italians had adopted 20 knots for their new ships, but they were expected to sacrifice protection. DNC proposed an increase to 19 knots. Estimated displacement was initially 15,300 tons, but that soon grew to 17,000 tons. This was a massive jump over the 15,000 tons of the previous standard class (Londons) then being built. Although the Admiralty Board initially endorsed the increase in displacement, the Cover for the next (King Edward VII) class shows that it sought reductions to contain ship size, hence cost. The design process was further complicated because it coincided with a decision to change gun propellant (to cordite MD) to reduce bore erosion. Cordite MD was less energetic, so a larger charge was required.⁵ The shift thus demanded larger magazines and that in turn made for a larger ship.

Another step towards uniform calibre was the adoption of faster-firing main battery guns. HMS Swiftsure, shown, was armed with 10in guns which could fire much faster than contemporary 12in guns, plus a secondary battery (7.5in guns) more powerful than the usual 6in quick-firing weapons. She was conceived not for the Royal Navy but for the Chilean navy, which needed a counter to the large armoured cruisers Argentina was buying in Italy. In this sense Swiftsure and her sister HMS Triumph were conceived as semi-capital ship cruiser-killers, not too different from the first battlecruisers. The ships went on the market after Chile and Argentina agreed to stop their naval building race (there is some suggestion that the Royal Navy was rescuing the builders from severe financial embarrassment). The cylinder on the fore side of the ship’s foretop displayed the range at which she was firing; a similar cylinder appears to have been mounted on the after side. Note the rangefinder atop her compass platform, just forward of the chart table, with the ship’s compass (note the balls to compensate for nearby magnetic masses) forward of it. The ship’s goose-neck cranes proclaim her non-Royal Navy origin. Swiftsure and her near-sister Triumph had 30in searchlights, whereas the 24in type was standard in the Royal Navy. In January 1907 Swiftsure and the battleship Jupiter were used for comparative trials. Various trials, including some with other ships, showed that the 24in searchlight was generally superior. This photograph was taken by Abrahams of Devonport. (Dr David Stevens, RAN Seapower Centre).

HMS Agamemnon (shown in July 1908) and Lord Nelson were radical departures from the long line of battleships designed by Sir William White, which had culminated in the King Edward VIIs. The incoming DNC Philip Watts told the Board of Admiralty that he could provide considerably more firepower on the same tonnage and this was his first opportunity to show what he could do. The ships’ hulls were unpierced by 6in gun ports. The bridges of past designs were eliminated altogether to provide those in the conning tower (behind the light canvas-covered structure visible at the fore end) with a clear view. As officers complained that they could not con a ship in formation from the conning tower, an additional light flying bridge was added. Lord Nelson had a charthouse.

By late 1900, the design had apparently stabilised. In December DNC was asked to produce a sketch design showing eight 7.5in in four turrets plus ten (rather than twelve) 6in, with a trial speed of 18 knots. This was not the end of the story. When he reviewed the sketch design in April 1901, Controller (Wilson) argued that the ships had to be faster ‘in view of the fact that nearly all the recent battleships building or projected by Foreign nations will have higher speeds. We cannot hope to maintain the command of the sea unless our battleships and armoured cruisers are fast enough to bring the corresponding vessels of the enemy to action if they are sighted. The slight inconvenience entailed by the extra length required to give 21,000 IHP and 19 knots speed is not worth consideration in comparison with the advantage of being able to insure bringing the enemy to action.’ The Naval Lords now reviewed the design. On 3 April they decided on a speed of 18.5 knots.

The new King Edward VII design was the first British battleship to be armoured above the main deck, presumably in response to the threat of intermediate-calibre guns. The design initially showed the 9in belt of the previous Formidable class, extending from the bottom of the slope of the armour deck (well below the waterline) up to the flat main deck, which in the previous class was 1in thick. Initially the new design showed 6in armour above the main deck, the flat deck armour being moved up to the upper deck, the top of the enlarged armoured box. When the design was approved, the side armour extending from below the waterline was split into a 9in waterline belt and an 8in upper strake, the weight saved on the upper strake going into a thicker upper belt (7in between main and upper decks). Weight was also saved by reducing the thickness of the middle (protective deck) from 3in (slope)/2in (flat) in the Formidable to 2in slope and 1in flat in the new ships.

The Naval Lords also chose to substitute single 9.2in guns for the twin 7.5in. The 9.2in mounting would be the same as in Cressy class cruisers. The Cover provides no explanation for the change in armament. For the Royal Navy, it was the step to what was later called a semi-dreadnought, a ship with near-battleship intermediate guns in place of all or part of the earlier quick-firing secondary battery. The first ships of this King Edward VII class were built under the 1902–3 programme; repeat ships were ordered under the 1903–4 programme.

The Royal Navy could have gone further, to a 10in gun, which many considered the largest which could fire rapidly. Although that might not seem much more powerful than the 9.2in, it fired a shell about twice as heavy (because shell weight is proportional to the cube of the calibre). Roughly contemporary with King Edward VII was the new Japanese battleship Kashima, laid down at Elswick in February 1904 with four 10in guns and twelve rather than ten 6in.⁶

The Board was apparently particularly affected by new US designs. In the winter of 1901 it ordered a War College comparison of the tactical value of speed vs guns and armour, inspired by the example of the new US battleship-sized armoured cruisers of the Tennessee class (four 10in guns, 22 knots).⁷ In presenting this study DNI (in effect the chief of naval staff) suggested that the strategic aspect (sustained speed) be taken into consideration. Later he argued that although speed was probably not very important tactically (Senior Naval Lord agreed) it might be of the greatest moment strategically. This time First Lord called for comments by Controller, Junior and Second Sea Lords and principal flag officers afloat.⁸

The basis for the War College conclusion that speed had limited tactical value was two assumptions: that both sides were determined to fight and that the commander of the slower ships always carried out the right movements. In that case faster ships could choose their own range and keep their broadside (mainly secondary battery) guns bearing longer. Vice Admiral A K Wilson (Channel Squadron) pointed to ‘a further advantage which cannot be accurately assessed in the rapidity with which mistakes, which are constantly being made on both sides, can be rectified’. A slow fleet could never bring a faster fleet to action, nor could it prevent it from going wherever it wanted. Wilson’s Rear Admiral (A G Curzon-Howe) added that ‘the condition of the men and ship, after being mauled by faster antagonists choosing their own distance and attack, must be reckoned with . . . before expressing an opinion’.

Fisher’s successor in the Mediterranean Fleet (Admiral Compton Domvile) noted that recent manoeuvres showed that a fast division of battleships could bring an enemy to action, delaying him long enough for the rest of the fleet to catch up. Part of the fleet should be fast and homogeneous, the rest being perhaps slower but with greater gun power. Like Wilson, his rear admiral (Watson) considered May’s assumption that both sides wanted to fight there and then was unrealistic. Historically the problem had been to bring a reluctant enemy to action. Fast battleships would bring the enemy to action; slower but more powerful ones would destroy him. During an action, fast ships at either end of the battle line would head the enemy off or attack his rear.

Mediterranean Fleet cruiser commander Rear Admiral B Wake-Walker (who would later write the Royal Navy’s cruiser handbook) pointed to the great strategic value of speed demonstrated by recent manoeuvres. ‘It is not sufficiently realised that at sea as on land, to have the advantage of speed is to strategically double one’s value.’ A speed advantage was like the weather gauge sought by seamen under sail: the fleet possessing it could bring the enemy to action and prevent him from getting away. Only when fleets were in contact and both anxious to fight was speed less important. ‘But what is the good of a perfect battle fleet that can never hope to overtake the enemy and unless it is able to drive them into a corner, cannot force an action?’ He was well aware of the argument that if the Royal Navy built for 18 knots, some other country would build for 18.5 knots and so on. Wake-Walker’s solution was to build a special class of ships specifically to ‘hang onto the rear of the enemy’s fleet’. He imagined 14,000-ton ships with 2500 tons of coal and a speed of 22 or 23 knots, a complete armoured belt (specially designed so they would not lose speed to bow hits) and bow and stern fire of three or four 9.2in guns, plus a battery of ten or twelve 7.5in guns. Three such ships, ‘judiciously handled’, would be a match for two battleships. Their attacks on the rear of the enemy line would slow enough ships to slow down the entire enemy fleet. These ships might be called second class battleships or fleet armoured cruisers. In the recent manoeuvres a Duncan class battleship was assigned to stiffen the cruisers. This policy proved successful, so Wake-Walker advocated a unit consisting of a Duncan and two Cressy class armoured cruisers. Moreover, if an enemy attached armoured cruisers to its fleet to deal with British armoured cruisers, they would not be available to raid British commerce. ‘We thus force them into a policy, in spite of themselves, in other words we start the war holding most of the trumps in our hands.’

The conning tower is clearly visible at the fore end of Agamemnon’s superstructure.

The three 1903–4 ships were not originally to have been repeat King Edward VIIs.⁹ Philip Watts was now DNC: the previous year he had replaced Sir William White. Much as White had replaced Barnaby as a more forward-thinking cruiser designer from private industry (Elswick), it seems that Watts was considered a more forward-thinking battleship designer from the same company. He was well acquainted with Admiral Fisher, who when Controller had assured him that he would become DNC. Watts began by claiming that he could have provided the characteristics of the King Edward VII class on 14,000 tons rather than 16,350 tons. The difference could go into heavier protection or more weapons or both. Watts offered six outline designs for 14,000-ton battleships. The repeat King Edward VIIs were built because in August 1903 the Board cancelled Watts’ new design.¹⁰

Watts began work on the next battleship in February 1902. He produced an outline of a 14,000-ton ship with the same armament and protection as the King Edward VII class. In April he was asked to enlarge the ship to carry four more 9.2in guns (total of eight). In May he reported the size and cost of an enlarged ship carrying four 12in, twelve 9.2in and twelve 6in guns, with a speed of 18.5 knots: 19,000 tons, £1,700,000. This was far too large for the Board. The alternative was an enlarged version of the last pre-King Edward VII design, the Duncan class: it would retain a speed of 19 knots and the same protection (considerably thinner than a King Edward VII), but would have reduced stores. Armament would be four 12in, eight 9.2in and ten 6in. That would require a ship of 15,265 tons or 15,880 tons with full stores (5 July 1902).

Watts began work on a new design incorporating his ideas of greater efficiency. On 8 July 1902 he reported four designs (A to D) of a 14,000-ton ship with ‘special arrangement of armour’ and various speeds and gun arrangements, with armour fixed by what was left over within the 14,000-ton limit.¹¹ In effect he was paring his ship back to the displacement of the earlier Duncan, which had a conventional battery (four 12in, twelve 6in) and considerably less protection than a King Edward VII (7in side and no upper belt), but did offer higher speed (19 knots vs 18.5 knots). Watts’ new approach made it possible to build much more heavily-armed ships within the limits the Royal Navy had to accept. The May report showed, in effect, that what became the Lord Nelson class, the bridge to the Dreadnought, could not be built using White’s design practices.

Watts’ Legend for the initial series gives some idea of how he hoped to save weight. Design A offered the same armament as a King Edward VII and the increased speed (19 knots rather than 18.5 knots) of a Duncan. Compared to King Edward VII, Design A required 190 tons less general equipment, the greatest saving being in anchors and cables. Armament weight was somewhat reduced (2200 tons rather than 2575 tons), presumably by rearrangement. Machinery was cut from 1800 tons to 1430 tons, probably mainly by adopting lighter-weight boilers. Coal was cut from 950 tons to 880 tons. Armour and its backing were cut from 4175 tons to 3780 tons. Hull structural weight was cut from 5900 tons to 5170 tons, partly because A was a shorter ship (410ft rather than 425ft between perpendiculars). It offered about the same beam, but slightly less draught. A smaller ship required less power for the same speed: 15,000 IHP rather than 18,000 IHP with natural draught. The 14,000 tons included no Board Margin (in King Edward VII it was 200 tons).

Lord Nelson shows her charthouse, with a compass platform above and a flying bridge well above that. Later ships eliminated the flying bridge and were conned from the compass platform above the charthouse (which contained the helm, with another helm in the conning tower). The 12pdr battery was mainly on the flying deck above the 9.2in turrets, with 3pdrs atop the turrets, as in the King Edward VII class.

In the summer of 1902 the Board accepted Watts’ Design A as the basis of the 1903–4 programme. He was asked to try a variety of alternatives. Giving up the 6in battery altogether would save 290 tons, which could be invested in armour, for example in increasing citadel armour from 4in to 7in (A1); alternatively, some of it could be added to the bow (A2). The main deck amidships over the machinery could be thickened from 1½in and 2½in (flat/slope) to 2in and 3in (150 tons, version A3). Alternatively, giving up half a knot (reduction to 13,500 IHP) would save 140 tons, which might equate to a 5½in citadel (A4) or increased bow armour (A5) or a thicker deck amidships (A6).

Watts’ Design B offered eight 9.2in guns and twelve rather than ten (as on King Edward VII) 6in. Watts said it had the armament of the American battleship which had inspired the King Edward VII in the first place and the speed of a King Edward VII. To provide them within a fixed displacement, he drastically cut ammunition per gun: fifty-four rather than the usual eighty rounds per 12in gun, 100 rather than 150 per 9.2in, 166 rather than 200 per 6in, 200 rather than 300 per 12pdr and 333 rather than 500 per 3pdr.¹² Watts retained the 9in waterline belt, backing it with a thicker armoured deck (2½in slope, 1½in flat) – but eliminating the upper armoured deck of the earlier ship. He narrowed the upper part of the belt and cut it to 7in. The upper belt, which now extended below the main deck, was cut to 4in (but with 7in over the batteries). Watts estimated that the resulting ship would cost £1,150,000 compared to £1,300,000 for a King Edward VII with a less powerful armament (however, Watts’ ship was much more expensive than a Duncan because of its more powerful armament; the earlier ship cost £980,000).

White had often argued that commercial builders sold warships to foreign navies on much the same basis Watt had designed his ship: more guns, fewer rounds of ammunition and less fuel for shorter legs. Watt pointed to the reductions he had accepted: complement held to 750 and reductions to half water and two-thirds of normal stores and ammunition at load draught, the displacement for which speed was calculated. Coal was cut from 900 tons to 800 tons. A subtler reduction was in arcs of fire: Watts’ 12in guns could train only to 30° beyond the beam rather than the 45° of the King Edward VII class. That made it possible to push the 12in turrets closer together, reducing the length and weight of the citadel. Hull structure was drastically cut back and weights of 12in and 9.2in guns were taken from tenders for those in the King Edward VII class rather than from the weights assumed in that design (saving 200 tons). Savings were even made in the boats, 40ft boats replacing the earlier 56-footers.

Watts pointed out that the weight he had invested in guns could be used differently. Putting the weight added for four 9.2in into armour would buy thicker main side armour – 10in and 8in and a 7in battery instead of 9in and 7in and 4in. Alternatively, it could provide more power (19,000 IHP) and higher speed (19 knots).

Lord Nelson shows the 3pdrs atop her after 12in and 9.2in turrets, with 12pdrs in her superstructure.

In Design C the heavy armament (four 12in, eight 9.2in) was concentrated in triangular ‘bunches’ fore and aft, maximising end-on fire. Concentration also made it possible to reduce armour weight by enclosing the bases of three turrets in a single armoured redoubt. The usual 6in battery was eliminated. Watts estimated that a Design C ship would cost £1,190,000. Design D was C with an additional 9.2in turret on each broadside, for a total of twelve such guns (he claimed that six of them could fire end-on). An additional novel feature of Designs C and D was that the 12in guns fired over the 9.2in gunhouses. All of these ships had the same anti-torpedo (boat) battery as King Edward VII: fourteen 12pdrs backed by ten 3pdrs.

In October and November Watts offered enlarged versions of B with more armour and thicker shields, with greater freeboard etc. B1 was a dramatic step towards an all-big-gun ship, the 6in battery being abolished (B2, however, had four 7.5in guns in addition to the 9.2in, in gunhouses).¹³ A Legend dated October 1902 offered alternatives B3 and B4 with, respectively, eight and ten 9.2in guns. It seems likely that the 6in battery was eliminated to bring the ship’s size down to something considered affordable. Trial speed was set at 18 knots. Displacement was 16,000 and 16,100 tons. Maximum belt thickness was 12in.

The 19 November offering (Design E) was an all-big-gun ship, perhaps the first the Royal Navy ever considered: twelve 10in guns, with nothing else but anti-torpedo weapons (fourteen 12pdrs and ten 3pdrs), plus the usual torpedo tubes (four on the broadside, one at the stern).¹⁴ Armament arrangement was fixed by the ship’s reciprocating powerplant: one turret at each end, two on each side, for an eight-gun broadside. Probably not coincidentally, E was roughly what Admiral Fisher was soon proposing. The 10in gun was specified because it seemed to be the largest which could be fired rapidly. Compared to the October designs, this one would have displaced somewhat less (15,800 tons). Speed would have been the same (18 knots on trial, 16.5 knots continuously, on 15,500 IHP). The origin of this all-big-gun design is not evident from the Cover.

Watts offered modified versions of the B designs, with eight, ten or twelve 9.2in guns – and no 6in battery – in December 1902. He submitted a Legend for a ‘New Design’ (16,000 tons, 18 knots) armed with four 12in and ten 9.2in on 11 February 1903. It would have had two twin and one single 9.2in mountings on each broadside and designs for both twin and single mounts were requested from Vickers and Elswick. According to a note in the Cover (24 February 1903, by DNC’s deputy Mr Narbeth), the 16,000 ton B3d design (ten 9.2in) was approved with changes: (i) an 8in citadel with 2in splinter protection, as on the main deck; (ii) twelve rather than ten 9.2in guns, the extra weight to come out of the margin and total ammunition supply not being increased (it would be 1000 rounds of 9.2in, 100 each for ten guns); (iii) machinery spaces would be unchanged; (iv) the 9.2in guns would be arranged to fire further across the beam (by raising them); (v) the ship might be lengthened to bear the extra weight due to lifting the forward 9.2in guns and to maintain the ship’s speed without extra power.¹⁵ By June, detail design was proceeding. For example, pending the report of the Boiler Committee, it was decided to give the ship one-fifth cylindrical boilers and four-fifths small-tube (Babcock & Wilcox) boilers. Consideration was given to using new 12in/45s in place of the existing 12in/40s (adding about 100 tons). The ships were also given the new 9.2in/50s, which were heavier than the earlier type. There was also interest in providing them with full ammunition. Watts’ suggestion that weight be saved by adopting fast-running engines was rejected.

In May, Controller ordered that the design be completed in time for contracts to be placed in October 1903 under the 1903–4 programme.¹⁶ The Cover includes an approved Legend dated 4 August 1903 (originally dated 30 July). The design received the Board Stamp on 6 August. DNC must have been shocked when the Board suddenly withdrew approval of the design a few days later.¹⁷ Without any approved new design, three repeat King Edward VIIs had to be built under the 1903–4 programme.

Controller offered Watts several reasons for the rejection. It was too large (150 tons larger than the King Edward VII class). DNC pointed out that in each case the object had been to carry the most powerful armament possible into action with suitable protection and manoeuvring power on about the same dimensions. Not counting armament, the 1903 battleship would weigh 13,135 tons, compared to 13,775 tons for King Edward VII without its armament. On 640 tons less (without armament), Watts had managed to carry 790 tons more armament as well as far better protection. He argued that his August 1903 design was at least 50 per cent cheaper than a King Edward VII, counting the total of armament and protection, as the latter might be traded for even more armament. First Sea Lord also told DNC’s assistant, Mr Deadman, that approval for the August 1903 design had been cancelled because of limited docking facilities (this was later retracted). Watts argued that the new design had the same clearances of basins and channels as that which had been accepted for the King Edward VII class.

Agamemnon in 1918, little changed except for having had her funnels raised. She was converted after the war into a radio-controlled target; after being discarded in 1926 she was replaced by HMS Centurion.

Watts cited ‘a rumour in the Office’ that the design had been cancelled because the advance in firepower was too great: ‘it is said that it is not considered politic to make so large an advance on what other Powers are doing. I do not believe . . . this.’ Controller had mentioned a further consideration which he was not at liberty to disclose without the Board’s permission; but without any explanation, Watts could not hope to develop acceptable designs. Word that the design had been abandoned leaked outside the Admiralty.¹⁸

The solution was apparently to retreat to ten 9.2in guns, the middle mountings on each side being single. A new Legend was dated 19 October 1903. The Cover includes a developed version designated G5, whose Legend is dated 13 November 1903. The design was still in flux. In December 1903 Controller assembled a précis of what had been done in the design of the 1904–5 ships for First Lord Selborne. Meanwhile he asked DNC to look into the possibility of thickening the armour deck at the expense of the upper deck; he also wanted to know how much weight would be saved by going to all water-tube boilers. DNC offered to thicken the flat part of the armour deck to 1¾in by omitting armour gratings and limiting the upper deck between the machinery casings to ½in (and elsewhere to ¾in instead of 1in). He might also be able to gain weight by reducing turret roof thicknesses to those in the King Edward VII class. The Naval Lords decided to adopt all water-tube boilers and also to reduce some armour thickness so as to extend side armour over the armoured deck fore and aft.

The abortive design armed with twelve 9.2in guns showed that there was sufficient space for sixteen heavy guns. The alternatives of sixteen 10in or twelve 12in appear as early as 6 August 1903 in a Legend titled ‘New Battleship Designs: Alternative Armament’. A ship mounting the 12in guns would be perhaps a little longer than one armed with sixteen 10in, but not much. DNC produced a Legend for a ship armed with sixteen 10in guns, dated 25 September 1903.¹⁹ DNC’s deputy J H Narbeth thought DNC might want to offer the 12in ship and he prepared slips of paper to be stuck into the Legend indicating the 12in gun alternative. Narbeth’s sketch shows engines aft, magazines between the waist turrets and boilers forward of them, abaft the bow turret. A sketch of the deck arrangement of this ship was included in the Cover for HMS Dreadnought. The 12in ship offered a 6800lb broadside and 5100lbs end-on. The sixteen 10in ship offered 5000lbs on the broadside or 3000lbs end-on. The existing design with ten 9.2in offered a 5650lb broadside and 3220lbs end-on. All of these alternatives dwarfed a King Edward VII: 4660lbs on the broadside, 2660lbs end-on.

The design was still in flux. A 14 October 1903 Legend, perhaps the first to bear the name Lord Nelson, showed eight 9.2in guns (displacement was 15,600 tons). DNC presented a G series of designs in November 1903: G was the August 1903 design (twelve 9.2in), G1 a modified version (19 October), G2 a somewhat lengthened version, G3 a shorter version. G4 and G5 were cut to ten 9.2in guns. Controller asked for more deck armour. The new rendable projectiles being adopted abroad could carry their bursters through side armour with as much, if not greater, penetration as armour-piercing projectiles (Controller cited a 6in capped shell which penetrated 10in KC armour without being damaged). Thicker deck armour was needed to deal with the splinters such inboard explosions would produce.²⁰ In December 1903 the Naval Lords unanimously supported the G5 design, but they wanted beam limited to not more than 79ft 6in. Based on extensive work by the Boiler Committee, they were prepared to accept a powerplant using only water-tube boilers (Yarrow boilers had already been tested and Babcock & Wilcox was also likely to be satisfactory).

Early in February 1904 DNC offered a further alternative (G6) whose form was improved by lengthening it 20ft, making it certain to attain the desired 18-knot speed without extra power. This ship could conceivably mount two 9.2in in each of the amidships turrets, giving her a total of twelve such guns. DNC still considered the all-10in gun ship worth considering. He offered an updated version called E1. He also offered a further design (H) mounting sixteen 10in guns. There was no mention of the all-12in design.

At a 10 February 1904 meeting the Naval Lords considered three alternative designs: G5, E1 (twelve 10in) and H. They were uninterested in the larger G6. E1 was discussed and investigated at length using fighting diagrams. The 10in gun would not penetrate the belt or turret armour of the latest French battleships at 3000 yds, whereas in theory the 12in had 3in to spare. It was unanimously agreed that the ship should have 12in guns, as noted in a 17 February 1904 Minute. The Naval Lords unanimously chose G-5 (ten 9.2in guns), with speed set at 18 knots and displacement set at 16,500 tons including a 200-ton Board Margin. Two such ships were included in the 1904–5 programme as the Lord Nelson class – the last British pre-dreadnoughts.

It is not clear to what extent, if any, Admiral Fisher was responsible for the uniform-calibre alternatives DNC offered. He was almost certainly aware of what Narberth and Watts were offering in 1902–3 because he was Second Naval Lord between June 1902 and August 1903. However, the Cover, which includes the 10in and 12in uniform-battery ships, the types Fisher later advocated, includes no correspondence with Admiral Fisher or any acolyte. Descriptions of Fisher’s time as Second Naval Lord emphasise his work on personnel issues.²¹

Agamemnon, June 1908. (A D Baker III)