Читать книгу A History of Ireland in International Relations - Owen McGee - Страница 8

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Ireland’s Place in World History:

From the Fianna to the First World War

If ancient Greece and Rome were the cradle of European civilisation, for much of history Ireland existed independently from this idea of civilisation. German scholars of the Celtic west of Europe have suggested that the Irish were ‘the most important and influential of the Celtic peoples’, but Celtic culture was driven forcibly from the European continent by the Roman Empire.1 The Irish produced one of the earliest forms of written language and received Christianity early, but rather than diocesan churches they promoted monastic orders whose illuminated manuscripts were noteworthy for developing a uniquely Celtic artistic imagery. Irish monks also served as missionaries abroad, including in central Europe. Nevertheless, a defining trait of Irish society was its ambivalent attitude to the sea. Although the Irish were self-consciously islanders, they were not a great seafaring people and most always chose to live inland. Irish explorations of the Atlantic and the North Sea were not unknown, but were limited because of the harshness of the climate on the Atlantic coastline. Here circular stone forts had existed since the earliest times, but they were seemingly designed to guard against attacks by land rather than invasions by sea.2

Despite a broadly similar culture across the island, scholars have often considered that a greater degree of political unity existed between Ulster, in the north of Ireland, and Scotland than between various parts of the island of Ireland itself.3 Before and after the arrival of Christianity, northern Irish kings resided near the northeast coast of Ireland, which is only a short distance from the west coast of Scotland.4 Law tracts in the Irish language (Gaeilge) show that their yearly dues, unlike that of all other Irish kingdoms, included ships.5 Both medieval Irish wonder voyage literature and the earliest Irish heroic sagas of the Fianna emanated from this region. Irish voyage literature involved the discovery of fantasy islands with magical qualities. Although similar metaphors existed in ancient Greek literatures, Irish belief systems were noticeably different. Befitting the status of the Irish as northern Europeans, a spiritual notion of otherworldly ghosts rather than a Mediterranean belief in underworld demons was paramount.6 Meanwhile, the geopolitics of this literature was rooted in northern Irish familiarity with the numerous islands off the western coast of Scotland: ‘Dáil Éireann’, the title of the modern Irish parliamentary assembly, is itself a name derived from ancient Irish kingdoms, including Ulster kingdoms that encompassed western Scottish isles.7 From the sixth until the sixteenth century, a northern O’Neill dynasty, with roots in the west of Ireland, frequently claimed to be the legitimate rulers of the whole of Ireland. The fact that the Christian church established its ecclesiastical capital (Armagh) within the O’Neill kingdom probably bolstered their purely secular claim to rule, but it was rarely, if ever, recognised.8

The western Scottish isles were considered to be a homogenous Kingdom of the Isles during the short-lived North Sea Empire of King Cnut, an eleventh-century Danish king who also conquered England and whose daughter married the Holy Roman Emperor. Cnut’s equating secular rulers’ powerlessness before God with their inability to command the seas may have reflected the influence of an Irish Christian culture in which sea voyages were often considered to serve ‘a penitential function’.9 Despite centuries of raids by sea, Scandinavian culture never became a dominant force in Ireland. On the east coast, the future capital of Dublin minted coinage for Cnut and became a trading centre with a focus on Wales and northern England. In the early eleventh century, forces led by Brian Bóruma (Boru), a southern Irish king who hoped to receive recognition as king of all Ireland, defeated Danish-backed forces in this region, but Irish society remained very poorly equipped to deal with invasions by sea.10 As a result, native Irish kings were completely unable to deal with a Norman invasion by sea in the late twelfth century, which also introduced to Ireland the practice of feudalism. This was a Latin legal system under which land was assigned to individuals purely on the basis of royal decrees. For four centuries, this new, centralised legal and political order would coexist alongside a native Irish society characterised by local dynastic kingdoms.

The Normans created new, fortified town walls and castles to subjugate local populations while also encouraging native Irish chieftains to act as mercenaries in Anglo-Scottish wars.11 Through such military expeditions, the Irish learnt new methods of horsemanship, archery and shipbuilding, while fortified stone dwellings, akin to tower homes rather than castles, became more common. Ulster soldiers who fought as part of Edward I’s invasion of western Scotland (1296–1304) were able to re-establish themselves as local Scottish lords, in the process making the west coast of Scotland and the Kingdom of the Isles nominally safe for the Norman kings of England while also being considered an acceptable arrangement by opposing Scottish kings.12 This allowed many Irish chieftains to occupy a secure middle ground in Norman society that seemed to guarantee political stability. As a result, many reacted unfavourably when Donal O’Neill, calling himself ‘King of Ulster and, by hereditary right, true heir of the whole of Ireland’, supported the Scottish Bruce dynasty when it defied secular and clerical rulers by launching a major, albeit unsuccessful, invasion of Ireland (1315–18). This campaign claimed that the Irish and Scottish nations were one, that both aspired that ‘God willing, our nation may be restored to her former liberty’, while O’Neill would defend his actions by sending a remonstrance to Pope John XXII, in which he accused the Normans of England of inherent treachery and argued that it was the Irish alone who had ‘eminently endowed the Irish church’.13

A desire to emphasise an inheritance to rule that predated Norman times surfaced across Irish-speaking society during the fourteenth century, including in Scotland and the Kingdom of the Isles, which retained its own coronation rites, bishop and legal system, including a record-keeper and weights-and-measures officer.14 Gaelic chieftains also expected none but their own family members to hold high ecclesiastical office. This was a cause of tension because in the eyes of the diocesan church, which was urban and Latin speaking, Gaeilge speakers’ sense of values was less Christian than the new Norman settlers.15 Particularly in the northern half of the country, Irish society was predominantly rural, nomadic and caste-based, and dealt not in currency but exclusively in goods and even (in the post-Viking age) people.16 It has been suggested that the closest international parallel with Irish society at this time can actually be found in Japan, where a similar bardic, as well as military-chieftain, culture existed, and ‘constant feuding between the clans … was not the ideal circumstance for traders and merchants’.17

Although Irish music and culture partly became a tool of Christian expression, reputedly at English insistence, churchmen condemned the arts of poetry and music that, in Irish society, were not used for mere artistic or entertainment purposes. Instead, they were used to celebrate the status of an Irish bardic tradition as the supposed custodian of literally all values, learning and sense of history, dating back to the earliest times.18 A native style of music, played on bagpipes or the wire-strung harp, existed to accompany such recitations, but this musical art form was ‘not merely not European’ but was ‘quite remote from it’, being ‘closer to some forms of Oriental music’, practiced from the Middle to Far East, in its combined use of grace notes, improvisation and historical storytelling.19 Irish culture became self-referential and historicist to a high degree because of the absence of an Irish-speaking population abroad with which to engage in cultural exchanges, except in Scotland. Critically, however, this link with Scotland began to decline during the later fourteenth century. Continental political ties developed among the Scottish nobility through their intermarriage with the French during the Anglo-French wars of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, but no corresponding development took place within Ireland. Instead, intermarriage between Irish and old Norman families created a greater degree of insularity within Irish society, as did a growing religious use, by the fifteenth century, of Irish rather than Latin as the language of communication.20

The Irish adapted to urban, or Latin, culture better in the southern half of the island. By the fourteenth century, Gaeilge-speaking Irish noble families acted alongside the Normans as traders in several port towns along the southern coastline of Ireland. Reflecting Anglo-Norman ties with Calais and the European lowlands, these Irish families traded materials and foodstuffs, such as hides and fish, with Belgium, France and Spain and, soon thereafter, also made inroads via Bristol into business life in Wales and England. The English Crown, however, viewed the Irish as inherently disloyal, as well as inhabitants of a different domain, and so responded with discriminatory legislation.21 Under the Statute of Kilkenny, written in French during 1366 (English would not become the language of England until the fifteenth century), the King’s subjects were forbidden to trade or intermarry with the Irish, to use the Irish language or to recognise Irish law. Contact with Irish musicians, poets and singers – each of whom occupied royal court status within Gaeilge-speaking Irish society – were also forbidden ‘in view of the danger of espionage’.22 On the whole, however, trade and commerce served to strengthen Anglo-Irish links because the overseas trade of Dublin in particular was confined to the Irish Sea, involved more imports than exports and attempted to regulate other urban trade within Ireland.23

The pivotal role of bankers and a mercantile–military elite in fifteenth-century Europe impacted on Ireland during the dynasty of the Tudors, a family of Welsh origins that put an end to Norman rule in England in 1485 and allowed private commercial enterprise to become a feature of government.24 The Tudors reinvented Anglo-Irish relations by refusing to recognise the historic Kingdom of the Isles and making parliamentary government (which had hitherto met rarely in either England or Ireland) an instrument of English power by ruling that all Irish parliaments must be perpetually subordinate to the English parliament. The motive of the Tudor policy of ‘leaving the great Irish families undisturbed as long as they acknowledged the royal authority in church and state’ (a policy often termed ‘surrender and re-grant’) was primarily financial, but it served to undermine Gaelic Irish society quickly, most notably in Ulster.25 Amidst opposition, some of the northern O’Neills accepted Tudor titles and developed a familiarity with London court society primarily because the traditional O’Neill claim to kingship was not only in the process of being outlawed but also faced a new military opposition from loyal Scottish lords.26 This soon created an Irish determination to look to the European continent for alternative allies. The emergence of Scottish dynastic ties to England and France coincided with the creation of Scottish cities and universities during the fifteenth century, but attempts to found a university in Ireland, during 1320 and 1464, had failed, while Irish students were often not welcome in England.27 The exclusion of Ireland from the continental intellectual renaissance marked primarily by the late medieval creation of the university had caused Ireland to become something of an educational backwater for the first time.28

During the later sixteenth century, Elizabeth I’s programme of dissolving Irish monasteries coincided with the state execution of all clergymen who refused to accept the English Crown as the religious head of Christendom. It also led to the creation of the first Irish university, Trinity College in Dublin, nominally as a Protestant theological college. As a response, Catholic religious orders founded the first of many Irish Colleges on the European continent. The first was created in Spain, where trading links had long existed between Gaelic Irish chieftains near the west and southwest coasts of Ireland and regions such as Galicia. In common with Irish trade with Bordeaux, the Spanish lowlands, Brittany and Italy, these trade links were now purposively curtailed by legislation.29 There was no Irish support for the attempted Spanish invasion of England in 1588. Some Irish nobles, however, had sent family members to Spanish Flanders to acquire more modern military expertise. In the 1590s, Ulster chieftains made the unusual move of considering pledging their allegiance to the Spanish Hapsburg dynasty, in an attempt to acquire Spanish assistance, whilst endeavouring to appeal to a distinct sense of Irish nationality based on Catholicism. They mounted a resistance to English rule that, in the wake of a couple of military victories, seemed likely to stimulate a nationwide rebellion, but this endeavour was defeated in 1602 in the wake of a very small Spanish invasion attempt on the southern coast of Ireland.30 Meanwhile, on a national level, the formation of over a dozen Irish Colleges on the European continent, located in Spain, Portugal, Belgium, France, Italy and even Prague, was of limited significance because they were designed primarily for the training of priests. Although no longer complete unknowns in European court society, Irishmen were generally viewed in Europe only as a potential source of additional manpower, be it for political intrigues on the continent itself or against England, rather than as representatives of a distinct nation in international relations.31 This was because the Irish parliament served little purpose other than to make requests for English subsidies to sustain an insolvent Irish administration that was nevertheless able to facilitate extensive exchequer returns to London, based upon rents, customs and taxes, that helped to ensure that ‘Irish money balanced the royal books’ of England.32

The increasingly confessional nature of European states did not reflect the origins, nature and purpose of contemporary wars in Europe where the balance of power was considered to rest with the outcomes of Atlantic trade wars that were fought between the Spanish, French, Dutch and English. The Dutch played the most pivotal role because their bankers were the most adept financiers of both wars and state debts. Dutch tradesmen would succeed in getting appointed as mayors of major Irish towns such as Dublin, Drogheda and Limerick several times over the course of the seventeenth century.33 The status of the Netherlands as the cockpit of Europe was reflected by its desire to maintain its competitive advantage in the world of trade and its consequent authorship of the rules of international relations. Hugo Grotius defined the bases of international law as resting equally upon a recognition of the sovereignty of nation-states and their right to free trade on the ocean. An alternative method the Dutch employed to maintain their advantage, however, was to sustain their army through hiring soldiers from within other states’ jurisdiction.34 Irish expatriate soldiers, most notably Owen Roe O’Neill, attained senior military rank in the Netherlands, albeit in the Spanish Netherlands. Here O’Neill would suggest during the 1620s that an effort should be made to establish an Irish republic despite the fact that the only republic in Europe at the time was Spain’s enemy, the United Provinces of the Netherlands (established 1581), the sovereignty of which would not be recognised by Spain until the Westphalia settlement of 1648.35

The primary objective of the Tudor and Stuart dynasties in Britain was maximising the power of the English navy through financial speculation in colonial plantation schemes, beginning in Ireland and subsequently in North America. After initial Tudor plantations in the eastern Irish province of Leinster and the southern Irish province of Munster, upon the accession of the Stuarts a major plantation scheme was launched in Ulster. As this was launched at the same time as the first English plantation scheme in America, it effectively introduced a new dynamic into the framing of Irish political developments: namely, the development of an Atlantic economy. In the opinion of Sir Walter Raleigh (1554–1618), this was based upon one simple principle: ‘whosoever commands the sea, commands the trade; whosoever commands the trade commands the riches of the world and consequently the world itself.’36 London and lowland Scottish investors profited greatly from the plantation of Ulster (purchasing, for instance, the entire townland of Derry), which had much of the best quality land in Ireland. A perpetual sense of insecurity would exist among these planters, however, because the manner in which courts arranged the dispossession of land from its prior legal owners was frequently illegal.37 Among the profiteers was Sir Arthur Chichester, ‘the landless second son of a minor Devonshire gentleman’, who suddenly became exclusive owner of all commercial shipping and fishing rights in Ulster as well as one of the largest landed estates in either Britain or Ireland. Regarding this development, historian Sean Connolly has noted that

All this is, at first sight, little short of piracy, yet public policy [supported by the Privy Council of Scotland] also played a part in the transactions … The two enterprises were in fact complimentary. Gaelic Ulster and Gaelic Scotland represented a single ungovernable hinterland. The passage back and forth across the narrow waters of the North Channel of mercenary fighters had long sustained the rebelliousness of one [Ulster] and the militarised disorder of the other [Scotland]. Plantation in Ulster, along with continued efforts to discipline the clan chiefs of the Highlands and Islands, would fracture this zone … removing a major threat to the security of all three British kingdoms … [and] transformed irreversibly the face of what had previously been the last stronghold of Gaelic Ireland.38

Being urban recipients of state aid, many of these planters were of note for introducing more commercial practices into Irish agriculture. Meanwhile, during the 1630s, Sir Thomas Wentworth, a new English appointee to lead the Irish administration, attained a complete monopoly of all Irish trade in Virginia tobacco.39 Maryland, the second such American colony, was supposed to be filled exclusively with unwanted Catholic subjects. Controversially, however, rather than encouraging his unwanted (Irish) Catholic subjects to become planters, Wentworth allowed them to join in their thousands the Spanish army in Flanders in an effort to improve Anglo-Spanish relations. This proved to be a major setback to Anglo-Dutch relations. In turn, it created controversy over the specific manner in which Charles I was financing the Royal Navy, causing a civil war to break out in England in which Wentworth became the first political casualty.40 Just prior to his death, Wentworth had extended the operations of the English admiralty to Ireland in an effort to suppress piracy and enhance English security while he also disbanded the Irish parliament.41 Irish Catholics from the south of Ireland reacted by creating an alternative form of political assembly known as the Irish Confederation. Meanwhile, Owen Roe O’Neill, who had received the military services of those who had left for Spanish Flanders, returned to Ireland to lead an undisciplined rebel force in Ulster. Both of these groups claimed to support the Stuart king and did not seek any foreign intervention, but the Irish Confederation would be offered, not by its own request, the services of a papal nuncio who was expected to act in a purely advisory capacity on church–state relations.42

The Irish Confederation dissolved voluntarily on receiving promises from English royalists that its demand for national political rights for Ireland, including a separate Irish admiralty as well as full liberties for Irish Catholics, would be met.43 These promises were made shortly before the king’s trial and execution in 1649, however, and so they would soon be broken. O’Neill, who was looked upon by many Irish speakers in Ulster as a potential Irish king, died suddenly later the same year not long after he signed a truce with an English parliamentarian force that had come to Ireland with Oliver Cromwell.44 Cromwell’s reputation in Ireland would be shaped primarily by his decision to ignore the truce that was signed with O’Neill as soon as the latter died. Thereafter, Cromwell hunted down all alleged Irish rebels and introduced land laws that denied all Catholics the right to own land. During Cromwell’s Irish campaigns of the 1650s, up to 30 per cent of the Irish population would be lost due to warfare, plague or exodus.45 Meanwhile, after being ‘all things to all men’ for the duration of the English civil war, the southern Irish royalist James Butler intrigued for the underground court of Charles II on the European continent, looking for French and Spanish support against Cromwell, before the restoration of the Stuart monarchy in 1660 made this unnecessary. Thereafter, as a reward, Butler was granted land and a university chancellorship in England; was promoted from a marquis to the Duke of Ormond; and, as a long-term leader of an Irish administration, controversially maintained all Cromwell’s discriminatory legislation. Ormond could also be said to have laid the basis for the future integration of Ireland into the British Empire by arranging that virtually all appointees to lead the Irish administration would henceforth be drawn from the ranks of career diplomats in the English foreign office which, upon the Act of Union with Scotland in 1707, essentially became a British foreign office.46 In the words of Sir William Temple, who was England’s diplomat at the Hague at the same time as he directed government policy regarding Ireland, the sole purpose of the Irish administration was to provide security for ever-growing English investments and plantation schemes in Ireland, to be overseen by English appointees who would ‘own and support upon all occasions that which is truly a loyal English protestant interest’.47 This policy was upheld by all eighteenth-century Irish parliaments, each of which upheld Cromwellian land settlements that denied Catholics the right to exercise political power and in the process created a strongly colonial mindset among a new ruling class.48

Over the course of the eighteenth century, Dublin became a hub for financial activity, including the creation of new banks and a national canal network. Plans were also implemented to make Dublin a more elegant city with fine parks and buildings to house a governmental administration and parliament.49 However, although Ireland was nominally a distinct kingdom, it was governed in the manner of a colony where the first priority was to create a mercantile system to serve greater British economic interests, thereby ensuring that any expansion in overseas trade that operated via Ireland did not enhance the profile of the country in any way.50 Ireland’s absence of valuable natural resources, excepting wood and peat, had made overseas trade essential to its prosperity. Nevetheless, the British aristocracy usually considered the most prominent Irish landowners, even Ormond, to be poor country squires because they were literally just one step away from bankruptcy.51 Meanwhile, the wealth and political influence of new Irish parliamentary leaders, who built stately homes in Ireland, was purposively made dependent on receiving their education and ‘marrying well’ in England, the latter feat being something that frequently served as a ticket to inheriting family seats in both the British and Irish parliaments.52 Against this political backdrop, occasional stirrings of a colonial or cultural nationalism in eighteenth-century Irish writings were of comparatively little significance.

Jonathan Swift, a Dublin-born Protestant clergyman and pamphleteer of English parentage, called on the British Royal Navy to conquer the Spanish Indies rather than waste English money on land wars in Europe.53 George Berkeley, a philosophical Irish Protestant bishop of English parentage, celebrated the importance of the new Bank of England to all such enterprises. By helping to enhance the performance of British government stock on the Amsterdam stock exchange, it had created a strong Anglo-Dutch banking nexus and stimulated public finance schemes in England that satisfied commercial interests in both the imperial parliament and the London stock exchange that it was in their best interests to allow the British state a degree of perpetual credit that no other European state, most notably France, could match.54 Both Swift and Berkeley were personal investors in the London South Sea Company, a state-backed private enterprise intended to secure a monopoly over (hitherto Spanish-controlled) South American trade. Thereafter, many Irish individuals would benefit financially from opportunities presented by the British Empire, including emigrating to British North America and the Caribbean, although this generally served only to sever any loyalty, or connection, they had to a specifically Irish polity.55 Mirroring this development, some Catholic exiles from Ireland became either diplomats or knighted military officers in Spain, Austria, Prussia and even Russia, but in the process they ceased to have any connection with their birthplace and would never return to Ireland.56 This reflected the fact that Ireland, or Irish families, had never become a distinct player in the dynastic order of early-modern Europe.

The Williamite Wars (1689–91) that deposed the brief rule of James II (1685–9), a Catholic Stuart monarch, were fought largely on Irish soil. In strengthening Anglo-Dutch ties, they paved the way for Protestant families from Saxony in Germany to inherit the British throne and also stimulated much European interest, albeit primarily on a financial level only. James II had granted some Irish ships the right to trade directly with the Canary Islands, a Spanish archipelago off the coast of Morocco that was noted for its sugar trade, a wine trade with England, as well as being a basis for Spanish–American trade.57 Anglo-Dutch competition would effectively counteract this trend. Meanwhile, direct Irish imports from the American colonies had always been outlawed in order to give English tobacco and sugar companies a complete monopoly over the Irish market. The export of Irish foodstuffs to the American colonies had been encouraged, however, and this helped to facilitate the commercial development of Cork city and Galway town on the south and west coast of Ireland respectively. Cork and Galway merchants who were Catholics soon had to flee the country, however, because of their legal inability to own property. Combined with the legal bans on their holding parliamentary, civil or military office, this meant that it was very difficult for them to continue in business.58 During the early eighteenth century, some Irish Catholic exiles had associated themselves briefly with the Jacobite court in exile in France but, unlike some Scottish Jacobites of Ulster descent,59 they were evidently unwilling to conspire against England. Reflecting this trend, by the 1760s a movement had developed within Ireland that sought only to restore Catholics’ rights to sit in the Irish parliament.60 Meanwhile, a group of Irish Catholic merchants in Bordeaux who traded with Cork merchants and the French East India Company began acting as informal intermediaries in Anglo-French and even Anglo-American diplomatic relations.61

Upon visiting Dublin in 1771, Benjamin Franklin thought that the Irish parliament could potentially be an ally of the American colonies in seeking independence from Britain. Once America began to struggle free, Franklin also believed that a direct trade agreement could be reached between the United States and Ireland by means of a formal commercial treaty. The first American consular office established in Ireland would report in 1790 that ‘no country in Europe contains more real friends to America … who rejoice more in her rising prospects’ than Ireland.62 The Irish parliament of the day, however, was never the potential friend to America that Franklin believed. Simon Harcourt, a former British ambassador to Paris and the English lord lieutenant of Ireland, had persuaded the Irish parliament to send 4,000 troops to put down the American struggle for independence and also to raise an Irish volunteer force to defend the English colony in Ireland in these soldiers’ absence. Thereafter, William Eden, a member of the British imperial board of trade who had attempted to outfox the Americans, decided upon being appointed leader of the Irish administration to remove the restrictions on direct trade between Ireland and the colonies solely in an effort to defeat the French naval blockade of supplies to the British troops.63 Once it became clear that this strategy had failed and it had lost its American colonies, the British imperial parliament passed three acts to set down rules for the Irish administration. The supremacy of the British Privy Council in all legal matters was reaffirmed. Although it was stated that the British parliament did not legislate directly for Ireland, it was ruled that the Irish parliament must enact any legislation relating to overseas trade that had been adopted in the imperial parliament.64

Some absentee landowners in Ireland were in favour of abolishing the Irish parliament altogether, considering it irrelevant compared to the ever-growing economic needs of the empire. Through espousing such politics, some Irishmen such as George Macartney became governors of the British West Indies, Ireland, the East India Company and the Cape of Good Hope, as well as a British ambassador to China.65 Similar motives inspired William Eden’s move, as a British Privy Councillor and vice-treasurer for Ireland, in creating a Bank of Ireland in 1783. Although nominally a national bank, it was actually a sister bank to the Bank of England and was governed by a former British diplomat. He had been able to establish his own bank in Ireland upon marrying the daughter of a wealthy London banker and buying a sugar plantation in the British West Indies.66 Henceforth, plantation owners in Dublin as well as in the rising new northern town of Belfast were able to manage their West Indies plantations from afar and, in turn, use this wealth to create in their hometowns new chambers of commerce that had a decidedly imperial focus.67 Meanwhile, Britain’s response to Catholic petitions to have their liberties restored was to allow them to serve in the British army and to permit some to vote whilst still denying them a right to sit in parliament. Purposively, a state-funded Catholic seminary college was created at Maynooth in order to make the historic Irish Colleges on the European continent redundant while a Jesuit college was established at Stonyhurst, England to serve as a launching pad for wealthy Irish Catholics to enter the British diplomatic service.68

A group of republican clubs known as the Society of United Irishmen had called for the reform of the Irish parliament to make it a representative national assembly that would include Irishmen of all religious denominations. This demand, however, came from outside the Irish parliament, mostly from journalists, minor merchants and some volunteers. Ultimately, the potential impact of the United Irishmen initiative was neutralised by the lack of any effective platform after the disbandment of the Catholic petition movement and the outlawing of volunteering. A wealthy Londoner who had experience of British diplomatic work suggested to the United Irishmen that they cultivate links with revolutionary France. This same man, however, had also been the leader of the University of Cambridge branch of the freemasons, a fraternity that was an instrument of the British Empire’s military networks and foreign policy intrigues.69 Thereafter, the United Irish movement became an underground movement that involved British intelligence operatives whose sole purpose was to manipulate Irish political circumstances in order to bring about an Act of Union between Britain and Ireland.70 As a result, the United Irish leaders, perhaps mostly notably Lord Edward FitzGerald, a great admirer of the United States who renounced his aristocratic title upon befriending Thomas Paine in Paris,71 effectively became the victims of a conspiracy. Although not an admirer of the United States, Theobald Wolfe Tone would later be described by many as a founder of Irish nationalism. In his writings, he espoused the novel idea of an Irish parliament being a neutral in Britain’s wars whilst also acting as an eloquent United Irish advocate for Catholic liberties. However, Tone’s subsequent career, upon being persuaded to join the French army and promote two minor French invasion attempts of Ireland, was an unmitigated disaster that can best be described as a mere footnote to the French revolutionary wars.72

The chief architect of the Act of Union between Britain and Ireland in 1800 was Robert Stewart, a Dublin Presbyterian who converted to Anglicanism at Cambridge University so that he could intermarry with the British aristocracy, acquire the new title of Viscount Castlereagh and inherit family seats in both the British and Irish parliaments. Castlereagh would become famous internationally for organising a diplomatic alliance with Prussia and Russia to defeat Napoleonic France and subsequently chairing the Congress of Vienna (1814–15) to redraw the map of Europe. In Ireland, however, he was widely denounced for provoking and suppressing (in a very draconian fashion) an ill-advised rebellion in the summer of 1798 and subsequently bribing MPs into accepting his union proposals.73 Meanwhile, expatriated Irishmen had little bearing on either the revolutionary wars or Castlereagh’s attempts to contain them. The loyalty of a century-old Irish brigade in the French army to the Bourbon dynasty had led to its disbandment in 1792. Reflecting Robert Emmet’s brief attempt to organise another Irish rebellion that year, a Napoleonic Irish Legion was formed in 1803 that carried on its flag an image of a crownless harp and the inscription ‘L’independence d’Irlande’, but this legion would not survive the restoration of Bourbon monarchical rule in 1815.74 Among those United Irishmen who survived the British intelligence war with France were some who found a better life in the United States. This included a future American consul to France as well as men who, upon entering academic or professional life in America, formed pioneering (and non-denominational) Irish American voluntary organisations that championed the cause of full political liberties for Catholics not only in America but also in Britain and Ireland.75

During Castlereagh’s term as foreign secretary (1812–20), British governments under Prime Minister Lord Liverpool broke promises made to Irish politicians at the time of the Act of Union that Ireland would retain a distinct exchequer. Lord Liverpool abolished all Irish customs houses, in the process making all Irish ports mere extensions of that of the city of Liverpool, where new shipping companies now carried all trade to and from Ireland and all customs were collected. This engendered Dublin’s dramatic economic decline and also quickly put an end to Cork, Limerick and Galway’s status as Atlantic ports.76 Traditional Irish links with the European continent also declined rapidly. Some interest in French soldiering would remain in Ireland up until the 1870s, when there were Irish celebrations of the choice of Marshal Patrice de MacMahon as the first president of the Third Republic. However, like the Franco-Irish composer Augusta Holmes’ miliantly nationalist symphonic piece Irlande (1882), this was essentially an echo of purely historical cultural links.77

Over the course of the nineteenth century, use of the Irish language declined from approximately half to just 5 per cent of the Irish population. Celebrated Irish painters and English-language writers in London purposively adopted the role of representatives of a historic culture that could be romanticised only because it was now past.78 Notoriously, in the recent past, Scottish writer James MacPherson had made the ancient Irish Fianna sagas the basis of his own original English-language verse that was translated into several European languages and was celebrated by artists and politicians in both Europe and America. However, when it was discovered that he had misrepresented his own original writings as being direct translations from an ancient text by a non-existent Scottish Gaelic poet ‘Ossian’ (a name derived from the legendary Irish Fianna, or ‘Fenian’, Oisín), many people abroad assumed thereafter that the notion that an Irish culture and language had ever existed, let alone thrived, was purely a fiction.79 ‘Ossianic’ societies soon acquired British royal patronage, while Charles Villiers Stanford, a Dublin-born founder of the music school of the University of Cambridge, composed a Lament for the Sons of Ossian to equate all Irish nationalists with being ignorant believers in a historical fiction. This prompted W.B. Yeats, an Irish cultural nationalist poet, to purposively entitle his first collection The Wanderings of Oisin.80 These debates about Irish life altered around the end of the nineteenth century. The Catholic Church, which had been legalised within the United Kingdom in 1850, encouraged an Irish language revival as part of a cultural nationalist movement that essentially defined itself against two notions of an Anglophone world. First, it labelled the equation of modernity with secularism as an Anglophone delusion. Second, it labelled cosmopolitan cultures and commercialism as an anti-intellectual force. If Britain had been, in Napoleon Bonaparte’s words, a ‘nation of shopkeepers’, Irish cultural nationalists were now encouraged to believe that Ireland’s destiny was to be a nation of schoolteachers.81

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To enable British industrialisation, Ireland’s role in the nineteenth-century United Kingdom economy was to be a provider of agricultural produce and additional labour. A process of involuntary emigration coincided with a traumatic Great Famine (1845–51) that cost a million lives and led a further million to attempt to emigrate.82 The British government’s response was controversial because it refused to interfere with the continued exportation of Irish food. It also ordered that the starving should be made to do more manual labour in order to be deserving of receiving charitable assistance.83 A precedent was also set. Britain refused to allow poverty relief aid from outside legal jurisdictions to reach Ireland, and this would become a source of controversy later that century when, during a period of mass evictions and fears of renewed famine in Ireland, recipients of American aid were prosecuted.84 Assisted emigration schemes to the British colonies continued unabated. American opposition to state-aid for denominational education encouraged the Catholic Church to promote this trend because religious education could receive more overt political backing in the British colonies, including Canada.85 This indirectly affected the experience of Irish emigrants to America. As a result of emigration, more Irish-born soldiers fought in the American civil war (1861–5) than in any other war in modern times,86 but the Catholic Church’s ongoing resistance to state-education programmes meant that the experience of Irish migrants to America continued to be characterised by a sense of social insecurity or isolation.87

A contrary trend stemmed from the British government’s expulsion from Ireland of nationalist rebels who had attempted to emulate the 1848 revolutions in Europe. Realising that the American government ‘hailed the European revolutions of 1848 as extensions of their own’,88 these expatriate Irishmen enthusiastically embraced an American republican patriotism by combining anti-British expressions of American foreign policy with fierce critiques of British rule in Ireland.89 The United States itself ‘remained properly cautious … in terms of promoting republican principles abroad’ because direct intervention could promote harmful retaliation. During the 1850s, American expansionist ambitions to fulfil their nation’s ‘manifest destiny’ (a term coined by John O’Sullivan, an influential American diplomat of Irish descent) found an alternative outlet in filibuster campaigns, which were privately organised military expeditions in foreign territories that enjoyed unofficial state backing. This development originated with America’s desire to capitalise upon the chaotic situation facing many European colonies in Latin America, not least through utilising secret freemason networks.90 Previously, Irish adventurers like Daniel Florence O’Leary acquired fame in South American campaigns led by Simon Bolivar and made this a prelude to entering the British diplomatic service.91 Now, however, Irish filibusters were inclined to offer their services to the American government instead. The creation of the American Fenian Brotherhood among Irish emigrants, several of whom were veterans of previous filibuster campaigns (American or otherwise),92 was a direct manifestation of this trend.93 At their public national conventions, the American Fenians, while calling for an independent Ireland, expressed their total identification with the American principle that only republican governments effectively championed liberty.94

Junior American consuls, first created in Ireland during 1790, remained in place under the Union and continued to report on trading possibilities. American ships had traded directly with a dozen different Irish port towns, but by the 1830s this situation had changed to being just an occasional importer of Ulster linens via Liverpool.95 The Americans responded by introducing a direct trading line with Galway town, which was deemed to be without rival as an Irish port and was expected in New York to become ‘one of the most flourishing cities in Ireland’. Between 1858 and 1863, sixteen American steamers operated direct trade between Galway and New York before a combination of competition from a new British government-backed enterprise in Liverpool and the oubreak of the American civil war led to their sudden demise.96 Irish nationalist journalists from Galway and the west of Ireland thereafter left for the United States, where they formed what were effectively ‘pro-Irish’ American newspapers that the British government frequently seized whenever they were imported into Ireland because of their critiques of British foreign policy.97

This tradition of Fenian journalism embodied a paradox. American foreign policy was based on drawing a stark contrast between American republican liberties and the supposedly morally corrupt values of European monarchical governments, including an allegedly arrogant British government. To a significant extent, however, this American national identity was only an expression of a fear that the European powers (with which the United States still did most of its trade) might use their influence on any of the American continents in order to destroy the young American republic.98 Boosting overseas trade and an expansionist impulse were always the central dynamics of American foreign policy.99 Against this backdrop, ‘most Americans sympathised with Irish nationalism, but not to the point of sparking a crisis with Britain’.100 The radical American republican Charles Sumner, a one-time chairman of the US Foreign Relations Committee, developed an informal association at this time with a circle of professional revolutionaries, Irish or otherwise. Anglo-American tensions would remain for so long as Sumner was in office, not least because one of Sumner’s ideas (rooted in his past experience of the annexation of Alaska) was that the United States should be granted Canadian territory as reparation for Britain’s allegedly hostile actions during the US civil war.101 This was an idea that some American Fenian filibusters echoed.102 Canadian raids, however, also involved key British intelligence operatives,103 effectively making the Canadian ‘Fenian’ raids a mere episode to embarrass those Americans who had spoken about annexing Canada. For Britain, this event was seen to have permanently neutralised the Fenian threat. It also served to make the Fenians, at best, a mere embarrassing footnote in the future writing of American history.104 After denouncing the Canadian raids and castigating all secret society conspiracies for being ‘at once the terror and the offspring of the sway of tyrants’,105 John Savage, the president of the American Fenian Brotherhood, worked with the conservative American Republican presidents Andrew Johnson and Ulysses Grant in securing an amnesty for all Fenian prisoners, in turn giving birth to an internal legal debate on American citizenship and naturalisation laws.106 American-Irish Fenians, who had always promoted a tradition of American state-militia service, also worked within the Grand Army of the Republic Association in an effort to heal US civil war divisions.107 Ignoring Catholic condemnations of their politics,108 many distanced themselves from immigrant politics, represented not least by the Democratic Party’s infamous Tammany Hall machine in New York,109 and embraced the perhaps more conservative Republican Party,110 including John Devoy, a journalist and recent political exile from Ireland who also attempted to cultivate a rapport with politicians in Ireland from his New York base.

Devoy was exiled from Ireland because he was a leading member of a nationalist–revolutionary secret society known as the Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB). This had used Fenian fund-collection channels in the United States to establish the Irish People, a shortlived Dublin journal (1863–5). In its take on international relations, the Irish People was less a champion of American republican values than it was an advocate of the Eurocentric idea that Ireland, like Poland (which had just witnessed a failed uprising), was indisputedly one of the suppressed nationalities of Europe.111 Although the IRB was supposed to have an oath-bound discipline, its leaders and members were politically talented individuals rather than soldiers. As a result, a misconception about the IRB existed among those American militia soldiers who had joined the American Fenian Brotherhood.112 A proclamation by Irish republican rebels during 1867 was inspired by French republican adventurers who had served under infamous continental revolutionary Giuseppe Garibaldi and mistakenly believed that a UK-wide potential for a republican revolution existed.113 ‘Fenianism’ was practically negated as an aspect of Anglo-American tensions during 1872, but a tradition of vocally pro-Irish Congressmen and newspaper editors in America developed thereafter. This provided the inspiration for men like John Devoy to attempt to initiate cross-Atlantic political communications. Uniquely and controversially, however, Devoy also saw this as a means to revive the IRB.114

American influence on Ireland grew more significant after Ulysses Grant, accompanied by the US minister to France and the ‘ever brash’ foreign affairs staff of the New York Herald, visited Ireland in early 1879 upon being granted the freedom of Dublin.115 Devoy, one of several Fenians who worked for the New York Herald, also came to Ireland to secretly reorganise the IRB, which he publicly called upon to ‘come out of the rat holes of conspiracy’ and form a new Irish nationalist party at Westminster with American financial support.116 This was a prelude to a US tour by Irish politician Charles Stewart Parnell, who was able to address the American House of Representatives about Ireland, thanks mostly to William Carroll, a Donegal-born American freemason and Republican Party activist who claimed to be a descendant of Charles Carroll, a governor of Maryland of Irish descent who had been the sole Catholic signatory to the American Declaration of Independence in 1776.117 Through the freemasons, Carroll had become the leader of the American Clan na Gael, a secret society that was designed to replace the Fenian Brotherhood, which soon disbanded, and which Devoy soon remodelled upon less masonic lines.118 An end result of this ‘new departure’ was to make the idea of fund collection in America by means of Irish relief organisations an acceptable notion to many Irish politicians. The British government was very opposed to this development, however, because it considered that it amounted to illegal attempts to collect funds abroad for either party political or seditious purposes (the IRB reached a peak in terms of its resources during the period 1879–84).119 For this reason, many Irish politicians were arrested and the freedom of the Irish press was often curtailed throughout the 1880s.120 A British secret service even promoted bogus dynamiting conspiracies in Paris, New York, Philadelphia and Chicago with two goals in mind: first, to convince American and French intelligence services of their need to cooperate more with the British; and, second, to justify mass arrests in Ireland on the grounds that all Irish nationalists supposedly possessed the same financiers as these largely fictitious American and Parisian ‘dynamitards’.121 While this devious propaganda was ultimately countered by Irish politicians at its root during 1889,122 it served to discredit Irish nationalism in both America and France.123 Reflecting this, although James Blaine, an Anglophobe US Secretary of State, appointed Irish republican rebel Patrick Egan to an American diplomatic office,124 circumstantial evidence that some US citizens of Irish birth had irresponsibly become involved in ‘dynamitard’ conspiracies led Blaine to accept at face value British propaganda that portrayed Irish nationalist activists of the day as ‘the scum of Europe’.125

After the UK franchise was extended to include half of adult males in 1884, Irish nationalists perpetually won the vast majority of the Irish seats at Westminster. To defuse this situation and to stem the decline of the landed aristocracy’s political power in Ireland, British Prime Minister W.E. Gladstone decided to promote the idea of establishing a devolved parliamentary assembly in Ireland that would be without fiscal autonomies.126 Parnell’s acceptance of this idea helped to take the steam out of the idea of establishing an independent Irish republic, be it American-inspired or otherwise. Gladstone’s idea was also actively promoted by new Irish organisations that were founded with the Catholic Church’s patronage within British colonies such as Canada and Australia.127 By the 1890s, American sympathisers with Ireland, such as Eugene Kelly (manager of the Emigrants Savings Bank in New York) and some leaders of America’s new Catholic universities, had also accepted this trend while also encouraging the Irish community in America to adopt Catholic moral perspectives on various social and political issues, including American foreign policy regarding the Philippines and Cuba.128 Against this backdrop, the existence of marginal Irish filibuster, or war correspondent, intrigues during the Anglo-Boer War (1899–1902) were essentially a last hurrah for defunct practices.129 Irregularities in international affairs that had grown immediately before, during and after the US civil war had been eclipsed by new intergovernmental organisations that had started to become effective. These included the International Telegraph (later Telecommunications) Union (1865), the Universal Postal Union (1874), the Hague Conference on Private International Law (1893) and the Permanent Court of Arbitration (1899), which would virtually become a global body in the wake of the second Hague Convention of 1907. Present at the latter convention was a representative of a new Irish political party, Sinn Féin, which called for all Irish political representatives to abstain from the British imperial parliament and make a unilateral stand for Irish independence.130 This idea had first been championed many years before by Daniel O’Connell, an Irish advocate for Catholic liberties and eloquent critic of the international slave trade who had acquired Europe-wide fame as a political liberal during the 1830s and 1840s.131

In its initial conception, Sinn Féin had an essentially Eurocentric worldview. Arthur Griffith, a humble Dublin printer who had formerly intrigued in South Africa, maintained that a combination of Britain’s ‘financial plunder of Ireland’ and ‘the custom house interdict upon direct trade between Ireland and the [European] continent’ was preventing Irish nationalists from acquiring an international audience.132 During 1904, at a time when Hungary was launching the most expensive parliamentary building in Europe, Griffith pointed to the dual monarchy compromise that Hungary had reached with Austria in 1866 as providing a potential parallel for Ireland.133 As Hungary had no distinct defence or foreign affairs ministries, this was a rather poor suggestion. Griffith soon modified his idea, however, by proposing instead within his Sinn Féin Policy (1906) that Ireland should send its own consular representatives abroad with a view to establishing an independent Irish voice in international relations. Although Griffith emphasised that ‘the policy of Sinn Féin proposes … to bring Ireland out of the corner and make her assert her existence in the world’, his citation of Argentina and Holland as ‘friendly nations’ essentially reflected the fact that he was over-preoccupied with the impact that the British financial world was having upon Ireland.134 The broader European trend of growing appreciation for all things American had a relatively limited impact on Sinn Féin, even though it did attempt to promote some new (American-inspired) Irish co-operative banks and had pointed approvingly to the claim of Michael Davitt, the author of The Fall of Feudalism in Ireland (New York, 1903) and an Irish spokesman on the Russian question, that the vote of pro-Irish congressmen in America would have far greater consequences for the future of international relations than the vote of Irish politicians at Westminster.135

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By the turn of the twentieth century, Ireland occupied a very paradoxical position. The cultural Gaelic League had become the principal forum for Irish nationalism despite the fact that Ireland was, for all intents and purposes, an English-speaking nation. On an ideological level, its nationalist politicians saw hope in the rise of the democratic republic of the United States. They also valued the existence of Irish communities abroad and were disinclined to entirely disavow the legacy of past republican United Irish or Fenian conspiracies. Be that as it may, the reality of Ireland’s place in the Atlantic economy was governed purely by its membership of the British Empire. Therefore, Anglo-American relations formed an overarching context that essentially limited Irish ambitions.

In American politics, Irish newspaper editors in Chicago or New York had long championed the expansion of the American navy whilst simultaneously campaigning against the creation of any formal arbitration treaty between the United States and Britain on the grounds that this might force America to take part in Britain’s global wars. While this was a justifiable stance on American foreign policy, it was combined with a more controversial propaganda against manipulative British financial influences within America. Diplomats of the French republic in America privately shared this preoccupation.136 Its public expression within the immigrant press of what was becoming known as ‘Irish America’, however, led American governments to view new publications such as Devoy’s Gaelic American (which supported Sinn Féin while declaring that ‘Europe, not England, is the mother country of America’) as advocates of an eccentric brand of ‘hyphen-American’ politics that was, if anything, unpatriotic, not least because it was evidently rooted more in a cultural Anglophobia than a thorough grasp of the dynamics of the American economy.137 Indeed, ever since the 1820s, Anglo-American tensions had been minimised by the fact that the United Kingdom had been willing to discourage European interference on the American continents in return for the United States conceding to the Royal Navy the right to be the primary policer of the seas. This understanding, although informal, allowed Anglo-American trade to both flourish and coexist. If rivalries existed, this was rooted in the expectation that, ultimately, the United States would naturally assume a monopoly over trade on all the American continents, whether through its own foreign direct investment schemes or the emergence of other republican governments (possibly even in Canada) that would reject the practice of monarchy.138 American interest in Ireland had never really extended beyond the question of trading possibilities. As a result, by the 1910s, the United States had become interested primarily in maintaining the existing ‘strong commercial relationship between the north-east of Ireland and the US’. The attitude of American consular officers within Ireland towards Irish nationalism now fitted neatly within this paradigm.139

In recent decades, the powerful shipbuilding industries of Liverpool and Glasgow had led to the closure of independent shipbuilding companies in the historic Irish cities of Dublin and Waterford. New shipbuilding firms had developed, however, in the rising northern Irish town of Belfast because they operated as subsidiaries of those in Liverpool and especially Glasgow. From the 1860s onwards, this turned Belfast into a thriving commercial centre. This was illustrated by the construction of numerous public buildings, including a particularly impressive City Hall to reflect London’s formal recognition of Belfast as a city in 1888.140 Nationally, Belfast was perhaps best known for producing a vocal local press that often championed a peculiar pan-Protestant reading of contemporary politics as well as international relations.141 More significantly, however, as the home of a university since 1845, Belfast was producing significant figures that worked for the British foreign office. This included in the Far East, where Britain, like the United States, would succeed in signing a major trade treaty with Japan in 1911.142 At the same time, the Belfast-born diplomat James Bryce, who had previously won over American academic opinion by publishing pioneering studies of the American constitution, succeeded as the British ambassador to the United States in settling American–Canadian relations to Britain’s satisfaction.143 This arrival of a northern Irish role in British diplomacy coincided with a concerted campaign to portray all historic links between Ulster and Scotland as having been rooted purely in a common British nationalism, essentially in a desire to suppress the re-emergence of a ‘Gaelic’ Irish nationalism.144

James Bryce arranged an Anglo-American Arbitration Treaty (1911) under which any trade or related disputes between the two countries were to be sent to the Court of Arbitration in the Hague, a city located within Britain’s closest financial ally, the Netherlands.145 The US Senate, however, rejected Bryce’s treaty and the Gaelic American declared this as a victory for ‘Irish-America’. John Devoy repeated ad nauseum his founding editorial policy of working to ensure that ‘the direction of the foreign policy of this great Republic’ must never be allowed to fall into the hands of ‘a clique of pro-British sycophants’.146 The reality, however, was that Irish nationalist sympathisers in America had no access to the corridors of power. This situation in Ireland itself was not much different. Sinn Féin championed the idea of launching an Irish economic war against the British imperial treasury on the grounds that Ireland had been an almost perpetual victim of gross over-taxation,147 but James Craig, the rising new leader of unionism in Belfast, was a wealthy businessman who both cultivated political links with London bankers and accepted fully the logic of the British imperial treasury regarding Ireland. In particular, British investments in Ireland were now negligible compared to investments in Australia and India. The wealth generated by the latter had been used by religious ministers in Ulster to establish new Irish Presbyterian theological colleges (such as Magee College in Derry), while Ireland’s value as a source of revenue, providing but 4 per cent of the UK’s taxation, was small enough to be comparatively insignificant.148 Therefore, Craig and the British imperial treasury considered any injustices in the government of Ireland to be completely irrelevant compared to the much greater budgetary concerns of the empire. In an Irish electoral sense, this body of opinion was only a small minority voice, but its dominance in high politics naturally shaped the impact that the outbreak of the First World War would have upon Ireland.

Britain had anticipated the prospects of a major war with Germany as early as 1904. Although it was expected that ‘at most, Ireland would be subject only to a diversionary attack’, after 1905 the Royal Navy began including Ireland in a common naval defence scheme based upon the potential strategic significance of the three western Irish ports of Bearehaven (Castletownbere), Lough Swilly and Cork harbour as part of the island of Britain’s ‘western approaches’. This was done with an eye to the development of submarine warfare and potential attacks on trans-Atlantic shipping,149 although the ‘western approaches’ concept was justified in racial as much as geopolitical terms.150 In 1911, a treasury report claimed that Ireland was actually costing more to govern than it was contributing to national defence. Therefore, Erskine Childers of the British Foreign Office proposed that volunteer movements should be formed in Ireland to compensate for this fact until such time as the return of Ireland to the position of a contributing member of the imperial partnership was made feasible. Childers believed this could be accomplished by establishing a new colonial assembly, akin to that in Newfoundland, to govern Ireland without any cost to the imperial treasury.151 This was a proposal that the old Irish Party at Westminster, originally founded by Parnell (who died in 1891) and now led by John Redmond, accepted. However, rather than be subjected to this situation, James Craig and Dublin-born lawyer Edward Carson called for the partition of Ireland to reflect Belfast’s status as a centrally important imperial city. In support of this move, the British cabinet would soon invite Craig and Carson to serve as Treasurer and First Lord of the Admiralty respectively.152 Meanwhile, James Bryce, on retiring as British ambassador to the United States and concentrating on diplomatic work on the European continent, would promote the idea that Ireland, like many eastern European countries, was really the home of two separate ethnicities or nationalities.153 Prior to leaving the United States, Bryce also introduced President Taft to another Ulster-born British diplomat, Roger Casement, who would distribute his pamphlet Ireland, Germany and the Freedom of the Seas to all American government agencies and bodies of higher education in an attempt to convince the English-speaking world that Irish nationalism was merely a German conspiracy.154 Casement himself would subsequently do all in his power to make his ‘German Plot’ conspiracy seem real.

The shocking feature of these developments to Irish nationalists was the proof they offered of their total powerlessness. Although it held the vast majority of Irish seats, the Irish Party held just an eighth of the total seats in the House of Commons and had no effective spokesman on international affairs. The idea of partitioning Ireland and establishing a powerless national assembly in Dublin was deeply unpopular in Ireland, as well as in ‘Irish-America’. Britain was confident, however, that any potential American criticism could be neutered as soon as America could be persuaded to join Britain’s war effort against Germany. This was because ‘the day that American blood will have flowed, Irish opposition in America will become absolutely impossible’.155 Sinn Féin had promoted a campaign of non-enlistment in the British army to weaken Britain’s hold on the country ever since the entente cordiale between Britain and France (1904) seemed to indicate that Ireland could have no continental allies. Therefore, when a minority of Irish Volunteers opted not to enlist in the British war effort, they acquired the appropriate nickname of ‘Sinn Féin volunteers’. These expressed their desire to act as a national defence force that would be neutral regarding the war, but the British government started arresting its members. Before the anti-enlistment, or Sinn Féin, volunteer movement could be completely suppressed, members of the IRB, who had infiltrated its officer corps, decided to stage a symbolic rebellion in Dublin in the name of an Irish republic. This was done in the belief that the suppression of such a rebellion would serve to revive, or boost, Irish aspirations for complete independence.156

The 1916 Rising, as this Easter Week rebellion would be called, took the form of an 1848-style European protest, where barricades were manned within a deposed capital city in the name of a country’s right to have its own distinct political constitution. However, it was also intended to attract international attention to Ireland’s desire for complete political independence. The official policy of the anti-enlistment Irish Volunteers of strict neutrality regarding the First World War was championed in small Irish publications that had been funded by the 1916 rebels, such as Arthur Griffith’s Nationality. The latter had also argued that Ireland should seek entirely independent representation at whatever peace conference concluded the war. The British government and its supporters denied this claim of neutrality, however, by pointing to Casement’s Philadelphia publication, which had been sent to all US governmental officials, and his subsequent actions in Germany. Up until the war ended in November 1918, Britain used Casement’s ‘German Plot’ as its justification for imprisoning without trial any elected Irish politicians of professed nationalist sympathies on the grounds of their being supposedly pro-German or even paid German spies. Outrage at the extent to which the pro-enlistment Irish Party at Westminster supported this claim led to a complete swing of Irish public opinion behind the hitherto marginal Sinn Féin Party, which also attained popularity by resisting Britain’s efforts to introduce wartime conscription in Ireland. The latter development also created more public sympathy for the IRB’s underground efforts to keep the anti-enlistment Irish Volunteer movement in existence.157

Sinn Féin did not treat the international debate on the freedom of the seas until after America’s entry into the First World War in April 1917. In keeping with its perpetually neutral stance, it argued that the significance of this concept to Ireland lay only in the possibility of opening up Irish ports to trade with the US after the war had ended.158 Meanwhile, the principal policy of the revamped Sinn Féin Party was to assert that America’s entry into the war should lead to the creation of a more benign and republican international order at whatever peace conference was held in the wake of the war. Indeed, a struggle for Irish independence was now launched that was based almost entirely on a claim that an American-inspired, post-war peace settlement should favour Irish claims to distinct representation at such a peace conference and, in turn, the establishment of Ireland as a distinct player in international relations alongside those new European governments that had come into existence as a result of the war, such as the republic of Finland and the kingdom of Poland.159 Reflecting this, the challenge of securing recognition of Ireland’s distinct nationality in international relations would be defined not by an attempt to fight the British army but rather by an attempt to mobilise international opinion in favour of an Irish demand for the complete evacuation of British armed forces on the grounds that British rule in Ireland had no democratic legitimacy. Ireland’s republican moment had now arrived.

Endnotes

1 Doris Edel, The Celtic West and Europe (Dublin, 2001); Michael Richter, Medieval Ireland (2nd ed., Dublin, 2005), 1–2 (quote).

2 J. DeCourcy Ireland, D.C. Sheehy (eds), Atlantic visions (Dun Laoghaire, 1989); Michael Richter, Medieval Ireland (2nd ed., Dublin, 2005), 8.

3 Dáibhí Ó Cróinín, A new history of Ireland, vol. 1 (Oxford, 2005), 18; Brendan Smith (ed.), Cambridge history of Ireland, vol. 1 (Cambridge, 2018), chapter 1.

4 Dáibhí Ó Cróinín, A new history of Ireland, vol. 1 (Oxford, 2005), 212–15.

5 John O’Donovan (ed.) Leabhar na gCeart or the Book of Rights (Dublin, 1847), 141–3, 155, 157, 159, 161, 169–73.

6 Doris Edel, The Celtic West and Europe (Dublin, 2001), chapters 4–6.

7 Elva Johnston, ‘A sailor on the seas of faith: the individual and the church in The Voyage of Máel Dúin’, in Judith Devlin, H.B. Clarke (ed.), European encounters (Dublin, 2003), 239–52; F.X. Martin, F.J. Byrne (eds), The scholar revolutionary: Eoin MacNeill (Dublin, 1973).

8 Dáibhí Ó Cróinín, A new history of Ireland, vol. 1 (Oxford, 2005), 202, 210–11, 216–21; Peter Crooks (ed.), Government, war and society in medieval Ireland (Dublin, 2008), 321–2.

9 Doris Edel, The Celtic West and Europe (Dublin, 2001), 81 (quote).

10 David Dickson, Dublin (London, 2014), 5–10; Brendan Smith (ed.), Cambridge history of Ireland, vol. 1 (Cambridge, 2018), chapter 4.

11 Peter Crooks (ed.), Government, war and society in medieval Ireland (Dublin, 2008), 194–214. Norman coins were frequently buried alongside Gaelic heirlooms as family treasures by Gaelic chieftains of the day. A.M.P., ‘Ancient cemetery in Islandmagee’, Ulster journal of archaeology, series 1, vol. 6 (1858), 346–50.

12 Peter Crooks (ed.), Government, war and society in medieval Ireland (Dublin, 2008), 210; Alexander Nicolson, History of Skye (Glasgow, 1930), 9–12, 22–5; N.J. McKie, ‘The McGhies of Balmaghie’, The Gallovidian, vol. 7 no. 26 (summer 1905), 99–103.

13 Peter Crooks (ed.), Government, war and society in medieval Ireland (Dublin, 2008), 169, 173, 177–93, 194–214, 332–7.

14 G.R. Gayre, ‘Some notes upon the Mackays of the Rhinns of Islay with reference to the Mackays of Kintyre, the McGhies of Galloway and the Irish MacGees’ (NLI, Genealogical Office, Ms689).

15 Sean Duffy (ed.), Atlas of Irish history (Derbyshire, 1997), 44, 54; Brendan Smith (ed.), Cambridge history of Ireland, vol. 1 (Cambridge, 2018), chapter 12.

16 John O’Donovan (ed.), Leabhar na gCeart or the Book of Rights (Dublin, 1847), introduction, 139, 141, 143; Brendan Smith (ed.), Cambridge history of Ireland, vol. 1, 117.

17 Paul Kennedy, The rise and fall of the great powers: economic change and military conflict from 1500 to 2000 (London, 1988), 17.

18 Doris Edel, The Celtic West and Europe (Dublin, 2001), 41, 45, 48, 72.

19 Sean O’Riada, Our musical heritage (Portlaoise, 1982), 20.

20 Peter Crooks (ed.), Government, war and society in medieval Ireland (Dublin, 2008), 313–15; Sean Duffy (ed.), Atlas of Irish history (Derbyshire, 1997), 44, 54.

21 Brendan Smith (ed.), Cambridge history of Ireland, vol. 1 (Cambridge, 2018), chapter 12; [Henry Egan Kenny], ‘Trade in medieval Ireland’, in Seamus McManus, The story of the Irish race (Connecticut, 1921), 340–5. W.R. Childs, ‘Irish merchants and seamen in late medieval England’, Irish historical studies, vol. 32 no. 25 (May 2000), 22–43.

22 Michael Richter, Medieval Ireland (2nd ed., Dublin, 2005), quote p. 164.

23 Colm Lennon, Sixteenth-century Ireland (Dublin, 1994), 36–9; David Dickson, Dublin, 23, 26, 52–3.

24 Paul Kennedy, The rise and fall of the great powers: economic change and military conflict from 1500 to 2000 (London, 1988), 4–18, 21. Lawrence James, The rise and fall of the British Empire (London, 1995), 5.

25 Steven G. Ellis, Ireland in the age of the Tudors 1447–1603 (London, 1998), 214, 216; Sean Connolly, Contested island: Ireland 1460–1630 (Oxford, 2007), 93–7; Peter Crooks (ed.), Government, war and society, 298, 317–9.

26 Ciaran Brady, Shane O’Neill (Dundalk, 1997).

27 Michael Richter, Medieval Ireland (2nd ed., Dublin, 2005), 160, 176.

28 Doris Edel, The Celtic West and Europe (Dublin, 2001), 79.

29 Brendan Smith (ed.), Cambridge history of Ireland, vol. 1 (Cambridge, 2018), 347–52. The legislation outlawed a Spanish wine trade with Ireland and an Irish cloth trade with the continent that had operated through the ports of Bordeaux and Bruges. John Ryan S.J., Ireland from AD800 to AD1600 (Dublin, 1934), 227–9; Colm Lennon, Sixteenth-century Ireland (Dublin 1994), 6, 40–2.

30 Hiram Morgan, ‘Hugh O’Neill (1550–1616)’ and ‘Red Hugh O’Donnell (1572–1602)’, Dictionary of Irish biography (Cambridge, 2009).

31 Mary Ann Lyons, Thomas O’Connor, Strangers to citizens: the Irish in Europe 1600–1800 (Dublin, 2008).

32 Raymond Gillespie, Seventeenth-century Ireland (Dublin, 2006), 55–60, 103–4, 124–5, 138, 273, 274 (quote).

33 M. O’Driscoll, D. Keogh, J. aan de Wiel (eds), Ireland through European eyes (Cork, 2013), 192.

34 Paul Kennedy, The rise and fall of the great powers, 78–9, 82–9.

35 Micheál Ó Siochrú, ‘Owen Roe O’Neill (1580–1649)’, Dictionary of Irish biography (Cambridge, 2009).

36 Denis O’Hearn, The Atlantic economy: Britain, the US and Ireland (Manchester, 2001), chapter 2 (quote p. 28).

37 Sean Connolly, Contested island: Ireland 1460–1630 (Oxford, 2007), 302, 304.

38 Sean Connolly, Contested island: Ireland 1460–1630 (Oxford, 2007), 289–91, 301 (quotes).

39 Raymond Gillespie, Seventeenth-century Ireland, 102–3, 129.

40 Lawrence James, The rise and fall of the British empire, 6–7, 10–11; Raymond Gillespie, Seventeenth-century Ireland, 123–30; Terry Clavin, ‘Sir Thomas Wentworth (1593–1641)’, Dictionary of Irish biography (Cambridge, 2009); N.A.M. Rodger, The safeguard of the sea: a naval history of Britain, volume one (London, 1997), 379–94.

41 J.C. Appleby, Mary O’Dowd, ‘The Irish admiralty: its organisation and development c. 1570–1640’, Irish historical studies, vol. 24 no. 95 (May 1985), 299–326.

42 Tadhg Ó hAnnracháin, ‘Gian Battista Rinnucci (1592–1653)’, Dictionary of Irish biography (Cambridge, 2009); Jane Ohlmeyer, Civil war and restoration in the three Stuart kingdoms: the career of Randall MacDonnell, Marquis of Antrim 1609–1683 (Cambridge, 1993).

43 J.C. Appleby, Mary O’Dowd, ‘The Irish admiralty: its organisation and development c. 1570–1640’, Irish historical studies, vol. 24 no. 95 (May 1985), 325–6.

44 Raymond Gillespie, Seventeenth-century Ireland, 155–8; Micheál Ó Siochrú, ‘Owen Roe O’Neill (1580–1649)’, Dictionary of Irish biography (Cambridge, 2009).

45 Jane Ohlmeyer (ed.), Cambridge history of Ireland, vol. 2 (Cambridge, 2018), 269.

46 Michael Perceval Maxwell, ‘James Butler (1610–1688)’, Dictionary of Irish biography (Cambridge, 2009). Early examples of British diplomats leading the Irish administration included Sir William Temple (1628–99), Sir Cyril Wyche (1632–1707) and Sir Robert Southwell (1625–1702). Later examples included William Eden (1744–1804) and Alleyne Fitzherbert (1753–1839). Entries for these men exist in Dictionary of Irish biography.

47 Quote from John Gibney, ‘Sir William Temple (1628–99)’, Dictionary of Irish biography (Cambridge, 2009).

48 Sean Connolly, Religion, law and power: the making of Protestant Ireland 1660–1760 (Oxford, 1992).

49 Ian McBride, Eighteenth century Ireland (Dublin, 2009), 111. In the past, Irish parliaments had often met in other Leinster towns such as Drogheda, Kilkenny and Clonmel. Maurice Craig, Dublin 1660–1860 (Dublin, 1952), 1–5, 12–15.

50 Ian McBride, Eighteenth century Ireland (Dublin, 2009), 10; Raymond Gillespie, Seventeenth-century Ireland, 248–51, 273–4.

51 NLI, Ormonde papers (additional), MSS 48,367–77.

52 David Hayton, ‘James Butler (1665–1745)’, Dictionary of Irish biography (Cambridge, 2009); C.J. Woods, ‘Thomas Conolly (1738–1803)’, Dictionary of Irish biography (Cambridge, 2009).

53 Lawrence James, The rise and fall of the British Empire (London, 1995), 33.

54 Paul Kennedy, The rise and fall of the great powers: economic change and military conflict from 1500 to 2000 (London, 1988), 103–5.

55 Jane Ohlmeyer (ed.), Cambridge history of Ireland, vol. 2 (Cambridge, 2018), chapter 15; James Kelly (ed.), Cambridge history of Ireland, vol. 3 (Cambridge, 2018), chapter 23.

56 Owen McGee (ed.), Eugene Davis’ souvenirs of Irish footprints over Europe (1889, 2nd ed., Dublin, 2006), 175–8; Jane Ohlmeyer (ed.), Cambridge history of Ireland, vol. 2, 403–8.

57 ‘Ship’s pass signed by king on show’, Irish Independent, 5 Aug. 2010.

58 Ian McBride, Eighteenth century Ireland (Dublin, 2009), 126–31, 196–7, 240–4.

59 Historical Manuscripts Commission, Calendar of the Stuart Papers, vol. 5 (London, 1912), pp. 141–2, 155, 391, 402–3, 427, 492. Copies of relevant French War Ministry papers can be found in NLI, microfilms n. 547 and n. 1944.

60 Sean Connolly, Religion, law and power: the making of Protestant Ireland 1660–1760 (Oxford, 1992), 233–49.

61 P. Butel, L.M. Cullen (eds), Cities and merchants: French and Irish perspectives on urban development 1500–1900 (Dublin, 1986); Turlough O’Riordan, ‘Thomas Sutton (1722–1782)’, Dictionary of Irish biography (Cambridge, 2009).

62 Bernadette Whelan, American government in Ireland, 1790–1913: a history of the US consular service (Manchester, 2010), 2, 87 (quote).

63 Ian McBride, Eighteenth century Ireland (Dublin, 2009), 110; Patrick Geoghegan, ‘Simon Harcourt (1714–1777)’, Dictionary of Irish biography (Cambridge, 2009).

64 R.D.C. Black, ‘Theory and policy in Anglo-Irish trade relations 1775–1800’, Journal of the social and statistical inquiry society of Ireland, vol. 28 (1950), 312–14.

65 Thomas Bartlett, ‘George Macartney (1737–1806)’, Dictionary of Irish biography (Cambridge, 2009).

66 Daniel Beaumont, ‘William George Digges LaTouche (1747–1803)’, Dictionary of Irish biography (Cambridge, 2009); F.S.L. Lyons (ed.), Bank of Ireland 1783–1983 (Dublin, 1983).

67 Louis Cullen, Princes and pirates: the Dublin Chamber of Commerce 1783–1983 (Dublin, 1983); Sean Connolly (ed.), Belfast 400: people, place and history (Liverpool, 2012), 22–3; Ian McBride, Eighteenth century Ireland, 11–12.

68 Ciaran O’Neill, ‘Education, imperial careers and the Irish Catholic elite in the nineteenth century’, in D. Dickson, J. Pyz, C. Shepard (eds), Irish classrooms and British empire (Dublin, 2012), 98–110.

69 Jessica Harland-Jacobs, Builders of Empire: freemasons and British imperialism 1717–1927 (University of North Carolina, 2007); C.J. Woods, ‘Archibald Hamilton Rowan (1751–1834)’, Dictionary of Irish biography (Cambridge, 2009).

70 C.J. Woods, ‘Leonard MacNally (1752–1820)’, Dictionary of Irish biography (Cambridge, 2009); C.J. Woods, ‘William Jackson (1737–1795)’, Dictionary of Irish biography (Cambridge, 2009).

71 Kevin Whelan, ‘Lord Edward FitzGerald (1763–98)’, Dictionary of Irish biography (Cambridge, 2009).

72 Thomas Bartlett, ‘Theobald Wolfe Tone (1763–98)’, Dictionary of Irish biography (Cambridge, 2009).

73 Patrick Geoghegan, ‘Robert Stewart (1769–1822)’, Dictionary of Irish biography (Cambridge, 2009).

74 Marianne Elliott, Partners in revolution: the United Irishmen and France (Yale, 1982), 323–64.

75 Michael Funchion (ed.), Irish American voluntary organisations (Connecticut, 1983); Patrick Geoghegan, ‘David Bailie Warden (1772–1845)’, Dictionary of Irish biography (Cambridge, 2009).

76 Bernadette Whelan, American government in Ireland, 1790–1913: a history of the US consular service (Manchester, 2010), 85–95; Denis O’Hearn, ‘Ireland and the Atlantic economy’, in Terence McDonough (ed.), Was Ireland a colony?: economic, politics and culture in nineteenth-century Ireland (Dublin, 2005).

77 Owen McGee (ed.), Eugene Davis’ souvenirs of Irish footprints over Europe (1889, 2nd ed., Dublin, 2006), 121–2, 133–6; Maria O’Brien, ‘Augusta Mary Anne Holmes (1847–1903)’, Dictionary of Irish biography (Cambridge, 2009). Holmes was the daughter of an Irish-born French military officer.

78 This dynamic particularly defined the careers of Thomas Moore and Daniel Maclise. Fintan Cullen, R.F. Foster, ‘Conquering England’: Ireland in Victorian London (London, 2005), 57–9.

79 Howard Gaskill (ed.), The reception of Ossian in Europe (London, 2004).

80 Robert Somerville-Woodward, The Ossianic society 1853–1863 (Dublin, 1999); W.B. Yeats, Collected poems (London, 1989).

81 Owen McGee (ed.), Eugene Davis’ souvenirs of Irish footprints over Europe (1889, 2nd ed., Dublin, 2006), 179–81; Gerard Keown, First of the small nations: the beginnings of Irish foreign policy in the interwar years 1919–1932 (Oxford, 2015), 89.

82 James Donnelly, The great Irish potato famine (Gloucester, 2002), chapter 7.

83 James Donnelly, The great Irish potato famine (Gloucester, 2002), chapter 3.

84 In 1880, at a time of about 14,000 evictions in the west of Ireland, the Irish National Land League collected about £245,000 in the United States for Irish relief aid. At the same time, a Dublin Mansion House Relief Fund collected £180,000 within the United Kingdom and the British colonies. As the former fund emanated from outside British jurisdiction, however, the Land League was declared illegal and prior recipients of its funds were imprisoned on charges of sedition. C.C. O’Brien, Parnell and his party (Oxford, 1957), 134–5; T.W. Moody, Davitt and Irish revolution (Oxford, 1981); Mansion House Relief Committee (Dublin, 1881); Samuel Clark, Social origins of the land war (Philadelphia, 1974), 306.

85 Ciaran O’Neill, ‘Education, imperial careers and the Irish Catholic elite in the nineteenth century’, in D. Dickson, J. Pyz, C. Shepard (eds), Irish classrooms and British empire (Dublin, 2012), 108–9; Francis M. Carroll, ‘Thomas D’Arcy McGee (1825–68)’, Dictionary of Irish biography (Cambridge, 2009). On this theme, see also the Dictionary of Irish biography entries for John Hobart Caradoc (1799–1873) and Thomas Colley Grattan (1781–1864), and George C. Herring, From colony to superpower: US foreign relations since 1776 (Oxford, 2008), 185–7.

86 Damian Shiels, The Irish in the American civil war (Dublin, 2013); Arthur Mitchell (ed.), Fighting Irish in the American civil war and the invasion of Mexico (North Carolina, 2017).

87 Kerby Miller, Emigrants and exiles: Ireland and the Irish exodus to North America (Oxford, 1985).

88 George C. Herring, From colony to superpower: US foreign relations since 1776 (Oxford, 2008), 214.

89 See, for instance, the Dictionary of Irish biography entries for Thomas Devin Reilly, John Mitchel, John Savage, Joseph Brenan, Thomas Francis Meagher, Thomas D’Arcy McGee, Terence Bellew McManus, Michael Doheny, John O’Mahony, Thomas Joseph Kelly, John Devoy and John Finerty.

90 George C. Herring, From colony to superpower: US foreign relations since 1776 (Oxford, 2008), 160, 196, 215.

91 Peter O’Leary, ‘Daniel Florence O’Leary (1801–1854)’, Dictionary of Irish biography (Cambridge, 2009). Department of foreign affairs and trade, The Irish in Latin America (Dublin, 2016).

92 See the Dictionary of Irish biography entries for James Francis Xavier O’Brien, Thomas Francis Bourke and William George Halpin.

93 George C. Herring, From colony to superpower: US foreign relations since 1776 (Oxford, 2008), 180, 214–16.

94 William D’Arcy, The Fenian movement in the United States (Washington D.C., 1947). The British foreign office collected copies of these American Fenian statements for intelligence purposes. Many of these can now be found in the National Archives of Ireland in Dublin.

95 Bernadette Whelan, American government in Ireland, 1790–1913: a history of the US consular service (Manchester, 2010), 85, 95–7.

96 Bernadette Whelan, American government in Ireland, 97–9.

97 J.P. Rodechko, Patrick Ford and his search for America (New York, 1976); Owen McGee, ‘John Finerty (1846–1908)’, Dictionary of Irish biography (Cambridge, 2009).

98 George C. Herring, From colony to superpower: US foreign relations since 1776 (Oxford, 2008), 96–8, 116–17, 126–9, 185-7.

99 David A. Lake, ‘The state and American trade strategy in the pre-hegemonic era’, International organization: the state and American foreign economic policy, vol. 42 no. 1 (winter 1988), 33–58.

100 George C. Herring, From colony to superpower: US foreign relations since 1776 (Oxford, 2008), 282 (quote); David Sim, A union forever: the Irish question and US foreign relations in the Victorian age (New York, 2013).

101 A. Landy, ‘A French adventurer and American expansionism after the civil war’, Science and society, vol. 15 no. 4 (fall 1951), 313–33; Marta Ramon, A provisional dictator: James Stephens and the Fenian movement (Dublin, 2007), 205.

102 Speeches of American Fenian filibusters who were arrested in Ireland, such as John McCafferty and Thomas Francis Bourke, virtually alleged that the British foreign office had manipulated the American civil war into happening. [A.M. Sullivan], Speeches from the dock (Dublin, 1868). In practice, the principal American grievance with Britain was the degree to which it gave practical recognition to the Confederacy as a belligerent. Paradoxically, McCafferty himself was a former Confederate.

103 ‘Henri Le Caron’ [Thomas Henry Beach], Twenty-five years in the secret service (London, 1893).

104 Leon O’Broin, Fenian fever: an Anglo-American dilemma (London, 1971).

105 Marta Ramon, A provisional dictator, quote p. 59.

106 Lucy E. Salyer, Under the starry flag: how a band of Irish Americans joined the Fenian Brotherhood and sparked a crisis over citizenship (Cambridge, 2018).

107 Arthur Mitchell (ed.), Fighting Irish in the American civil war and the invasion of Mexico (North Carolina, 2017), 238–53.

108 The text of the Vatican’s official condemnation of the Fenians can be found in D’Arcy, Fenian movement, 329.

109 One Fenian, William Randall Roberts, did become associated with Tammany Hall and served one undistinguished term as American minister for Chile under the Democratic administration of Grover Cleveland (1884–8). Owen McGee, ‘William Randall Roberts (1830–97)’, Dictionary of Irish biography (Cambridge, 2009).

110 See the entries for John Savage, Thomas Joseph Kelly, John Finerty and Patrick Egan in the Dictionary of Irish biography.

111 Róisín Healy, Poland in the Irish nationalist imagination 1772–1922: anti-colonialism within Europe (London, 2017).

112 Owen McGee, The IRB (Dublin, 2005), 32–6, 62–3.

113 A. Landy, ‘A French adventurer and American expansionism after the civil war’, Science and society, vol. 15 no. 4 (fall 1951), 313–33. The text of the proclamation can be found in John Newsinger, Fenianism in mid-Victorian Britain (London, 1994), 54–5.

114 Owen McGee, The IRB (Dublin, 2005), chapters 2–4.

115 Bernadette Whelan, ‘President Ulysses Grant’s Irish tour, 1879’, History Ireland, vol. 19 no. 1 (Jan.–Feb. 2011); George C. Herring, From colony to superpower: US foreign relations since 1776 (Oxford, 2008), 265 (quote).

116 Owen McGee, The IRB (Dublin, 2005), 60–5.

117 Noel Kissane, Parnell: a documentary history (Dublin, 1991), 28–9; Owen McGee, ‘William Carroll (1835–1926)’, Dictionary of Irish biography (Cambridge, 2009). Although a Westminster MP, Parnell had an anti-British ancestor who served as an officer in the American navy during its 1812 war against Britain.

118 John Devoy, ‘The story of Clan na Gael’, Gaelic American (weekly serial, Sep. 1923–Apr. 1925).

119 Owen McGee, The IRB (Dublin, 2005), chapters 4–5.

120 Margaret O’Callaghan, British high politics and a nationalist Ireland (Cork, 1994); M.L. Legg, Newspapers and nationalism (Dublin, 1999), 136–8, 168–9; Owen McGee, The IRB, 86–7, 121–130.

121 Christy Campbell, Fenian fire (London, 2002); Owen McGee, The IRB (Dublin, 2005), chapters 4–7; British Library, Althorp Papers, Add77033, letter of E.G. Jenkinson, 3 Apr. 1884, and Add77036, letters of E.G. Jenkinson, 14 Feb. and 16 Mar. 1885.

122 T.W. Moody, ‘The Times versus Parnell and Co., 1887–90’, Historical studies, 6 (1968), 147–82.

123 Janick Julienne, ‘La question Irlandaise en France de 1860 à 1890’ (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Paris VII, 1997); Owen McGee, The IRB, 185–6.

124 Egan served as American minister to Chile (1889–93). Owen McGee, ‘Patrick Egan (1841–1919)’, Dictionary of Irish biography (Cambridge, 2009).

125 George C. Herring, From colony to superpower: US foreign relations since 1776 (Oxford, 2008), 282 (quoting Blaine).

126 Stephen Ball (ed.), Dublin Castle and the first home rule crisis (Cambridge, 2008).

127 Patrick O’Farrell, The Irish in Australia (Kensington, 1987), chapters 5–6; Mark McGowan, The wearing of the green: Catholics, the Irish and identity in Toronto 1887–1922 (Montreal, 1999).

128 David Noel Doyle, Irish Americans, native rights and national empires (Dublin, 1976); Michael Funchion (ed.), Irish American voluntary organisations (Connecticut, 1983), 183–9.

129 Owen McGee, The IRB, chapter 9.

130 The representative at the Hague conference was George Gavan Duffy, a London-Irish lawyer and Francophile Sinn Féiner. Gerard Keown, First of the small nations: the beginnings of Irish foreign policy in the interwar years 1919–1932 (Oxford, 2015), 26.

131 Patrick Geoghegan, Liberator: the life and death of Daniel O’Connell 1830–1847 (Dublin, 2010); Eoin MacNeill, Daniel O’Connell and Sinn Féin (Dublin, 1917).

132 Arthur Griffith, How Ireland is taxed (Dublin, 1907), 5, 8–9.

133 Arthur Griffith, The resurrection of Hungary: a parallel for Ireland (Dublin, 1904).

134 Arthur Griffith, The resurrection of Hungary: a parallel for Ireland with appendices on Pitt’s Policy and Sinn Féin (3rd ed., Dublin, 1918), 162.

135 Owen McGee, Arthur Griffith (Dublin, 2015), 78, 129–31. A handful of Irish champions of cooperative farming and cooperative banking went on educational business tours of America during Theodore Roosevelt’s term in office.

136 Jerome aan de Wiel, The Irish factor 1899–1919: Ireland’s strategic and diplomatic importance for foreign powers (Dublin, 2008), xvii, 4.

137 Michael Doorley, Irish-American diaspora nationalism (Dublin, 2005); Carl Wittke, The Irish in America (New York, 1956), 274–6 (quote).

138 George C. Herring, From colony to superpower, 132–7, 142–4, 154–7, 185–7.

139 Bernadette Whelan, American government in Ireland, 1790–1913: a history of the US consular service (Manchester, 2010), 262 (quote), 265.

140 Sean Connolly (ed.), Belfast 400: people, place and history (Liverpool, 2012), 27, 31, 37, 36, 41–2.

141 L. Litvack, C. Graham (eds), Ireland and Europe in the nineteenth century (Dublin, 2006), 117–21.

142 Fergus Gaines, ‘Sir Robert Hart (1835–1911)’, Dictionary of Irish biography (Cambridge, 2009); Linda Lunney, ‘Sir John Newell Jordan (1852–1925)’, Dictionary of Irish biography (Cambridge, 2009).

143 James Quinn, ‘James Bryce (1838–1922)’, Dictionary of Irish biography (Cambridge, 2009).

144 G.R. Watson, The Ulster Covenant and Scotland (Belfast, 2012).

145 The text of the Anglo-American Arbitration Treaty can be found in The advocate of peace, vol. 73 no. 9 (Sep. 1911), 196–8.

146 Michael Doorley, Irish-American diaspora nationalism (Dublin, 2005), 28–30 (quote p. 28).

147 Owen McGee, Arthur Griffith, 107, 113.

148 W.E. Vaughan (ed.), A new history of Ireland, vol. 5 (Oxford, 1996), 791–4; W.E. Vaughan (ed.), A new history of Ireland, vol. 6 (Oxford, 1996), 355.

149 Jerome aan de Wiel, The Irish factor 1899–1919: Ireland’s strategic and diplomatic importance for foreign powers (Dublin, 2008), 22; W.E. Vaughan (ed.), A new history of Ireland, vol. 5 (Oxford, 1996), 794 (quote). Of the £11 million spent on UK coastal defence during the 1860s, only £120,000 of this was expended in Ireland (Cork) because it was believed that any invasion attempt would be concentrated on southern England. It was also considered that Irish ports would be inconvenient bases for any enemy force to use as part of a greater attack upon Britain. The development of submarine technology altered this perspective.

150 Sir Halford Mackinder, a Glasgow Tory MP, was its effective author. For an appreciative study of his writings, see Geoffrey Sloan, ‘Ireland and the geopolitics of Anglo-Irish relations’, Irish studies review, vol. 15 no. 2 (2007), 163–79.

151 Erskine Childers, The framework of home rule (London, 1911), chapter 10, part 3.

152 Patrick Buckland, James Craig (Dublin, 1980), 36.

153 Seamus Dunn, T.G. Fraser (eds), Europe and ethnicity: World War I and contemporary ethnic conflict (London, 1996), chapter 10.

154 Roger Casement, Ireland, Germany and the freedom of the seas (Philadelphia, 1914).

155 Jerome aan de Wiel, The Irish factor 1899–1919: Ireland’s strategic and diplomatic importance for foreign powers (Dublin, 2008), quoted 324.

156 Gabriel Doherty, Dermot Keogh (eds), 1916 (Cork, 2007).

157 NAI, Bureau of Military History papers, WS1170; Owen McGee, Arthur Griffith, 155–6, 161–5, 180–1. While many appeals were issued against his sentence, Casement’s posthumous reputation as a hanged rebel was shaped not least by memoirs by Robert Monteith in the 1930s and the British government’s offer of a return of his remains in 1965. De Valera chose to honour Casement in 1965 on the grounds of his initial work in highlighting human rights abuses in the Congo rather than his actions during the First World War. This reflected the fact that Casement’s ‘German Plot’ had led the British government to arrest de Valera and other Sinn Féin leaders and imprison them without trial for the best part of a year on the false charge of being German agents rather than Irish nationalists. Maurice Moynihan (ed.), Speeches and statements of Éamon de Valera 1917–1973 (Dublin, 1980), 604.

158 Nationality, 23 June 1917, 8 September 1917, 3 November 1917, 17 November 1917, 8 December 1917, 10 August 1918, 5 October 1918.

159 Arthur Griffith (ed.), The Resurrection of Hungary with appendices on Pitt’s policy and Sinn Féin (3rd edition, Dublin, 1918), preface, xii.