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INTRODUCTION

North of Jefferson

The Problem

Historians and the wider public continue to be fascinated by Thomas Jefferson, who seems to embody a fundamental American contradiction. An advocate of republican government, principal author of the Declaration of Independence, and given at times to ideological musings that bordered on the anarchic, Jefferson also owned hundreds of slaves, had a long-term affair with his bondwoman Sally Hemings, and, like most slaveholders, considered the birth of slave children “an addition to capital.”¹ Driven by hagiography, criticism, and, more often than not, the passion engendered by his many contradictions, scholars continue to study Jefferson’s life and voluminous correspondence, hoping to discover some fundamental truth about the American political order, about the vexed relationship between liberty, power, and race that runs throughout the history of the United States.

But for all the attention devoted to Thomas Jefferson, there has been surprisingly less analysis of the problem of slavery within the Democratic-Republican party, the political coalition that elected Jefferson president of the United States in 1800. Jeffersonian democracy, far more so than Jefferson’s personality, shaped the long-term relationship between freedom and slavery in American history. As a political movement, it brought together northerners and southerners, gentry elites and men on the rise, evangelicals and freethinkers, cosmopolitans and nationalists, and, most crucially of all, democrats and slaveholders. The Democratic-Republican coalition united the vanguard of democratization in the northern states and the most adamant representatives of southern mastery. Men who believed the United States should be a beacon of democracy for a world enslaved by aristocratic power became the political allies of men who believed the United States was obliged to protect a master’s right to enslave. This diverse composition was torn at times by sectional and ideological conflict, but it consistently found unity in American nationalism and the political aspirations of white men. And that unity proved essential to the preservation of slavery in a democratizing polity.

This book studies a diverse set of white men who helped build Jeffersonian democracy in the North from the late 1790s to the early 1820s. As a group, these northerners present a very different intellectual problem from that posed by a slaveholder who believed in universal human freedom yet could not free his slaves. They force us to think about how slavery was tolerated not by the minority of masters in the early American electorate, but by the majority of non-slaveholders, whose relationships to slavery were often far less direct. To trace these relationships is to examine the pervasiveness of slavery, a complex institution that affected masters, non-slaveholders, and slaves alike. Masters and slaves understood slavery as governed first and foremost by individual control and domination; such power was necessary to maintain property rights in slaves. But the masters themselves were governed by a national polity in which non-slaveholders predominated. Slavery thus required some degree of toleration, if not consent, by non-slaveholders. Beyond the individualized dominion of masters, slavery required individual acts of accommodation on the part of the masterless majority, daily decisions to accept life in the midst of the extreme authority necessary to enslave. Without such accommodation, the slaveholding republic of the United States could not have survived as long as it did.²

And yet such accommodation could never be taken for granted, for the very ideological commitments that brought Jeffersonians together threatened to drive them apart. This was especially true at the national level, despite the protections of slaveholder property rights and power in the U.S. Constitution. Had the Democratic-Republican coalition simply been a racial compact between white men, all of whom agreed that perpetuating slavery served their political, social, and economic interests, it would have been far more reliable from the perspective of slaveholders. Instead, ties to slavery were often more subtle, formed out of universalist ideals and aspirations as much as narrow prejudice and self-interest. Northerners embraced the Democratic-Republican coalition for two primary and often intertwined reasons: to advance democracy and build the American nation-state. Throughout the early republic, democracy and nationalism bound whites to a slave society, as northern Republicans looked to southern masters like Jefferson to lead them to political freedom. This ideological encounter with slavery inevitably warped democratic ideals. Accommodation of slaveholder power subdued antislavery argument and promoted disregard for African Americans as legitimate political subjects. Institutional and ideological pressures to reconcile with Jeffersonian slaveholders constrained democratic universalism, as race and national belonging began to take precedence over more cosmopolitan ethical and political commitments.

But the democratic reconciliation with slavery always remained uneasy. Northern Republicans frequently challenged southern power at the national level, and they occasionally made universalist claims in defense of free African Americans, even as the northern polity became more restricted by race. Slaveholders, meanwhile, consistently demanded autonomous control over the regulation of slavery. These demands were produced by the nature of slaveholder power, not simply by a general desire to limit the power of the new federal government over the states. And they were rarely acceded to by all northerners. In practical terms, the accord between slavery and American democracy was clearly successful, as both institutions expanded dramatically throughout the early national period. But in ideological terms, it remained tenuous, because slaveholder power could never fully be incorporated into a democratic ethos.

This book reexamines the rise of early national democratic ideology in the context of slavery, tracing northern responses to slaveholder power as they shifted back and forth between accommodation and dissent. While I include some figures from the northern political elite, relative equals to southern gentry like Jefferson, the majority of characters in this book come from the “middling” ranks of early national American society—tradesmen and farmers who rose to political prominence through the Republican coalition, newspaper editors, a Baptist minister, and a number of European immigrants and democratic radicals.³ These white men were the principal agents and beneficiaries of Jeffersonian democracy, and their words and actions constitute the main sources used in this book.⁴

The predominance of white men in the narrative reflects their predominance in the Democratic-Republican coalition and in the United States government, but it also obscures the more complex world of early national politics. As a number of historians have shown, women played an active role in early national political life. They also engaged in wider ideological debates over slavery in civil society. Likewise, free African-Americans had an important impact on northern politics and particularly on the politics of slavery, even in places where they were barred from the polls by various mechanisms. Yet formal democratic politics—voting and office-holding—were confined to men and, over time, to white men especially. While there are good studies that document how race and gender shaped the rise of American democracy, this book focuses instead on the impact of slavery which, as I argue throughout, had a determinative influence on the politics of race in the northern states.⁵ Taking white male democrats on their own terms, through the political institutions and political culture that they developed, I focus my analysis on how their responses to slavery shaped democracy in the North and at the national level.

I focus primarily on ideology and political argument in Congress, in newspapers and pamphlets, and in political celebrations. But I also pay close attention to the individual political actors whose thoughts and words compose the primary evidence in this study, in order to capture the subjective dimension of early national political life. Jeffersonians believed that to be a democrat was to think for oneself: to form independent political opinions and exercise autonomous judgment. Mobilizing individuals was therefore a task not for customary authorities but for self-conscious political actors, men who employed ideology to build connections between individual subjects and partisan and state institutions. Opponents sometimes castigated Jeffersonian ideologues as schemers with purely instrumental ends, but to true believers, political argument had a higher purpose—to liberate men from arbitrary rule so that they could think and vote on their own behalf. Democracy thus depended on individual conscience as much as political institutions.

What was true for democracy was true for slavery, since these two institutions were inseparable in the Democratic-Republican party and in Jeffersonian America. Slavery affected democratic thought and practice from the outset, and it posed an ideological problem that democratic subjects had to address. Contending with slavery was an almost daily act for anyone who read the main Jeffersonian paper from Washington, the National Intelligencer, as fugitive advertisements and slave sales consistently lined its pages. It was an even more pressing issue for northerners who traveled to Washington after 1800, since slavery was a viable institution in the new national capital and southern slaveholders predominated in the federal government. This book emphasizes that all of these individual encounters with slavery mattered deeply to the development of democratic politics and political culture in the United States. In a far more pervasive and deeper way than Jefferson’s by turns agonized and racist musings in Notes on the State of Virginia, it was countless individual acts of conscience—decisions to accept, ignore, challenge, and attack slavery—that defined the relationship between bondage and freedom in the early United States.

That relationship, this book argues, was ultimately ambivalent. On the one hand, northern democrats made significant concessions to slavery, both ideological and institutional. That allowed slaveholders considerable freedom under the United States government, which they used to protect and expand human bondage. On the other hand, when faced with blunt manifestations of slaveholder power, northern Jeffersonians tended to oppose their southern colleagues. At times, they also defended the rights of free African Americans. In practical terms, this dialectic between accommodation and conflict was decided in favor of slaveholders, who were by any measure more powerful and more secure in the 1820s than they were in the 1790s. Taking the long view, however, Jeffersonian democracy did reveal a potential threat to the institution of slavery: the possibility that a majority of American citizens would refuse to tolerate the coercion necessary to maintain it. That threat existed not because the founding documents or fathers of the United States somehow possessed an inherent antislavery idealism, but because enslaved people, free blacks, abolitionists, slaveholders, and nonslaveholding whites, in various ways and with various motives, forced the problem of slavery into national political life.⁶ By the end of the Jeffersonian period, slaveholders had secured considerable power in the national government, while the rise of white supremacy and racial exclusion in the North constrained abolitionism and free African American agency. On the other hand, by 1820 slaveholding had become an irrepressible problem in national democratic politics. That would not change until slavery was abolished.

Historiography

Analyzing the democratic relationship to slavery requires paying attention to local, national, and transatlantic political developments, much as Jeffersonians themselves did in the newspapers that were the foundation of the early national public sphere. There are good, detailed studies of Jeffersonian democracy in the North, but their state level or regional focus entails a lack of attention to slavery, which began to decline across the northern states in the early nineteenth century. Until quite recently, national studies of early American democracy have either overlooked slavery or taken the northern United States as indicative of a wider American reality. Thus the constant caveat, “in the North at least,” in the work of Gordon Wood, who has done the most to popularize a vision of early national politics built around the contest between deference and democracy. Collectively, these versions of early national politics imply that slavery never became a substantive problem for the Republican coalition and that it therefore had little bearing on the formative years of democratic ideology and political culture.⁷

In many ways, this is an argument Jefferson would have endorsed. He famously called the Missouri Crisis of 1819–1821 a “fire bell in the night,” implying that the early national period had been free from serious conflict over slavery before then. But historians have long known this was not the case. Antislavery historians writing before and after the Civil War stressed the political impact of the “slave power” from the Constitution onward. Slavery and sectional difference were less present but still potent in Henry Adams’s brilliant synthesis of the early republic, published in the 1880s. In the early twentieth century, however, the influential scholarship of Charles Beard established a new narrative for the early republic. Beard insisted that Jeffersonian democracy was driven by conflict between agrarian and financial interests, much along the lines he had laid out in his Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States. Identifying a shared hostility to finance capital between southern slaveholders and northern farmers, Beard minimized the impact of slavery on early national politics.⁸ The contemporaneous reinterpretation of the Civil War and Reconstruction by William Dunning and his students likewise suppressed an earlier antislavery historiography. These two traditions merged in the work of popular historian, Democratic partisan, and Indiana racist Claude G. Bowers, who wrote best-selling narratives of the early republic, Jacksonian democracy and “the tragic era” of Reconstruction.⁹

African American historians and intellectuals contested these stories of the United States, which left little room for black people, past or present, and suppressed the influence of slavery on national political life. W. E. B. Du Bois’s Harvard dissertation on the international slave trade documented the influence of slavery on domestic politics and foreign policy, while his Black Reconstruction in America opposed the mainstream interpretations of the Dunning school.¹⁰ Finally, in the mid-twentieth century, following in the wake of new histories of slavery by John Hope Franklin, Kenneth Stampp, and others, scholars began to bring the problem of slavery back into studies of the early republic. Inspired by abolitionist historians and the Civil Rights movement, Staughton Lynd criticized Beard and insisted on the political importance of slavery in a series of essays in the 1960s. In the 1970s, David Brion Davis and political scientist Donald Robinson wrote detailed histories of slavery as an ideological and political problem after the American Revolution. In the late 1980s, Robin Blackburn’s comparative work offered a hemispheric context for thinking about the relationship between the rise of a democratic nation-state and the expansion of slavery in the early United States.¹¹ Yet these books did not have a major impact on early American political history as a whole, which is somewhat surprising given the intellectual power of Davis’s and Blackburn’s work. Political historians instead focused on the problem of “republicanism,” rather than slavery, for much of the 1970s and 1980s.¹² Throughout the twentieth century, dominant historical interpretations of early national political life have treated slavery as a marginal institution.

This state of affairs now seems to have changed, perhaps in a permanent way. In recent years, a large number of historians have returned to the political history of slavery and abolition in the early national period. Institutional historians have examined slavery’s deep impact on the structures of American governance from the Revolution to the early republic;¹³ historians of political culture have shown the intricate ways slavery affected early American political ideology;¹⁴ and political historians and historians of abolitionism have documented intense debate over slavery in the early republic, in conflicts over territorial expansion, fugitive slaves, antislavery petitions to the Congress, diplomacy with Saint-Domingue, and the treatment of free African Americans in the North.¹⁵ The intensity of early national conflict did not match the Missouri debates, or the subsequent antebellum struggle over slavery. But in many ways it helped set the terms for those later debates, not least by shaping a democratic political order in which slavery was deeply entrenched.

Yet the problem of slavery for Jeffersonian democracy remains relatively unexplored. Studies of the Federalist party, the minority opposition after 1800, have collectively drawn a subtle portrait of a northern and conservative antislavery voice that was especially strong in New England.¹⁶ In contrast, analysis of the northern Jeffersonian relationship to slavery tends to be less complex, with historians generally taking one of two positions: either Jeffersonians opposed slavery on democratic grounds, or else they accepted slavery as the price of a white man’s democracy, anticipating the racialized republic of the Jacksonian period.¹⁷ Neither position captures the true dilemma of Jeffersonian politics, which tied slavery to democracy in a number of far more intricate ways, relying as much on egalitarian idealism as on racial exclusion. The reconciliation between democratization and enslavement was uneasy and never straightforward, but in pragmatic terms it was quite successful. Slavery and democracy expanded together, bound in an alliance that proved difficult to untangle.

Narrative

The Democratic-Republican coalition took form in the 1790s in order to oppose the Federalist coalition that had emerged under the presidency of George Washington. Ideological divisions over the nature and power of the new federal government were already present in the First Congress, which sat in New York, and escalated when the national capital moved to Philadelphia in 1790. The diplomatic and ideological repercussions of the French Revolution further heightened partisan conflict, and by the mid-1790s Republicans and Federalists were fighting each other from Georgia to Massachusetts and had begun to coordinate local and national struggles. Republicans were stronger in the South than in the North in the 1790s, as the presidential election of 1796 demonstrated: Jefferson won all the southern states save Maryland and Delaware. But during the Adams administration, the Republican opposition gained power in the North in response to the 1798 Alien and Sedition Acts, which sought to suppress democratic agitators in the North and exclude immigrant radicals from the United States. In this predominantly northern struggle, southern Republicans proved key allies. In the election of 1800, the bisectional Democratic-Republican coalition recorded one of the signal triumphs in American political history. Without the organization of the mass democratic parties of the antebellum period, Republicans swept Federalists from office in the presidency and in both houses of Congress, inaugurating two decades of national dominance by Jeffersonian democracy.

The “Revolution of 1800” (as Jefferson called it) is often represented as a victory for democracy, which it no doubt was for many Republican partisans. It was also a victory for slaveholders. In the southern states, the Republicans were already the dominant party in 1800, and southern Federalism, outside Maryland and Delaware, had all but collapsed by Jefferson’s second term. The three-fifths clause in the U.S. Constitution, which gave additional electoral weight to the South based on the slave population, augmented the national power of southern Republicans. Southern preponderance was most obvious in the fact that Republicans elected Virginia slaveholders to the presidency for six terms in a row: Thomas Jefferson (1801–1808), James Madison (1809–1816), and James Monroe (1817–1824). Beyond the presidency, slaveholders held sway in the early Jeffersonian Congresses, where they defended the rights of masters to govern their slaves, and the institution of slavery, as they saw fit. A coalition that promoted democracy in the North also protected the prerogatives of slaveholders in the South.

The heyday of Jeffersonian democracy coincided with a pivotal period in the history of American slavery. From the 1790s to the 1820s, masters began to aggressively push the peculiar institution to the West, as they exploited enslaved labor to produce short-staple cotton for the British market. The slave population of the South surged from roughly 700,000 to 1.5 million between 1790 and 1820, and the United States entered the antebellum period poised to become the dominant slaveholding society in the Western Hemisphere. Jeffersonians played a critical role in this process. Aggressive foreign and military policies helped cement territorial sovereignty over the new states of Mississippi, Alabama, and Louisiana. The defense of slaveholder property rights by southern Jeffersonians facilitated the rise of a massive domestic trade in enslaved people after 1808. By 1820, Republican victories at the state and national levels had confirmed the triumph of democracy for white men in the North. Meanwhile, slaveholder power in the Republican coalition, in conjunction with southwestern expansion, cotton production, and the domestic slave trade, ensured the dominance of slavery in the antebellum South.¹⁸

This book integrates the two main developments of Jeffersonian America by trying to understand how white northerners, in the midst of their democratic transformation, came to terms with the growing power of slavery. The northern Republican response to slavery varied from individual to individual and, in many cases, an individual’s response to slavery varied across time, shifting from opposition to accommodation—and then, in more cases than one, back to opposition. The strength of Jeffersonian political culture lay less in its ability to impose any one uniform response to the problem of slavery than in its ability to contain contradictory sentiments about the institution in a wider culture of democratic nationalism.

Jeffersonian democracy thus followed a crooked path, but not a haphazard one. The political intensity of the 1790s created powerful pressures and incentives for northerners to join southern masters in the fight against Federalism, and that entailed some accommodation of slaveholder power. The first two chapters explore this process in two different locations, Federalist New England and Jeffersonian Philadelphia, where negotiating the problem of slavery was an inevitable condition of democratic politics.

In New England, Federalists contested Republican claims to be persecuted democrats by arguing that Jeffersonian political power depended directly on the institution of slavery. This forced Republicans to publicly come to terms with their ties to the South. They did so by insisting on their own political oppression, aggrandized throughout the Jeffersonian press. The experience of northern freedom served as collateral in an ideological alliance that brought democracy to New England while entrenching slavery in the South.

Similar transactions defined the nature of Jeffersonian democracy in Philadelphia, but the terrain was very different. Philadelphia, was in many ways the most heterogeneous and egalitarian place in the early United States, home to a large free black community, an influential antislavery organization, and articulate immigrant radicals who imported European struggles against aristocracy into the United States. Philadelphia was a crossroads where democracy collided with slavery and cosmopolitanism collided with race. Chapter 2 examines these intersections from the perspective of three Irish American immigrants, John Binns, Thomas Branagan, and William Duane. All three believed that America should serve, as Tom Paine had argued, as an “asylum of freedom” and an exemplar of democratic rule. They reframed personal and transatlantic struggles for liberation in terms of American nationalism, lending the illusion of universality to the recently invented United States. At the same time, all three men came to some sort of accommodation with slavery, a coercive institution bent on denying asylum to enslaved people.

In New England and Pennsylvania, the rise of the Republican coalition demanded some accommodation of slavery. Jeffersonian success, however, also produced new sources of sectional discord. Chapters 3 and 4 examine sectional conflicts over slavery in the Republican coalition, which often turned on the relationship between slaveholder power and democratic governance. The relative ideological accord between slavery and democracy developed by white men in the North repeatedly broke down when it came to the institutional politics of slavery at the national level.

As Chapter 3 demonstrates, from the 1790s onward, conflict over slavery was no longer resolved by brokering between regional elites. Instead, slavery was entangled in partisan struggles between Federalists and Republicans, and thus in the national politics of democracy. When northern Jeffersonians came to Washington after 1800, they encountered some of the most powerful slaveholders in the nation, who were often far more adamant in the defense of slavery than Thomas Jefferson. On issue after issue, from fugitive slave rendition, to the end of the international slave trade, to the expansion of slavery to the West, southerners confronted northern Republicans and fought to control slavery on their own terms. Effectively, they demanded that democracy check its advance where slavery was concerned. On that question, slaveholders alone should rule. As northern Republicans repeatedly encountered the antidemocratic posture of slaveholders, they turned to dissidence, disillusion, and in some cases revocation of the Jeffersonian alliance.

Slavery was hardly the only issue that fueled northern discontent with the Democratic-Republican coalition. Republican attempts to respond to the diplomatic crises of the Napoleonic wars by restricting American commerce alienated many men in the North, catalyzing sectionalism and regional envy of southern power. Once northerners began to think in sectional terms, it was difficult to prevent them from attacking the political power of slavery in the federal government. Chapter 4 outlines the emergence of northern sectionalist thought in the Democratic-Republican coalition, from the early Jeffersonian years to the onset of the War of 1812. Tracing debates over Jeffersonian foreign policy and northern resentment of Virginia rule, the chapter concludes with an analysis of the Clintonian campaigns of 1808 and 1812, when George and then DeWitt Clinton challenged James Madison for the presidency. In 1812, DeWitt Clinton came close to defeating Madison and undoing Virginia’s hold on the presidency, while some of Clinton’s supporters broke with the ideological structure of Jeffersonian democracy created in the 1790s.

Yet in the midst of internal dissent and renewed Federalist attacks, Jeffersonian democracy demonstrated a remarkable resilience. The Democratic-Republican coalition’s true strength became apparent in the critical year of 1812. Faced with domestic and diplomatic challenges, Jeffersonians managed to maintain their preponderance in national politics and redefine American nationalism on Republican terms. Northerners played a critical role in this process, as Chapter 5 argues. Pennsylvania Republicans resolutely supported declaration of war against Great Britain on June 18, 1812 and they likewise backed the reelection of James Madison later that fall. Despite military and political setbacks during the war, martial nationalism became a new and potent ideological bond between Republicans North and South. Chapter 5 follows the ideological war of 1812, in which immigrant radicals once again played a pivotal role. Republicans redefined the United States as an aggrieved democracy, struggling against internal and external enemies. Nationalism suppressed the problem of slavery, as Federalists and enslaved people who challenged bondage during the war were cast as allies of Britain and opponents of the United States.

Once again, however, national ideological unity broke down over the practical politics of slavery. The final chapter of this book traces the congressional conflict of 1819–1821 over the expansion of slavery to the new state of Missouri. In contrast to Republican nationalism during the War of 1812, the Missouri Crisis appears much as Jefferson described it, as an alarming interruption in national political life. But the Missouri Crisis was also the culmination of a long Jeffersonian argument about the power of slavery in the United States. A debate that began over the expansion of slavery to the West became a referendum on Jeffersonian democracy, American nationalism, and slaveholder power.

The Missouri Crisis presented northern Republicans with a dilemma at once ideological and historical. Northern Republicans tried to use Jeffersonian nationalism to restrict slavery expansion by arguing that the founding ideals of the United States were opposed to slaveholder power. But they faced a contending nationalist argument that stressed the protection of slavery as the price of Union and celebrated the expansion of American sovereignty under Republican rule. That counterargument was persuasive in good part because northern Jeffersonians had often accommodated slaveholder power in the past. Republican advocates of restriction were defeated, in other words, by their own ideological commitments, which had tolerated a major expansion of American slavery during two decades of Jeffersonian rule. During the Missouri Crisis, northerners took a stronger stance against slavery than they ever had before. But they did so in a political context where nationalism, the American nation-state, and the economic power of slaveholders were far stronger than they had been previously. Thus in addition to the difficulty of confronting slaveholder power, northern Jeffersonians faced the more complicated task of confronting their contradictory history as democrats in a slaveholding republic.

The Missouri Crisis had no decisive conclusion in northern political thought, and it left a divided legacy for the antebellum era. Antislavery northerners left the Missouri Crisis bitter at southern defenses of slaveholder power, but also confident in their commitments to the American nation and the core democratic principles of Jeffersonian politics. Other northerners, in contrast, responded to the Missouri Crisis and especially its final phase, which focused on the rights of free African Americans, by endorsing a racist consensus in which the political union of the United States and the political rights of white men required the subordination of black Americans, free and enslaved. As the Missouri Crisis concluded, moreover, New York’s Martin Van Buren began early attempts to revive the Jeffersonian coalition, thus setting in motion a renewed North-South partnership that would flourish by the late 1820s, with the rise of Jacksonian democracy.¹⁹

While this book ends as antebellum politics begins, it also looks beyond the Jacksonian era to a longer, deeper, and ongoing story about the relationship between democratic freedom, oppression, and power in the United States. Ultimately, it explores a problem raised in a starker form by antebellum abolitionists and especially by escaped slaves who joined the antislavery struggle: why did nonslaveholders tolerate the existence of slavery? And how could they be persuaded to oppose to it? As Frederick Douglass told a British audience in March of 1847, “the northern states claim to be exempt from all responsibility in the matter of the slaveholding of America … but this is a mere subterfuge.” In fact, northerners buttressed slaveholder power by supporting the United States Constitution, while their “deep prejudice against the coloured man” constricted African American freedom. Upon returning to the United States a few months later, Douglass bitterly noted:

I have no love for America, as such; I have no patriotism. I have no country. What country have I? The institutions of this country do not know me, do not recognize me as a man. I am not thought of, or spoken of, except as a piece of property belonging to some Christian slaveholder, and all the religious and political institutions of this country, alike pronounce me a slave and a chattel.

As Douglass was well aware, abolishing slavery would require overturning that state of affairs, so that a slave could become a man. There was far more at stake in that transformation than a physical contest with mastery. Abolition would require non-slaveholders to reject the legitimacy of slaveholder power and to accept the legitimacy of Frederick Douglass and other African Americans as equal political subjects. That effectively meant reconstructing a democratic culture that had been built through the toleration of slaveholding authority.²⁰

It would take a concerted and complex struggle by antislavery politicians, abolitionists, enslaved people, and white northerners to dislodge slaveholder power from the center of national political life and to destroy slavery during the American Civil War. Yet in many ways, after the war, as after multiple crises over slavery in the past, the institutional and ideological constraints of Jeffersonian democracy returned in new forms, as racist violence and racial union displaced black emancipation. The postbellum Democratic party, a descendant of the Jeffersonian coalition, maintained an alliance between northern freedom and southern oppression well into the twentieth century.²¹ In order to liberate individuals and build democracy, northern Jeffersonians embraced slaveholders and accommodated bondage. The toleration of coercive, antidemocratic authority has been a dominant aspect of American political culture ever since.