Читать книгу American Cool - Peter N. Stearns - Страница 9

Cool. The concept is distinctly American, and it permeates almost every aspect of contemporary American culture. From Kool cigarettes and the Snoopy cartoon’s Joe Cool to West Side Story (“Keep cool, boy.”) and urban slang (“Be cool. Chill out.”), the idea of cool, in its many manifestations, has seized a central place in the American imagination.

By the 1990s, the word has come to mean many things, but it always suggests approval. A university student writes on an examination that Columbus received a hearty welcome on his return to Spain; when asked why he made such an egregious historical mistake, he points to the textbook, which states quite clearly that the explorer had received “a cool reception.” This anecdote encapsulates the recent history of the word “cool.” The textbook writer had used the word according to its dictionary definition—“restraint”—but the university student understands it to mean “good.” Thus the positive connotation of “cool,” along with its increasing usage, symbolizes our culture’s increased striving for restraint. Being a cool character means conveying an air of disengagement, of nonchalance, and using the word is part of the process of creating the right impression. The popularity of the word is accompanied by other revealing usages: one can “lose” or “blow” one’s cool. Cool has become an emotional mantle, sheltering the whole personality from embarrassing excess.

Where did this preoccupation with dispassion, with “cool,” come from? How did it arise and evolve? How was Victorian emotional culture, seemingly so ensconced, replaced with the current emotional status quo? Whence came American cool?

This book addresses these questions by analyzing a major change in American middle-class emotional culture, a change that took place between approximately the end of World War I and midcentury. In the last half of the nineteenth century, a complex emotional culture flourished among the Victorian middle class, exerting a powerful influence on the entire range of social relationships. This influence extended into the twentieth century, but by the 1920s Victorian standards were being irrevocably transformed, preparing the way for a cooler approach to emotional expression. American Cool exposes a major break in what have been called “feeling rules”¹—the recommended norms by which people are supposed to shape their emotional expressions and react to the expressions of others.

American Cool focuses extensively on the transition decades, from the erosion of Victorianism in the 1920s to the solidification of a cool culture in the 1960s. Beyond describing the characteristics of the new directions and the ways in which they altered or amended earlier standards, the book seeks to explain why the change occurred.² It then assesses some of the outcomes and longer-range consequences of this change.

Emotional culture is an important topic in its own right, being a component of those deeply held popular beliefs that are sometimes summed up in the word “mentality.”³ Involving preachments and definitions by a variety of popularizers, emotionology⁴ addresses emotional goals in family settings, in childrearing, in work relationships, in codes of politeness. It affects the way people describe their own emotional standards and, often, the way they actually evaluate aspects of their emotional experience. Interesting in its own right as a part of cultural identity, emotionological change also affects social interactions and elements of emotional life itself. Both Victorian and twentieth-century emotional culture helped define family law, for example, including the criteria by which couples could seek divorce.⁵ Social protest and popular leisure constitute two other areas in which changes in emotionology may combine with other factors to create new patterns of behavior. Sorting out the impact of emotional standards in these areas is not easy, but some strong correlations can be identified. Analysis in each emotionological period, Victorian and twentieth-century, will thus move from widely disseminated emotional norms to evidence of middle-class reception to consequences in public behaviors.

And the analysis will address actual emotions, despite the difficulty of separating them from the surrounding emotional culture. Most emotionologists argue that cultural standards at least partially shape “real” emotional life itself.⁶ Emotional culture forms the basis for constructing reactions to one’s own emotions, and in some respects the emotions themselves. Emotions researchers loudly debate the balance between “basic,” biological or natural emotions⁷ and those that derive from social requirements and cultural norms.⁸ No definitive resolution of this debate is in sight. The present study certainly assumes that basic emotions are not the whole story—that emotional experience contains a strong cognitive and self-reflective element that is greatly affected by the cultural standards applied to the experience. However, this study also deals with the probability that cultural change must itself be assessed in terms of its success or failure in dealing with some natural impulses.

Certainly the assumption of considerable social construction is essential to the present study’s demonstration of significant change. An assumption of basic emotion, in contrast, is not essential.⁹ But the issue of basic impulse will reemerge when we chart some of the complex results of change emerging from Americans’ pursuit of new outlets for passions and from specific emotions that had been redefined.

For the shifts themselves were considerable, with far-reaching implications. In the 1890s American men were advised, by leading scientific and educational authorities, to use their anger: “If [a man] reacts positively, out of that very stirring may come achievements and performance of a high level.” Merely a half-century later, childrearing authorities warned parents against encouraging temper in boys, for an angry man is “possessed of a devil.” Motherhood, a sublime emblem of generous, intense love in the late nineteenth century—“she sends forth from her heart … the life-giving current”—became by the 1930s an emotional hazard: “Motherlove is a dangerous instrument.” On another love front: Victorian men routinely wrote of their transcendent feeling. Theodore Weld intoned, “I don’t love you and marry you to promote my happiness. To love you, to marry you is a mighty END in itself. … I marry you because my own inmost being mingles with your being and is already married to it, both joined in one by God’s own voice.” A scant century later, men’s tune had changed, as love became essentially sexual: “I snatched her into my arms and held her as in a vise. … I was madly infatuated, tingling in every atom of my being.” Popular writers and fraternity men alike contended that men should press themselves on women even when the latter begged to stop; the man who could not do this, as writer Charles Malchow put it, had “not progressed very far in ‘the art of love.’”¹⁰ Changes in love and anger, signaling also basic shifts in the emotional rules meant to define men and women, marked the replacement of Victorianism with a new framework, not just in the abstract but in the daily acts of raising children or dealing with the opposite sex. Passion itself was redefined, becoming suspect unless it was sexual. American Cool traces the nature and process of cultural change, building the specific ingredients into a larger reevaluation of emotional intensity.

This study focuses primarily on the middle class of business people and professional families. Like many studies of the middle class, it is biased toward evidence from Protestants in the North and West, but regional factors will be considered to some extent, particularly as they involve the South. The class limitations constitute the most important point to emphasize. The Victorian middle class used its emotional culture to help differentiate itself from other groups, particularly workingclass immigrants. Changing middle-class standards in the twentieth century were less blatantly class specific, and in discussing impacts we will encounter some evidence of spillover into other groups and their behaviors. Emotional culture forms an aspect of middle-class standards that had some hegemonic power, both in its nineteenth-century version and, more extensively though more subtly, in its twentieth-century formulation. And of course, by 1950, some 85 percent of all Americans were claiming to be middle class, which does not mean that they shared the most widely accepted middle-class emotional norms (the claim was above all an incomes claim) but certainly suggests the growing potential resonance of bourgeois emotionology. The middle class did not entirely triumph, however. Therefore, the distinction between my primary emphasis—the middle class—and American society seen as a complex combination of classes, ethnic groups, and subcultures must be constantly recalled. This book analyzes a class culture that had demonstrable influence on national culture, but it is not a full study of the larger and more diverse national experience.¹¹

Even with this important limitation, the present enterprise is undeniably ambitious. It claims that a general middle-class emotional style shifted ground, with measurable manifestation in a host of specific emotional areas, within roughly three decades. The subject of overall emotional style is not unprecedented, but it is hardly commonplace. Despite the relative novelty of historical study of emotion, three approaches to the subject have emerged to date. The first involves examining another topic that includes emotional components; emotions history was partially launched by histories of familial relationships in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that inevitably extended to claims about emotional change.¹² The second approach more explicitly focuses on emotional standards and their periodization but limits itself to individual emotions like love or anger. This approach has produced the clearest advances to date in the historical understanding of emotion, defining the causes and effects of change and the relationship between cultural construction and natural and invariant emotional impulses. But the third approach, which this study is intended to further, involves an effort at larger synthesis. Still focused explicitly on emotional standards and their results, this approach seeks to determine larger consistencies in emotional norms that relate specific emotional standards to a broader style. The Victorians had such a style, though it has often been erroneously characterized in terms of blanket repression. The middle class in the twentieth-century United States gradually but definitely revisited that style, producing a new amalgam. This book examines this sweeping, partially unwitting process.

The idea of a major twentieth-century emotionological transition follows from, and relates to, several widely accepted findings about American social and cultural experience. This study builds on these findings, though it modifies them while dramatically extending their scope.

It is generally accepted that a significant difference existed between the social patterns that began to emerge in the United States during the 1920s and those that had predominated through the later nineteenth century. Some have indeed dubbed the 1920s “the end of Victorianism.” Change is of course both constant and cumulative, which makes any effort to identify particularly crucial transition decades difficult and contestable. Nevertheless, this study is by no means unique in claiming that the 1920s formed a point at which several varied trends converged. By the 1920s the United States had become predominantly urban, shifting focus away from the classic small town. Classic individual entrepreneurship was also increasingly replaced with corporate management, and consumer values were increasingly glorified. New approaches to sexuality and a growing emphasis on personality over character constitute two other trends identified with the 1920s that are still more closely related to a redefinition of emotional standards. Recent work explaining the 1920s rise of the Ku Klux Klan according to an inchoate realization of how much was changing, of what desperate efforts might be necessary to recapture older values, identifies this transition decade from yet another, but clearly related, vantage point.¹³

My exploration of change in middle-class emotional style did not begin as an attempt to flesh out yet another aspect of the 1920s turn away from Victorianism. Indeed, whereas existing periodization schemas tend to posit a sudden Victorian collapse in the 1920s, this study treats the decade as the beginning of a more extended transition. The significant break in emotional culture coincided with changes in other areas, for this break reflected these changes, thus illustrating the kind of functional causation that social constructionists have characteristically claimed without always providing historically precise illustration. Emotional change, in other words, resulted from new social needs, and it also helped promote change, turning this transition into a still more extensive reevaluation of nineteenth-century conventions that reverberated into subsequent decades.

The idea of a major change in emotional style stems most directly from findings about shifts in specific emotional standards. My own earlier studies, several of them collaborative, of anger, jealousy, and fear all identified the 1920s as the point when Victorian signals were reconsidered, in a process that extended for several decades.¹⁴ In approaching anger, my first venture into emotions history, my coauthor and I had initially expected to see the more decisive changes later in the twentieth century, associated for example with the heralded rise of permissive childrearing. In fact, however, we found that the central new themes began earlier. A subsequent investigation of jealousy uncovered a very similar chronology though with many different specifics. Other emotion or emotion-related histories that had focused largely on the nineteenth century produced similar (if not always fully explored) claims that something different began to take shape by the early twentieth century.¹⁵ This was particularly true of several studies of love, both those directed to heterosexual romantic love and those focused on the decline of the peculiar nineteenth-century fascination with motherlove as a familial emotional icon.

My exploration of the transition in emotional style thus synthesizes a variety of existing findings about explicit emotional change. Owing a great debt to the many historians, sociologists, and social psychologists who have identified the basic ingredients, this study seeks to retain the advantages of the relative precision of these focused inquiries while also ranging more broadly into general threads of change and tying the origins of specific shifts to the origins of a novel overall emotionological framework.

It is important to note that a small number of specific emotions studies devoted to the United States have shunned an overall twentiethcentury periodization in favor of much smaller chunks of time that coincide with specific childrearing fads¹⁶ or other short cycles. My study argues that while shorter-term variations can be usefully identified, they should not obscure the larger style shift. Indeed, by identifying part of the nature and much of the timing of the twentieth-century transition in emotional culture, inquiries into shorter-term variations have made the need for a larger synthesis increasingly obvious. This synthesis identifies the general themes previously identified while also extending into other emotional domains less fully explored, such as grief.¹⁷ The challenge of the specific studies is clear: what are the underlying ingredients that appear, along with other, more limited attributes, in redefinitions as varied as a new concern about anger at work and a growing aversion, in middle-class men’s culture, to Victorian standards of romantic love?

A number of imaginative researchers have already ventured into the challenging area of overall emotional styles and their alterations from one period to the next. The best-developed case for a sea change in emotional style focuses not on the twentieth century, however, but on the eighteenth. Its analogy to the present effort will help clarify my intent, and its content relates to the Victorian baseline as well.

There are two principal formulas applied to an eighteenth-century emotional transition, both of which connect to more familiar aspects of cultural change in the period. Norbert Elias’s civilization-of-manners schema, recently applied to the nineteenth-century United States as an extension of its West European point of origin, emphasizes an increasing discipline of emotions and bodily functions alike. Starting with the upper classes, people learned new and more rigorous forms of impulse control. Applied to emotions, the schema helps explain not only a general set of goals but also more specific and measurable redefinitions, such as disgust as an emotional reaction to “uncivilized” sanitary habits and personal manners; a growing hostility to emotional spontaneity, manifested in disapproval of excesses in traditional popular festivals and religious behaviors; attacks on crude uses of fear in religion and childrearing; and a growing revulsion against emotionally charged vengeance in punishment and unwonted anger in both public and familial settings.¹⁸ Emotional self-control, in sum, underlay and united a number of changes in particular emotional goals, many of which have been explored in their own right.

A second schema, compatible with the idea of emotional control but supplementing and complicating it in important respects, involves a concomitant reevaluation of the emotional functions of the family, which also took shape in Western Europe and North America in the eighteenth century or a bit earlier. The family began to extend into areas beyond economic production and material welfare, and family relationships gained new priority over community ties and other friendships. This was another reason why anger and fear were reevaluated, with particular emphasis on the need for control in parent-child contacts, as part of an effort to create loving bonds and a lessened sense of hierarchy within the family. Jealousy was also redefined to focus on romantic relations rather than more general disputes over honor. Guilt gained ground on shame as a source of emotional discipline because it is possible to instill guilt initially as part of intense emotional contacts within the family and to maintain it through threatened deprivation of those contacts. The importance of love between parents and children and of love as the basis for marital choice increased. Grief over the deaths of family members became more central.¹⁹ Taken in tandem, family reevaluation and civilization of manners provide a framework for, and a causal link among, most of the vital shifts in emotional standards that occurred in Western society toward the end of the early modern period. This framework also illustrates the analytical potential of seeking a big picture in dealing with emotional change, lest basic ingredients get lost amid attention to detail.

Basic cultural frameworks normally have considerable staying power, and when gradual changes do occur, they remain within the existing framework. As we will see, this was the case with Victorian variants on the trends established before the industrial revolution. A genuine framework change, however, did occur in the twentieth century, and several scholars have already theorized about its nature.

Some have described the change as a transformation in basic American character taking shape around the middle of the twentieth century or a bit later. David Riesman has argued that there was a general shift from inner-directedness, strongly oriented toward achievement and attuned to internal motivations and promptings, toward other-directedness, emphasizing attunement to signals from peers and media as the source of appropriate goals and standards. Christopher Lasch played a variant on this theme in his briefly celebrated lament on the decline of American character.²⁰ For Lasch, the inroads of meddling experts and other changes in American society—including the weakening of the family resulting from women’s new work roles—produced a decline in strong individual motivation and an increase in shallow self-indulgence and concern with peer approval. Neither Riesman nor Lasch heavily emphasized the emotional corollaries of their claims, but clearly such corollaries would exist. While the present study does not propose anything quite so sweeping as a modal personality change, and while it certainly eschews Lasch’s empirically dubious claims about a shift in psychoanalytic dynamic, it does acknowledge a definite shift in emotional norms from an implicit emphasis on individual drive toward a greater concern with group conformity and attunement to peer reactions. In fleshing out this argument and explaining the causation and results of change, we tread at the edges of a trail blazed by earlier analysis.

Emotions theorists have recently cleared a trail of their own, venturing several overlapping arguments about a twentieth-century emotional style markedly different from its Victorian predecessor. For a time, American sociologists assumed a high level of repression in American emotional culture prior to the twentieth century, which gave way during this century (there was little concern for precisely when) to a radically different emphasis on self-expression and self-actualization. Modernization, in this sense, meant jettisoning “traditional” limits on venting emotion and delighting in a new individual freedom to let everything hang out. This formulation was not entirely wrong, but it was unquestionably oversimple, beginning with its faulty identification of Victorianism with traditionalism and undiluted repression. Interestingly, more recent sociological work on emotion has tended to eschew broader formulas in favor of attention to specific emotions or to a much more modest set of shifts and cycles within the twentieth century itself.²¹

Several Dutch and German sociologists, however, have picked up the theoretical gauntlet with a vengeance, working on the twentieth century within the broader historical perspective provided by Norbert Elias and his model of an earlier transformation toward impulse control. For example, Jürgen Gerhards argues for a “postmodern” emotional culture that escapes the bounds of Elias’s framework, though not simply in a release from repression. Cas Wouters develops the idea of “informalization” as the key description of the new emotional culture, in which strict codes of behavior diminish in favor of a more complex, mutually negotiated series of emotional self-restraints. Wouters even posits a correlation between the shift in emotional standards and the dominant mode of emotional analysis: “Just as Freud’s ‘discovery’ of ‘animalic’ emotions and motives occurred at the peak of their repression and denial, by analogy, the ‘sociology of emotions’ began to spread when rejection of repression and denial of emotions seemed to reach their height.” Abram de Swaan, even before Wouters, referred to growing informality and ad hoc negotiations about emotional display as part of an increasing democracy in social relationships. He, too, distinguished a decline in rigid rules against spontaneity, and like Wouters he argued that more spontaneity could be tolerated because of lessened insistence on hierarchy and growing confidence that most people knew without prodding how to avoid undesirable excess.²²

This, then, is the recipe for twentieth-century emotional change that has already been prepared. It is plausible and correct in many respects. Why not simply reheat it; why review the ingredients directly? Why, in sum, a whole new cookbook? For the following reasons, all explored in the subsequent chapters:

1. The idea of a twentieth-century movement away from impulse control incorrectly reads Victorian emotions as repressive and nothing more. This is not the case, at least as applied to the nineteenth-century American middle class. It is essential to correct this baseline in order to arrive at a true verdict on the twentieth century.

2. Many of the generalizations emanating from Dutch researchers, and echoed by Jürgen Gerhards in Germany, rest on fairly slender empirical evidence. Important studies are cited, particularly a Dutch attitudinal survey in the 1960s. But generalizations have outraced data, sometimes producing sweeping claims based on remarks by the American novelist Tom Wolfe.²³ Further, important studies demonstrating new forms of twentieth-century repression have not been incorporated in the dominant model. Finally, the “informalization” model assumes a transatlantic equivalence in emotional trends, with scattered American and European evidence used interchangeably. A fuller examination of specific cultures, like that of the American middle class, is imperative.

3. Evaluations of the timing of change are suspect, at least for the United States. The Dutch work focuses on the 1960s as the transition point. American Cool will argue that in the United States the more decisive break began to emerge four decades earlier.²⁴ Only by properly identifying timing can we address causes and consequences.

4. The informalization model, while more right than wrong, simply does not capture the full substance of the emotional culture that emerged from the decline of Victorianism in the United States. Despite its attractive caution and complexity, it overdoes the liberating elements and, still more important, downplays the vital corollary of growing informality itself: the growing aversion to emotional intensity that such informality requires. It is the very un-Victorian suspicion of intense emotional experience, far more than a simple renunciation of Victorian repression, that forms the essence of the transition in American emotional culture. This is what must be explained. Emotional restraint must be seen as itself a causal force that has reshaped various relationships in contemporary social life. Even more than the informalization proponents have realized, fundamental features of the emotional culture that emerged from the ashes of Victorianism are counterintuitive, involving actual emotional constraints of which many middle-class Americans have remained unaware.

Source materials for this book cluster primarily, though not exclusively, in what is generally known as prescriptive literature. Victorian popularizers, and their readers, felt a need for guidance in various aspects of emotional socialization, and the popularity of the numerous manuals directed at parents and youth has been well documented. Then, in the 1920s, a new set of popularizing authorities entered the marketplace The audience their work achieved forms one index of middle-class Americans’ quest for some real innovation in emotional guidelines.

For the Victorian period the manuals referred to above form a vital starting point. Most of them addressed various kinds of emotional standards.²⁵ Popular short stories—particularly those with a strong moral purpose as featured in Godey’s Ladies Book, Peterson’s, and the Ladies Home Journal—etiquette books, and hortative stories for older children and youth add to the prescriptive mix.²⁶ Many of these genres continued in the transition decades of the twentieth century, although the youthadvice literature began to decline rapidly, and stories aimed at children shifted toward escapism (which itself reveals a new emotional tone).²⁷ Marital advice manuals and popular magazines for men as well as for women increased in volume and utility, while childrearing advice in various forms remained essential. Also vital for twentieth-century emotionology was the burgeoning prescriptive literature focused on emotional standards at work. The cumulation of this various material, combined with many other studies that provide additional evidence on key points—such as recent interview and questionnaire data and private letters from the Victorian period—yields a fairly full picture of emotional culture and the range of its audience. The same material also provides suggestive evidence about causation, when used in combination with information about larger social and cultural trends available from existing historiography for both the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries and from additional research in areas such as popular health attitudes. Supplemented by a more disparate range of materials, including several key interview studies from the 1930s onward,²⁸ this body of evidence enables us to venture some conclusions about actual internalization of the recommended standards and about the larger impact of these standards in all areas of life, from leisure to law.

One final point, which no introduction should be without: So what? What is the point of attending to emotional culture at all? Emotional culture is hard to study, yet the game is worth the candle, and not only because the quest is intrinsically challenging. In the first place, the study of emotional culture makes an essential contribution to other kinds of emotions research, aiding scholars who seek to understand what emotions are and what roles they play. Emotions study is on the upswing of late. Cognitive psychologists, even researchers on artificial intelligence, probe links between emotional reactions and other forms of thought; though typically interested in formulas yielding high generalization, and thus often partisans of the idea of inherent, basic emotions, they are not immune to an interest in cultural change as a variable. Social psychologists, dealing with emotions in a collective context, have contributed directly to historical study and have examined various categories of emotional standards and behaviors that may or may not be open to historical change. A growing group of sociologists, and some anthropologists, includes the most articulate advocates of the idea of social or cultural construction, in which emotional standards and even internal behaviors respond at least in part to evolving functional needs. Yet it remains true that reasonably general, reasonably precise, and reasonably analytical tests of the idea of basic emotional change are not numerous. The present study contributes additional substance to the constructionist venture and links with other kinds of inquiries into the relationship between emotion and variations (including changes) in social context.

Emotions research also adds new and important dimensions to historians’ examination of several familiar developments, and it helps connect these developments. Here, an example quite relevant to this study will serve better than a general formulation. The concept of consumerism is a staple in American social and cultural history. We all know that new passions for acquisition had flamed by the 1920s; though it can be argued that basic changes occurred somewhat earlier, important discussions of precise timing need not obscure the basic point that growing numbers of Americans, headed by the middle class, developed a new relationship to goods and the process of obtaining them. We know also, if in fairly general terms, that the rise of consumerism, as distinct from earlier, more subsistence-based forms of acquisition, promoted or reflected broader changes in outlook.²⁹ But we are far from knowing the full effects of growing commitment to consumerist behavior. A study that explores the emotional corollaries of this trend, which is what this book is in part, thus adds considerably to our grasp of the human meaning of a familiar new social pattern. It is hardly surprising that increased interest in acquiring nonessential goods had emotional consequences, so that other kinds of emotional contacts changed as people put more emotional energy into consumption. But these ramifications have rarely been examined. Catching the connection as it took shape—that is, treating the connection historically—is an essential step in improving understanding. Further, growing consumerism was connected to other developments, familiar in themselves and coincident in time, such as changing religious values. By looking at the larger framework for measurable shifts in emotions culture—by looking beyond a single major factor such as consumerism—emotions history can reveal how concomitant changes were brought home to real people in that substantial segment of their lives pervaded by emotional reactions and evaluations.

Emotions history does not, however, simply measure the results of other changes in human terms. It also adds to the explanation of change. Emotions research, particularly in the constructionist school, tends to downplay this vital facet of emotion, looking mainly at the context for emotional standards and at the ways standards shape individual lives. Emotions are treated either as isolated phenomena or as dependent variables; their own impacts are not assessed. From the historical side, much social history has focused on emphasizing the rationality of various groupings. One of the first claims in social history, for example, was that lower-class rioters were not impelled by blind passion, that they chose targets carefully according to well-defined goals. These goals certainly differed from modern, middle-class goals; there was no disputing the importance of cultural context. But within this context cool rationality prevailed. Only recently have social historians developed any real interest in going beyond rationalism to look at other kinds of reactions and relationships. But their probes remain tentative and characteristically confined to family patterns and other private behaviors. The potential for examining the wider consequences of emotional change—for taking emotions seriously as a source of social behaviors, within families to be sure but also in a variety of other, more public settings—has not been tapped. This kind of emotions history is not, it must quickly be noted, in conflict with rationalist social history. Emotions are not irrational; they relate to the cognitive process in that they involve thinking about one’s own impulses and evaluating them as an intrinsic part of the emotional experience itself.³⁰ When changing emotional standards thus affect social protest, as I will argue occurs in the twentieth century as a consequence of the emotional transition this book explores, the result is not that protest becomes more or less rational. Emotions form part of the motivational package that includes culturally logical goals and careful choice of targets. They do, however, have a causal force of their own, and in this respect, as in numerous other areas, we short-change our power to explain if we leave out the impact of emotional culture. When this culture changes, as it did in the second quarter of this century, other results follow. We will see elaborate results in law, protest, leisure, and other areas—some of which add fundamentally to general understanding of the behaviors involved and the needs that underlay them.

Finally, because emotional standards play a significant role in translating other changes into human routine and in contributing to change, a study that seizes on a recent basic transition inevitably contributes to an understanding of emotional patterns, and some wider behaviors, in the United States today. The transition that began to take definite shape in the 1920s still reverberates in ways that have been partially delineated elsewhere.³¹ Without claiming to explore the connection fully where emotions are concerned—this is a study of the transition and not of contemporary emotional patterns—I intend to suggest some probable implications. In the transition that formed a new emotional culture, we find a mirror in which we can see and understand some of our own features and compare them with the emotional faces of our Victorian forebears.