Читать книгу Conflict Resolution Beyond the International Relations Paradigm - Philip Gamaghelyan - Страница 8

I entered the field of conflict analysis and resolution in 2004, and soon encountered interactive problem solving, also known as problem-solving workshop (PSW) and dialogue with their variations and adaptations as central methods of conflict resolution practice. Ever since, my career has been devoted to advancing conflict resolution practice in various areas of the world, primarily in the South Caucasus. At the initial stages of my conflict resolution career, I tried to learn the conventional methods of the field and apply them in conflict contexts where I worked. Later, I grew critical of some of the conventions. Among the first, I questioned the presumed need for the neutrality or impartiality of the facilitator and the suggestion to stay away from the history of conflict seen as a dividing phenomenon, and I worked on developing respective adaptations of the PSWs and dialogue. I strove to keep to their core, while experimenting with new elements, such as methods for working with memory and history or encouraging facilitation by insider-partials. Devotee to conflict resolution and believer in its inherent goodness, I would question the effectiveness of the practices employed, but not the rationale of specific practices themselves.

It was not until 2013, when I had an opportunity to work with a group of Syrian peace activists when I started suspecting that conflict resolution practices approached uncritically can sometimes not only fail to do good but could do harm. To quote Avruch, “concern with making our conflict interventions instrumentally effective raises—or should raise—ethical questions: efficiency for whom, in the service of what?” (Avruch 2012, 29). I saw the need to rethink my work, to rethink what I knew about conflict resolution and how I knew it.

From a conceptual standpoint, the conflict analysis and resolution theories do not always define conflict as a disagreement between or among preestablished sides. In conflict resolution practice, however, “sides” are central to our understanding of conflict. PSWs and dialogues are methods focused on the process of relationship building between or among the conflict sides and on interactive forms of imagining new solutions for addressing existing problems between or among them. The taken-for-granted assumption in these methods is the presence of a specific number of identifiable sides to conflict, typically of two sides. We commonly understand any conflict as a clash between them. From the beginning of the current Syrian conflict in 2011 and until 2013, when I started working on this book, the US and Western European media routinely portrayed it as a conflict between the Bashar Assad regime and the “opposition,” by 2014 adding the Islamic State of Levant (ISIL) as a “side” and later yet started framing Syria as a multilateral conflict. In these early days, however, the binary frames prevailed. The analyses of international think tanks were more nuanced than that of media and acknowledged the presence of multiple identity groups, such as Alewites, Sunnis, Christians, Kurds, the Syrian Army, the Free Syrian Army, and various non-armed opposition groups. The think tanks also, however, framed the conflict itself as a struggle between the regime and the opposition and tried to fit the identity groups into one or the other. A report on Syria produced by the International Crisis Group (ICG) in 2013 consistently referred to “the regime” and “the opposition” as units of analysis. It described Alewites as supporters of the regime, Sunnis as supporters of the opposition and used phrases such as “the opposition should,” showing that to the ICG, “the opposition” is an identifiable party to the conflict that is the binary opposite of the regime (“Syria’s Mutating Conflict—International Crisis Group” 2013). Such framings dictated approaches to respective conflict resolution efforts. As the conflict was framed to be between a dictatorial regime and a fragmented opposition, the early intervention efforts led by the United States and its allies were directed at supporting and consolidating the opposition. Further, as the fragmentation of opposition was often framed as consisting of one wing leaning toward Islamic fundamentalism and another leaning toward democratic reform, the efforts were directed at the strengthening of the democratic wing. Other interventions, such as former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan’s effort, were attempting to find a mediated solution between the “two sides” (Annan 2012).

In 2013, the binary framing seemed natural to me as well. When invited to facilitate a workshop for a group of Syrian peace activists, my colleagues and I initially followed the convention and framed the initiative as a dialogue between Assad and opposition supporters, before discovering that only the small minority of those present self-identified as belonging to either of these sides. It dawned on me then that I knew of no method that would help me integrate a group of Syrians of no side into a conflict resolution process. When describing conflict, I had learned to use the binary framing by default, without questioning the influence that such framing and subsequent interventions can have on the conflict. On the example of Syria, as we framed it as a conflict between two sides, the support for a particular side or a mediation that brought the sides together was appropriate. However, were we to frame the Syrian context as a fluid and chaotic struggle of numerous agendas and cross-cutting identities still united under the umbrella of the overarching Syrian identity, then boiling it all down to an over-simplified notion of “regime vs. opposition” would do little to help the situation. Such an approach would arbitrarily assign individuals and identity groups to one side or the other exacerbating the dichotomy that might not have been otherwise clearly pronounced, and then in a manifestation of a self-fulfilling prophecy, tried to bridge the divide it had itself created.

This is not to say, of course, that it is the mediators or the conflict resolution practitioners who construct conflicts or that the binary frames are never acceptable. Conflicts are typically in place well before we intervene. However, we should be open to a possibility that our framing and interventions could do further damage; that assuming a binary every time we see a conflict can pave the way for solidifying one. Yes, starting from 2011, Syria had some defined conflict sides, such as the Assad regime and specific armed groups opposing the regime. Nevertheless, large parts of the population did not identify with any of these actors. Many Alewites and Christians, routinely considered by commentators of that time as pro-regime, were opposed to it while they also feared the armed opposition. Moreover, many of those opposing the regime included groups, such as various nonviolent movements, ethnic minorities, nonaligned youth groups, intellectuals, to name just a few, who were opposing the armed rebels just as much. More importantly, a great many people still identified themselves as Syrians, a shared identity, and strongly resisted any attempt to classify them as pro-regime, anti-regime, Alewite, Sunni, Kurdish, Islamist, or anything else that could suggest a division. Yet these voices were rarely heard, as they were neither “the regime” nor “the opposition.” They were excluded and marginalized, among others, by the conflict resolution community.1

My questioning started from my inability to apply the concept of “sides” in the context of a particular initiative that defied all analytic frames I was familiar with. It seemed a minor inconvenience at first, but at a closer look, turned out that “sides” were central to the literature on conflict resolution practice—the first fallen domino that would bring down many others as my research progressed.