Читать книгу British Battleships of World War One - R. A. Burt - Страница 10
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In order to understand how natural it was for Great Britain to complete the first seagoing ‘all-big-gun’ battleship in 1906, it is necessary to return to the origins of its concept, and to touch on some of the revolutionary ideas propounded during the previous eighteen years. The evolution of the battleship from the sail-powered line-of-battle ship took the form of a succession of more or less experimental warships, as designers responded to developments in weapons, armour and propulsive machinery. As guns became bigger, armour grew thicker; but the size of battleships did not grow in proportion, it being generally believed that investing in fewer, but larger ships (which would soon be rendered obsolete) made bad sense. With ever increasing weights of armour, armament and machinery, the designers were constrained to maintain stability by reducing freeboard, thus placing the armament near the water-line. In many battleships of this era, the guns were often partly submerged even in a moderate seaway.
In 1888, Sir William White, the Director of Naval Construction, submitted designs for a first class battleship substantially increased in both size and freeboard. The resulting battleships, the Royal Sovereign class, were authorized under the 1889 programme, itself the result of the realization of the growing threat from other navies. The seven ships of the class became the archetype of future battleship design, and were copied by navies throughout the world. Their greatly increased freeboard of 19ft 6in forward and 18ft aft compared very favourably with that of Trafalgar (completed 1890), 11ft 9in forward and aft. From this excellent high freeboard design, which was completed in 1892, slow but sure progress was made until by 1898 criticism was being voiced that the ultimate had been reached and that scope for future improvement was impossible if based on a design now ten years old. Since 1892, 29 British battleships had been built: Majestic class (nine ships); Formidable (three ships); Canopus (six); London and Queen (five); and the six Duncans. All these were along the lines of Royal Sovereign, and while new technology had been introduced into each successive class, improvements were confined to machinery and armament.
Towards the end of 1900, while White was absent because of illness, the Chief Constructor, Henry Deadman, put forward proposals for an extravagantly powerful battleship which would represent a marked advance on anything previously built. His proposals were not worked out in great detail and were rejected as impracticable, but the need for more powerful ships was clear, especially when the latest figures for foreign designs showed great advances over British counterparts. Details of the Italian Benedetto Brin, carrying four 12in, four 8in and twelve 6in on a displacement of 13,427 tons, and the American New Jersey class, sporting four 12in, eight 8in and twelve 6in on 14,948 tons, had become known during 1900 and, as the British Queen and Duncan classes of the current programme mounted only four 12in and twelve 6in on 15,000 tons, the Controller, Admiral Sir A. K. Wilson, called for a series of alternative designs embodying stronger secondary armaments. Constructor J. H. Narbeth prepared a series of sketches, based on Queen, with additional intermediate armaments of 9.2in or 7.5in guns. Dimensions varied according to length, stability and speed required. Work on this design, which was to emerge as the King Edward VII class, had not been completed by the time White returned to office early in 1901, and on his suggestion some modifications were made. White resigned on grounds of ill-health and left the Admiralty on 31 January 1902. The new design had been completed, however, and the drawings were approved by his successor, Philip Watts.
The first five ships of the King Edward VII class were laid down under the 1901–2 Programme. On a displacement of 16,350 tons normal load, they carried four 12in, four 9.2in and twelve 6in guns (and were, in fact, the last British battleships to carry 6in guns specifically for use against armoured ships). Although distinctly more powerful than the preceding classes, their actual fighting value on completion was rather less than had appeared on paper – the inherent disadvantages of the three mixed calibre armaments being accentuated by the developments in long-range firing that had occurred during their building period. Service opinion of the completed ships was critical; the multiplicity of calibres was disliked and it was considered that the ships were still undergunned for the displacement in comparison with foreign designs.
Dreadnought, ‘the cat amongst the pigeons’ as she anchors at the head of the pre-dreadnought battle fleet during the 1907 Fleet Review.
DESIGNS FOR DREADNOUGHT
‘HMS UNTAKEABLE’
Displacement (tons)
17,000 (normal).
Dimensions
Length: 555ft pp
Beam: 80ft
Draught: 24ft 6in (mean).
Armament
Twelve 12in 45cal*
Sixteen 4in QF.
Armour
Main belt: 10in–9in
Bulkheads: 10in
Barbettes: 10in–8in
Conning tower: 12in
Communications tube: 6in
Turrets: 10in
Decks: main 1½in–1in, middle 2in–1in, lower 2½in.
SHP: 23,000 = 21 knots (normal).
| Weights (tons) | |
| Hull: | 6,420 |
| Armour: | 6,390 |
| Armament: | 3,000 |
| General equipment: | 600 |
*BVIII mountings as in Lord Nelson.
In 1902, after Watts had been appointed DNC, the question of battleship design came under complete reconsideration. The next set of designs were intended to meet the requirements of a new policy aimed at initiating battleship types having a definite superiority over foreign designs rather than merely matching developments abroad. A large number of drawings embodying many variations in armament, protection and speed were considered in an endeavour to combine all essentials on a minimum displacement and cost. In conjunction, the Controller, Admiral Sir William May, instigated exhaustive investigations into the relative efficiency of the armament and protection provided in various battleship types. These indicated:
1. The destructive effect of secondary guns was very small in relation to that of the main armament.
2. Damage caused by heavy projectiles was so extensive that the more lightly protected secondary armament was likely to be destroyed before it got within its effective range.
3. Heavier armour was required over a much larger area than had previously been customary.
The outcome of these findings was a design that should have been put in hand for the 1903 Programme, but the Board instead decided to build three more King Edward VIIs and defer the new type until the following year. The 1904 ships were to have four 12in and twelve 9.2in, but by the time construction started the secondary armament had been reduced to ten as a result of constraints imposed by the docking facilities then available and the consequent limitation on beam. The two ships, Lord Nelson and Agamemnon, were to represent the end of the short-lived mixed calibre type in British battleship construction.
A major impetus to the evolution of the all-big-gun battleship came in 1904 with the appointment of Admiral Sir John Fisher as First Sea Lord. While CinC Mediterranean Fleet, he had kept in close contact with developments in gunnery and torpedoes, and fully appreciated the necessity for armament changes to meet the requirements of increasing battle ranges. In conjunction with the Chief Constructor at Malta dockyard, W. H. Gard, he conceived the principles on which Dreadnought would eventually emerge – HMS ‘Untakeable’. Subsequently, as CinC Portsmouth, with Gard as Chief Constructor there, he prepared a series of all-big-gun designs, aided by advice from Alexander Gracie (Managing Director of Fairfield shipyard) on machinery and boilers.
LORD NELSON
Outboard profile and plan, October 1908
In the summer of 1902, Fisher had been considerably impressed by arguments put forward by Armstrong at Elswick in favour of the 10in gun; a new pattern of this calibre promised a very high rate of fire, and more of them could be carried on a given displacement than the standard battleship big gun, the 12in. Armstrong put forward a number of designs, the most interesting of which had been submitted in October 1902 and provided for eight 10in and twenty 6in, with a speed of 20 knots on a 17,000-ton displacement. These ideas coincided with Fisher’s. Examining the sketches, he eliminated the 6in battery in favour of a design mounting sixteen 10in, so arranged that ten could fire ahead, astern or on either beam. Fisher circulated the design to three officers who were later to serve on the Design Committee for Dreadnought: Captain R. H. S. Bacon, Captain H. B. Jackson and Captain C. E. Madden. They expressed a preference for a lesser number of 12in guns: the larger calibre shell would be more destructive in effect, and fire control would be simpler with fewer turrets.
In parallel with these developments, a more public discussion centred upon an article in the 1903 edition of Jane’s Fighting Ships by the celebrated Italian naval constructor, Vittorio Cuniberti. His proposal, ‘An Ideal Battleship for the British Fleet’, mounted a main armament of twelve 12in guns in four twin and four single turrets, on a displacement of 17,000 tons and with a speed of 24 knots. (The turret arrangement in Fisher’s plan, of which no records have survived, is thought to have been similar.) And, on the other side of the Atlantic, views about the need for a one-calibre armament were being propounded by Lieutenant-Commander William Sims of the US Navy.
In the Admiralty itself, the design discussions for the Lord Nelson class in 1903–4 had produced two similar ideas. Philip Watts had revived a design concept dating back to 1882, when, in conjunction with Fisher, he had attempted to combine the best attributes of Devastation (1874) and Inflexible (1881). This proposed eight 12in guns in four twin turrets, one forward and one aft on the centreline, one on each beam amidships, echeloned. Meanwhile, the Assistant DNC, J. H. Narbeth, had put forward a plan that appears to have been similar to Fisher’s ideas in 1900: twelve 12in guns mounted in six twin turrets, one forward and one aft on the centreline, with two on each beam amidships. In view of the radical increase in size and cost implicit in these proposals, they were not taken up; but the scene was now set for Fisher to bring the all-big-gun battleship into reality.
Lord Nelson, 1911. Last of the British pre-dreadnoughts and the first British battleship for which Philip Watts, as DNC, was entirely responsible.
Specifically, the dreadnought type had its origins in these considerations:
1. The menace of the torpedo with its increasing range and accuracy made imperative longer battle ranges to over 3,000 yards.
2. Long-range hitting had become practicable with the introduction of satisfactory rangefinding instruments. Since 1899, shooting in the Mediterranean Fleet had indicated that, with efficient fire control, it might be possible to secure hits at 8,000 yards or over.
3. Effective fire control at ranges over 5,000 yards called for salvoes by eight or more guns of equal calibre, a large group of splashes being easy to observe. When the splashes straddled the target, the exact range could be determined.
4. The 12in gun combined destructive effect and accuracy to a degree that considerably outweighed the faster rate of fire of intermediate calibres, especially at long ranges. During the Russo-Japanese War, reports received by British Intelligence in May 1904 concerning actions fought by the Japanese off Port Arthur, Chemulpo (and, later, in the Gulf of Pechili) stressed the importance of long-range hitting and the substantially greater effect of 12in guns compared with 8in and under. Reports received after the Battle of Tsushima in May 1905 (after Dreadnought’s design had been approved) confirmed these findings.
5. A superior speed afforded important strategic and tactical advantages, especially when backed by superiority in armament. In the 1901 British fleet manoeuvres, Admiral Sir Arthur Wilson, a strong advocate of line-ahead formation and broadside firing, had utilized a speed advantage to envelope the head of the opposing line and concentrate the full weight of his force’s broadside to this. (In May 1905, similar tactics were used by Admiral Togo against a much slower Russian fleet at the Battle of Tsushima.)
6. The development of ‘all-big-gun’ ships abroad. Early in 1904, while CinC Portsmouth, Fisher had learned that designs had been worked out in the USA for a ship with a speed of 18.5 knots, carrying eight 12in guns on a displacement of 16,000 tons. The US Navy had tried unsuccessfully to increase these figures to ten 12in on 19,000 tons, but this had been thought too ambitious. (Construction of two ships to this design, Michigan and South Carolina, were to be authorized in 1905, at the same time as Dreadnought, but would not enter service until three years after the latter.) Late in 1904, information had been passed secretly to the Admiralty indicating that, as a result of their recent war experience, both the Japanese and the Russians intended to fit their future battleships with a uniform armament of eight or more 12in guns.
On becoming First Sea Lord in October 1904, therefore, Fisher took advantage of his position to press his views and, as a first step, submitted to the Cabinet a comparative evaluation of the 10in gunned design by Armstrong against his alternative design, HMS ‘Untakeable’, which now provided on the same displacement (17,000 tons) eight 12in guns, six of which would bear over the same end and broadside arcs as any ten of the sixteen 10in guns of the Armstrong design. It also embodied Captain Bacon’s argument in support of the 12in gun, which Fisher regarded as conclusive, and stressed both their ideas in respect of armour, internal protection and speed (21 knots), the importance of the two latter items being strongly emphasized.
Admiralty approval for the essential features of the proposed design was secured by December 1904, and it was suggested that such a radical departure from conventional practice would probably encounter considerable opposition from the more conservative members of any committee. On 22 December 1904 a Design Committee was appointed for the purpose of examining these designs, and Fisher invited membership from those known to be in favour of the ‘all-big-gun’ school, naval experts and scientific officers alike. The Committee, chaired by Fisher, was required to act in an advisory capacity only, but its deliberations were to cover all points of design, including the arrangement of armament, fire control, protection, underwater integrity, torpedo net defence, machinery, fuel, communications, boat stowage and accommodation. The Committee members included: Rear-Admiral Prince Louis of Battenberg (Director of Naval Intelligence), Engineer Rear-Admiral Sir John Durston (Engineer-in-Chief of the Fleet), Rear-Admiral Sir Alfred Winsloe (Commander Submarine and Torpedo Flotillas), Captain H. B. Jackson (Controller), Captain J. R. Jellicoe (Director of Naval Ordnance), Captain C. E. Madden (Naval Assistant to Controller), Captain Reginald Bacon (Naval Assistant to First Sea Lord), Philip Watts (Director of Naval Construction), Professor J. H. Biles (Glasgow University), Lord Kelvin, Sir John Thornycroft, Alexander Gracie (Fairfield Shipbuilding), R. E. Froude (superintendent of Admiralty Experimental Works, Haslar) and W. H. Gard (Chief Constructor, Portsmouth Dockyard). J. H. Narbeth acted as Secretary to the DNC and was responsible for working out details of the various designs.
DREADNOUGHT
Preliminary Layouts
The Committee met for the first time on 3 January 1905 and was issued with instructions from the Admiralty stipulating that: the new vessel must be capable of docking at Portsmouth, Devonport, Malta and Gibraltar, but not at the smaller dock at Chatham. Armament was to consist of the maximum number of 12in guns practicable to any given design, all to be carried above main deck level and supplemented by an anti-torpedo battery heavy enough to counter destroyers. Under consideration were eight basic designs, all closely linked, differing only in armament layout and machinery. Some of the designs featured the latest turbine plant which had just come into service, in place of reciprocating machinery.
The procedure for design consideration was very complicated, but according to Professor Biles it went as follows: ‘A’ designs were progressively modified as far as ‘F’ and then reduced to ‘G’ which was thrown out because its low freeboard meant that elements of the main armament were too near the water-line. The final order of consideration was: ‘A’ reduced to ‘B’ to ‘C’ to ‘D’ to ‘E’ and then enlarged to ‘F’ and finally reduced to ‘G’. Further modifications were called for and, as a result, it was one of the ‘H’ designs that went forward for final approval. The author has been unable to locate full sets of figures concerning all of the designs which were put before the Committee and it is doubtful if these are still in existence.
After long debate, the Committee recommended that the following elements be included in the design:
1. Retention of the 12pdr 18cwt gun as anti-torpedo armament.
2. Provision of armoured screens abreast magazines and shell rooms with all main watertight bulkheads solid (no doors).
3. Turbines instead of reciprocating machinery.
On an increase of 1,400 tons displacement, it was found that the basic comparisons of Dreadnought with Lord Nelson were:
1. Weight of broadside 28 per cent heavier (6,000lb against 5,300lb); greater destructive power with simpler fire control.
2. Vertical hull armour reduced in area and maximum thickness, but deck and internal protection stronger.
3. Nominal speed three knots higher.
4. Maximum fuel capacity slightly greater, but nominal extreme radius of action considerably less.
Innovations included such features as the raised forecastle deck, with strong flare, carried well aft; detachable mounts for some of the 12pdr guns; longitudinal armoured screens for magazines and shell rooms; location of the foremast abaft the forefunnel; detachable bridge wings; and a reversed accommodation plan, placing officers forward and ratings aft. The final design was criticized on the grounds that protection was sacrificed somewhat to armament and speed and, although it had been regarded as ‘adequate’ by the Committee, the reduction from the scale of armouring that had been considered essential when the Lord Nelson design was prepared (1902–3) was later admitted, officially, as a weak point, and was to be a common fault in all of the 12in-gunned dreadnoughts that served in the Royal Navy.
Exceptional measures were taken to ensure that Dreadnought’s displacement and cost be kept to a minimum in order that the anticipated opposition to the type could not be based on these factors. After the Committee had delivered its deliberations on 22 February and reported their findings in March 1905, the ship was laid down on 2 October 1905, but as the design was experimental it was decided that further building would be deferred until after her trials. Secrecy and speed of construction were considered essential in order to gain a lead over foreign Powers. To this end, there was no official intimation that the design was in any way different from usual constructions, but the building slip was screened off from prying eyes. The whole of Portsmouth Dockyard’s resources were mustered in the interests of speedy construction, with every possible time-saving procedure being employed. The 12in guns being made for the Lord Nelson class were allocated to the new ship. This greatly delayed the Nelsons, but they were considered to be of less importance. An excellent rate of construction was achieved, and the ship was ready for sea one year and a day after being laid down.
Armament
The Committee was well aware of the need to give the new ship a suitable main armament, their instructions having been to procure the maximum practicable number of guns on the given displacement. A number of alternative plans and sketches were considered, including proposals for superfiring and triple turrets, the primary objective being to secure a high percentage of ‘all round’ as well as broadside fire together with freedom from blast between individual turrets. The problem of blast, which restricted the total number of guns that could be effectively carried, featured prominently in all of the plans discussed. The use of triple turrets was discussed by the Committee, but there is no record of any actual design embodying these having been prepared and considered. Captain Bacon recorded that neither triple nor superfiring turrets were thought practicable by the Admiralty at that time. Their future adoption was by no means ruled out, but at this juncture there was insufficient time for the trials such fittings would entail.
At the first two meetings Philip Watts suggested two alternative sketches based on the Lord Nelson layout, but with increased numbers of 9.2in guns. Their distribution was: Sketch 1, four 12in main armament and eighteen 9.2in, three in casemates; Sketch 2, four 12in main armament and sixteen 9.2in in eight twin turrets mounted amidships. The sketches were quickly discarded.
Some of the most promising designs are listed here for comparison:
1. Twelve 12in in six twin centreline turrets, three forward and three aft, the inner turrets in each group superfiring over the outer. This design, which embodied Fisher’s ideas in respect of heavy end-on fire, was actually put forward to the Committee as having been prepared in accordance with the strong recommendations of Admiral Sir Arthur Wilson, whose opinion had been requested by the Board. Wilson, who had a high reputation as a strategist and tactician, emphasized that all recent experience stressed the predominating importance of broadside fire in fleet actions. The proposed arrangement was intended to satisfy both theories, and it made a strong impression, being well liked by the Committee. However, it was rejected because of potential blast effect from the upper turrets on the lower ones; general lack of experience with superfiring turrets, and time required for the design and manufacture of these – the rapid construction stipulated by Fisher necessitating the use of turrets and mountings already in hand. The final point of rejection for the design was that the grouping of the turrets, both forward and aft, entailed great risk of complete disablement of an entire group, especially as no armoured bulkhead had been provided between the barbette bases. There was also some mention of prohibitive size and cost of the design.
2. Ten 12in guns in five centreline twin turrets, two forward and three aft, arranged as in the first design, but the upper turret in the forward group was suppressed and the after turret was lowered one deck level. This too was rejected for similar reasons, and for being even less economical than the first design (needing more armour in the turret areas).
3. Twelve 12in guns in six twin turrets, three forward and three aft. Two turrets in each group were disposed abeam, with the third on the centreline above and between them. This was a modification of the first design although reduced in size and cost, yet providing a compromise of broadside and end-on fire. This design was rejected because of the distinct disadvantages of the beam turrets in respect of blast and seaworthiness; there was also the possibility of total disablement of a group of turrets because of their close proximity.
4. The Design ‘D’ series proved very interesting, calling for displacements ranging from 19,000 to 21,000 tons. The first sketch sported twelve 12in guns in six twin turrets, all on one (upper deck) level. Two turrets were centreline, one forward and one aft. The other four were abeam, two on each side and well spaced. This design, thought to coincide with Fisher’s original plan begun at Malta in 1900 and completed at Portsmouth in 1904, was similar to a proposal put forward by the Assistant DNC, J. H. Narbeth, during 1903–4 as an alternative to the Lord Nelson. The design was rejected because of its low freeboard and restricted arcs of fire caused by blast interference between turrets.
5. Twelve 12in guns arranged as in Design 4, but with the forward turret on a raised forecastle deck and the beam turrets placed closer together (Design ‘D1’). This was rejected on grounds of blast interference and turrets too closely spaced.
6. Design ‘D2’ was similar, with twelve 12in guns, although the beam turrets were even more widely spaced than before. This again was rejected because of the restricted arcs of beam and after turrets, relatively low percentage of broadside fire, and excessive size and cost.
A graph showing blast curves indicated that the only arrangement giving better results than ‘D2’ would be the substitution of a single centreline turret for the after pair of beam turrets, and this plan, which reduced displacement to 17,850 tons, had been approved by Rear-Admiral Prince Louis of Battenberg and was finally accepted on 13 January 1905. The final design was ‘H1’, mounting ten 12in guns in five twin turrets: three on the centreline (one forward on a raised forecastle, one amidships and one aft, all on upper deck level). The other two were disposed one on each beam amidships on the upper deck. This arrangement allowed a nominal ahead and astern fire of six guns with a broadside of eight and, although inferior to all of the centreline superfiring plans, provided a high percentage of all-round fire, and was generally conceded to represent the best compromise of the various wing and centreline proposals. With one turret less, the broadside was the same as in the 12-gun designs while, next to four, eight guns were considered the best workable unit for fire-control purposes.
After the 1914–18 war Sir Philip Watts implied, in a paper written for the Institute of Naval Architects, that the final armament plan for Dreadnought was developed along different lines, and that only four stages were needed to arrive at the final layout. He said that the six-turret, all centreline superfiring design was the first and then, reducing the upper turrets in each group produced the second layout. A further modification of the turrets resulted in the third stage, with the final layout showing the superfiring turrets brought down to the upper deck amidships, one on each beam and one amidships aft on the centreline. However, the majority of accounts (including the Ship’s Covers and Dreadnought’s Book) refer to a considerably greater number of alternatives discussed by the Committee, with eight basic designs and many variations considered (see Tables).
The main feature of Dreadnought was her all-big gun armament (12in) with nothing smaller as all battleships built before her (9.2in and 7.5in etc to support a usual 4 × 12in). The two views here show some of her crew posing for a photograph (note the ship’s cat on the gun) and across her deck looking aft whilst at battle practice (cleared for action) 1907.
The completed ship was fitted with the same mountings (BVIII) as those in the Lord Nelson class and allowed ahead fire for the beam turrets, the forecastle sides being well recessed for this purpose. In practice, however, they could not be fired within approximately 10° of the axial line for fear of blast damage to the superstructure. Direct astern fire from these amidships turrets was precluded for the same reason. The fore turret was set farther back than usual and, as a result of the high forecastle, had a considerably higher command than in preceding classes, the guns being carried approximately 6ft 6in and 4ft 6in higher than in the King Edward and Lord Nelson classes respectively.
When Dreadnought arrived in Portsmouth harbour after her acceptance trials in 1906 there was a huge rush of local press and commercial photographers taking to small boats in a bid to capture her image and show the public the new addition to their fleet. This over-exposure continued right up until the appearance of the Bellerophon class. A close-up of Dreadnought showing her bridge and forward 12in guns taken by Mr Ernest Hopkins, 1908.
The secondary armament consisted of twenty-eight 18cwt 12pdrs, an increase of four over Lord Nelson, the guns being much more widely spread than in that ship so as to reduce the risk of simultaneous disablement and to ensure, as far as possible, that some would remain operable during the closing stages of an action when a torpedo attack was considered to be especially probable. At the time it was believed that the unprotected quick-firing guns, widely dispersed in the open, stood a better chance of survival than if closely grouped together in a battery, even if light armour protection was allocated. The detachable mounts on the forecastle and quarterdeck, which enabled the guns to be lowered below deck when not in use, was a novel feature adopted after experiments had shown that they suffered badly from blast from the main armament.
Because of the ever-increasing size of destroyers, the 3pdrs were abandoned, and retention of the 12pdr, which had been the Royal Navy’s principal anti-torpedo gun for the last ten years, was subjected to severe criticism. All reports from British Naval observers with the Japanese fleet during the Russo-Japanese War had emphasized the ineffectiveness of the 12pdr and recommended that nothing smaller than 4.7in could be considered adequate. The provision for nothing heavier than the 12pdr in Dreadnought appears to have been largely due to a current report that it was not actually essential to sink attacking destroyers, provided they could be stopped or put out of action before coming into range.
The Committee considered that the new 18cwt 12pdr was quite sufficient for this purpose, and that twenty of them would be more effective than fourteen 4in quick-firing pieces which represented an equivalent weight. However, a substantial body of opinion, which included the former DNC, Sir William White, stated that the 12pdr had become quite inadequate and that a heavier calibre was required. Without the benefit of foresight the Admiralty were unable to see that this was, in fact, quite true, although they did later admit to this fault and some rectification was seen in the Bellerophon and St Vincent classes, which sported a 4in QF secondary battery. Dreadnought was actually completed with twenty-eight 12pdrs, although this was increased to thirty-one afterwards by the addition of an extra gun fitted on each of the centreline 12in turrets.
Armour
Admiralty instructions to the Committee called for ‘adequate protection’ which had to be interpreted in terms of what was possible on an acceptable displacement and cost after priority requirements for armament and speed had been satisfied. The final armour protection of Dreadnought showed no advance over the immediately preceding Lord Nelson class, although the percentage of displacement vis-à-vis protection had increased. Dreadnought’s vertical hull armour was actually inferior, though maximum thickness of deck and internal protection was much stronger. The principal modifications over Lord Nelson were:
1. Maximum thickness of main belt was reduced by 1in, the upper level of 8in being omitted.
2. Lower side armour from fore barbettes to stem was 6in uniform against the 6in and 4in of Lord Nelson.
3. The ¾in upper deck armour amidships was omitted.
4. Middle deck armour between end barbettes increased by ¾in on slope and flat.
5. Lower deck armour forward increased by ¾in.
6. Maximum thickness of turrets reduced by 1in at rears.
7. Conning tower thickness reduced by 1in.
8. 4in and 2in magazine screens added longitudinally.
The reduced thickness of the belt, barbettes, turrets and conning tower was accepted to allow for the addition of the magazine screens which were considered essential protection against torpedo attack or mines, especially the wing magazines which could only be placed approximately fifteen feet inboard of the hull. The actions fought during the Russo-Japanese War indicated that most battleships stood a good chance of survival after being hit by a torpedo provided that an internal explosion did not occur; the screens were fitted in Dreadnought specifically for this reason. Upper side armour above the main deck was abandoned mainly because there was no secondary battery in this location. Another factor that influenced the reduction in thickness of the main belt, from 12in to 11in, was that Dreadnought required a longer strake for her hull, and a 12in belt’s tonnage (which would have added 850 tons to that in Lord Nelson) was not acceptable for the design.
Dreadnought in October 1905, just one week after being laid down.
The completed hull 3 February 1906, seven days before launch (the armour plates are not yet in place).
7 April 1906; the armour plates have just been positioned.
At the fitting-out stage, 11 August 1906.
DREADNOUGHT: FINAL LEGEND
Displacement (tons)
17,850.
Dimensions
Length: 490ft pp
Beam: 83ft
Draught: 26ft 6in
Freeboard: 28ft forward, 16ft 6in amidships, 18ft aft
Gun heights: 30ft forward, 22ft amidships, 22ft aft.
Armament
Ten 12in
Eighteen 12pdr
Five 18in torpedo tubes.
Armour
Main belt: 11in tapering to 4in
Bulkheads: 11in–3in
Turrets: 11in–3in
Barbettes: 11in–3in
Conning tower: 11in
Signal tower: 8in
Communications tube: 5in–4in
Magazines: 2½in–2in
Decks: main ¾in, middle ¾in–1¾in, inclines 4in, lower 2½in–1½in.
| Weight breakdown (tons) | |
| Hull: | 6,100 |
| Armour and backing: | 5,000 |
| Armament: | 3,100 |
| Machinery: | 2,000 |
| General equipment: | 650 |
Fuel
900 tons coal minimum; 2,400 tons maximum plus 900 tons oil.
SHP
23,000.
Complement
700.
It was anticipated that the upper shell plating would act as a ‘burster’ for striking shells, with the armoured inclines on the deck providing the principal protection for the vital parts of the ship below. The Assistant DNC, J. H. Narbeth, recorded that Philip Watts would probably have preferred to have maintained, or even increased, the Lord Nelson standard of protection for Dreadnought, but as the considerably increased displacement involved would have mitigated against the Dreadnought design’s acceptance as a relatively economical type, a lower but admittedly weaker standard was accepted at the time.
Watts had paid particular attention to the underwater protection and subdivision and stated that Dreadnought should be able to sustain hits from one or two 18in torpedoes yet remain afloat. In addition to the six main transverse bulkheads which were unpierced below the main deck level, sufficient stability had been provided to ensure against possible capsizing if some of the compartments became flooded below the middle deck level. Independent pumping, draining and ventilating systems were provided for each compartment; the usual drainage, running the full length of the ship, of previous designs being finally abolished.
Dreadnought’s main armoured belt consisted of an 11in strake which ran from the outer face of the forward barbette to abeam the after barbette. The upper edge was at middle deck level while reaching approximately five feet below the water-line at normal displacement. The 11in thickness tapered at the lower edge of the complete run to 7in.
DREADNOUGHT: LAUNCH FIGURES, 10 FEBRUARY 1906
Displacement: 6,088 tons
Length: 490ft pp
Beam: 82ft 1in
Beam as moulded: 81ft 11¼in
Depth of keel from upper deck: 43ft 2¼in
Length of boiler rooms: 132ft 0½in (144ft 0⅜in incl. cross bunkers)
Length of engine rooms: 68ft 0¼in
Weight of hull: 5,446.6 tons
Breakage at launch:
longitudinal in a distance of 407ft = 1¼in hog
transverse in a distance of 77ft 3in = nil.
The 6in forward strake ran from the 11in belt, at the same height, to the stem of the ship; the after strake reduced to 4in and was placed higher than the main belt, but lower than the 8in run. This 4in run was approximately three feet above the 11in belt. The 8in upper main belt sat above the 11in run with the top edge being 8ft 6in above the water-line at normal displacement. The belt terminated at the same point as that of the 11in strake. The main bulkhead, which was fitted aft only, was 8in thick and ran obliquely inwards from the after extremities of the lower side armour to the outer face of the after barbette. It did not drop below the middle deck level. The ¾in-thick main deck ran from the stem of the vessel through to the lip of the 8in bulkhead aft.
DREADNOUGHT: PARTICULARS, AS COMPLETED
Construction
Portsmouth DY; laid down 2 Oct 1905; launched 10 Feb 1906; completed for trials early Oct 1906.
Displacement (tons)
18,120 (normal), 20,730 (deep), 21,765 (extra deep).
Dimensions
Length: 490ft pp, 520ft wI, 527ft oa
Beam: 82ft 1in
Draught: 26ft 6in (normal), 29ft 7½in (deep), 31ft 1½in (extra deep)
Freeboard: 28ft forward, 16ft 6in amidships, 18ft aft
Height of 12in guns above lower wl: 31ft 6in forward, 22ft 6in amidships, 23ft aft (normal); 29ft forward, 20ft 6in amidships, 20ft aft (deep).
Armament
Ten 12in 45cal Mk X; BVIII mountings; shell stowage 80rpg
Twenty-eight 12pdr 18cwt; PIV mountings; 300rpg
One 12pdr 8cwt field gun
Five MG
Five 18in torpedo tubes; twenty-three torpedoes plus six 14in.
Fire control
None fitted as completed. Director control gear fitted in tower over control top in 1914/15.
Armour *
Main belt: 11in tapering to 7in
Upper tier: 8in
Ends: 6in forward, 4in aft
After bulkhead: 8in
Barbettes: 11in–8in–4in
Turrets: 12in–11in–3in
Conning tower: 11in sides
Communications tube: 8in
Decks: middle ¾in, main 1¾in, inclines 2¾in, lower 1½in (forward), 3in–2in aft.
Breakdown of armour weights (tons)
| 6in side belt forward: | 427 |
| 11in side: | 641 |
| 8in side: | 510 |
| 4in side aft: | 184 |
| 11 in screen: | 47 |
| 8in screen | 63 |
| 12in barbettes: | |
| ‘A’ (excluding fittings) | 358 |
| ‘B’ and ‘X’ | 429 |
| ‘Y’ | 188 |
| Conning tower: | 52 |
| Signal tower: | 46 |
Machinery
Parsons direct-drive turbines working four propellers
Eighteen Babcock & Wilcox boilers in three groups; normal working pressure 250psi reducing to 185psi at the turbines. Each boiler was fitted with six oil sprayers giving a total output of 960lb per boiler/hour at 150psi.
Total heating surface: 55,400sq ft
Grate area: 1,599sq ft
Engines: Vickers with designed SHP of 23,000 for 21 knots
Fuel: 900 tons coal normal; 2,900 tons maximum plus 1,120 tons oil
Radius: 6,620nm at 10 knots (with oil fuel); 4,340nm at 10 knots (without).
Using 2,220shp, consumption was 127 tons of coal per 24 hours. Continuous seagoing speed was 18.4 knots, giving radius of 4,910nm (520nm more than that of Lord Nelson).
Ship’s boats
Steam pinnaces: two 45ft, one 36ft
Launches: one 42ft
Cutters: three 32ft
Whalers: four 27ft
Gigs: one 32ft, one 30ft
Skiff dinghies: one 16ft.
Searchlights
Twelve 36in: two bridge, four forward superstructure, four amidships structure, two after superstructure; one 24in signalling lamp on platform below control top.
Anchors
Three 125cwt stockless (bower and sheet), one 42cwt stream (close stowing), one 15cwt kedge. 475 fathoms 2 cable.
Wireless
Mk I type plus short-radius set.
Complement
685–692 (1905 Estimate); 700 (1907); 732 (1909); 798 (1910); 810 (1916).
Cost of vessel
£1,672,483 (guns: £113,200).
Notes:
*All KC except decks which were non-cemented. Decks of less than 3in and the communications tube were of mild steel.
The middle deck was protected by a total of 1¾in made up of two plates, one of 1in the other of ¾in. The inclines of that deck consisted of three plates, one of ¾in and two of 1in thickness (2¾in total). Towards the extremities of this middle deck, just before dropping to the lower deck, was an increase to 3in in the areas of the forward and after barbettes. The lower deck forward ran from the extremities of the fore barbette, sloping steeply downwards with a thickness of 4in; on the flat at lower deck level it reduced to 1½in, running to the stem of the ship. Aft, this lower deck, having left the middle deck at a steep fall, of 4in thickness, ran toward the stern at 2in for approximately 28 feet then rose slightly, increasing to 3in, and dropped again to 2in for another 25 feet or so, after which it again dropped at a thickness of 3in.
The forward barbette was 11in on the outer face above main deck level; below, it thinned to 8in. The inner face was 8in above the main deck level and then thinned to 4in below. Beam barbettes were given 11in uniform on the faces, with the inner faces 8in above the main deck and 4in below.
The after barbette’s face was 11in uniform, with the inner face 8in above main deck and 4in below. Turrets were reduced from that of Lord Nelson by reducing the back plates from 13in to 12in and the faces and sides to 11in from 12in. Roof plates ranged from 4in on the forward part to 3in on the crown. The forward conning tower had 11in sides and a 3in roof; the floor was 4in thick. The communications tube was 5in and ran down to behind the main belt at main deck level. The after conning tower, which was located behind the second funnel, had 8in sides, a 3in roof and 4in floor; the communications tube for this was also 4in. The underwater magazine screens varied in thickness according to location: 2in thickness on the forward screen, 4in on the beam fittings, and 2in on both of the after screens. These screens were fitted to port and starboard of the magazines, but were not continuous. The oil and coal bunkers, placed behind the armour belts between the main and middle decks abreast the boiler rooms, afforded a little extra protection for the internal parts of the ship.
DREADNOUGHT
Outboard and inboard profiles, 1906
A note concerning the reduction of the armour protection on the turrets is worthy of mention. Captain Jellicoe told the Committee that, although a thickness of 11in or 12in was quite sufficient to keep shells out, it had never been tested to see whether or not the actual turret mechanism could withstand the shock of a direct hit; he felt there was little need to increase the thicknesses, but suggested that an all-round reduction could be made.
The torpedo net defence was devised by Captain Bacon, and was the most elaborate and complete system fitted to a warship to that date, yet needed only two or three minutes to drop the nets from a stowed position. The net defence ran for three-quarters of the length of the ship along the upper deck level.
Machinery
The original proposals for the new ship was that she be fitted with reciprocating engines, although the obvious advantages in efficiency and economy of turbines were well known, but whether or not it was practicable to fit them to such a large vessel was debatable. It was estimated that with reciprocating engines and earlier hull forms of equal fullness, about 20,000 tons displacement and 30,000 SHP would have been required for the 21 knots asked for in the initial design. The first four designs all had reciprocating engines, turbines appearing in designs after this, with comparisons of both turbines and reciprocating machinery in the same basic layouts. The main difficulty in fitting turbines to the new vessel was her size, and it was debated whether or not she would have adequate stopping, turning and astern power for rapid manoeuvring under all conditions.
In January and February 1905, comparative trials were carried out between the Gem-class cruisers Amethyst (turbines) and Sapphire (reciprocating), and the River-class destroyers Eden (turbines) and Waveney (reciprocating). Throughout the trials it was seen that the most satisfactory results came from the ships with turbine propulsion, and it was found that to secure the requisite stopping and astern power one turbine needed to be fitted to each shaft, which afforded greater astern power than in any previous machinery.
The principal advantages of having turbines fitted in Dreadnought were:
1. Substantial saving in weight, space and cost compared with reciprocating plant.
2. Smoother running, easier operation and reduced engine room complement.
3. Economy in fuel at high powers.
4. Reduced risk of damage in action because of machinery being fitted lower in the hull.
5. Increase in ship’s handiness because of using four propellers instead of two; the wing shafts being farther off the centreline.
DREADNOUGHT: STEAM TRIALS 1906
Preliminary steam speed trials were held off the Isle of Wight 1–9 October 1906. Winds of Force 3–4 and Strength 2 seas prevailed throughout. The ship had left dock after hull inspection on 28 September, so her bottom was clean.
Draught: 25ft 6in forward, 27ft 1½in aft
Steam pressure: 241 psi boilers, 221psi engine room
Shaft revolutions: 321 starboard outer, 337 starboard inner, 321 port outer, 333 port inner
Mean revolutions: 328.4 on all shafts
Pitch of propellers: 8ft 4½in
During the 8-hour full power trials, 12,225shp was developed by starboard engines, 12,487shp by port. A total of 24,712shp gave a mean speed of 21.05 knots
A total of 134 tons of best, handpicked Welsh coal was used throughout
Feedwater temperature: 70°F starboard, 66°F port Various speeds were achieved on the measured mile runs, the following figures being logged: 21.78; 21.45; 21.78; 21.39 knots.
Dreadnought coaling on a Saturday afternoon late in 1906, just outside Portsmouth Harbour.
The installation in Dreadnought was: the high pressure (HP) turbines were fitted on the wing shafts, the low pressure (LP) on the inner shafts. These inner shafts were also fitted with cruising turbines. There was one HP ahead and one HP astern on each wing shaft, plus one LP ahead and one LP astern on the inner shaft. The steam for low power was passed from the boiler into the cruising turbines and thence to the HP wing turbines, before returning to the LP turbines and finally into the condensers.
On trials of the completed ship it was seen that the continuous seagoing speed was greater than that of Lord Nelson, but at low speeds Dreadnought’s radius was less. This was because at speeds of 10–12 knots, Dreadnought was using her cruising turbines which proved troublesome, a feature which could not have been foreseen; fuel consumption of the cruising turbines was extremely high and after Dreadnought they were not fitted. In all other respects, the turbines fulfilled expectations; there was much less vibration in the ship and noise was considerably reduced. As the first turbine-driven battleship completed for any navy (the Japanese Aki, begun seven months before Dreadnought, was the first turbine-engined battleship laid down, but was not completed until 1911), Dreadnought proved a successful innovation in design and, together with improved hull lines, gave a speed of more than three knots higher than preceding classes without excessive rise of displacement or cost.
Other Features
The rig details, fire control and boat arrangements were worked out by Captains Bacon, Jackson and Jellicoe. The problem of reducing vibration to a minimum for fire-control purposes received particular attention. Nine alternative proposals for cranes or gallows for boats were submitted, one of which embodied a mast, of light girder construction, which did not require stays. The final proposal, which was accepted, was for a tripod mast, this being considered safe, strong and easy to construct. The tripod mast had first appeared in the Royal Navy in the 1860s in the rigged turret ships Wyvern and Captain, as a means of eliminating shrouds which had always considerably restricted arcs of fire. It was reintroduced in Lord Nelson in 1904, although only on the mainmast which needed adequate support for the main derrick. The position for the tripod mast in Dreadnought, close abaft the fore funnel, was selected in the belief that smoke and fumes would be carried away from the control top, but this did not prove to be the case and was one of the design’s weak points.
The reversed forward rake of the tripod legs was so designed to enable the boat derrick to swing well outboard without hindrance. The alternative possibility of a tripod mainmast with derrick does not seem to have been considered at that date. No mainmast was originally proposed for Dreadnought, although subsequently it was considered necessary to have some kind of after control top which could also be used as a spreader for the wireless aerials. The small baby tripod, finally fitted in Dreadnought, was greatly criticized in service as being too low and of little use for anything except perhaps the W/T lines. It was never repeated after Dreadnought.
The design of the superstructure, which was broken up by the amidships turret, was entrusted to the same three Captains. Boat stowage was located between the funnels, and the main derrick handled the heavy steam launches and larger pinnaces. There was also a pair of long topping davits fitted on each side of the forward superstructure for the smaller seaboats (gigs and cutters, etc.). The wings of the bridge on the forward superstructure were detachable, this being a concession to Captain Bacon who had recommended a narrow, more compact bridge structure without the usual long wings. The Admiralty had at first been opposed to this, but the wings were detachable and could be removed if necessary (they were removed later during the war).
Dreadnought, late 1906.
Starboard quarter view of Dreadnought in 1907.
Superb view of Dreadnought fully dressed for inspection during the Imperial Press Conference Review of 1909. Note the rangefinder drum on top of the foretop rather than on the face.
Much praise was lavished on Dreadnought, and after her successful sea trials she underwent a lengthy special test cruise to the Mediterranean and Trinidad from January to March 1907. During this cruise a report was written on the capabilities of the vessel in general. Close inspection of the hull revealed that while her framework was ideally suitable for a ship of such proportions, some of the framing in the area of the forecastle had buckled slightly while she was in a swell. No real damage had been done, but it was noted that extra supports were needed in future vessels of similar size.
The accommodation of the crew and officers constituted a direct change from previous battleships; with the officers now quartered forward and the ratings aft. This reversal had been instigated by Admiral Fisher with a view to having the officers’ quarters nearer their normal action stations on the bridge and in the conning towers, bearing in mind the greater length of the vessel over previous designs. In hot weather, awnings could be erected on the quarterdeck for the men, and the officers, who had their own compartments, would not suffer. Another advantage of having the crew aft was that they could get to and from their quarters easily, without having to negotiate long passageways cluttered with coalbags which was the normal practice. The men had better ventilation from the long rows of scuttles abaft the armoured belts; this would lead to fewer cases of TB, which had been prevalent throughout the Navy in previous years. The system proved unsatisfactory, however, and was very unpopular with the officers. They felt that their accommodation was insufficiently segregated, their cabins were situated on the main deck level and were very small, distributed haphazardly wherever space could be found. The Admiral’s quarters were in the forward superstructure so, of course, there was no traditional sternwalk.
Dreadnought averaged 17 knots from Gibraltar to Trinidad (3,430 miles) and 19 knots from Trinidad to Portsmouth (3,980 miles) which was considered an unprecedented performance in high speed. En route she conducted manoeuvring and turning trials (see tables) and could not be faulted, especially in view of the fact that she was of considerably greater length than previous battleships. She was able to keep a straight line while steaming astern, and could be brought extremely quickly to rest from moderate speeds by using the propellers in reverse. The anchor gear was stated to be perfection for the day, but the machinery for the boat booms was inadequate and would have to be of a more powerful type in future. The winches used for coaling the ship were too weak for the job; larger engines were required, as was the case for the working of the ventilation fans.
DREADNOUGHT
Body plan
DREADNOUGHT
Deck layout, 1906
DREADNOUGHT
Sections
DREADNOUGHT: STEAM TRIALS JUNE/JULY 1914
The relatively poor performance throughout these trials stemmed from the fact that the ship had not been docked since March 1913 and her bottom was foul. Wind Force 3–4 NE, sea swell 3–4.
Draught: 29ft forward, 30ft 2in aft
Steam pressure: 206psi boilers, 191psi engines
Shaft revolutions: 228.4 starboard outer, 330.7 starboard inner, 324.8 port outer 287.2 port inner
Mean revolutions: 306.2 on all shafts
11,240shp developed by starboard engines, 11,410shp by port; total SHP 22,641 gave a recorded speed of 18 knots
A total of 158 tons of best Welsh coal was used.
The lifeboat equipment was noted as being perhaps the best yet installed in a battleship. The arrangements for control of the vessel were considered to be impressive; the entire ship could be viewed from the charthouse and bridge and it was claimed that Dreadnought was as easy to handle as a destroyer. The searchlight location was also praised.
Gunnery trials were carried out, and thought to be most satisfactory, although the size of the secondary armament was disliked, it being considered too small to combat attacking vessels. Throughout these trials, careful notes and observations were made by a Lieutenant Dreyer who, in collaboration with Captain P. Scott, was to change fire control within the Royal Navy with the introduction of the ‘director control system’ a few years before the First World War.
Dreadnought in 1909, with civilians aboard. Looking aft from the forecastle. Note twin 12in guns, twin 12pdr on top, one 36in SL on each bridge wing, two pairs of 36in on conning tower level, and single 24in on lower foretop position.
Dreadnought. View forward over the forecastle deck from the foretop. Note the simple and uncluttered bridge with compass positioned centrally in front.
Appearance Changes
Dreadnought conveyed an immediate impression of exceptional power and fighting efficiency. She was always easily distinguishable by her large, heavy tripod foremast, its legs raked forward close abaft the fore funnel, but in any case her appearance was radically different from preceding ships or, in fact, from any battleship then afloat. Prominent features included: a raised forecastle with cutaway sides; a heavy turret on each beam and on the centreline amidships; flat-sided funnels, the fore noticeably smaller than the after funnel; stump tripod mainmast, its legs raked aft, carrying the after control top; tall derrick topped up vertically each side of the mainmast. Changes in appearance during the course of her life included:
1906–7 Rangefinder added over after conning tower behind second funnel. Prominent flaps (collapsible) fitted at each side of rangefinder platform (probably blast screens). Extra 12pdr guns added on each of the centreline turrets.
1909–10 Experimental range indicator fitted over fore control top; relocated on face of top during 1910–11 and removed in 1912. Fitted with short-radius W/T set. Forward pair of searchlights removed from superstructure amidships.
1912–13 Blast screens added abaft 12pdrs on fore turret.
1913 24in searchlight and platform below control top removed. Main topmast removed. Long signal struts fitted forward, below fore control top.
1914–16 Director control for main armament fitted, the director tower being located over fore control top. Rangefinder removed from after conning tower. Small rangefinder added on bridge. 12pdrs removed from fore turret and superstructures with the exception of the upper pair in the forward superstructure which were decked in. There is some uncertainty as to whether the forecastle and quarterdeck 12pdrs were removed (detachable mounts?), the official lists showing a figure of twenty 12pdrs for the beginning of 1917. Four 12pdr AA are reported to have been added, two right aft on the quarterdeck, but the location for the other pair is uncertain, though probably near the after tripod. The bridge searchlights were remounted on platforms, low down on the fore tripod legs. Anti-torpedo nets removed. In order to give the conning tower a clear view ahead, the wings were removed from the bridge and the navigating platform was extended forward.
1916–17 Stern torpedo tube removed. After control top removed, its searchlight remounted on a platform on the mainmast. Special anti-flash protection fitted to magazines and ammunition hoists after Jutland. Some extra deck protection fitted in areas of magazines, but very slight because by now she was the oldest of the dreadnoughts.
1917 Deflection scales painted on sides of forward and after turrets. Quarterdeck 12pdr AA guns replaced by two 3in AA guns. Foretopmast was reduced in height.
Dreadnought. View aft over the stern and after funnel from the foretop. Note spaciousness of the decks, and the streamlined superstructure and fittings.
Dreadnought, 1913/14, showing a few changes in the rig. Blast screens have been fitted around 12pdrs on top of 12in gun turrets, and long signal struts have been fitted forward below fore control top. The 24in SL has been removed from the lower foretop.
Dreadnought sails out of Malta in November 1913 after manoeuvres with the Mediterranean Fleet. Note the very dark grey paintwork.
History: Dreadnought
Built under the 1905–6 Naval Estimates after the design had been approved in March 1905. The order to commence was issued on 8 July 1905.
1906 1 Sept Commissioned in Reserve Fleet at Portsmouth for trials.
3 Oct Began trials.
3 Dec Completed official acceptance trials.
11 Dec Commissioned to full complement at Portsmouth for prolonged trial cruise.
1907 5 Jan Left Portsmouth. Called at Arosa Bay, Gibraltar and Golfo d’Aranci (Sardinia) before proceeding to Trinidad.
23 March Returned to Portsmouth.
27 March Commissioned for service as flagship of Nore Division of Home Fleet on its formation (formerly Channel Fleet).
Summer Further trials of different types of propeller.
7–14 May First practice cruise of Home Fleet (Nore Division).
18 June With Nore Division cruised to Norway and throughout parts of Scotland.
22 July Mobilization of Home Fleet and cruise to Torbay and Cowes.
3 August Home Fleet reviewed off Cowes by HM King Edward VII, followed by fleet manoeuvres (4–8 August).
1908 12 July Home Fleet assembled off Deal and anchored in the Downs.
16–21 July Annual exercises in North Sea with Nore Division and Atlantic Fleet.
1909 23 March Paid off at Portsmouth and recommissioned the following day for service as flagship of CinC Home Fleet.
4 May Combined exercises north of Scotland with Nore Division and Atlantic Fleet.
12 June Imperial Press Conference Review at Spithead, delegates aboard Dreadnought.
6 July Annual combined manoeuvres in Atlantic with Nore Division, Atlantic and Mediterranean Fleets.
17–24 July Visited Southend with other units of Home and Atlantic Fleets.
31 July Review of Home Fleet at Cowes, Isle of Wight. Inspection by HM King Edward VII during visit of HIM the Tsar of Russia.
Aug On reorganization of fleets, Nore Division became 1st Division Home Fleet.
1910 April Exercises in Scottish waters with 1st and 2nd Divisions of Home and Atlantic Fleets.
July Combined manoeuvres off west coast with Atlantic and Mediterranean Fleets. 1st and 2nd Divisions, with part of the 3rd and 4th Divisions taking part also.
26–29 July With Home Fleet in Torbay for visit by HM King George V.
1911 Jan Combined exercises off north-west coast of Spain with Mediterranean Fleet.
March Relieved as flagship of 1st Division Home Fleet by Neptune and paid off for refit.
28 March Recommissioned with nucleus crew after refit at Portsmouth.
6 June Completed to full complement at Portsmouth for service as private ship in 1st Division Home Fleet.
24 June Present at Coronation Fleet Review by HM King George V.
6 July Combined exercises with 1st Division Home Fleet, Atlantic Fleet and 4th CS off south-west coast of England and Ireland.
July Exercises with combined fleets in North Sea.
1912 1 May 1st Division became 1st BS of 1st (Home) Fleet on introduction of 3rd Fleet reorganization scheme.
7–11 May Royal inspection of 1st and 2nd (Home) Fleets at Weymouth, followed by four days of exercises at sea.
9 July Present at Parliamentary Review of Home Fleets at Spithead, followed immediately by annual manoeuvres with 1st and 2nd Fleets and parts of 3rd and Mediterranean Fleets.
Oct Tactical exercises with 1st Home Fleet.
Dec Transferred to 4th BS (late Mediterranean Fleet) of 1st Home Fleet, the squadron being based on Gibraltar rather than the usual Malta harbour.
1913 1 July Recommissioned as flagship of 4th BS with 1st Home Fleet at Portsmouth.
Nov Manoeuvres in the Mediterranean with Mediterranean Squadron, 4th BS, 1st BS, 3rd CS and the light cruiser squadrons.
1914 15 July Left Portland for Spithead with 1st (Home) Fleet.
16 July Arrived at Portsmouth.
17–21 July Present at Test Mobilization and Royal Review of the Fleet by HM King George V. This review was probably the largest gathering of dreadnought types ever.
25 July Returned to Portland with 1st Fleet.
29 July Left Portland for Scapa Flow.
Aug On the outbreak of war 1st Home Fleet became the Grand Fleet without change in the organization of the battle squadrons.
20 Oct With 4th BS which consisted of the battleships Erin, Temeraire, Bellerophon, Agincourt and Iron Duke. All were patrolling between Rockall Bank and the Hebrides. During the evening the squadron just missed intercepting the German minelaying vessel Berlin which was bound for Stanton Banks from Iceland.
22 Oct–3 Nov With 4th BS which was temporarily based in Lough Swilly pending completion of anti-submarine defences at Scapa Flow.
Dec Relieved as flagship of 4th BS by Benbow and reverted to role of private ship in that squadron.
1915 18 Feb At 12.30 Dreadnought was returning from tactical exercises with the fleet, ESE of the Pentland Firth, – 4th BS having just parted company with the main fleet to return to Cromarty – when she sighted U29 which had broken the surface immediately ahead after firing a torpedo unsuccessfully at Neptune. After a brief chase Dreadnought rammed and cut U29 in two, almost colliding with Temeraire which was also trying to ram the submarine. There were no survivors from U29.
Dreadnought at war, 1916/17. By this time, Dreadnought was, in fact, obsolete compared to the super-dreadnoughts then in existence. Note control top is being completely smoked out while the ship is at speed.
Aug With 4th BS based at Cromarty.
1916 April Refit at Portsmouth.
May Temporarily transferred to 3rd BS to strengthen that squadron on its relocation from Rosyth to Sheerness, as a precaution against further raids on the east coast by German High Seas Fleet. Later relieved by Royal Oak.
31 May 3rd BS moved out in readiness to join Grand Fleet in action at Jutland.
June Rejoined the Grand Fleet.
14 June Sighted and attempted to ram a U-boat off Dunnet Head while exercising with the fleet.
Late June Returned to Sheerness as flagship.
1918 March Rejoined 4th BS at Scapa Flow.
12 April Grand Fleet main base transferred from Scapa Flow to Rosyth.
7 Aug Paid off into Reserve at Devonport.
1919 25 Feb Transferred to Reserve at Rosyth and recommissioned as the tender Hercules, and as a parent ship in Reserve.
1920 31 March Ordered to be paid off onto the sale list and crew was reduced to prepare vessel for sale.
1921 9 May Sold at Rosyth to Messrs T.W. Ward Shipbreakers Ltd for approximately £44,750.
1923 2 Jan Reached Inverkeithing in Scotland where she was broken up.
Dreadnought, showing her final wartime changes: turret scales, director control on foretop, SL on platform on top of baby tripod, no main foretopmast, and reduction in number of 12pdrs.
