Читать книгу The Making of a Mediterranean Emirate - Ramzi Rouighi - Страница 9

CHAPTER 1

The Politics of the Emirate

When the Ḥafṣid ruler Abū Zakariyā Yaḥyā (r. 1229–49) died, his son Abū ‘Abd Allāh Muḥammad al-Mustanṣir (r. 1249–77) became ruler of Ifrīqiyā. Acceding to the throne in Tunis, al-Mustanṣir took control of a large kingdom that stretched from Ṭarāblus (Tripoli) in the east to Bijāya in the west. During his long reign, Bedouins, powerful Almohad sheikhs, and urban elites continuously challenged his authority. In 1270, the integrity of his kingdom miraculously survived a Crusade against Tunis led by Louis IX.¹ Saved by Louis’ death, al-Mustanṣir still had to pay a great sum of money to end the siege of his capital. Old, politically weakened, and seriously impoverished, he battled ceaselessly to maintain his power. After his death, the unity of the Ḥafṣid kingdom crumbled. A number of Ḥafṣid emirs based in large cities such as Bijāya, Qasanṭīna (Constantine), and Tarablus declared independence from Tunis. Supported by urban elites and powerful Bedouin armies, these emirs fought each other to maintain or expand their holdings in Ifrīqiyā. For almost a century, they challenged the preeminence of the ruler of Tunis until Abū al-Abbās Aḥmad II (r. 1370–94) led a political realignment that put an end to independent Ḥafṣid emirates. The process of reunification reached its culmination under his son Abū Fāris ‘Abd al-‘Azīz.

Some modern scholars, the historian Robert Brunschvig foremost among them, understood the period of the multiplication of emirates in Ifrīqiyā as one of the weakness of the Ḥafṣid state.² He and others described the endemic warfare between Ḥafṣid emirs and celebrated those rare occasions when a maverick Ḥafṣid was able to impose his will on all the others. In so doing, they replicated the perspective of contemporaries such as Ibn Khaldūn, who saw the rule of autonomous emirs as the result of the weakness of the Ḥafṣid dynasty, its fragmentation, poor health, and old age. Ibn Khaldūn wrote:

It should be known that the first (perceptible) consequence of a dynasty’s senility is that it splits…. The same was the case with the Almohad dynasty. When the shadow it cast began to shrink, the Ḥafṣids revolted in Ifrīqiyā. They made themselves independent there and founded their own realm for their descendants in that region. Their power flourished and reached its limit, but then, one of their descendants, the emir Abū Zakariyā Yaḥyā, the son of Sultan Abū Isḥāq Ibrāhīm, the fourth Ḥafṣid caliph, seceded in the western provinces and founded a new realm in Bijāya and Qasanṭīna and environs.³

By framing the political history in relation to an ebb and flow of the power of a centralizing state, historians set up a particular outcome, the centralization of power in Tunis, as an ideal political situation and, by the same token, independent emirates as anomalies. While this approach is helpful in organizing the complicated and often contradictory historical record, it is irremediably attached to the dynastic perspective of the sources.⁴ As an alternative, I argue that the period between 1200 and 1400 is better understood in relation to two distinct but related processes. The first was characterized by the oscillation between two modes of Ḥafṣid political domination: the “regional” mode, in which the Ḥafṣid ruler of Tunis controlled all the major cities of Ifrīqiyā, appointed their governors, and received taxes from them; and the “local” mode, in which independent Ḥafṣid emirs withheld the taxes they collected for Tunis, and raised strong enough armies to maintain themselves in power. The second process, which will be the focus of Chapter 4, was the gradual emergence of Emirism, an ideology that became dominant under the “regional” rule of Abū Fāris.

Conceiving of the political history in terms of an oscillation between regional and local domination generates a periodization with four important moments: (1) the foundation and consolidation of the dynasty; (2) the independence of Bijāya (and other cities); (3) the popular rebellion and non-dynastic rule of a group whom the sources refer to as the ghawghā’, or mob; and (4) the reunification of Ifrīqiyā under Abū Fāris. These moments, which form the basis for the four sections of this chapter, are not arbitrary. They mark major political realignments within the elite in support of a particular agenda and, in the case of the popular rebellion, the failure of the elites to reach a compromise with each other. In other words, each configuration of Ḥafṣid domination came about because of the victory of specific coalitions over others, not because of the fluctuation of the power of an impersonal state.⁵ Rather than presenting a state-centric view, this perspective, and by extension the organization of this chapter, imagines politics as the process by which a particular group comes to rule, a process that the references to the “Ḥafṣid state” tend to leave unexamined, or worse, to take for granted.

Like the state, the notion of a “tribe” presents the historian with a series of challenges. First, it generally acts to mask rather than illuminate politics, mainly by casting very different circumstances under the same, generally unfavorable, label. For even if the sources describe tribes (qabā’il) as static and unchanging, they were not always the same, but represented different political groups, orientations, and agendas. Second, the tribes that appear in the sources are merely those that gained significance in relation to dynastic politics. They were not necessarily the only tribes around. Their activities both for and against the Ḥafṣids explain their depiction in the sources. Third, and as for the Bedouins’ self-representation, there are hints that they produced written narratives about the past. But these were mostly tales about the feats of hero ancestors and pious teachers.⁶ The few extant lines of poetry and hagiographic narratives clearly demonstrate the involvement of tribes in political struggles but do not offer details sufficient for an analysis of political history. Last, and while they present us with facts of a different order, dynastic sources are no less problematic. For instance, they tend to represent relations between tribes and the Ḥafṣids within the framework of pledges of allegiance and tribute, which creates a sense of their neutralization and pacification. But the pledges of tribal leaders were not everlasting. They did not prevent them from forming alliances with others, including enemies of the dynasty, and even from openly rebelling against it. While it is important to account for these aspects of the perspective of our sources, it is most prudent not to fall prey to a romantic view of Bedouins and imagine, as some continue to do, the existence of egalitarian and democratic tribes.⁷

Our ability, then, to determine whether the Ḥafṣid dynasty truly ruled over all of Ifrīqiyā, and so whether Ifrīqiyā was politically unified under their rule, is determined by the perspective of the sources. The sources do make it clear that during the period of local emirates, no Ḥafṣid emir ruled over a unified Ifrīqiyā or exerted effective control over areas beyond the city or cities he controlled. At least during that time, Ifrīqiyā was not a homogeneous political region, and there can be little doubt about that. But this lack of political unification did not prevent historians in the fifteenth century such as Ibn al-Shammā‘ (fl. 1457) from thinking of the Ḥafṣids as the “kings of Ifrīqiyā,” and not only of some areas of Ifrīqiyā or only part of the time.⁸

In addition to the Ḥafṣid dynasty and powerful Bedouin groups, a third group in the political configuration of Ifrīqiyā were the Almohad sheikhs (shuyūkh).⁹ These generals led the Almohad military occupation of Ifrīqiyā and enforced the expropriation of lands, the imposition of heavy taxation, and the transfer of wealth from the eastern Maghrib to their capital in Marrakech (Marrākush). The sheikhs belonged to the coalition that first conquered the western Maghrib and were then dispatched to the east to lead the Almohad military. The Almohads (1130–1269) built fortified neighborhoods or Kasbahs (qaṣabāt, sing. qaṣaba) inside the cities they ruled, and these became the centers of their military-fiscal-judicial domination. The Ḥafṣids had originally been Almohad sheikhs, and they now had to contend with their former peers who decided to remain in Ifrīqiyā. Bringing these sheikhs under control was a long and arduous political process that the Ḥafṣids commenced at the beginning of their rule. To counter the power of the Almohads, the Ḥafṣids encouraged the immigration of elite Andalusis to Ifrīqiyā, at first with the backing of an Andalusi militia. Conflicts between the Andalusis, who were favored by the Ḥafṣids, the Almohads, and members of the urban elite became a common feature of politics. These conflicts often involved alliances with Bedouins. Lastly, as is evident from the Crusade led against Tunis by Louis IX, Mediterranean powers had an impact on regional politics—if only because they forced the Ḥafṣid rulers to mobilize their resources and organize defenses. Generally, however, they played a secondary role, because they were not able to shape the terms of political change or bring about outcomes that could put them in a position of leadership in Ifrīqiyā. Though their military raids and their occupation of coastal areas in Ifrīqiyā, in some cases for extended periods, appear further to demonstrate Ifrīqiyā’s lack of territorial integrity, by themselves these actions did not constitute a threat to the Ḥafṣid order. Their impact on the development of Emirism, the political ideology that became dominant at the end of the fourteenth century and shaped the region’s subsequent history and historiography, was at best indirect and secondary.

The Foundation and Consolidation of the Dynasty: The First Regional Emirate (1220–77)

The Last Years of Almohad Rule in Ifrīqiyā

Almohad rule in the Maghrib and al-Andalus stretched over the largest area to come under the rule of a single political entity since Roman times. In the first years of the thirteenth century, the Almohads experienced difficulties holding it together.¹⁰ In the provinces, rebellions multiplied, as did conspiracies and bloody purges at the court in Marrakech. Worse, the local military commanders on whose shoulders the integrity of Almohad domination rested were no longer satisfied with the great wealth they derived from their posts. The central government tried to stay a step ahead of its generals’ discontent by accelerating their rotations, but that policy further undermined the stability of the regime.

Ifrīqiyā was even less stable: the anti-Almohad ruler of Majorca, a member of the Almoravid Banū Ghāniya clan, controlled a large portion of the central Maghrib (al-Maghrib al-awsaṭ) with the support of a number of powerful Bedouins. The Banū Ghāniya would emerge as a persistent threat to the Almohads and, ultimately, as an opportunity for those seeking automony from them: the Ḥafṣids declared independence from the Almohads in the process of eliminating the Banū Ghāniya from Ifrīqiyā.

The way this came about was as follows. At the turn of the thirteenth century, a Bedouin chief rebelled against the Almohads and declared independence in his native city of al-Mahdiya (Mahdia). He took on the caliphal title of al-Mutawakkil ‘alā Allāh and led his troops on a raid against the city of Tunis. Emboldened by the success he had there, he attacked the Majorcan emir Yaḥyā b. Ghāniya. Ibn Ghāniya’s reaction was swift and decisive.

First, Ibn Ghāniya invaded al-Mahdiya and forced the rebel caliph to capitulate and recognize his rule. Then, taking advantage of this victory, he led his troops on to other cities. Bāja fell when Ibn Ghāniya defeated an Almohad army sent there from Bijāya. He then took Biskra, Tabassa (Tebessa), and al-Qayrawān (Kairouan). Without putting up a fight, Būna (Annaba) sent its capitulation in 1203 and a besieged Tunis surrendered, agreeing to a very heavy tribute. Yaḥyā b. Ghāniya became the ruler of Ifrīqiyā. Though his rule was short-lived, it was significant for the transformation of the Ḥafṣids into an independent dynasty.¹¹

The Almohad reaction to Ibn Ghāniya’s opportunistic attack was immediate. The Almohad caliph al-Nāṣir (r. 1199–1213), who had just ousted the Banū Ghāniya dynasty from the Balearic Islands, led an army against Yaḥyā b. Ghāniya in Ifrīqiyā. The Almohad navy easily took back Tunis, forcing Yaḥyā to retreat to the south. There, in 1205, Yaḥyā met defeat at the hand of the Almohad sheikh ‘Abd al-Wāḥid b. Abī Ḥafṣ al-Hintātī—a relative of the man who would go on to found the Ḥafṣid dynasty. After the Almohads had forced the surrender of Yaḥyā’s cousin in al-Mahdiya, the Almohad caliph al-Nāṣir entered Tunis victorious. Though Yaḥyā was still alive, the rebellion had been effectively quelled.

Up to that point, Almohad rulers had appointed only close relatives to the governorship of Tunis and Bijāya, the two largest Ifrīqiyān cities. They now broke from that custom: before heading back to Marrakech, al-Nāṣir decided to appoint ‘Abd al-Wāḥid as governor over much of Ifrīqiyā, presumably a reward for defeating Ibn Ghāniya. As a Hintātī, ‘Abd al-Wāḥid belonged to an important Almohad clan, but he was not a member of the Mu’iminid ruling family. When al-Nāṣir left Tunis in 1207, this sheikh took control of the area from Tunis to Tripoli. Though still not all of Ifrīqiyā, it was enough to help him build his stature as a political leader.

The Almohad Origins of the Ḥafṣids

‘Abd al-Wāḥid’s father, Abū Ḥafṣ ‘Umar b. Yaḥyā al-Hintāti, had been an early supporter of the founding father and mahdī of the Almohads, Ibn Tūmart (d. 1130).¹² He had been a member of Ibn Tūmart’s Council of Ten (the highest executive body in the Almohad hierarchy), and one of the most important participants in the negotiations that led to the proclamation of the first Almohad caliph, ‘Abd al-Mu’min, after Ibn Tūmart’s death.¹³ Abū Ḥafṣ had gone on to become one of the most important military leaders of the Almohad conquests. He was especially active in al-Andalus, where he participated in the conquest of Almería from Castile. His political role was even more important, and hinted at the independence he would assume later on: he advised the caliph and opposed him on occasion in the name of the ideals of the mahdī.¹⁴ His loyalty to the Almohad cause was, however, never in doubt. On two occasions, ‘Abd al-Mu’min left him in charge of Marrakech, an act that demonstrated the caliph’s trust in Abū Ḥafṣ and Abū Ḥafṣ’s full membership in the ruling elite. Later, all this helped make ‘Abd al-Mu’min’s successor al-Nāṣir trust Abū Ḥafṣ’s descendants—and to help Abū Ḥafṣ’s son ‘Abd al-Wāḥid become the governor of Ifrīqiyā, thereby helping to create an independent Ḥafṣid dynasty. Indeed, ‘Abd al-Wāḥid was not the only descendant of Abū Ḥafṣ whom the Almohad caliphs held in great esteem. The Almohads singled the family out for favor by maintaining marriage ties with them and offering many of them trusted and sensitive positions.

Throughout the early period of Almohad rule, ‘Abd al-Wāḥid and his descendants continued to earn the trust of the caliphs and gradually secured their claims on a hereditary governorship of Ifrīqiyā. The rebel commander Yaḥyā b. Ghāniya obliged in the creation of Ḥafṣid tales of heroism by continuing to rebel: no sooner had al-Nāṣir and his army returned to Marrakech, leaving ‘Abd al-Wāḥid in charge of Ifrīqiyā, than Yaḥyā b. Ghāniya reemerged in southern Ifrīqiyā and threatened Almohad rule yet again. The new governor marched against him and defeated his army near Tabassa in 1208. Ibn Ghāniya fled in the direction of the central Maghrib and, with help from allied Bedouins, went on to defeat Almohad troops near Tāhart (Tiaret). It was not until 1209–10 that ‘Abd al-Wāḥid dealt a serious blow to Ibn Ghāniya and his supporters among the Riyāḥ, ‘Awf, Dabbāb, Dawāwida, and Zanāta and imposed peace. Defeated and on the run, Ibn Ghāniya once again escaped alive.

When al-Nāṣir died in 1213, ‘Abd al-Wāḥid briefly withheld his support for the designated caliph Abū Ya‘qūb, an act in which he probably drew on his father’s moral standing. ‘Abd al-Wāḥid ultimately recognized the caliph’s appointment. He also enjoyed support among the Almohad sheikhs in Ifrīqiyā: when he died in 1221, the sheikhs recognized his son Abū Zayd ‘Abd al-Raḥmān as his successor to the governorate of Ifrīqiyā. But the Almohad ruler al-Mustanṣir (r. 1213–24) did not agree with their choice, and instead appointed Abū Isḥāq Ibrāhīm b. Ismā‘īl b. Abī Ḥafṣ to serve as interim governor until the governor of Seville, and ‘Abd al-Mu’min’s grandson, Abū al-‘Ulā, could take over in Ifrīqiyā.

The political defeat of the Ḥafṣid clan in Ifrīqiyā was brief, and they owed their next victory, once again, to Ibn Ghāniya, who used the confusion to rebel yet again. New to the area, Abū al-‘Ulā was unable to rout Ibn Ghāniya immediately. Instead, ‘Abd al-Wāḥid’s son, Abū Zayd, defeated Yaḥyā in 1223 and headed for Tunis as a victor. This could not but have solidified the family’s claims to leadership in the region. The new caliph, al-‘Ādil (r. 1224–27), recognized Abū Zayd for his impressive military victory and appointed him governor of Ifrīqiyā. But his authoritarian and unpopular governorship ended in 1226, after just two years, when the caliph appointed his brother, the sheikh Abū Muḥammad ‘Abd Allāh b. ‘Abd al-Wāḥid b. Abī Ḥafṣ, to replace him. One Ḥafṣid had been deemed lacking, and another was now appointed in his stead—so thoroughly had the Almohads come to rely on the house of Abū Ḥafṣ.

The new Ḥafṣid governor of Tunis, Abū Muḥammad, had little to no control over Bijāya and western Ifrīqiyā. But that was the least of his concerns. As soon as he took over, he had to fend off yet another Ibn Ghāniya–led rebellion in southern Ifrīqiyā, as well as the rebellion of the Walḥāsā in the region of Būna. The chaos afforded yet another opportunity for a Ḥafṣid governor to stake his claim to the region—to become, as it were, a son of Ifrīqiyā.

Ifrīqiyā Becomes Ḥafṣid

The lord (mawlā) Abū Zakariyā claimed independence (istabadda) in Ifrīqiyā, since it was his country (balad) and the country of his father and brother.¹⁵

With yet a third son of ‘Abd al-Wāḥid, Abū Zakariyā, the Ḥafṣid dynasty made Ifrīqiyā its home. In 1227, Abū Zakariyā became governor of Tunis, having previously served as the commander of Gābis. The Almohad caliph would have sent the diploma of governorship to Abū Muḥammad, who had served in the post under the previous caliph, except that Abū Muḥammad, following the path of moral indignation first carved by his grandfather Abū Ḥafṣ, refused to recognize the caliph’s appointment. Abū Zakariyā received the appointment instead. In 1228, one of his first acts was to prove his loyalty to the regime over his family: with the help of Almohad troops, he exiled his brother Abū Muḥammad. He then entered Tunis and became the ruler of the Almohad province of Ifrīqiyā—the third descendant of Abū Ḥafṣ to assume the post.

Abū Zakariyā’s loyalty to regime was neither blind nor uncritical. Despite his support for the caliph over his own brother’s objections, he still retained some distance from events in the capital, and could be provoked to rebellion when the Hintāta were threatened. Indeed, al-Ma’mun (r. 1227–32) tested Abū Zakariyā’s loyalty in the course of a wider conflict in the Maghrib. Al-Ma’mūn’s rule over the Maghrib was hardly secure. While he was trying to reassert Almohad control in al-Andalus, he received news that his cousin Yaḥyā b. al-Nāṣir had rebelled in the Maghrib. He immediately headed south to engage in battle with his cousin, and in the course of the conflict, publicly repudiated the mahdī’s doctrine. He also killed a great number of Almohad sheikhs, some of whom were Hintāta.¹⁶ The response was immediate: the Ḥafṣids were, after all, Hintātīs and could not simply accept the slaughter of kin. Abū Zakariyā disavowed al-Ma’mūn and, in his stead, recognized Yaḥyā b. al-Nāṣir as the legitimate Almohad caliph. But whether out of principle or political motives, Abū Zakariyā could not sustain fealty to a mere pretender. In 1229, he eliminated Yaḥyā’s name from the Friday sermon (khuṭba), and made the imams deliver it instead in the name of the mahdī and the four “rightly guided” caliphs (rāshidūn). Abū Zakariyā then formalized his independence from Marrakech by taking up the title of emir (amīr), the only title he ever bore. Seven years later, he added his own name to the weekly sermon, thus publicly proclaiming himself an independent ruler (1236–37).¹⁷

For later Ḥafṣid historians such as Ibn al-Shammā‘, Abū Zakariyā claimed Ifrīqiyā because it was already his country. This is typical of the chronicles’ tendency toward historical foreshortening. In reality, the first Ḥafṣid ruler was an Almohad and articulated the legitimacy of his rule in Almohad terms. Abū Zakariyā fashioned himself as the inheritor of the charisma and spiritual leadership of Ibn Tūmart, and of the military skills and piety of ‘Abd al-Mu’min. His supporters also made use of the fact that his grandfather, Abū Ḥafṣ, had been an early follower of the mahdī and a great Almohad general. While he was viewed as rooted in the region, his political legitimacy still drew on roots in the far west.

As for the Almohad sheikhs of Ifrīqiyā, with the political situation in the west spiraling out of Almohad control, they had two choices: go back to Marrakech in loyalty to the caliph or stay in Ifrīqiyā. Many stayed. Once they were no longer there on a temporary assignment, they had to reassess their situation and commit themselves to being in Ifrīqiyā. Abū Zakariyā permitted their role to shift: they now gained renewed influence at the court, precisely at a time when Tunis was flourishing as a capital; Abū Zakariyā sponsored the building of a prayer hall (muṣallā) outside the city’s walls and organized spacious markets around the Great Mosque of Tunis.

Abū Zakariyā’s sense of continuity with the Almohads was palpable both inside and outside the court. Following Almohad custom, he redesigned Tunis’s Kasbah, the fortified tower and walled quarters where the ruling family and high government officials lived. In Ramadan 1233, he inaugurated a new minaret for the Kasbah’s mosque, which had been and remained known as the Almohad Mosque. In the treaties with northern Mediterraneans, his subjects are described as “Almohads.”¹⁸ Even his methods of cultivating loyalty and punishing offenders were Almohad, including favoring the Ku‘ūb and Mirdās at the expense of the Dawāwida who had supported Ibn Ghāniya. Unsurprisingly, the Dawāwida resisted the new order, and just as unsurprisingly, Abū Zakariyā sent an army against them, defeated them, and made them relocate from Tunis to the Zāb and the area south of Qasanṭīna. In 1238, he marched against the defiant Hawwāra, defeated them, and forced the survivors into servile labor, just as the Almohads had done.

Having consolidated his power in Ifrīqiyā and nipped in the bud a conspiracy of Almohad sheikhs, Abū Zakariyā now focused on expanding his realm. But here he had a momentous decision to make. Would his emulation of the Almohads extend to actually taking over their realm? Would he assume their mission of protecting the Muslims of al-Andalus? Abū Zakariyā chose a course of restraint, but sovereigns in the Maghrib nonetheless looked to him as an Almohad successor. In 1242, he invaded Tilimsān (Tlemcen), but decided not to march against the Almohads in the western Maghrib. Yet the kings of Iberia who led “the Christian reconquest” feared Abū Zakariyā’s growing power: in 1231, James I of Aragon raced to Majorca, which had been under his control since 1229, because of rumors of a Ḥafṣid expedition against the island. Likewise, the emirs of al-Andalus looked to Abū Zakariyā for protection, just as they had looked to the Almohads: in 1238, the emir of Valencia, Zayyān b. Mardanīsh, hoping to defeat James’s siege of the city, appealed to Abū Zakariyā, whom he recognized as overlord. Abū Zakariyā sent a small flotilla, but it was unable to help. In October 1238, Valencia capitulated. Though his aid was inadequate and ultimately futile, the sources are unanimous in emphasizing Abū Zakariyā’s intention of coming to the rescue of Muslims.¹⁹

When Abū Zakariyā died in 1249, he left a great reputation behind him. Some of the chronicles depict him with mere boiler plate praise of the sovereign, as having listened to the complaints of the poor and having been loved by the masses. But others detected the thin line he walked between Almohad succession and outright independence. They described him as surrounding himself with a Council of Almohads that supported Ḥafṣid claims to authentic Almohad lineage. They also praised his wise reliance on freed Christian captives (‘ulūj) and Andalusi immigrants, who, together with Christian mercenaries, helped the Ḥafṣids to keep in check the power of the Almohad sheikhs.²⁰ Almohad though he might have acted, he was also willing to carve an independent course of rule.

Fending Off Urban Elites, Bedouins, and Crusaders

Abū Zakariyā’s son and heir, Abū ‘Abd Allāh Muḥammad, benefited from the support of his father’s confidants, a fact not to be taken for granted given that the bonds of patronage at court were rarely passed on by legacy. The chroniclers note that when Abū ‘Abd Allāh arrived in Tunis, he immediately enjoyed the double allegiance of the Almohad sheikhs and the common people (‘āmma).²¹ But things were not so simple. In 1250, he survived a coup attempt fomented by Almohad leaders who resented the rising power of the freed slaves and the Andalusis. In 1253, his own brother, Abū Isḥāq Ibrāhīm, continuing the family tradition of internecine quarrels, escaped Tunis, where he had been closely watched, and took refuge among the Dawāwida. Their sheikhs pledged allegiance to him, recognized him as emir, and helped him form an army to unseat his brother. When they were defeated, Abū Isḥāq fled to al-Andalus, where he found refuge at the court of Muḥammad b. Yūsuf of Granada.

In 1253, a mere four years after assuming rule, Abū ‘Abd Allāh took on the caliphal title Commander of the Faithful (amīr al-mu’minīn) and assumed the caliphal-sounding regnal name al-Mustanṣir. This move must be seen in the context of his attempts to quell the Almohad sheikhs, now in the form of the Banū Nu‘mān. A powerful Almohad family, the Banū Nu‘mān had supported al-Mustanṣir’s father, and he came to see their influence as governors of Qasanṭīna as a serious threat to his rule. he eliminated three of the most prominent members of their clan from the political scene by killing them.

Threats to al-Mustanṣir’s rule came not only from the Almohad sheikhs but from the urban elites, and further members of his own family. Taking advantage of the political instability in eastern Ifrīqiyā, urban elites in the western town of Milyāna made bids to break away from Tunis. In 1261, al-Mustanṣir’s brother Abū Ḥafṣ took Milyāna and placed it in the hands of the Awlād Mandīl before heading back to Tunis. East of Milyāna, the Mediterranean port city of Jazā’ir Banī Mazghanna (Algiers) also proclaimed independence from Tunis and prompted a similar reaction. In both cases, the Ḥafṣids asserted their military domination at great cost.

In addition to urban elites who jockeyed for influence, the Ḥafṣids faced a constellation of armed Bedouin groups, each with its own agenda and strategies. A few years before the events of Milyāna, al-Mustanṣir had seen firsthand how challenging Bedouins could be. When the coalition led by the self-proclaimed messiah Abū Ḥimāra threatened to overtake the whole southern Zāb, al-Mustanṣir led an army from Tunis, had Abū Ḥimāra killed, and arrested the leaders of the Mirdās and Dabbāb who had offered him logistical support. But even then, he could not rest on his laurels, facing the ever-troublesome Dawāwida in the region south of Qasanṭīna, aided by members of his own family. With al-Mustanṣir’s cousin Abū al-Qāsim on their side, the Dawāwida sought to sponsor their own Ḥafṣid ruler. But when the time came to fight, Abū al-Qāsim cowered, fleeing to al-Andalus and leaving the Dawāwida and their sheikh Shibl b. Mūsa to face the Tunisan army alone. The battle went in favor of al-Mustanṣir, who forced the enemy to retreat to the south of al-Masīla. Unsatisfied, al-Mustanṣir was back on the offensive two years later, in 1268, with the help of the Ku‘ūb, Dabbāb, and Sadwīkish. The Banū ‘Asākir branch of the Dawāwida accepted defeat and pledged allegiance to him, but the Banū Mas‘ūd refused to capitulate and fled to the south of Biskra, well into the Sahara, where their livelihood would be endangered. After some discussion, they reversed their decision and asked to negotiate terms with al-Mustanṣir, who responded by arresting their leaders and decapitating them, and then leading a surprise attack against their remaining supporters.

Seriously challenged inland and still having trouble imposing his will in the region, al-Mustanṣir now faced yet another enemy: Louis IX. In 1270, after the failure of his Crusade in the Levant, Louis led a Crusade against Tunis. After four months, the tight naval siege he maintained forced al-Mustanṣir to ask for help from nearby cities and Bedouins. Whether the move would have weakened his rule or allowed him to build alliances we will never know: just when al-Mustanṣir’s capital seemed about to fall to the crusaders, a mysterious illness killed Louis and forced the crusaders back home with the body of their leader, and future saint. The peace treaty al-Mustanṣir signed to convince the crusader army to leave came at a heavy price: two hundred and ten thousand ounces of gold, and a number of commercial concessions and guarantees.²²

Half a century was not enough to secure Ḥafṣid rule over all of Ifrīqiyā. As soon as al-Mustanṣir died in 1277, wars of succession ensued. The political crisis made it clear that the ruler of Tunis had had a very fragile hold on power. Louis’s Crusade showed that al-Mustanṣir could not defend his kingdom without the help of Bedouins. The succession wars showed that all the major political players sought to confer legitimacy on their actions by attaching themselves to a Ḥafṣid emir. This illustrates the extent to which the Ḥafṣids had succeeded in becoming the dynasty of Ifrīqiyā.

The Ḥafṣids of Ifrīqiyā

The Ḥafṣids were at first just Almohad governors, but over time, they claimed an increasing degree of autonomy. Making Ifrīqiyā Ḥafṣid, or bringing it under unified Ḥafṣid rule, was a gradual, imperfect, and often violent process. It also involved making the Ḥafṣids, the powerful Hintātī clan from the western Maghrib, into Ifrīqiyans. This process did not begin as a well-formed or formulated plan. The first Ḥafṣid governor could hardly imagine that his descendants would make Ifrīqiyā their homeland. In fact, once the Ḥafṣids declared independence from Marrakech, they did not denounce their roots in the Almohad order. On the contrary, they claimed continuity with the Almohads and behaved like them, too, as if the Almohad capital had moved from Marrakech to Tunis. Nonetheless, the Ḥafṣids seceded, made Tunis their capital, and began appointing the governors of Bijāya. Rulers of Tunis had never done this before.

The making of the first Tunis-based regional emirate began with the imposition of Ḥafṣid domination over the body of Almohad sheikhs. To defeat those sheikhs, the Ḥafṣids utilized a variety of strategies, the most significant of which was to establish alliances with urban elites and Bedouins. They also encouraged elite Andalusis to immigrate to the cities they controlled—Tunis and Bijāya foremost among them. They appointed Christian converts to key positions in the bureaucracy and bolstered the number of non-Almohad soldiers by utilizing Andalusi and Christian militias from nearby kingdoms such as Aragon.²³ As they saw them, these paid soldiers constituted an army more loyal than any they could muster at home to fend off Bedouins, Almohad sheikhs, and other members of the Ḥafṣid clan. All this is remarkable when considered against the uncertain beginning the Ḥafṣids had in Ifrīqiyā and their attachment to the Almohads. It is therefore far from surprising that a few groups continued to resist their “regional” domination.

Bijāya as an Autonomous Ḥafṣid Capital (1277–1346)

The resolution of Ḥafṣid crisis of rule came in the form of Bijāya’s secession from Tunis. The secession at first followed a familiar pattern: wealthy merchants sought out the Ḥafṣid emir Abū Zakariyā Yaḥyā (r. 1285–1301) and supported his accession to the throne in their city. But unlike the previous abortive secessions, this one split the Ḥafṣid dynasty into two self-recognized branches, each claiming control over a different part of the kingdom that had once been ruled by Abū Zakariyā (1229–49) and al-Mustanṣir (1249–77). While Bijāya was not the only autonomous city, focusing on its independence gives a concrete example of the shift from the regional Ḥafṣid emirate to a number of local ones.

The Limits of Regional Rule

When Abū Zakariyā Yaḥyā II al-Wāthiq succeeded al-Mustanṣir to the throne in Tunis, he was young and, according to the Ḥafṣid historian Ibn Qunfudh, his ḥājib (vizier) treated him “as an adult guardian [treats] a child.”²⁴ A native of Murcia, this ḥājib, Ibn al-Ḥabbabar, had risen in the ranks under al-Mustanṣir, becoming chief of the customs house in Tunis before being appointed to the highest office. He married into the Hintātī clan and wielded a great deal of power, eliminating potential competitors and appointing his own men, many of whom were Andalusis, to sensitive positions. He also appointed his own brother as governor of Bijāya.

The Bijāyan notables did not appreciate the newcomer’s haughty attitude and cavalier treatment of them, and not long after his arrival, conspired to rid themselves of him, of al-Wāthiq, and of their supporters. To do so, they sent for al-Wāthiq’s uncle, Abū Isḥāq Ibrāhim in Tilimsān. Abū Isḥāq had fled to Granada during al-Mustanṣir’s rule (1249–77), and upon hearing of al-Mustanṣir’s death, he had reentered the Maghrib to await his moment at the ‘Abd al-Wādid court in Tilimsān. The moment arrived when a delegation of Bijāyans arrived and offered him their city. He accepted readily and was proclaimed emir in Bijāya in April 1279.

Ibn al-Ḥabbabar responded to this move by sending an army to Bijāya under the command of Abū Ḥafṣ ‘Umar—another uncle of al-Wāthiq’s—who promptly defected and joined Abū Isḥāq on Bijāya’s side. This major defeat left Tunis with no real army and forced al-Wāthiq to abdicate in favor of Abū Isḥāq in August 1279.²⁵ Abū Isḥāq then arrested Ibn al-Ḥabbabar, confiscated his property, and had him killed. The young al-Wāthiq was arrested for plotting with the leader (qā’id) of the Christian militia and was executed in 1280, together with his three sons. Prominent individuals associated with al-Mustanṣir and Ibn al-Ḥabbabar received the same treatment.

As a ruler of Tunis and Bijāya, Abū Isḥāq showed a clear policy of favoritism toward Andalusis. Abū al-Qāsim Aḥmad b. al-Shaykh was put at the head of the palace while Abū Bakr b. Ḥasan b. Khaldūn, the grandfather of the famous historian, headed the treasury. The Ḥafṣid ruler then appointed his son Abū Fāris governor of the province of Bijāya and agreed to the appointment of Muḥammad b. Khaldūn, the son of his treasurer, to the highest office, that of ḥājib, in Bijāya. In turn, the new governor of Bijāya, Abū Fāris, designated the Almohad Ibn al-Wazīr governor of Qasanṭīna, and two sons of the powerful Banū Muznī from Biskra as governors of the southern regions of al-Zāb and al-Jarīd. By appointing them as governors, the Ḥafṣids extended their influence over the Banū Muznī dynasty, which ruled in that oasis town. The move gave the Ḥafṣids more consistent access to Saharan caravans and consolidated the Banū Muznī in their capital, even if they had to recognize the Ḥafṣids as overlords.²⁶

Abū Isḥāq attempted to stretch his influence even further over the region by maintaining good relations with his western neighbors, the ‘Abd al-Wādids (1236–1555). The founder of that dynasty, Yaghmurāsan (r. 1236–83), renewed his allegiance to Abū Isḥāq and, in 1282, sent his heir to Tunis with gifts to ask for the hand of a daughter of Abū Isḥāq for one of his sons. The union of the two dynasties was thus sealed. Soon after that, the new couple became the parents of two future ‘Abd al-Wādid sultans. But the relative peace between the eastern and western Maghribī dynasties did not afford the government of Tunis the relief it sought. Crop failure in 1280 and the reluctance of the Bedouins to pay taxes led Abū Isḥāq to send his two sons, Abū Zakariyā and Abū Muḥammad, at the head of important military units to collect the taxes in fall 1282.²⁷ Doing so was no easy task. The powerful Dabbāb had rallied behind a man who claimed to be al-Faḍl, the son of the former Ḥafṣid ruler al-Wāthiq (r. 1277–79), and sought to unseat Abū Isḥāq.

Kings and Kingmakers

This man was Aḥmad b. Marzuq b. Abī ‘Umāra. His family was from al-Masīla (M’sila) and had emigrated to Bijāya, where he had grown up. He worked as a tailor in Bijāya, then traveled to the western Maghrib, where he claimed to possess supernatural powers and to be the awaited mahdī. In order to demonstrate his good faith and messianic status, he promised to produce miracles that would convince the skeptics. On the appointed day, the miracles he promised failed to materialize and he had to escape the region. He traveled back to Ifrīqiyā and stayed with Bedouins in the region of Tripoli, where a former servant of the Ḥafṣid al-Wāthiq claimed he recognized Ibn Abī ‘Umāra as al-Faḍl.

The two managed to convince the chief of the Dabbāb of this, put together an army, and openly rebelled against Tunis. The powerful Ku‘ūb promptly joined the rebels and, with their support, Ibn Abī ‘Umāra was declared caliph in the regions south of Tunis. In December 1282, Qābis (Gabēs) fell to the rebels, and in fear, a Ḥafṣid army led by a son of Abū Isḥāq disbanded before battle. Leaders from al-Qayrawān, Safāqis (Sfax), and their surrounding areas joined the new caliph against the ruler of Tunis. In January 1283, more Tunisan soldiers, led by the Almohad sheikh Mūsā b. Yāsīn, sent to fight the rebels deserted and joined the other side.

Isolated and defeated, the Ḥafṣid ruler Abū Isḥāq fled Tunis in the dead of winter with a few of his supporters. Repeatedly robbed and harassed en route, he finally reached Bijāya where his son Abū Fāris was governor. But he would not find the support he sought even there. Sensing an opportunity in his father’s arrival, Abū Fāris obtained his father’s abdication and was declared caliph in Bijāya in March 1283. Ifrīqiyā now had two caliphs: Abū Fāris in Bijāya and Ibn Abī ‘Umāra in Tunis.

A war between the two Ḥafṣid caliphs was inevitable. It took place in June 1283 in the plains of Marmājanna and lasted an entire day. Abū Fāris was killed, his three brothers and his nephew captured. Ibn Abī ‘Umāra ordered their heads severed. The only Ḥafṣid who survived the battle was Abū Fāris’s uncle Abū Ḥafṣ ‘Umar, who fled the scene in the company of a small group of loyalists.²⁸

The news of the defeat created great commotion in the now defeated Bijāya. The two Ḥafṣid emirs in town, the old Abū Isḥāq and Abū Zakariyā, fled in the direction of Tilimsān. Abū Isḥāq did not get very far before being captured in the land of the Banū Ghubrīn by the partisans of a Bijāyan who led a pro–Ibn Abī ‘Umāra party. They imprisoned him until an emissary of Ibn Abī ‘Umāra arrived from Tunis, then killed him and sent his head to Tunis, where it was paraded. Abū Zakariyā was far luckier, arriving in Tilimsān, where he received a warm welcome from the ‘Abd al-Wādid ruler who had married his sister not long before.

Meanwhile in Tunis, Ibn Abī ‘Umāra attempted a purge of the old Ḥafṣid guard. He appointed the Almohad sheikhs Mūsā b. Yasīn and Abū al-Qasim b. al-Shaykh to the two highest positions and had the chief of the treasury, Abū Bakr b. Khaldūn, arrested, confiscated his possessions, tortured him, and had him strangled to death. In a bid for support from the urban elite, Ibn Abī ‘Umāra canceled an unpopular tax and behaved outwardly like a pious man, visiting the shrines of saints and ordering the building of a mosque at the place wine was sold.

But Ibn Abī ‘Umāra’s purge went too far. On the advice of the Almohad Abd al-Ḥaq b. Tafrākīn al-Tinmāllī, he jailed many Bedouin chiefs, thus angering the very groups who had brought him to power. His attitude toward the region’s notables was no better: he killed many of them, including his highest officials, on the tiniest of suspicions. Having alienated the Bedouin chiefs, the urban notables, and the Almohads, Ibn Abī ‘Umāra found himself without much support. His demise was even more precipitous than his rise.

And soon enough, in 1284, the chief of the Ku’ūb went to meet Abū Ḥafṣ ‘Umar, the sole survivor of the battle of Marmājanna, swore an oath of loyalty to him and led a rebellion to bring down Ibn Abī ‘Umāra. The two armies met south of Tunis; Ibn Abī ‘Umāra’s soldiers disbanded while he escaped and went into hiding somewhere in Tunis. In July 1284, Abū Ḥafṣ ‘Umar received the oath in Tunis, taking the caliphal title borne by his brother, al-Mustanṣir bi-Allāh. One week later, Ibn Abī ‘Umāra was found hidden at the house of an Andalusi shopkeeper; he confessed his fraud in the presence of witnesses and was decapitated.

These events were apparently memorable to later historians, who narrated them in lavish detail. But for us, Ibn Abī ‘Umāra’s usurpation of the Ḥafṣid name demonstrates two important aspects of the political situation after the death of (the first) al-Mustanṣir: the importance of access to an army; and the importance of membership in the Ḥafṣid dynasty. Without fulfilling those two requirements, it was impossible to survive as the ruler of Tunis. In their struggles against each other, all the urban-based elites—Tunisans, Andalusis, and Almohads—had found themselves incapable of overpowering the others without external military help, whether African or European. The gradual demilitarization of the Almohad sheikhs and the elimination of the Andalusi militia only strengthened the hand of Bedouins.

The Emir of Bijāya and His Backers

The end of the first regional emirate came at the hand of Bijāya’s wealthy merchants. In 1284–85, a delegation of Bijāyans, headed by the prominent Andalusi Ibn Sayyid al-Nās, went on a mission to Tilimsān to convince the Ḥafṣid emir Abū Zakariyā b. Abī Isḥāq to be their ruler.

[Ibn Sayyid al-Nās] went to Tilimsān to urge Abū Zakariyā to claim his lordship [over Bijāya]. [After convincing Abū Zakariyā], he borrowed money from Bijāya’s merchants and spent it to acquire the instruments and symbols of kingship (ubbahat al-mulk) on his behalf. He also gathered clients and followers [in his name].²⁹

The merchants’ money had bought Bijāya its own independent emir and, although the sources do not tell us this, probably secured them a good return on their investment in the form of official support for trade.³⁰ Their involvement in politics helped put an official stamp on the commercial orientation of the city.

As the main organizer and leader of this operation, Ibn Sayyid al-Nās reaped great benefits. As soon as Abū Zakariyā Yaḥyā (r. 1285–1301) took over the reins of power, he appointed Ibn Sayyid al-Nās to the position of ḥājib, the highest in his administration. Commenting on Ibn Sayyid al-Nās’s performance in the position he too had held, Ibn Khaldūn ranked it higher than that of the legendary ḥājib of al-Mustanṣir (r. 1249–77). But in an aside characteristic of his style, Ibn Khaldūn also explained that Ibn Sayyid al-Nās’s task may have been facilitated by the absence of influential Almohad sheikhs in Bijāya who could have challenged him.³¹ This remark may merely indicate Ibn Khaldūn’s jealousy toward the man whose shoes he later filled. Nonetheless, it suggests that the Almohads did not represent a significant political group in the city. In Bijāya, the Almohads had lost the influence they had held in the half-century since the Ḥafṣids had taken over the city. The Ḥafṣid strategy of undermining their power by appointing Andalusis had worked better and faster in Bijāya than in Tunis.³² The influence of Andalusis in Bijāya was such that when the Andalusi Ibn Sayyid al-Nās died, his secretary, another Andalusi, replaced him.³³

But the power of a few individuals can hardly be taken to mean that in the 1280s, Andalusis formed a unified party. Even a perfunctory survey of the sources demonstrates that Andalusis were fully engaged in politics against other Andalusis, and that there was hardly such a thing as Andalusi solidarity. If anything, powerful Andalusi individuals led opposing factions against Andalusis and non-Andalusis alike, with the purpose of gaining influence over the Ḥafṣid rulers or ingratiating themselves with them. But this did not prevent members of the old families of Bijāya from attributing the loss of influence they felt to the Andalusis, from feeling that Andalusis discussed political matters in threatening ways, and that they often acted in consort. Prominent Bijāyans of the “old” families such as the judge Abū al-‘Abbās al-Ghubrīnī (1246–1304) were not among the leaders of the independence movement, even if they supported it. Certainly, it would have been difficult for the Andalusis to achieve Bijāya’s autonomy without their participation and support. But together, the two groups formed a powerful enough coalition that it succeeded in bringing about a local emirate, and in maintaining it for decades to come.

Behind the Local Emirate

The coming together of powerful Andalusis and “old” Bijāyans enabled the formation of an independent Ḥafṣid emirate in Bijāya. The event was noted in Tunis, where the ruler immediately formed an alliance with the ‘Abd al-Wādids of Tilimsān to defeat Abū Zakariyā Yaḥyā and end his rule over the city.³⁴ But the alliance’s attacks on the city failed. Worse for Tunis, Bijāya’s successful resistance led many cities in the region, such as Qasanṭīna, to defect and join the new emirate.

As they joined Bijāya, these urban elites showed that they did not favor a regional configuration in principle—only if they were the ones behind it. Such regional politics would have to wait until the late fourteenth century. Once Abū Zakariyā Yaḥyā died, his son Abū al-Baqā’ (r. 1301–9) briefly unified Ifrīqiyā from Bijāya, but his feat was quickly undone in a rebellion led by his own brother, Abū Yaḥyā Abū Bakr, the emir of Qasanṭīna (1310/11).³⁵ Abū Bakr defeated Abū al-Baqā’ and his supporters among the Ṣanhāja and took over Bijāya in 1312, but he stayed there only long enough to appoint the Andalusi Ibn Ghamr ḥājib and then leave the city to him. At this point, Bijāya was nominally ruled from Qasantīna rather than Tunis, but it was functionally as independent as it had been before—a Ḥafṣid emirate under Ibn Ghamr’s rule.³⁶

Here again, the strength of the Bedouins came into play. The ascendance of Andalusis like Ibn Ghamr displeased powerful Bedouins near Bijāya since their power rested on the Ḥafṣid emirs’ military dependence on them. As Ibn Khaldūn put it:

Ya‘qūb b. Khulūf was known as Abū ‘Abd al-Raḥmān, the leader of Ṣanhāja. Ṣanhāja [soldiers constituted] the army of the sultan and were settled near Bijāya. [Ibn Khulūf] had an important position in the government and [obtained] wealth from wars and [from] defending [the city] against its enemies. Both the emir Abū Zakariyā and his son [Abū al-Baqā’] used to leave him in charge of Bijāya when they traveled…. So Ibn Khulūf demanded that the sultan [Abū Yaḥyā Abū Bakr] dismiss Ibn Ghamr.³⁷

Ibn Khulūf and other Bedouin chiefs were crucial to the maintenance of local Ḥafṣid emirates such as that of Bijāya. Deriving strength from their military contribution, they made political demands that the Ḥafṣid emirs had to consider. Although Abū Bakr did not accede to Ibn Khulūf’s demands, Bedouins were clearly not alien to the urban scene and its politics. Unlike those over which the Ḥafṣids had little or no control and, who often raided villages and towns under Ḥafṣid rule, these Bedouins formulated political demands within the boundaries of Ḥafṣid power. They were allies and their support was politically crucial.

Until his death in 1319, Ibn Ghamr was the effective ruler of Bijāya, even if he governed in the name of Ḥafṣid legitimacy. But challenges to his influence did not abate, and many came from Bedouins. Ibn Talīlan, the chief of the Kutāma, and Ḥasan b. Ibrāhīm b. Thābit, chief of the Banū Thābit, both led battles against him. Ibn Ghamr was successful in eliminating his opponents, only to see them run to the ‘Abd al-Wādid ruler of Tilimsān urging him to invade Ifrīqiyā. The ‘Abd al-Wādids’ two campaigns in 1313 and 1315 against Ifrīqiyā penetrated deep, through the lands of the Banū Thābit south of Bijāya and around Qasanṭīna, and even reached Būna. They were incapable, however, of taking any of the important cities and had to retreat to Tilimsān.³⁸

A year before Ibn Ghamr’s death, in 1318, Abū Yaḥyā Abū Bakr became ruler in Tunis and began imposing the unification of Ifrīqiyā. When Ibn Ghamr died in 1319, Abū Bakr appointed the younger of his own sons, Abū Zakariyā Yaḥyā, as governor of Bijāya, and chose a certain Ibn al-Qālūn as his ḥājib.³⁹ Soon after, this ḥājib was replaced by another, also named Ibn Sayyid al-Nās.⁴⁰ So successful was this Ibn Sayyid al-Nās in ingratiating himself with the Ḥafṣid ruler of Tunis that he was then called on to assume the same post in the capital. Treating the office of ḥājib like his property, before he left for Tunis Ibn Sayyid al-Nās appointed his successor in Bijāya. Although there were others like them, Ibn Ghamr and Ibn Sayyid al-Nās exemplified the powerful ḥājibs who were the effective rulers of Ifrīqiyā’s local emirates.⁴¹ The emergence of such individuals, many of whom were Andalusi, was the other side of the multiplication of independent capitals in Ifrīqiyā.

The Emergence of a Regional Elite

There was something deeply unstable about the independent emirate of Bijāya. The high-level officials were mercenaries who were unattached to city or country. They did not have ties to an ancestral home nearby and were not related to the powerful Bedouins that supported the local emirate—although on occasion ḥājibs formed politically motivated marriage alliances with Bedouins. The alliances they built were not long-lasting and, ultimately, their influence was never routinized. The death of a ḥājib or his elimination from the political scene was the chance for new contests and the formation of new coalitions that often rejuvenated old enmities and created new ones. No party or faction had overwhelming political advantage, and this led to a high turnover of officials. High turnover, in turn, not only produced discontinuity in the management of the government’s affairs, it fostered a whole class of functionaries who worked a few years in Bijāya, then in Qasanṭīna, then in Tilimsān or Granada. Instead of having the sons of Bijāya run the independent government of their city, the ḥājibs relied on politically less threatening outsiders. The result was the emergence of a group of administrators, jurists, and tax collectors who could find employment in any city, but who believed Tunis to be the real capital. Even when they belonged to the old families of Bijāya, like the Ghubrīnīs, they attempted to appoint their sons and grandsons to judgeships and other official positions in Tunis.

Conflicts between Ḥafṣid emirs, ḥājibs, members of the urban elite, and Bedouins undermined the autonomy of the Ḥafṣid emirate of Bijāya. The perceived weakness of the ruler of the city undoubtedly encouraged the expansionist aspirations of the ‘Abd al-Wādids, Marīnids, and Catalans who saw in his weakness a political opportunity. But they, too, were unable to do more than pick favorites among the major local players. The possibilities were becoming narrower with every conspiracy that ended in blood, every costly and wasteful siege, and every battle that saw loss of life and treasure. No Ḥafṣid emir in Ifrīqiyā seemed to be able to rally a strong enough coalition to eliminate all the others and bring back a regional emirate. The situation was ripe for a political earthquake, and since it did not come from within, it had to come from outside.

Elite Rule Challenged (1346–64)

Commoners and the Rule of the Elite

In 1346, the aging Abū Bakr (r. 1318–46) learned that his son Abū Zakariyā, who was the emir of Bijāya, had died. He decided to send his other son Abū Ḥafṣ ‘Umar to replace him. When Abū Ḥafṣ arrived in the city, he quickly realized he was not welcome there. Popular opposition to his appointment was fierce and led to the appointment of the people’s favorite instead. Ibn Khaldūn describes the situation as follows:

The scoundrels (awghād) of the court forced Abū Ḥafṣ to use violence.⁴² The people (al-nās) feared the consequences and consulted one another. Then there were days of great fear in which a great number of [people among the] populace (kāffa) [tried to] force their [will] on the incoming emir. They marched around the Kasbah bearing arms calling for the rule of their [deceased] emir’s son. Then they scaled the [Kasbah’s] walls and assailed [Abū Ḥafṣ ‘Umar’s] house, and captured him. They then proceeded to take him out [of the Kasbah] after they had pillaged all his possessions and took him to the home of the emir Abū ‘Abd Allāh Muḥammad, their [deceased] emir’s son and their lord, who was ready to break from them and join the caliph [Abū Bakr], his grandfather.

His uncle permitted [Abū ‘Abd Allāh to accept their offer] and they pledged allegiance to him in his house. The following day, they took him to his palace in the Kasbah and made him their ruler. He appointed his client Fāriḥ as his ḥājib….⁴³ The sultan became aware of the affairs of Bijāya and he sent them Abū ‘Abd Allāh b. Sulaymān, a most pious sheikh from the Almohads, to placate them. He sent with him a letter investing his grandson Abū ‘Abd Allāh Muḥammad, son of the emir Abū Zakariyā, [with the office] following their desires. [After that] they were relieved and enjoyed the rule of the son of their [deceased] lord.⁴⁴

Before these events, the participation of commoners (kāffa) in the politics of Bijāya had never been so significant that they could decide which Ḥafṣid emir would rule. While Ibn Khaldūn’s description makes it seem that the populace made the emir, his reference to a protégé of the Banū Sayyid al-Nās suggests the involvement of the elite behind the scenes. It is also possible, however, that Fāriḥ, who had benefited from Andalusi support in the past, was acting independently of Ibn Sayyid al-Nās and that he was behind the armed commoners. In any case, the “commoners” in question were not completely alien to local politics. If the involvement of non-elites in politics did not produce a complete redrawing of the political map this time, they soon after had a chance to make their presence felt in even more significant ways.

Marīnid Conquests and the Role of the Populace

In 1337, the Marīnid ruler Abū al-Ḥasan (r. 1331–48) took over the ‘Abd al-Wādid capital Tilimsān and became the most powerful monarch in the Maghrib. For the first time since the Almohads (1130–1269), a single dynasty was in the position of being able to bring the entire Maghrib under its rule. Growing Marīnid power threatened the autonomy of Bijāya and other cities in Ifrīqiyā, including Tunis.

Between 1337 and 1346, Abū al-Ḥasan’s influence on Ifrīqiyā expanded greatly.⁴⁵ For the Ḥafṣid rulers of Bijāya, a consolidation of power on the western frontier did not bode well. Using a strategy that had worked before, the caliph of Tunis, Abū Bakr (d. 1346) sought to placate the Marīnids and hoped that a deal with Aragon would secure naval support in case of an attack.⁴⁶ In 1342, Abū Bakr officially named his son Abū al-‘Abbās Aḥmad as heir, and saw it fit to include Abū al-Ḥasan as underwriter of his edict.⁴⁷ Taking an oath guaranteeing the caliphal succession furthered the Marīnid ruler’s involvement in Ḥafṣid affairs.

At the death of Abū Bakr, his son Abū Ḥafṣ ‘Umar received the pledge of allegiance thanks to the political maneuverings of Ibn Tafrākīn, the leader of the Almohad sheikhs in Tunis.⁴⁸ Hearing of the death of his father, the official heir to the throne, Abū al-‘Abbās Aḥmad, ran back to the capital to claim his right, but Abū Ḥafṣ would not let that happen and had the heir and another two of his brothers killed. The Marīnid Abū al-Ḥasan used this usurpation as a reason to get directly involved in the affairs of Ifrīqiyā.⁴⁹ He enticed Ibn Tafrākīn to switch camps and join a host of anti-Abū Ḥafṣ groups in support of the Marīnids. In 1347, the Marīnid Abū al-Ḥasan led an army to conquer Ifrīqiyā, leaving his son Abū ‘Inān Fāris in charge of his own capital. On his way, he obtained the peaceful submission of the powerful Dawāwida and of governors as far east as Ṭrāblus.

Abū al-Ḥasan took Bijāya from the Ḥafṣid emir Abū ‘Abd Allāh without a fight.⁵⁰ The Marīnid ruler sent him and his brother, the emir of Qasanṭīna, from Ifrīqiyā to the western cities of Wujda and Naḍrūma, where they “ruled” as his clients. Abū al-Ḥasan then pushed toward Tunis and entered it without much resistance in September of 1347. The Marīnid sultan made a spectacular entry into the city on his horse, flanked on his right-hand side by the leader of the Zughba of the central Maghrib and the Almohad sheikh Ibn Tafrākīn, and on his left by two Ḥafṣid emirs whom he had freed from the jails of Qasanṭīna. He took possession of the palace of Tunis and then left for a campaign in the south to secure the region.

Next, Abū al-Ḥasan ordered an end to a practice that had allowed Bedouins to collect taxes in exchange for their military service, and offered to pay them instead for services rendered. For him, the Bedouins’ regular access to tax revenue gave them too much autonomy. Not wishing to lose this source of income, the Bedouins attempted to overthrow the Marīnids and restore a Ḥafṣid emir in Tunis. A coalition of Bedouin and Ḥafṣid emirs rallied behind the grandson of a former Ḥafṣid pretender by the name of Ahmad b. ‘Abd al-Salām. In 1348, the two armies met and Abū al-Ḥasan’s army, which included many Ifrīqiyāns, disbanded. He barely escaped with his life: loyalty to the Ḥafṣids gained renewed significance in Ifrīqiyā.

The news of the defeat encouraged those who had rebelled against Abū al-Ḥasan. Meanwhile, his own son, Abū ‘Inān, declared himself sultan of Tilimsān and moved on the western territories.⁵¹ As soon as Abū ‘Inān let them, the two Ḥafṣid emirs his father had exiled promptly returned to Ifrīqiyā. Once again, the Bijāyans made Abū ‘Abd Allāh their emir. Other members of the Ḥafṣid house rallied against the Marīnids and took back most of Ifrīqiyā. Abū al-Ḥasan was left with nothing but the area immediately surrounding Tunis. After a series of losing battles against Ḥafṣid supporters and Ifrīqiyān Bedouins, Abū al-Ḥasan fled by sea. On his way back to the western Maghrib, he attempted to stop in Bijāya, but was refused entry. He found refuge in the west among the Hintāta of the High Atlas and died a year or so later, unable to unseat his son Abū ‘Inān.

After Abū al-Ḥasan was defeated, the three Ḥafṣid emirs of Bijāya, Qasanṭīna, and Tunis had to reclaim their dominions. The Marīnid interlude had emboldened some Bedouins and each Ḥafṣid emir needed to reassert his dominance over his domain. So frail was the grip these emirs had on power that when Abū ‘Abd Allāh, Bijāya’s emir, ventured out of the city to lead a campaign against Qasanṭīna, he immediately lost control of the western port city of Tadlis. The Marīnid episode meant that only with difficulty could the emir of Bijāya impose his rule over areas he had once controlled securely. Perhaps discouraged by the political situation in which he found himself, Abū ‘Abd Allāh sought the protection of the Marīnid ruler at Tilimsān, Abū ‘Inān, who offered to take care of him only if he renounced his rights over Bijāya. He accepted. In 1352, Bijāya came under Marīnid control. Abū ‘Inān appointed his relative ‘Umar b. ‘Alī al-Waṭṭāsī as governor—but left Abū ‘Abd Allāh’s ḥājib, Fāriḥ, in charge of the city.⁵²

Fāriḥ traveled to Qasanṭīna looking for support against the Marīnids. In his absence, the new pro-Marīnid governor arrived to take over Bijāya, and Ḥafṣid supporters, backed by the Ṣanhāja, openly rebelled against him. They killed a number of judges and pro-Marīnid notables, and sent for Fārih, urging him to return. Unfortunately for him, the rebels soon after changed their minds and joined the Marīnid camp. When he arrived in Bijāya, they killed him, and sent his head to the Marīnid ruler. They then invited the Marīnid governor of Tadlis to become governor of Bijāya. After the Ṣanhāja left town in direction of Tunis, Marīnid officials arrested Fārih’s supporters, including Hilāl, a client of the Banū Sayyid al-Nās, and the judge Muḥammad b. ‘Umar. They also arrested “the leaders of the mob elements (‘uraf’ al-ghawghā’) from among the people of the city” and sent them to a prison in the western Maghrib.⁵³ While it is not clear who the ghawghā’ were, they clearly had ties to judges and influential Andalusi families; and unlike the Ṣanhāja, the ghawghā’ were “people of the city,” and could not just leave town after their defeat.⁵⁴ It is difficult, however, to identify the ghawghā’ or their political motivations with any more precision than this.⁵⁵ Ibn Khaldūn would use the same word to describe the group that took over power in Bijāya later that year. It was not, however, surprising to find powerful groups such as the Ṣanhāja, pro-Ḥafṣid notables, and Andalusis involved in this anti-Marīnid rebellion. They each had reasons to oppose the Marīnids or to support their favorite Ḥafṣid. The end result was the same: the Marīnids controlled much of Ifrīqiyā, but the frail coalition that supported them did not hold together for long. Rather than a return of the Ḥafṣids, however, this time they faced an enemy against whom they were unprepared.

Popular Non-Dynastic Rule in Bijāya (1359/60–64)

The Marīnid Abū ‘Inān had appointed the governor of Tadlis, Yaḥyā b. Maymūn, to be governor of Bijāya. But his administration of the city ran counter to the interests of its notables and they sought to eliminate him. For help in doing so, they contacted the Tunisan ḥājib Ibn Tafrākīn and tried to rally the Ḥafṣids again. The emir of Tunis, Abū Isḥāq heeded their call, readied an army, and marched on Bijāya. “When they neared the city,” Ibn Khaldūn tells us, “the ghawghā’ revolted against the governor Yaḥyā b. Maymūn and arrested him and those with him. [The ghawghā’] put them in a ship and sent them to Ibn Tafrākīn who put them in jail, where they were treated well, until he felt sorry for them and sent them back to the [western] Maghrib. And so, the [Ḥafṣid] sultan Abū Isḥāq entered Bijāya in 761[1359–6O]…. He appointed his son [Abū ‘Abd Allāh, emir of Bijāya] and the Almohad sheikh Abū Muḥammad ‘Abd al-Wahhāb b. Muḥammad from Akmāzīr as his ḥājib.”⁵⁶ The Ḥafṣids were back in power in Bijāya, or so it seems, because according to Ibn Khaldūn, who is our only source of information on the subject, “the leader of the men of the ghawghā’ was ‘Alī b. Ṣālih, who was among the [inhabitants] of low quality in Bijāya and their most contemptible. Around him had gathered the evil [ones] and the criminals.⁵⁷ And with the power he had over them he was able to overpower the dawla.”⁵⁸ In other words, ‘Alī b. Ṣāliḥ, the thug, was the effective ruler of Bijāya, not Abū Isḥāq or his son.⁵⁹

When Abū ‘Abd Allāh, the former emir of Bijāya, was “freed” by Abū ‘Inān, he headed to his former capital in the company of Awlād Sibā‘ sheikhs, who jockeyed for position in the new situation. According to Ibn Khaldūn, he attempted to unseat “his uncle” for four years, without much success.⁶⁰ During the fifth year, he persuaded the much more powerful Dawāwida and the Sadwīkish to help him, and so he entered the city in 1364. He was helped by sedition among the rebels.

When the ghawghā’ were certain that the emir [Abū ‘Abd Allāh] was going to break their hold [on the city], and they became tired of the rule of ‘Alī b. Ṣālih, their leader (‘arīf), they revolted against him and reneged on their oath to him.⁶¹ They left his cause and firmly joined the emir Abū ‘Abd Allāh…. Then they brought to him his uncle Abū Isḥāq, and [Abū ‘Abd Allāh] was benevolent with him. [Abū Isḥāq] left [Bijāya] for his capital [Tunis]. Abū ‘Abd Allāh took control of Bijāya, the seat of his emirate, in 765 [1364] from ‘Alī b. Ṣāliḥ and those with him among the leaders of the mob (‘urafā’ al-ghawghā’) who were [responsible] for the rebellion (fitna). He took all their possessions and then accomplished God’s decree by killing them.⁶²

The leader of the ghawghā’ in Bijāya did not claim to rule on behalf of an emir, Ḥafṣid or Marīnid—even if the Ḥafṣid Abū Isḥāq was in Bijāya. ‘Alī b. Sāliḥ does not seem to have pledged allegiance to Abū Isḥāq. At the same time, he did not receive the oath of allegiance from either the city’s notables or the ‘āmma, but only from the ‘urafā’ who supported him. He was primus inter pares of an alliance of men who did not belong to notable families and who took over the reins of power.

The Effects of Elite Jockeying for Power

When in the early 1280s, the tailor Ibn Abī ‘Umāra came to power, he had been backed by powerful Bedouins and urban elites. His usurpation of the Ḥafṣid name would have been impossible without their support. But the ghawghā’ seized a political opportunity afforded by the post-Marīnid invasions and the high level of contentiousness between elite factions. While it is easy to make too much of this episode, it illustrates well the decomposition of the political bloc behind the local emirate. The Marīnid invasions demonstrated that in the largest cities of Ifrīqiyā, elite rule was not the only possibility. The local option could easily lead to the autonomy of cities without the need for the dynasty or its elite supporters. The question was whether anyone else would pursue this option or elite groups would form an alliance strong enough to eliminate it as a possibility. Over the next four decades, the elites would succeed in banding together over Ifrīqiyā.

The Coming of the Regional Emirate (1364–1400s)

Taking Bijāya Back

After four years of rule by the ghawghā’ in Bijāya, Ḥafṣid rule was restored in 1364. The emir Abū ‘Abd Allāh took over the city and employed the son of an influential Tunisan Andalusi family as his ḥājib. A few months later, he replaced him with his infinitely more famous brother, the historian ‘Abd al-Rahmān b. Khaldūn.⁶³ Ibn Khaldūn remembered receiving a very warm welcome when he arrived in Bijāya from Granada, where he had served the Naṣrid Muḥammad V (r. 1354–59; 1362–91).⁶⁴ But the celebrations did not last long. The political situation in Bijāya was grave and Ibn Khaldūn quickly realized that the odds were not in Abū ‘Abd Allāh’s favor. For his emir to survive politically, he had to gain the support of the Bijāyan notables and defeat the ruler of Qasanṭīna, Abū al-‘Abbās. He did neither. The Bijāyans called on Abū al-‘Abbās to rid them of Abū ‘Abd Allāh and his administration.⁶⁵ Recognizing his party had no chance of defeating Abū al-‘Abbās, Ibn Khaldūn begged for his life and safety. Abū al-‘Abbās allowed Ibn Khaldūn safe passage but then killed Abū ‘Abd Allāh and took over Bijāya in 1365/6.

Abū al-‘Abbās appointed the son of Abū ‘Abd Allāh as emir over Bijāya and then “advised [the new emir] to turn to Muḥammad b. Abī Mahdī, the leader of the city (za‘īm al-balad), the commander of the navy, and foremost among the wily and manly (ahl al-shaṭāra wa-al-rujūla) among the city’s men and its archers.” Ultimately, “Ibn Abī Mahdī [was] regent and spoliator of [the emir’s] rule (mustabiddan ‘alayhi).”⁶⁶

Once more, Ibn Khaldūn describes a set of novel political relations but does not elaborate. The commander of the navy, backed by armed young men, was the effective ruler of Bijāya. The restoration of Ḥafṣid rule in Bijāya brought about a weak emir maintained in place by armed men. Shedding some light on the identity of these young men, Ibn Khaldūn comments:

The people of Bijāya started [committing acts of piracy] thirty years prior [to the Franco-Genoese expedition against al-Mahdiya in 1390]. They gathered a faction from among the pirates (ghuzāt al-baḥr), built a navy, and chose the best men for it. These would arrive at the European coasts and islands by surprise and kidnap however many [people] they could and take away however many ships they found, and return with booty, slaves and hostages. [This was so] until the western coastal towns of the [province of] Bijāya were filled with their hostages, who made the country’s roads overflow with the noise of their chains and shackles when they went about doing their business and seeking their release…. This was painful to the European nations … and they [sought] revenge on the Muslims.⁶⁷

In Ibn Khaldūn’s treatment of the ghawghā’ and the pirates, one notices a clear preference for the latter. The pirates were tied to the Ḥafṣid dynasty since their leader had an official position as commander of the navy. It is reasonable to believe that he wielded a great deal of power because of the importance of his function to the Ḥafṣids, both as the leader of the navy and as provider of revenue. Furthermore, the pirates’ activities were inscribed in the logic of Crusade/counter-Crusade. That alone conferred upon them an ideological veneer not available to the ghawghā’. In the eyes of Ibn Khaldūn, the power that the leader of the navy had over the Ḥafṣid ruler was similar to the preeminence of the various ḥājibs and thus clearly distinct from the actions of the ghawghā’. Pirates were the armed hand of dynastic restoration.

Toward a New Regional Emirate

In 1369, the old ruler of Tunis, Abū Isḥāq, died. The emir of Qasanṭīna and Bijāya, Abū al-‘Abbās, quickly moved on the capital and took it over in 1370. For the first time in several decades, he brought the Ḥafṣid dynasty under a sole ruler. For the following twenty years, he worked tirelessly to consolidate his power and pacify the region. He fought countless battles against rebellious Bedouins, persuaded many others to accept him as ruler, and did the same with urban elites. During his reign, Bijāya lost some of its political significance because both Marīnids and ‘Abd al-Wādids were too weak to help support any independent city. As he rebuilt the sociopolitical foundations of a new Ḥafṣid dominion, Abū al-‘Abbās privileged Qasantīna and Būna at the expense of Bijāya.

Abū al-‘Abbās ruled for more than two decades (1370–94), the first such stretch in a few generations. Many, including Ibn Khaldūn, who dedicated his famous Kitāb al-‘ibar to him, admired his reign. Ibn Khaldūn credits Abū al-‘Abbās for reclaiming power from the hands of the ḥājibs, and beginning the process of concentrating power in the hands of the ruler. Ḥafṣid historians depict Abū al-‘Abbās as the ruler of all Ifrīqiyā, even though he delegated a great deal of power to emirs such as his son Abū Fāris of Qasantīna. But even correcting for later Ḥafṣid bias in favor of regional unity, Abū al-‘Abbās had begun the process of pulling Ifrīqiyā together.

When Abū al-‘Abbās died in 1394, Abū Fāris was recognized as the new emir. He left Qasantīna for Tunis and was proclaimed ruler without the sort of opposition the Ḥafṣids had until now made customary. Whereas Abū al-‘Abbās had established peace, Abū Fāris naturalized it. He expanded his domain in the south and in the west, bringing Tilimsān under his authority. Importantly, under his rule Tunis became the undisputed capital of Ifrīqiyā, and greatest city of the Maghrib, rivaled only by Fās (Fez), the Marīnid capital. His forty-year reign was that of a regional emir. The historians agreed: according to Ibn al-Shammā‘, Abū Fāris “attained the maximum control over Ifrīqiyā (balagha min mulki Ifrīqiyā al-ghāyatu al-quṣwā) by subduing the Bedouins (a‘rāb).”⁶⁸

After Abū Fāris’s death, his grandson Abū ‘Abd Allāh ruled for a little more than a year. ‘Uthmān (r. 1436–88) succeeded him. ‘Uthmān had to face a certain Abū al-Ḥasan, who had declared himself ruler of Ifrīqiyā from Bijāya and attempted to take over Tunis. However, by 1440, his attempt was crushed, and ‘Uthmān ruled a unified Ḥafṣid dynasty for decades. Under him, the Ḥafṣids brought into the fold the urban notables who had previously been so difficult to persuade. Far from the cities and the areas that they controlled, the picture was less clearly in their favor. However, no single group could now challenge the Ḥafṣids. While the Bedouins enjoyed a great deal of autonomy vis-à-vis the dynasty—not all of them paid taxes or contributed soldiers—with Abū Fāris, the Ḥafṣids were once more able to bring all of Ifrīqiyā under their rule. Tunis was once more the capital of Ifrīqiyā.

In the view of Ḥafṣid authors, Abū Fāris proved to be the greatest ruler the dynasty had produced in more than a century. He subjected local emirates, Bedouin confederacies, and independent cities that had blossomed for nearly a century outside Tunis’s control. If this description of Abū Fāris likens him to a messianic figure, it is only because in the eyes of those who lived through the period of war and instability, he was one. He finally realized the political fantasies of the preceding generations. Ḥafṣid commentators saw him as the true heir to the legacy of his two ancestors, Abū Zakariyā (d. 1249) and al-Mustanṣir (d. 1277), whom they so idealized. For them, the accession of Abū Fāris was a second coming of the regional emirate and a rebirth of the dynasty.⁶⁹

The Ḥafṣid intellectuals in the fifteenth century who celebrated Abū Fāris by comparing him to Abū Zakariyā and al-Mustanṣir accomplished an important ideological slight of hand. They recast the history of Ifrīqiyā in the intervening period in terms of the heroic task of returning Ifrīqiyā to the hands of the Ḥafṣid dynasty. This idea anchors their dynastic conception of historiography and casts the fourteenth century as a period of chaos and war between cousins.

How Ḥafṣid Was Ifrīqiyā?

In the course of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, Ḥafṣid emirs led a number of political coalitions. Sometimes, the support they garnered allowed them to control Tunis and all the large cities of Ifrīqiyā. At other times, they effectively controlled just a few cities. But many of these emirs were mere puppets in the hands of powerful Andalusi or Almohad ḥājibs. Consequently, the idea that Ifrīqiyā was a region ruled by the Ḥafṣid dynasty does not correspond to the political realities of the time. Even when, in its regional configuration, Ḥafṣid domination brought together cities from Tripoli to Bijāya, there were always areas that were beyond its reach—and not only mountainous ones. The local Ḥafṣid emirs’ ability to impose their domination was severely limited by their fear of venturing too far from their cities lest someone take them in their absence.

Adding up the areas effectively ruled by local Ḥafṣid emirs would, then, still leave a great deal of Ifrīqiyā outside the dynasty’s purview. Local emirs controlled areas near the cities. When the political realignments at the end of the fourteenth century eliminated local emirs, they did not radically alter this basic aspect of Ḥafṣid rule. Even under the regional emirate of Abū Fāris, the Ḥafṣids did not control all the “territory” of Ifrīqiyā, as modern historians have claimed following the medieval chronicles. Rather, they held the cities and projected their influence from there.

Not that this “influence” was an abstraction. It was tied to the ability to accumulate wealth and raise armies. Political and financial considerations were inextricably linked. The pledges of allegiance the dynasty received from urban elites, “small” dynasties, and Bedouins engaged all these groups either militarily, financially, or both. For this reason, no analysis of politics can be complete without an examination of the system of land tenure, agricultural production, and taxation through which the Ḥafṣids exercised their power in Ifrīqiyā. To discern the contours of the dynasty’s influence, one must understand the extent to which it was able, through its political leadership, to engender regional integration on an economic level.