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5: The Expatriate

TO THOSE few Americans who thought at all of Korea in the frantic days following the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Hermit Kingdom was merely an early victim of Japanese aggression, a nation which would presumably be restored to freedom after the defeat of the Japanese. But to Syngman Rhee, Pearl Harbor was a dream come true. With the irrepressible optimism of the political exile, he felt certain that Pearl Harbor, by unleashing America’s industrial might against the Axis powers, foreshadowed the defeat of Japan.

America’s entry into the war, which shifted the center of resistance against Japan from China to the United States, bolstered Rhee’s prestige within the Korean independence movement at a time when his stock had reached a low point. In 1940, a new amalgamation of factions within the Provisional Government had resulted in the formation of the Korean Independence Party, under the leadership of Kim Koo. Shortly thereafter, Kim formally supplanted Rhee as president of the Provisional Government. But now events had placed Rhee in a position more favorable than that of his rivals in Shanghai and Chungking. Korea’s redemption would come not through China but from across the Pacific.

In Washington, Rhee refused to recognize his formal demotion but pressed the cause of the Provisional Government as its Washington representative. When his protestations elicited nothing more than expressions of sympathy from American officials, Rhee condemned them as stupid, pro-Japanese, or pro-Russian. To Secretary of State Hull he wrote:

“The Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea is the sole representative of the Korean people, whether they are resident in Korea proper, Manchuria, Siberia, China or elsewhere, and regards itself, on the basis of the treaty of l882, negotiated between the Government of Korea and the Government of the United States, not as a free movement . . . but as the only government agency of Korea in existence.¹

Rhee’s claims were, of course, unfounded, The old treaty of friendship between the United States and the Korean monarchy had nothing to do with the American choice regarding which Korean government to recognize. Though it was later demonstrated that it had considerable support within Korea, the Provisional Government had not in any sense of the word been chosen by the Korean people. Rhee’s greatest obstacle, however, was that Korea itself did not enter into Allied war plans and therefore conjured up no sense of immediacy among American officialdom. In early 1942, the Pacific War Council discussed the possibility of granting some form of recognition to the Provisional Government, but decided to postpone any action until it might be more useful in arousing Korean opposition to Japan. As for regular diplomatic recognition, the U.S. position was summarized in reference to Korean participation in the post-war United Nations conference.

“The United Nations which are represented at the United Nations Conference on International Organization all have legally constituted governing authorities whereas the ‘Korean Provisional Government’ and other Korean organizations do not possess at the present time the qualities requisite for obtaining recognition by the United States as a governing authority. The ‘Korean Provisional Government’ has never exercised administrative authority over any part of Korea, nor can it be regarded as representative of the Korean people of today. Due to geographical and other factors its following even among exiled Koreans is inevitably limited. It is the policy of this Government in dealing with groups such as the ‘Korean Provisional Government’ to avoid taking action which might, when the victory of the United Nations is achieved, tend to compromise the right of the Korean people to choose the ultimate form and personnel of the government which they may wish to establish.”²

An area in which Rhee enjoyed some success, however, was that of gaining recognition of Korean nationality apart from the Japanese citizenship that had been forced upon the Koreans. Through Attorney-General Biddle and Secretary of War Stimson, he pressed for exemption of Koreans in the United States from alien restrictions such as those requiring identification certificates and prohibiting the possession of cameras. The attorney-general issued an order to this effect, and Secretary Stimson acknowledged that he was “fully appreciative of the feelings of the many loyal Koreans now resident in this country who have never been in sympathy with the government imposed upon their homeland by military conquest.”³

Partly as a result of the Anglo-American policy of giving priority to the defeat of Germany rather than Japan, it was not until the Cairo conference of November 1943 that Allied war aims concerning Korea were spelled out. The communiqué—framed by Roosevelt, Churchill, and Chiang Kai-shek—stated that “the aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent.” Stalin gave the communique his blessing at Teheran.

Among restless Koreans, the expression “in due course” brought a mixed reaction. From Chungking, Kim Koo denounced the phrase as “absurd,” and demanded independence “the moment the Japanese collapse.” Rhee was equally disturbed. But in Korea, where the qualifying phrase could be interpreted as meaning “shortly,” the attitude was one of jubilation.⁴

American policy, reflected in the “due course” provision, was conditioned by Roosevelt’s belief in the gradual introduction of self-rule into colonial areas lacking experience in self-government. In 1942 he commented:

“I like to think that the history of the Philippines in the last forty-four years provides in a very real sense a pattern for the future of other small nations and peoples of the world. . . . But . . . we must remember that such a pattern is based on two important factors. The first is that there be a period of preparation through the dissemination of education and the recognition and fulfillment of physical and social and economic needs. The second is that there be a period of training for ultimate independent sovereignty, through the practice of more and more self-government, beginning with local government and passing on through the various steps to complete statehood.”⁵

This thinking prompted Roosevelt to suggest to Cordell Hull “that Manchuria and Formosa be returned to China and that Korea might be placed under an international trusteeship, with China, the United States, and one or two other countries participating.”⁶

Although Roosevelt’s failure to cite Russia specifically suggested an unawareness of that country’s historic interest in Korea, due allowance was made at Yalta, where the proposal agreed to by Stalin provided for a trusteeship among Britain, Russia, China, and the United States. Nonetheless, the Soviets appeared cool to the prospect of a trusteeship. Averell Harriman quotes the Soviet leader as having asked why there was any need for trusteeship if the Koreans could produce a satisfactory government of their own—which Harriman concluded meant a Communist government. Roosevelt replied that the only experience the United States had in such matters was in the Philippines, where it had taken the people about fifty years to prepare for self-government. He felt that in the case of Korea the period might be twenty to thirty years. Stalin replied that the shorter the period the better, and inquired as to whether any foreign troops would be stationed in Korea. When the president replied in the negative, Stalin expressed his approval.⁷

6. Syngman Rhee (standing, fifth from right) and Mrs. Rhee (at Rhee’s right) with members of the Foreign Affairs Department of the Korean Provisional Government in Washington, May 28, 1944. This photograph dates from the period when Rhee was pressing for formal recognition of the Korean Provisional Government and for a guarantee of Korea’s independence at the end of World War II. (Pacific Stars and Stripes Photo)

The communiqué issued after the Yalta conference mentioned neither Korea nor the main purpose of the meeting, the obtaining of Soviet agreement to enter the war against Japan. But Rhee, convinced that his country had been sacrificed on the altar of Soviet intervention, leaped to the attack. In a press conference he charged a “deal” at Yalta aimed at turning Korea over to the Soviets. Repetition of his charges, which brought a denial from the State Department and then from the White House, further discredited Rhee in the eyes of American officials. These disclaimers, however, merely reinforced Rhee’s belief in the existence of a conspiracy against Korea. To friends he wrote:

“In view of the anxiety in some quarters to get Russia into the Asiatic War, recognition [of the Provisional Government] may have been withheld pending a clearer formulation of Russia’s desires in regard to Korea. If this were a factor, it represented either a crass willingness to trade the independence of a small nation for the support of a large one, or a timid fear of developing any foreign policy until we were able to ascertain that it would please a powerful ally. Either motive would be one we should not expect to be avowed.”⁸

In the eight months between the Yalta conference and Rhee’s return to Korea, great and calamitous events marked the end of World War II and the early stages of the cold war between the Communist and Free World blocs. In April 1945, Franklin Roosevelt, who had personally dominated American foreign policy during the war years, died; May brought the surrender of Germany and the long-awaited victory in Europe; in August, Japan felt the weight of the first atomic bomb.

The United States was unprepared for V-J Day. In the confusion which followed Japan’s surrender, Korea was one of many problems for Pentagon planners attempting to formulate a plan for the surrender of Japanese troops. No one had foreseen the speedy capitulation of theJapanese, and the new Truman administration was still being briefed on the details of Roosevelt’s personal diplomacy.

Gradually, however, the occupation of Korea loomed as a race between the Russians and the Americans. On August 12, Soviet troops began moving into North Korea. From Moscow, Ambassador Harriman and reparations representative Edwin W. Pauley, citing evidence of growing Soviet intransigence, urged that the United States occupy of as much of Korea and Manchuria as possible. On August 15, General Order No. 1, cabled to General MacArthur in Tokyo, directed U.S. forces to accept the surrender of Japanese forces in Korea south of the thirty-eighth parallel. The Soviets made no comment.⁹

Carl Berger writes: “The sad truth was that Korea was the only important area occupied by American troops in the Pacific for which detailed, concrete preparation had not been made by any branch of the United States Government.”¹⁰ Syngman Rhee, however, had waited years for this day. At an age when most men had long retired, Rhee fought State Department red tape in an attempt to return to Korea ahead of his Shanghai rivals. For him, the day of deliverance was at hand.

His exile over, Rhee nevertheless found himself in an anomalous position with respect to his own role in Korean politics. On one hand, years of agitation on behalf of Korean independence had made his name nearly a legend even in Korea itself. In addition, he spoke the language and knew the ways of Korea’s liberators—a considerable advantage considering the provinciality of his rivals.

On the other hand, even in the Orient, Rhee’s advanced age was a handicap to his political prospects. He was no longer president of the Provisional Government, and he faced younger and powerful rivals in Kim Koo and Kim Kyu-sic. In North Korea an ominous note was the publicity being accorded by the Soviets to an obscure guerrilla leader, Kim Il-sung. Finally, Rhee was not exactly a favorite of the Americans. Years of sniping at the State Department had had an effect, and when the American army entered Korea it was hardly to set Syngman Rhee up as president.

As for Rhee himself, four decades of life in the United States had neither mellowed his outlook nor broadened his perspective beyond the borders of Korea. Never an original thinker, in his old age Rhee tended increasingly to follow set channels of thinking: hatred of the Japanese, fear of the Soviets, and a driving ambition to go down in history as the first president of a united Korean republic. By 1945, he had come to regard himself as the embodiment of the new Korea, a Moses who had led his people out of the wilderness.

The Syngman Rhee who returned to Korea after World War II was a strange mixture of Western idealism and Oriental guile. He believed in collective security with a Wilsonian fervor, and viewed the American occupation of South Korea as a fortuitous guarantee of American interest in Korea. He wanted Korea to be set up as a democratic republic, but only if he could be chief executive and his power could be supreme. To protect his position and increase his power he was prepared to make use of every means available. Rhee’s dealings with Korean exiles in Hawaii, however discordant, had been educational. In Honolulu there were a church and a school to testify that when Rhee could not destroy his rivals he could still forge his own way.

Divided in half by foreign occupation, and projected overnight into the stuggle between Communist and Free World blocs, “liberated” Korea seemed hardly better off than under the Japanese. And from all sides came ambitious political exiles, anxious to fill and exploit what political vacuum might exist under the aegis of the occupying powers.