Читать книгу Ultimatum 2 - Richard Rohmer - Страница 10

Ross’s in-depth briefing session with the Secretary and Crisp was quickly underway. She had decided to use the conference room, now fully equipped with electronic projection gear and secure recording equipment, state-of-the-art stuff.

At the conference table, the Secretary invited Rob to brief them on his approach to the Russian nuclear waste scenario. “I heard your briefing of the President,” she cautioned, “but there must be much more material to put on the table.”

“There is. Let me start with the nuclear warhead scene and Russia,” Ross opened. “The Russians have tonnes of plutonium-enriched waste — weapons-usable fissile material. As I discussed the situation in the briefing, they don’t know how to immobilize it, get rid of it permanently. They know how technically, but they don’t have the money or the political will to do it.”

“Will they ever have either one?” Crisp asked.

“Someday, but not in the short term, not in the next ten years, the way I see it.”

“So we’re going to have to provide more money and massage their political will, right?” the Secretary said.

“Provide money? We’re already doing that in spades. The amount of money the United States gives to Russia to stop the spread of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons is verging on phenomenal. Try at least $760 million a year with proposals that could reach $30 billion over the next eight to ten years.

“There are dozens of programs, mainly in DOE, the Pentagon, and even here in our State Department. The goals, among other things, are to try to help Russia dismantle its enormous unconventional weapons complexes, safeguard nuclear material, and prevent Russian nuclear scientists from selling their products and skills to rogue states and terrorist groups.”

Crisp interjected. “Unfortunately there was no program to prevent Pakistan’s top nuclear scientist from peddling his nuclear proliferation wares to North Korea, Iran, and other clients. You will remember that at the beginning of 2004, Pakistan’s President Musharaff actually pardoned this man!”

Ross acknowledged this with a nod. “To go on, our Department of Defense’s Cooperative Threat Reduction programs are receiving in the range of a half-billion dollars a year for expenditure in Russia.”

State interjected. “Surely we’re getting something out of this, some good results?”

“The results? By the beginning of 2005 the claim was that more than 5,288 missile warheads had been deactivated, 419 long-range nuclear missiles and 367 silos had been destroyed, 81 bomber aircraft were gone, 292 submarine missile launchers and 174 submarine missiles had been disposed of, and 194 nuclear test holes and sites in Russia had been sealed.”

The Secretary said, “That’s not bad, is it?”

“No. Not bad, but...”

She went on.“I understand that in the U.S.-money-for-Russia package there was DOE’s $173-million program to strengthen the security and accounting for fissile material at nuclear weapons storage sites. The program was reported to be ‘very effective’.”

“True,” Ross acknowledged. “But, Madam Secretary, the main question with throwing all this money at Russian nuclear weapons and material in the name of stopping proliferation and preventing terrorist acquisition is this: Who is minding the store? Who is verifying where the money is going or that the in-Russia programs are actually being carried out?

“The answer is — no one. It would be far better for America to go hands-on with Russia in actually overseeing and using U.S. contractors to carry out the necessary work in the Kola Peninsula, PA Mayak, and elsewhere in Russia and remove the heavy duty nuclear waste to an international disposal site.”

“D’you really think Putin would go for that?” Crisp asked.

“Not a chance — unless we force the issue. Perhaps with the ultimatum.”

The Secretary asked, “What’s the status of the warheads reduction?”

“By the year 2008 some thirty thousand warheads will have been dismantled, leaving about five thousand on each side. The two presidents seem to have agreed to bring that down to in the range of seventeen hundred to twenty-two hundred each.”

“We’re negotiating a formal agreement, a treaty that Congress insists on,” the Secretary reminded him. “We’re almost there.”

“Yes, I know. The dismantling process produces two kinds of weapons-grade fissionable material from the core: highly enriched uranium, HEU, and plutonium. We are dismantling about eighteen hundred warheads a year at our Pantex plant in Amarillo. We have in temporary storage about four hundred metric tonnes of HEU plus about fifty metric tonnes of plutonium. On the Russian side they have about five hundred tonnes of HEU and some fifty to one hundred metric tonnes of plutonium. They have few warhead dismantling sites.”

The Secretary’s cell phone rang. She answered, saying, “I’ll call you back,” then returned her attention to Ross. “Sorry, Rob. Keep going.”

“So that’s just from weapons alone. No factoring on of the spent waste loaded with plutonium coming out of civilian nuclear reactors in Russia. Their nuclear reactors just keep on churning out tonnes of plutonium-filled waste. And the rotting nuclear submarines are all over the Kola Peninsula. Can you believe one hundred of them with their nuclear reactors still in place? And eighty on the Pacific coast. The Russians are in terrible shape, nuclear waste–wise. They don’t have the money. Their economy is such a shambles they can’t build a permanent disposal site.”

“Like our Yucca Mountain repository?” the Secretary asked.

“But Yucca isn’t a permanent disposal site.” Ross was emphatic. “A disposal site is a location where the most dangerous proliferation material, plutonium, the stuff from warheads, can be placed permanently and sealed in with no hope of retrieval. Instead the DOE’s statement of recommendation to the President about Yucca ... I’m reading this ... says,‘A repository at Yucca Mountain would centralize the disposal of high-level radioactive waste, while maintaining the option to retrieve it.’

“And, this, where the statement talks about keeping Yucca repository open for one hundred to three hundred years: ‘Keeping the repository open means that the underground storage areas can be directly inspected and the waste packages readily retrieved, were that necessary.’

“From the same statement: ‘By permanently disposing of surplus nuclear weapons material the U.S. encourages other nations to do the same.’” Rob paused. “That’s wrong. Yucca is for storage so the surplus nuclear weapons can be retrieved. It is stated policy that it’s not for ‘permanently disposing’ at all!”

The Secretary understood the point. “So what you’re saying is that it’s U.S. policy to get the Russians to permanently dispose of their weapons-grade plutonium but we’re not prepared to do that ourselves — not at Yucca, anyway.”

“Exactly. I agree with the DOE statement that there’s a worldwide consensus that deep geologic disposal is the best option for disposing of high-level nuclear waste. If we want to get the Russians to take apart their nuclear warheads, get them down to between seventeen hundred and twenty-two hundred and the same on our side, then we should get them to agree to permanently dispose of the weapons-grade plutonium extracted from their warheads.”

“And we have to do the same, permanently dispose,” the Secretary added.

“Absolutely. But Yucca won’t do that for America.”

“What will?”

“A depository, a place where we can permanently dispose of our weapons-grade surplus plutonium and high-level waste on an irretrievable basis, a place where the Russians can join us, do the same thing, dispose of their nuclear waste. We need an international site. That way we can partner with them in getting rid of their waste.”

“And get some sort of control, some sort of accounting of what they’re doing with our money,” Crisp suggested.

“That’s the point.” Ross nodded. “Put it this way. The disposal site has to be international, in a neutral, non–world power country, and accessible by land, sea, and air.”

“A neutral country? Why?” Crisp asked.

“You don’t think for a minute that the Russians would even consider sending their warhead surplus plutonium or uranium or whatever for safe disposal at Yucca or anywhere else in America?”

“Of course they wouldn’t,” Crisp agreed.