Читать книгу Applied Mergers and Acquisitions - Robert F. Bruner - Страница 135
DOES IT PAY TO DIVERSIFY OR FOCUS THE FIRM?
ОглавлениеOne of the robust debates today deals with whether and how the strategic efforts to diversify or focus the firm pay. The question is significant because of the prevalence of diversification-based business strategies among large firms today, and because of the relatively high volume of transactions motivated in part by a theory of the need to diversify or focus. Villalonga (2003) noted that between 1990 and 1996, diversified firms accounted for half of the employment in the United States, and 60 percent of the assets of traded firms. Following World War II, the U.S., European, and Japanese economies witnessed a dramatic increase in diversification and divisionalization.6 Rumelt (1974) found that 70 percent of the Fortune 500 firms were heavily or exclusively focused on one segment. By 1969, that group had fallen to 35 percent, as shown in Exhibit 6.22. The icon of this trend was the conglomerate firm, which pursued a strategy of unrelated diversification. The conglomerate arose in the 1960s and then gradually receded in the 1970s and 1980s as firms returned to a greater emphasis on strategies of focused business operations.
Rumelt also found that profitability varied by type of diversification strategy: As the firm moved from great focus (a “single business” strategy) to great diversity (an “unrelated business” strategy), the accounting returns of firms varied materially by type of strategy. Exhibit 6.23 summarizes these returns by category; see Rumelt (1974, pages 92, 94). Suggesting that a strategy of close relatedness in diversification yields the best returns, Rumelt’s findings were influential in prompting a critical reappraisal of conglomerate or unrelated diversification and became part of a general trend in the 1970s and 1980s toward increasing emphasis on strategic focus.
EXHIBIT 6.22 Changing Mix of Diversification Strategies for the Fortune 500 Firms
Strategic Category | Percentage of Firms in Each Strategic Category | ||
---|---|---|---|
1949 | 1959 | 1969 | |
Single business | 34.5% | 16.2% | 6.2% |
Dominant business | 35.4% | 37.3% | 29.2% |
Related business | 26.7% | 40.0% | 45.2% |
Unrelated business | 3.4% | 6.5% | 19.4% |
Note: “Single business” indicates firms focused entirely on one industry segment—not multibusiness firms.
“Dominant business” indicates firms deriving between 70 and 95 percent of their revenues from one segment and 70 to 100 percent from the largest related group of businesses.
“Related business” indicates firms deriving up to 70 percent of revenues from one segment and 70 to 100 percent from the largest related group of businesses.
“Unrelated business” indicates firms with relatively low influence from one single segment or group of related segments.
Source of data: Rumelt (1974), page 51.
EXHIBIT 6.23 Returns by Diversification Strategy
Category | Return on Capital | Return on Equity |
---|---|---|
Single business | 10.81% | 13.20% |
Dominant business | 9.64% | 11.64% |
Related business | 11.49% | 13.55% |
Unrelated business | 9.49% | 11.92% |
Note: “Single business” indicates firms focused entirely on one industry segment—not multibusiness firms.
“Dominant business” indicates firms deriving between 70 and 95 percent of their revenues from one segment and 70 to 100 percent from the largest related group of businesses.
“Related business” indicates firms deriving up to 70 percent of revenues from one segment and 70 to 100 percent from the largest related group of businesses.
“Unrelated business” indicates firms with relatively low influence from one single segment or group of related segments.
Source of data: Rumelt (1974), page 91.