Читать книгу Spanish and Portuguese South America during the Colonial Period; Vol. 2 - Robert Grant Watson - Страница 4

1646-1661

Haus, with the wreck of his army, continued his retreat throughout the night, never halting until seven leagues’ distance lay between him and the scene of his defeat. He then awaited his wounded and stragglers, whilst he sent to Recife for immediate assistance. Succours reached him the same day, sufficient to secure his further retreat, but not to enable him to resume offensive operations. The Council now distinctly perceived their danger; and they had reasons to distrust the professions of the governor of Bahia. Three weeks before the battle Hogstraten and another deputy had been sent to Bahia to express the belief of the Dutch Government that Camaram and Diaz were not authorized in their proceedings by the Portuguese governor, and to request that they might be recalled, or, in the event of their disobedience, be declared enemies of the Portuguese Crown. Telles persevered in his previous line of conduct, putting off the Dutch with vague professions. He taunted them in turn with their acts of aggression at Angola, at St. Thomas, and at Maranham. He further indicated that Camaran and Diaz were not men to be restrained by any words of his; and he pleaded that the Portuguese had been driven into insurrection by false accusations on the part of untrustworthy persons. Finally, he offered to act as mediator.

Hogstraten now repeated his offer to deliver Nazareth into the power of the governor, a proposal which he said he had already imparted to Joam Fernandes. His offer was accepted; and as he was somewhat afraid lest his conference with the Portuguese authorities might excite suspicion in the breast of his fellow-deputy, he had the audacity to tell him that they were tampering with him for the betrayal of his fort, and that he pretended to listen to them in order the better to thwart them. On his return to Recife he repeated the same tale, adding that the governor merely awaited some ships from Rio de Janeiro before attacking the Dutch possessions. Two regiments were now embarked at Bahia, and were to be landed at Tamandare. They were to be escorted by the homeward-bound fleet of thirty-seven ships.

It was arranged that, on the two regiments being landed at Tamandare, their commander, Payva, should proceed to Recife with letters for the Council, in which the Governor-General should state that he had sent two officers to remonstrate with the insurgents, and that, should remonstrances fail, he would compel them to return to their duty. Whilst this farce was being enacted, the Dutch commandant at Serinhaem had received instructions to disarm the Portuguese in that district. The Portuguese, however, declined to be disarmed, and the fort being surrounded and its water cut off, was compelled to surrender, the Indian allies of the Dutch being given up to the Portuguese.

Joam Fernandes had remained for seven days upon the scene of his victory at the Monte das Tabocas, when he was informed of the arrival of the troops from Bahia. Camaran and Diaz, the two partisan leaders, likewise reached the Monte das Tabocas about the same time. On meeting the troops from Bahia, after some formal words, Fernandes was joined by the whole Portuguese force; after which his first act was to send a detachment to reduce the fort of Nazareth.

Blaar was now sent to take possession of all the Portuguese women who might be found in the Varzea or open country behind Olinda, to hold as hostages. A number were taken, and were conveyed to the headquarters of Haus. This intelligence was speedily conveyed by a chaplain to Fernandes, and the army, being naturally roused by a desire to rescue the women, was put in motion for this purpose. By midnight they reached some sugar-works. Remaining there for three hours, they were roused by Fernandes, who announced that the wonderful St. Anthony had appeared to him, and had reproved him for his ill-timed delay. Once more being put in motion, the troops at daybreak reached the Capivaribe, which they crossed with considerable difficulty.

Having accomplished this passage without opposition from the enemy, they ere long came in sight of the headquarters of Haus, when they sent forward a party who succeeded in capturing some Dutch sentinels. From those they learned that the officers were at their morning meal, on the conclusion of which they were to march off with their prisoners. They were roused by the dread signal by which Camaram summoned his Indians. Their men were driven in, and no way of retreat was left to them, whilst the Portuguese poured in a steady fire upon them from their shelter. In this emergency the Dutch brought out the Portuguese women, and exposed them at the windows to receive the fire. This artifice brought a flag of truce from the assailants; but the besieged were so confident in their newly-found resource that they fired upon the flag, killing the ensign who bore it; they at the same time took aim at the Portuguese general, Vidal, who had approached under the protection of the flag. Enraged at this conduct, the Portuguese forgot the women, and proceeded to set the whole place on fire; which brought the enemy to their senses. It required all the authority of Vidal to induce his soldiers to spare the cowards who had so nearly taken his life.

The enemy now surrendered on the bare condition that their lives should be spared; they were not, however, able to procure the same terms for their Indian allies. More than two hundred Dutch were made prisoners in this affair, which, according to the Portuguese writers, was, of course, not accomplished without the aid of miracles. Joam Fernandes was now master of the field; and he conducted a triumphal procession to one of his own chapels to return thanks to his patron saint. The prisoners were sent to Bahia, Blaar being assassinated on the way. About the same time Olinda fell into the hands of a party of Pernambucan youths; whilst the traitor, Hogstraten, was as good as his word in delivering Nazareth to the patriots. The Dutch regiment which had garrisoned it entered the service of the Portuguese.

Whilst the troops sent from Bahia, nominally to aid in suppressing the insurrection, were thus taking an active part in extending it, the farce which the governor had commenced to play was continued by the Admiral Correa, who, according to his instructions, proceeded to Recife with the homeward-bound fleet. The Dutch authorities at that place, who may be excused for preferring to judge of the Governor-General’s intentions by acts rather than by words, were naturally not a little alarmed at the arrival of a fleet of such formidable dimensions. Correa, however, who was unaware of the recent occurrences on land, proceeded to execute the instructions which had been given him at Bahia, and with the utmost courtesy not only placed his own services at the disposal of the Council, but likewise offered them those of Vidal and his troops, which were at that moment most actively employed against them.

The Council, naturally enraged at this transparent duplicity, at first proposed to arrest the messengers of Correa; but, on the reflection that their own fleet was not in a condition to meet that of the enemy, they wisely sent a courteous reply, declining the services of the Admiral; on receiving which Correa, still wholly unaware of what was passing on shore, immediately set sail for Europe. Relieved from this danger, the Council lost no time in ordering Lichthart to get his ships ready with all speed, and to do the utmost damage to the Portuguese, an order which he obeyed to the letter.

Meanwhile Payva was with his two regiments on board of eight ships in the Bay of Tamandare. Letters had been written to advise him to put into the port of Nazareth, since it was known that the Dutch fleet was in search of him; but these warning despatches were intercepted, and he fell an easy prey to the squadron of Lichthart. Of his eight vessels one reached Bahia; two were abandoned and set on fire; two others ran aground, whilst three were taken by the enemy. The Portuguese are said to have lost seven hundred men in the action.

Whilst these events were passing in Pernambuco, the Portuguese were not less active in the other ceded provinces. Fernandes and Vidal sent officers to Paraïba to head the insurgents; whilst the Indians and Negroes were headed by officers sent respectively from the regiments of Camaram and Henrique Diaz, the result being that the Portuguese were soon masters of the captaincy. The Dutch were likewise in turn compelled to abandon Fort Mauritz on the San Francisco. It was soon razed to the ground, there being then no obstacle to prevent the free passage of the Portuguese from Bahia into the province of Pernambuco.

Fernandes now pitched his camp upon the neck of sand which divides the river from the sea about a league from Recife, commanding the communication of that place with Olinda, and on this locality he erected a fort to secure his ammunition and stores. To this fort was given the name which had been applied to the camp, Bom Jesus, and a small town soon grew up under its shelter.

The Dutch beheld with consternation the near approach of the enemy; and the splendid out-houses and gardens, which had been laid out by Nassau, as well as the bridge of Boavista, were destroyed by the people of Recife, in order to facilitate the defence of that town. The new town of Mauritias was likewise demolished. So great was the anxiety of the people that the Council found it advisable to communicate to them the contents of their latest despatches to Amsterdam, in order to convince them that their critical situation had been duly represented.

On the advice of Hogstraten an expedition was now organized against the island of Itamaraca, on which the enemy had to rely for grain. After three attacks, the assailants, under Fernandes and Vidal, forced their way into the town, and had actually secured their victory, when it was lost through their rapacity and cruelty. The troops from Bahia showed an example of plundering which was not thrown away upon the Dutch deserters of Hogstraten’s regiment; and Cardozo had given orders to put all the Indians to the sword, the result being that the Portuguese had to retire with loss and disgrace. They, however, fortified Garassu, and secured all the roads by which the enemy from Itamaraca could molest them.

For some time after this expedition the Portuguese were kept inactive by a strange infectious disease, which seemed only to yield to the treatment of bleeding, and which filled the hospitals, until Joam Fernandes hit upon the expedient of setting up certain images of saints, before whom mass was daily performed. To their intercession the cessation of the scourge was ascribed. At the same time that the main body of the Portuguese insurgents were suffering from this cause, their countrymen in Rio Grande were massacred by the Tapuyas, in revenge for the execution of the Indians at Serinhaem. This slaughter had, however, the effect of convincing the Portuguese who had not yet taken up arms of the uselessness of neutrality.

Meanwhile the action of the two forces at Recife was confined to isolated attacks, the besiegers not being provided with the means either of properly besieging the place or of blockading it. Every day or night witnessed some sally or skirmish, and many dashing but unimportant deeds are recorded. The general conviction, however, gained ground that the Portuguese would eventually win the day; and many slaves deserted to them whilst there was still some merit to be gained by doing so.

The Dutch at this time hoped to effect a diversion in their favour by means of Hogstraten’s regiment of deserters. Although he himself was a traitor beyond redemption, it was rightly believed that most, if not all, of his men had taken service with the Portuguese on compulsion, and would be glad of an opportunity to return to their natural service. In this belief, communication was opened with the regiment; and it was arranged that a sally was to be made from the city in order to facilitate their desertion. This measure was only thwarted by a chance movement of the Portuguese commander. The backwardness of the would-be deserters, however, could not escape notice. Their captain, named Nicholson, demanded an opportunity of clearing their fame, which, being granted, he and seventy of his men succeeded in effecting their purpose, and reached Recife in safety. After this, the remaining Dutch were disarmed and sent to Bahia.

Meanwhile massacre and counter-massacre, on the part of the respective Indian allies on either side, took place in the captaincy of Paraïba; and the Dutch became seriously alarmed for their supplies. They resolved, in desperation, to make a vigorous attack against Camaran. They were no match, however, for that active and able leader; and the Dutch commander was compelled to retreat, with the loss of many men, besides the whole of his baggage. The Portuguese cause at this time suffered a serious loss, in consequence of an ill-timed order from Bahia that the sugar-plantations of Pernambuco should be destroyed. The Governor-General, when issuing this edict, was not aware that these plantations were now in the hands of his countrymen. The unhappy Fernandes, while protesting against this measure, had to destroy his own canes to the value of two hundred thousand cruzados.1

1646.

The Dutch now became so greatly distressed for provisions that the Indians were only kept in their service by the opinion which was propagated, that every deserter to the enemy met with torture and death. The besiegers, too, began to suffer from want of provisions; but the form which discontent took in this case was desertion to Bahia, and severe measures had to be adopted by the Governor-General to put a stop to this practice. The Dutch, having made an attempt in force to intercept a convoy of cattle from Paraïba, were defeated with considerable loss at S. Lourenço.

Shortly after the above-mentioned event, there arrived at the camp two Jesuits, sent by the Governor-General, and who were the bearers of an astounding mandate from the King of Portugal, to the effect that his generals, Vidal and Martim Soares, should retire forthwith to Bahia, leaving Pernambuco in the possession of the Dutch. The reason of this order will presently be explained. In the meantime it is to be shown in what manner it was received. The two generals, or camp-masters as they were called, were at first so taken aback that they knew not how to reply. To yield up the country which they had won step by step with such difficulty, and to leave in possession a heretical enemy whom they detested, was naturally abhorrent to their feelings as soldiers, as patriots, and as Catholics. On Joam Fernandes, who had risked all on the insurrection, the blow fell yet more heavily. He was, however, the first to rally; when he declared that the King’s orders, having been issued in ignorance of the actual situation, ought not to be obeyed without a further reference to his Majesty.

This opinion prevailed, and was accordingly referred to the Governor-General at Bahia. He, however, having received positive orders, declined to take any responsibility upon himself should they be disobeyed. Upon this Martim Soares gave up his command, and sailed soon afterwards for Lisbon. Vidal and Joam Fernandes, however, remained true to their first resolution.

The orders from Lisbon had not been issued without great reluctance. The Duke of Braganza did not feel secure of his throne, and was apprehensive lest Holland should ally herself with Spain against him. He was at this time represented at The Hague by Francisco de Sousa Coutinho, an ambassador of great ability, which was in no small degree essential to his country, seeing the difficult part he had to play. De Sousa saw from the first that the West India Company were not equal to carrying on the expensive war in which they were embarked; and he accordingly advised his master to give the insurgents effective though unavowed assistance. When it became evident in Holland that the Portuguese authorities of Bahia put forth no effort to suppress the insurrection, the States retaliated by giving orders to seize all vessels coming from Pernambuco, a measure which was made a pretext for seizing Portuguese shipping in general. In short, Holland and Portugal were gradually drifting into open war; and, as has been said, the fear of an alliance being formed between the States and Spain had weighed with the King to send orders for the evacuation of Pernambuco.

It will be remembered that at the commencement of the insurrection there were many murmurs and menaces directed against Joam Fernandes; it had been even necessary to take special precautions against his being assassinated. In face of his brilliant successes, all murmurs against him had been silenced, and he was rightly regarded as the hero of a successful revolution for the liberation of his province. Now, however, that he was known to be acting in contravention of the express orders of his sovereign, the clamour against him recommenced. He was repeatedly warned that his life was in danger, and he received the names of nineteen persons who were engaged in a conspiracy against him. These communications producing no effect, the writer called upon Fernandes, and remonstrated with him; but he had the mortification of finding himself looked upon as a calumniator. With Vidal, however, he had more success; in so far that his story was at least believed, and an attempt was made to bring the conspirators to reason.

Not long afterwards, however, Fernandes, in coming from one of his sugar-works, having outridden his bodyguard, was attacked by three Mamelucos, one of whom shot him through the shoulder. One of the assassins was cut to pieces by his guard; the other two escaped through the canes. Fernandes, although he was aware of the conspirator who had set on the assassins, was magnanimous enough not to denounce him.

After this escape, Fernandes and Vidal organized a daring expedition against the island of Itamaraca. It was not successful in winning Fort Orange; but the rest of the island fell into the hands of the Portuguese, the Dutch having previously expelled from it their Indian allies.

The distress in Recife now reached the length of famine. The city was searched for food, and all that could be found was put into a common stock, one pound of bread per week being allowed for each soldier and citizen. But even this scanty allowance had soon to be withheld from the townspeople, in order that that of the soldiers might be doubled; for the latter now began to listen to the suggestions of the enemy. Horses, dogs, cats, and rats were greedily devoured; and many slaves died of inanition. Neither courage nor ingenuity could avail to procure food; whilst to venture beyond the works was certain death at the hands of Diaz and his negroes.

Months had elapsed since the dangerous position of the city had been known in Holland, but still no reinforcements arrived. Things had now come to such a pass that a capitulation or a complete surrender could no longer be delayed; for there was but food left for two days more. It is strange that at this critical moment the stoutest defenders of Recife should have been the Jews. Were the place rendered up to the Portuguese, they could hope to avoid death by apostasy alone; they had resolved, therefore, to perish by the sword rather than to surrender, and they had even induced the Council seriously to consider a plan for a general sally of the whole besieged population. Such was the result of the intolerant bigotry of the Portuguese.

At this supreme moment what were the feelings of the starving crowd when they beheld two vessels bearing towards the port under full sail, and carrying the Dutch colours? Casting anchor, they saluted with three guns, thus denoting that they were from Holland. They were the advanced guard of a convoy which might hourly be expected. It is here necessary to state the circumstances under which this fleet sailed, and also those which led to its tardy arrival.

It has been mentioned above that the interests of Portugal were at this time watched over at the Hague by a most astute diplomatist. The professional morality of European diplomacy has become considerably stricter in the course of late years than it was in the year of which we write, namely, 1646. Francisco de Sousa must be judged, therefore, as to his diplomatic conduct, by the ethics of his own age rather than by those of the present time. He had a most difficult part to play; and, being a thorough patriot as well as doubtless a devout Catholic, he held that the interests of his country, if not those of his faith, justified him in any amount of dissimulation, in order to secure them. His judgment both as to the importance of the Portuguese settlements in Northern Brazil to his country and as to the practicability of recovering them, was sound, as was proved by the event; but, as has been said, there were imperious reasons to make the court of Lisbon dread an open rupture with Holland. Under the circumstances the ambassador had the courage to take upon himself the entire responsibility of negotiating with the Dutch, leaving it to his master to disavow his proceedings should it prove necessary for the public well-being so to do. He was well aware that he was fully trusted; but he could not foresee all the possibilities of the future.

The Dutch statesmen, although they were slow at arriving at conclusions, could not but perceive that the Portuguese diplomatist had been merely seeking to gain time. They therefore called upon him to give a categorical statement of the intentions of his government with reference to Brazil. He replied in a note, in which he asserted that he had instructions to treat with them respecting the affairs of Pernambuco; and he requested that a conference might take place in time to save them the expense of fitting out an unnecessary armament. The Dutch Government, perceiving that he was only renewing his former practices, declined his proposal; whereupon De Sousa, being hard pressed, offered to communicate the instructions on which he was to act. This was a bold step; for it required the exercise of some creative genius on his part. He had, however, with him some blank despatches from his Government already signed, and one of these he filled up so as to suit the moment. The result was that the Dutch, being deceived, suspended their naval preparations.

The ambassador, however, although he had tricked the States, was perfectly open in his communications with his own Government; and he suggested to his sovereign to order his own disgrace or punishment should it be necessary to disavow the act which, according to his knowledge of the existing circumstances, he had judged best for the public interests. His action was secretly approved; but the Portuguese Government had sufficient decency to refrain from any open commendation of the ambassador’s conduct, nor did they confer upon him any reward. The King now assured the States that the insurgents in Pernambuco disregarded his authority, and that, therefore, they were justified in making war upon them. The Dutch naval preparations were therefore resumed; but they had been delayed for several months. It was November 1645 before the fleet was ready to sail; the frost delayed it at Flushing three months longer, and six months were consumed upon the voyage. Had the insurgents possessed the means of pressing the siege of Recife with vigour, the convoy would have arrived to find that place in the possession of the Portuguese.

As it was, the arrival of the fleet had the effect of prolonging this lingering war for years still to come. With the fleet arrived five new members of the Council, with six thousand troops, besides seamen and volunteers, all under the command of the experienced Schoppe. The first attempt of the new general was to regain possession of Olinda; but in this he was defeated. As, however, he had now a superior force in the field, the insurgents thought it advisable to evacuate Paraïba, and accordingly sent orders to Camaram to withdraw from that captaincy.

The Dutch leader next made a descent upon the northern captaincies, in which he made preparations for the future supplies of provisions for Recife. He sent also a considerable force to the river San Francisco for the purpose of cutting off the source from which the Portuguese were nourished; but in this latter attempt he was not so successful, and lost a hundred and fifty men. He next secretly fitted out a naval expedition with which he set sail to surprise Bahia. Landing upon the island of Itaparica, he established himself upon a commanding position, which he fortified. The Governor-General, being taken completely unawares, thought only of protecting the city; and meanwhile the invaders devastated the Reconcave unopposed. On this the Governor-General determined to attack the Dutch position—an unsuccessful enterprise—in which six hundred men were sacrificed. After this, Schoppe, who had only meant to effect a diversion in favour of Recife, returned to that place.

The Portuguese were now, in turn, considerably straitened for supplies; and Vidal had to proceed on foraging expeditions to Paraïba and to the Potengi. The insurgent leaders, however, were buoyed up by the hope which they entertained of assistance from Portugal. So strongly indeed did they entertain this hope that they concerted measures for the co-operation with them of the fleet which was to arrive; and a battery which was now erected caused much trouble to Recife. As it commanded the harbour as well as the streets, the Dutch were compelled to remove their vessels. In one of the sallies made by the Portuguese, the palace built by Count Nassau was sacked.

1647.

The convenient pretence that Portugal and the States were still at peace was abandoned, in so far as South America was concerned, after the attack by the Dutch on Bahia. The order of the Jesuits in Rio de Janeiro contributed to the insurgent cause a ship-load of supplies. A new Governor-General now arrived at Bahia in the person of the Count of Villa Pouca, who brought out with him reinforcements in twelve ships, three of which were unsuccessful in a conflict with the Dutch. The arrival of this fleet without any considerable succours for Pernambuco was a sore trial to the patriots of that province. The fleet brought them, however, a new commander, Francisco Barreto, with the rank of Campmaster-General. He had with him an escort of three hundred men, together with arms and ammunition. The Dutch, having information of his sailing, intercepted his ships off Paraïba, and Barreto was carried prisoner into Recife. After nine months’ captivity he effected his escape and joined the insurgents.

It certainly seemed a measure little calculated for insuring success to supersede at this juncture two such capable and efficient commanders as Fernandes and Vidal, who had hitherto headed the insurrection with such vigour, and who were so thoroughly acquainted with the country in which they had to operate. Such, however, was their thorough loyalty, and such the good sense of Barreto in conforming to their advice, that no ill effects resulted from this change in the command. In the course of the insurrection, Vidal and Vernandes had overrun one hundred and eighty leagues of country, from Ceará to the San Francisco; they had captured eighty pieces of cannon; and they now delivered up to the new commander two months’ provisions for the army, twenty-four contos2 in specie, and the value of eighteen thousand cruzados.3

1648.

Soon after this event a fresh fleet arrived from Holland, bringing out six thousand men, which placed the Dutch at an unmistakable advantage in the field, compelling the Portuguese to contract the limits of their operations. The insurgent leaders, with this view, called in their troops from various out-stations, and evacuated Olinda, confining themselves between Serinhaem and Moribeca. All of the inhabitants of the Varzea, capable of bearing arms, were ordered to repair to the camp. Upon a muster being taken, the entire insurgent force was found to number only three thousand two hundred men. Its quality, however, made up for its deficiency in quantity.

In describing the details of this long and tedious colonial war, one is glad to arrive at a point which, though it did not mark its conclusion, was nevertheless decisive as to its result. Such a point is the first battle of Guararapes. The Dutch commander had determined to take possession of the small town of Moribeca, from which place he could co-operate with the fleet destined for Nazareth. With this view he attacked the estancia of Barreta, making prisoner of Soares, the officer in command. A range of hills, called the Guararapes, rises between three or four leagues south of Recife, its skirts extending to within three miles of the sea, the intervening space being swampy. Where the range most nearly approaches the ocean there is only a narrow slip of land between the hills and the swamp—the entrance to the pass being between a lake and a thicket. Of this pass the Portuguese took possession, being protected by the wood from the view of an approaching enemy.

On the morning on which the Dutch were to enter the pass, the officer above-named, who had been captured at Barreta, contrived to make his escape, and his countrymen were thus well informed as to the disposition and strength of the enemy. A skirmishing party was sent out to decoy them onwards; and the Dutch thus suddenly found themselves in a position where their numbers were of little avail. After the first discharge of firearms the fight was hand to hand. It was well contested. Vidal had two horses killed under him; whilst the charger which Joam Fernandes rode on this decisive day had one of his ears perforated by a bullet. A Dutch soldier, who aimed a blow at the rider, lost his arm by a stroke from the sabre of Fernandes. As was to be expected, in spite of their inferiority of numbers, the patriots won the fight. The enemy left twelve hundred dead upon the field, of whom it is said one hundred and eighty were officers. Amongst the fallen was Haus, who had returned to Brazil; amongst the wounded was Schoppe.

After this victory the insurgents once more took possession of Olinda; but their joy was somewhat damped by the loss of their fortified battery, called the Asseca, which had so long annoyed Recife, and which, during the absence of the commanders, had been yielded without a struggle. At this time they likewise sustained a severe loss by the death of their Indian ally, Camaram. He was a man of much ability, and although a typical Indian warrior, was of such dignified and courteous manners that he obtained the love and respect of all. We are somewhat surprised, however, that he is claimed by the Church as a model convert, who every day heard mass and repeated the office. He invariably bore upon his breast a crucifix and an image of the Virgin. The Dutch were still masters of the sea; and in consequence the Portuguese suffered much damage. By means of cruisers the Dutch carried on a tolerably lucrative war; whilst Recife offered a ready market for produce, and a ready means of sending remittances to Europe.

Meanwhile a blow was struck at the supremacy of the States in a quarter in which it was little expected. A member of the family of Correa de Sa, by whose means the French had been expelled from Rio de Janeiro, now projected an expedition for the recovery of Angola. Under pretext of erecting a fort on that coast to secure a supply of negroes, he set out from Brazil, having obtained a large amount subscribed for the purpose. Arrived on the coast of Africa, he set sail for Loanda, and was there informed that a detachment of Dutch was acting against the Portuguese at Massangano. On this information, he sent a flag to the governor, stating that, although he had not come with a hostile purpose, he felt it his duty to defend his oppressed countrymen, and he allowed the Dutch two days in which to surrender. The latter, at the end of this time, made a show of resistance, but soon fled; after which, by great address, Correa de Sa effected the relief of Massangano, taking prisoners the entire Dutch force of over two thousand men, whom he caused immediately to embark for Europe. The city of St. Thomas was likewise abandoned. The tidings of this success reaching Portugal about the same time as those of the battle of Guararapes, had no small share in deciding the government of King Joam to take the course which, after long hesitation, they ultimately adopted in their negotiations with the Dutch respecting Pernambuco.

The councils of King Joam were now not a little distracted. The Dutch were fully aware of the value of the possession which was the subject of contention between them and Portugal; and they were fully determined not to yield Pernambuco. Their demands were that Portugal should cede to them the whole of the provinces which they had occupied at the conclusion of the truce, with the third part of Seregipe in addition; that the island and port of the Morro of St. Paulo, opposite Bahia, should be given to them, likewise, for twenty years, until the terms of the treaty should be fulfilled; that they were to receive 100,000 florins, yearly, for twenty years; and likewise one thousand oxen, one thousand cows, four hundred horses, and one thousand sheep, yearly, for ten years, and a thousand chests of sugar, yearly, for twenty years. All their slaves were also to be restored.

Although these exorbitant terms were subsequently somewhat lowered, the Portuguese nation had still sufficient pride not to submit to them. The King placed the matter before the members of his Council, from each individual of whom he required a separate written opinion. The result was that a memorial was laid before His Majesty, stating that however desirable might be a peace with Holland, yet that religion and honour alike necessitated the rejection of the terms proposed. The King had, however, one adviser who took an opposite view. This was Vieyra, the Jesuit, who proceeded to expose the weakness of the several arguments which were adduced by the Council. This able statesman looked not to the Portuguese possessions in Brazil alone, but to the imperial position which Portugal occupied in the world. He met the religious objection by the argument that there was nothing to prevent the Portuguese of Pernambuco from emigrating elsewhere. Since the very existence of Portugal was at stake, it was before all things the King’s duty as a Catholic sovereign to look to the safety of that stronghold of the faith. The captaincies which the Dutch required, were after all only about a tenth part of the country.

Sixty ships, he pointed out, had been captured during that year. The Dutch, he declared, possessed fourteen thousand vessels against one hundred and fifty belonging to Portugal. They had in India more than a hundred ships of war, and more than sixty in Brazil. But it was on the state of India that Vieyra rested his main argument, and on the certainty of the Portuguese losing their possessions on that continent should they persist in war with the States. Thus was the King left in as great perplexity as ever, since his Council advised him in one sense, whilst the statesman whom he most trusted took an opposite view of the situation. One suggestion of Vieyra’s was, however, complied with, namely, a Portuguese Brazil Company was established, and this had a notable effect in bringing the war to a conclusion.

1649.

The necessity for the above-named measure had long been represented to the King by this sagacious Churchman. It was indeed an imitation of the Dutch East and West India Companies. Individual interest, he argued, would create exertion and enterprise; whilst foreign capital would be attracted by so promising an adventure. There was one condition absolutely needed, however, to insure its success, namely, that all capital embarked in this adventure should be free from confiscation. It is necessary to explain that this proviso referred to the Inquisition, the political evils of which institution had been ably exposed by Vieyra. Were the property of merchants engaged in this Company liable to be seized at the instance of the Holy Office, the Company would, of course, cease to command public confidence. As a matter of course the Holy Office denounced the proposed measure. They objected even to the use of money belonging to suspected persons. It required the losses of eight successive years and the threatened ruin of the trade of Portugal to induce the Government to put down this obstacle raised by interested bigotry. But at length the Company was formed, and the King’s eldest son became Prince of Brazil.

To return to Pernambuco. The Guararape hills were once more the scene of a battle between the parties who contended for the mastery of this fertile province. On this occasion the relative position of the combatants was reversed, the Dutch being the defendants and the Portuguese the assailants. The former had sallied from Recife with a force of some five thousand men, and had taken possession of the pass between the sea and the hills of the above name. Here they were attacked by the Portuguese, and, after a struggle of six hours, were routed with a loss of eleven hundred men, nineteen stands of colours, with the whole of their artillery and ammunition. Prink, the Dutch commander, fell, as did the chief of the naval forces which assisted him. Joam Fernandes, the hero of the insurrection, had, as usual, several narrow escapes with his life. On the side of the victors fell Paulo da Cunha, who had taken a prominent part in the war.

Shortly after this battle the first fleet sent out by the new Company arrived at Brazil, the Dutch being unable to oppose it. There is not much, however, to record respecting the proceedings of the contending parties during the next three years. Holland, being engaged in war with the Protector of England, left the West Indian Company to provide for Pernambuco as best it could; but the means of the Company were exhausted, and their naval force at Recife became unfit to go to sea. Schoppe, indeed, made one attempt to intercept the homeward bound fleet of 1652; but he was beaten off with loss.

1653.

The conclusion of the struggle for the independence of Pernambuco was due, as had been its commencement, to the initiative of Joam Fernandes. To his intelligent and patriotic mind two considerations presented themselves, namely, that the Pernambucans must rely for their freedom on themselves alone; and that the expulsion of the Dutch could never be secured while Recife remained open to their ships. Taking these as his principles, it occurred to him that although there was no hope of obtaining direct succour from Portugal, yet that the Company’s fleet might be made use of to obtain the desired end. His commander, Barreto, entering into his views, the camp-masters met in council in San Gonzalo’s chapel, and agreed to endeavour to carry out the scheme.

The annual fleet was to sail from Lisbon early in October, with Pedro de Magalhaens as general and Brito Freire as admiral, the latter being the well-known historian. Barreto had been desired to have the ships in the ports of Pernambuco ready to join the fleet on its way to Bahia. The advice was received on the 7th of December, and on the 20th the convoy came in sight of Recife. After beating off some Dutch frigates, the general and the admiral landed at the Rio Doce. This scheme was then opened up to them, and they were requested to block up the harbour whilst the insurgents should make a last and desperate attempt to effect the capture of Recife.

As was to be expected, the commanders were not a little startled at the part which had been assigned to them. Magalhaens represented that his instructions from the King did not authorize him to engage in any act of hostility; nor had he permission from the Company to divert the fleet from its destination. He further intimated that were he to involve his country in war with Holland, the penalty would be his head. To this Fernandes replied by the argument once used by John Knox, that all temporal penalties, which at least ended with this world, could not outweigh in the scale the value of a soul which was to exist to all eternity; and that were the general to fail in carrying out the part which Providence now assigned to him, the souls of all those who would be thus exposed to renunciation of the faith would be required at his hands. It was an age of deep religious conviction, and both Magalhaens and Freire yielded to the arguments of Fernandes.

The result is soon told. The Dutch fleet, perceiving the intentions of the Portuguese, stood out to sea whilst they were able to do so. Their disappearance set at liberty the merchant ships along the coast, which were employed under the orders of Barreto. A line was drawn across the harbour of Recife, and strict precautions were taken that no relief should reach the city by sea or by land. The besieging force consisted of three thousand five hundred men. The indefatigable Fernandes led the first assault; and he was good enough to promise a separate mass for the soul of each of his men who should fall. On the morning of the 15th of January, the besieged were astonished to find themselves cannonaded by a battery of twenty-four pounders, and the fort of Salinas surrendered on the same night. One post gave in after another, and at length the inhabitants compelled the General to treat for a capitulation. The Dutch, having surrendered their arms, might remain for three months at Recife to settle their affairs; but all their possessions on the coast of Brazil, without exception, were to be surrendered to the Portuguese.

1654.

Fernandez entered the city and received the keys of the magazines and forts, seventy-three in number, which he proudly delivered to Barreto. Twelve hundred regular troops laid down their arms at Recife. The Portuguese likewise gained possession of two hundred and seventy-three guns; the Indians had retired toward Ceará. Some of the distant garrisons, having received timely warning of the loss of Recife, succeeded in effecting their escape; but at Itamaraca four hundred men were taken. The General and the Admiral now proceeded with the convoy to Bahia; whilst Vidal set out to announce the glad tidings in Portugal. But in this intention the commander was anticipated by a Benedictine priest, who, arriving at Lisbon on the same evening, proceeded at once to communicate the information to the King.

1661.

The news of this event reached Holland at a time when the Dutch, however much they might feel disposed to do so, were by no means in a position to take revenge. Their arms were not just then successful against England. But they succeeded in recompensing themselves for the loss of Pernambuco by wresting Ceylon from the Portuguese. They did not, however, immediately resign the hope of recovering their possessions in Brazil. Although Louis XIV. was accepted as mediator between Holland and Portugal, the States nevertheless sent a fleet under De Ruiter to the Tagus and attempted some reprisals. In the end, Holland yielded to circumstances. Charles II. of England, while treating for his marriage with the Portuguese princess, intimated to the Dutch that if they should persevere in the contest he would become a party to it. France likewise interfered energetically on behalf of Portugal; and at length the negotiations were concluded, the latter country consenting to pay a certain amount in money and commodities to Holland, and to restore her captured cannon.