Читать книгу Counterinsurgency In Eastern Afghanistan 2004-2008: A Civilian Perspective - Robert Kemp - Страница 9

This section will look at the roles of the various U.S. and international civilian actors in RC-East during the period 2004–2008, as well as some perspective from Washington.

State Department Political Officers

The State Department assigned political officers to both the PRTs and the Brigade HQ. These officers had four main tasks. First, they were reporting officers, tasked to provide information on political, political-military, economic, and social trends to the Embassy in Kabul. Second, they were conduits of information to the U.S. military on various topics: what U.S. government (USG), State Department, and embassy policy was, what was happening in Afghanistan at the national level, and developments in Pakistan—a very relevant topic for the border provinces. Third, they were charged with promoting USG policies to the provincial government. Finally, and in some ways most importantly, they were responsible for helping the nascent GOA govern effectively. At both the PRT and Brigade levels, the political officers traveled with the commanders, meeting with political leaders (usually governors) as well as military leaders. This freed the commanders to focus more on military aspects.

U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)

USAID officers, called Field Program Officers, were assigned to both PRTs and Brigade commands in RC-East. These officers were responsible for administering USAID projects at the provincial level (although they were not responsible for administering at the provincial level national-level programs run out of Kabul). They were also tasked with advising military officers on development issues; advising the GOA on long-term reconstruction and development strategy, and reporting back to AID headquarters in Kabul. In provinces where NGOs and IOs were present, the AID officers worked with them to assure projects were complementary, and to coordinate development strategy at the provincial level. Unlike the State Department, the AID officer at the Brigade HQ managed the AID workers at the PRTs. Many AID workers at this time were contractors, rather than career employees.

U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)

USDA officers focused on providing agricultural advice to the GOA, and to a lesser extent, individual farmers. They were not present in most RC-East PRTs, although two key posts—the Brigade HQ and the Jalalabad PRT—included them. The USDA officers complemented AID counternarcotics programs, providing advice on crops to substitute for poppy and micro credit programs for farmers.

A View from Washington

The State Department’s Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS) for Afghanistan during much of this time described his primary concern as acquiring the necessary “manpower, money, and time.”16 This reflected what he and others saw as the USG’s loosely held view that “in Iraq, we do what we must, in Afghanistan we do what we can.” In his view, while Gen. Barno clearly wanted to implement a COIN strategy early in this period, the lack of resources made this difficult in practice. At the same time the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was not comfortable with COIN, although by 2006, this was the de-facto strategy. The former DAS noted the relative autonomy he and his National Security Council (NSC) counterpart had on Afghanistan policy, since the administration was mostly focused on Iraq policy. This also allowed Embassy Kabul considerable input to policy, and embassy analysis and advice carried weight in Washington.

United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA)

In RC-East, UNAMA had hub offices at Gardez and Jalalabad. The lead political officers worked closely with USG political and military officers. The UNAMA officers had a wide mandate, dealing with conflict prevention and resolution, monitoring human rights, and promoting GOA capacity. They also played a substantial role in organizing elections. The overall approach of UNAMA in Afghanistan was one of a “light footprint” which placed Afghans in decision-making roles with international actors as advisors. This sideline method was presented as the most effective means of ensuring a sustainable and independent government in Afghanistan.

Now that the major players in RC-East and their goals have been introduced, the next three chapters will look at the major pillars of the counterinsurgency strategy: local government, development, and security.