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Table of Contents

Essentials of the Non-Euclidean Geometry

The Non-Euclidean Geometry Concerned with Conceptual Space Entirely—Outcome of Failures at Solving the Parallel-Postulate—The Basis of the Non-Euclidean Geometry—Space Curvature and Manifoldness—Some Elements of the Non-Euclidean Geometry—Certainty, Necessity and Universality as Bulwarks of Geometry—Some Consequences of Efforts at Solving the Parallel-Postulate—The Final Issue of the Non-Euclidean Geometry—Extended Consciousness.

The term "non-Euclidean" is used to designate any system of geometry which is not strictly Euclidean in content.

It is interesting to note how the term came to be used. It appears to have been employed first by Gauss. He did not strike upon it suddenly, however, as in the correspondence between him and Wachter in 1816 he used the designation "anti-Euclidean" and then, later, following Schweikart, he adopted the latter's terminology and called it "Astral Geometry." This he found in Schweikart's first published treatise known by that name and which made its appearance at Marburg in December, 1818. Finally, in his correspondence with Taurinus in 1824, Gauss first used the expression "non-Euclidean" to designate the system which he had elaborated and continued to use it in his correspondence with Schumacher in 1831.

"Non-Legendrean," "semi-Euclidean" and "non-Archimedean" are titles used by M. Dehn to denote all kinds of geometries which represented variations from the hypotheses laid down by Legendre, Euclid and Archimedes.

The semi-Euclidean is a system of geometry in which the sum of the angles of a triangle is said to be equal to two right angles, but in which one may draw an infinity of parallels to a straight line through a given point. The non-Euclidean geometry embraces all the results obtained as a consequence of efforts made at finding a satisfactory proof of the parallel-postulate and is, therefore, based upon a conception of space which is at variance with that held by Euclid. According to the Ionian school space is an infinite continuum possessing uniformity throughout its entire extent. The non-Euclideans maintain that space is not an infinite extension; but a finite though unbounded manifold capable of being generated by the movement of a point, line or plane in a direction without itself. It is also held that space is curved and exists in the shape of a sphere or pseudosphere and is consequently elliptical.

The inapplicability of Euclid's parallel-postulate to lines drawn upon the surface of a sphere suggested the possibility of a space in which the postulate could apply to all possible surfaces or that space itself may be spherical in which case the postulate would be invalidated altogether. Hence, it is quite natural that mathematicians finding themselves unable to prove the postulate with due mathetic precision should turn their attention to the conceptually possible. In this virtual abandonment of the perceptual for the conceptual lies the fundamental difference between the Euclidean and the non-Euclidean geometries. It may be said to the credit of the Euclideans that they have sought to make their geometric conceptions conform as closely as possible to the actual nature of things in the sensuous world while at the same time they must have perceived that at best their spatial notions were only approximations to the sensuous actuality of objects in space.

On the other hand, non-Euclideans make no pretense at discovering any congruency between their notions and things as they actually are. The attitude of the metageometricians in this respect is very aptly described by Cassius Jackson Keyser who says:

"He constructs in thought a summitless hierarchy of hyperspaces, an endless series of orderly worlds, worlds that are possible and logically actual, and he is content not to know if any of them be otherwise actual or actualized."[6]

The non-Euclidean is, therefore, not concerned about the applicability of ensembles, notions and propositions to real, perceptual space conditions. It is sufficient for him to know that his creations are thinkable. As soon as he can resolve the nebulosity of his consciousness into the conceptual "star-forms" of definite ideas and notions, he sits down to the feast which he finds provided by superfoetated hypotheses fabricated in the deeps of mind and logical actualities imperturbed and unmindful of the weal of perceptual space in its homogeneity of form and dimensionality.

Fundamentally, the non-Euclidean geometry is constructed upon the basis of conceptual space almost entirely. Knowledge of its content is accordingly derived from a superperceptual representation of relations and interrelations subsisting between and among notions, ideas, propositions and magnitudes arising out of a conceptual consideration thereof. In other words, representations of the non-Euclidean magnitudes, cannot be said to be strictly perceptual in the same sense that three-space magnitudes are perceived; for three-space magnitudes are really sense objects while hyperspace magnitudes are not sense objects. They are far removed from the sensuous world and in order to conceive them one must raise his consciousness from the sensuous plane to the conceptual plane and become aware of a class of perceptions which are not perceptions in the strict sense of the word, but superperceptions; because they are representations of concepts rather than precepts.

Notions of perceptual space are constituted of the triple presentations arising out of the visual, tactual and motor sensations which are fused together in their final delivery to the consciousness. The synthesis of these three sense-deliveries is accomplished by equilibrating their respective differences and by correcting the perceptions of one sense by those of another in such a way as to obtain a completely reliable perception of the object. This is the manner in which the characteristics of Euclidean space are established.

The characteristics of non-Euclidean space are not arrived at exactly in this way. Being beyond the scope of the visual, tactile and motor sense apprehensions, it cannot be said to represent judgments derived from any consideration or elaboration of the deliveries presented through these media. Yet, the substance of metageometry, or the science of the measurement of hyperspaces, may not be regarded as an a priori substructure upon which the system is founded. That is, the conceptual space of non-Euclidean geometry is not presented to the consciousness as an a priori notion. On the other hand, the a posterioristic quality of metageometric spaces marks the entire scope of motility of the notions appertaining thereto.

The notions, therefore, of conceptual space are derivable only from the perception of concepts, or, otherwise consist of judgments concerning interconceptual relations. The process of apperception involved in the recognition of relations which may be methodically determined is much removed from the primary procedure of perceiving sense-impressions and fusing them into final deliveries to the consciousness for conceptualization or the elaboration into concepts or general notions. It is a procedure which is in every way superconceptual and extra-sensuous. The metageometrician or analyst in no way relies upon sense-deliveries for the data of his constructions; for, if he did, he should, then, be reduced to the necessity of confining his conclusions to the sphere of motility imposed by the sensible world with the result that we should be able to verify empirically all his postulations. But, contrarily, he goes to the extra-sensuous, and there in the realm of pure conceptuality, he finds the requisite freedom for his theories; thus, environed by a sort of intellectual anarchism, he pursues analytical pleasures quite unrestrainedly. The difference between the two mental processes—that which leads from the sensible world to conception and that which veers into the fields beyond—is so great that it is hardly permissible to view the results arrived at in the outcome of the separate processes as being identical.

To illustrate this difference, let us draw an analogy. The miner digs the iron ore out of the ground. The iron is separated from the extraneous material and delivered to the furnaces where the metal is melted and turned out as pig iron. It is further treated, and steel, of various grades, cast iron and other kinds of iron are produced. The treatment of the iron ore up to this stage is similar to the treatment of sense-impressions by the Thinker. Steel, cast iron, et cetera, are similar to mental concepts. Later, the steel and other products are converted into instruments and numerous articles. This represents the superperceptual process. Trafficking in iron ore products, such as instruments of precision, watch springs, and the like, represents a stage still farther removed from the primary treatment of the ore and is similar to that to which concepts are treated when the metageometrician manipulates them in the construction of conceptual space-forms. Perception is the dealing with raw iron ore while conception is analogous to the production of the finished product.

Superperception would be analogous to the trafficking in the finished product as such and without any reference to the source or the preceding processes. Thus the notions and judgments of the non-Euclidean geometry are arrived at as a result of a triple process of perception, conception and superperception the latter being merely superconceived as formal space-notions. But it is obvious that the more complex the processes by which judgments purporting to relate to perceptual things are derived the more likely are those judgments to be at variance with the nature of the things themselves.

In view of the foregoing, the dangers resulting from identifying the products of the two processes are very obvious indeed. But the difference between the two procedures is the difference between Euclidean and non-Euclidean geometries or the difference between perceptual space notions and conceptual space notions. Hence, it is not understood just how or why it has occurred to anyone that the two notions could be made congruent. Magnitudes in perceptual, sensible space are things apart from those that may be said to exist in mathematical space or that space whose qualities and properties have no existence outside of the mind which has conceived them. It is believed to be quite impossible to approach the study of metageometrical propositions with a clear, open mind without previously understanding the fundamental distinctions which exist between them.

It follows, therefore, as a logical conclusion that geometric space of whatsoever nature is a purely formal construction of the intellect, and for this reason is completely under the sovereignty of the intellect however whimsical its demands may be. Being thus the creature of the intellect, its possibilities are limited only by the limitations of the intellect itself. Perceptual space, being neither the creature of the intellect nor necessarily an a priori notion resident in the mental substructure, but existing entirely independent of the intellect or its apprehension thereof, cannot be expected to conform to the purely formal restrictions imposed by the mind except in so far as those restrictions may be determined by the nature of perceptual space. And for that matter, it should not be forgotten that, as yet, we have no means of determining whether or not the testimony of the intellect is thoroughly credible simply because there is no other standard by which we may prove its testimony. It is possible to justify the deliveries of the eye by the sense of touch, or vice versa. It is also possible to prove all our sense-deliveries by one or the other of the senses. But we have no such good fortune with the deliveries of the intellect. We have simply to accept its testimony as final; because we cannot do any better. But if it were possible to correct the testimony of the intellect by some other faculty or power which by nature might be more accurate than the intellect it should be found that the intellect itself is sadly limited.

The possible curvature of space is a notion which also characterizes the content of the non-Euclidean geometry. It is upon this notion that the question of the finity and unboundedness of space, in the mathematical sense, rests. In the curved space, the straightest line is a curved line which returns upon itself. Progression eastward brings one to the west; progression northward brings one to the south, et cetera. On this view space is finite, but may not be regarded as possessing boundaries.

Space-curvature, reinforced by the idea that space is also a manifold is the enabling clause of metageometry and without them the analyst dares not proceed. Here again, we are led to the confession that however fantastic these two notions may seem and evidently are, there is nevertheless to be recognized in them a "dim glimpse" of a veritable reality—a slight foreshadowing of the revelation of some great kosmic mystery.

The manifoldness of space is the fiat of analysis. It is the inevitable outcome of the analyst's method of procedure. His education, training and view of things in general inhibit his arriving at any other result and he may be pardoned with good grace for his manufacture of the space-manifold. For by it perhaps a better appreciation of that wonderful extension of consciousness in the nature of which is involved the explanation of the perplexing problems which the manifold and other metageometrical expedients faintly adumbrate may be gained.

It is pertinent, in the light of the above, to examine into some of the relative merits of the three formal bulwarks of geometrical knowledge. These are certainty, necessity and universality.

Geometric certainty is derived solely from the nature of the premises upon which it is based. If the premises be contradictory, it is, of course, defective. But if the premises are non-contradictory or self-evident, then the certainty of geometric notions and conclusions is valid. Another consideration of prime importance in this connection is the definition. From it all premises proceed. Hence, the definition is even more important than the premise; for it is the persisting determinant of all geometric conclusions while the premise is dependent upon the limitations of the definition. The determinative character of the definition has led to its apotheosis; but this, admittedly, has been necessary in order to give stability and permanency to the conclusions which followed. But in spite of this it would appear that the certainty of geometric conclusions is not a quality to be reckoned as absolute or final.

With the same certainty that it can be said the sum of the angles of the triangle is equal to two right angles it may be asserted that that sum is also greater or less than two right angles. Certainty which is based upon the inherent congruity of definitions, premises and propositions is an entirely different matter from that certainty which arises out of the real, abiding validity of a scheme of thought. But this difference is not lessened by the fact that the latter is dependent, in a measure, upon the correct systematization of our spatial experiences by means of methodical processes. Euclidean geometry, accordingly, is not so certain in its applications as it is utilitarian; but non-Euclidean geometry is even less certain than the former and consequently more lacking in its utilitarian possibilities.

The necessity of geometrical determinations is merely the necessity which inheres in logical inferences or deductions. These may or may not be valid. Inasmuch as the necessariness of deductions is primarily based upon the conditional certainty of premises and definitions it appears that this quality is in no way peculiar to geometry whether Euclidean or non-Euclidean. In like manner, the universality of geometric judgments may not properly be regarded as a peculiarity of geometry; but is explicable upon the basis of the formal character of the assumptions which underlie it. The chief value, then, of non-Euclidean geometry seems to abide in the fact that it clarifies our understanding as to the complex processes by which it is possible to organize and systematize our spatial experiences for assimilation and use in other branches of knowledge.

With the above statement of the case of the non-Euclidean geometry it is now thought permissible to state briefly some of the elements thereof.[7]

Below will be found some of the elements obtained as a consequence of efforts made both at proving and disproving the parallel-postulate of Euclid:

"If two points determine a line it is called a straight."

"If two straights make with a transversal equal alternate angles they have a common perpendicular."

"A piece of a straight is called a sect."

"If two equal coplanar sects are erected perpendicular to a straight, if they do not meet, then the sect joining their extremities makes equal angles with them and is bisected by a perpendicular erected midway between their feet."

"The sum of the angles of a rectilineal triangle is a straight angle, in the hypothesis of the right (angle); is greater than a straight angle in the hypothesis of the obtuse (angle); is less than a straight angle in the hypothesis of the acute (angle)."

"The hypothesis of right is Euclidean; the hypothesis of the acute is Bolyai-Lobachevskian; the hypothesis of obtuse is Riemannian."

"If one straight is parallel to a second the second is parallel to the first."

"Parallels continually approach each other."

"The perpendiculars erected at the middle point of the sides of a triangle are all parallel, if two are parallel."

"If the foot of a perpendicular slides on a straight its extremity describes a curve called an equidistant curve, or an equidistantial."

"An equidistantial will slide on its trace."

"In the hypothesis of the obtuse a straight is of finite size and returns into itself."

"Two straights always intersect."

"Two straights perpendicular to a third straight intersect at a point half a straight from the third either way."

"A pole is half a straight from its polar."

"A polar is the locus of coplanar points half a straight from its pole. Therefore, if the pole of one straight lies on another straight the pole of this second straight is on the first straight."

"The cross of two straights is the pole of the join of their poles."

"Any two straights inclose a plane figure, a digon."

"Two digons are congruent if their angles are equal."

"The equidistantial is a circle with center at the poles of its basal straight."

A typical postulate based upon the Bolyai hypothesis of the acute angle is the following:

"From any point P drop PC, a perpendicular to any given straight line AB. If D move off indefinitely on the ray CB, the sect will approach as limit PF copunctal with AB at infinity.

Fig. 5.

PD is said to be at P the parallel to AB toward B. PF makes with PC an angle CPF which is called the angle of parallelism for the perpendicular PC. It is less than a right angle by an amount which is the limit of the deficiency of the triangle PCD. On the other side of PC, an equal angle of parallelism gives the parallel P to BA towards AM.[8] Thus at any point there are two parallels to a straight. A straight has, therefore, two separate points at infinity."

"Straights through P which make with PC an angle greater than the angle of parallelism and less than its supplement do not meet the straight AB at all not even at infinity."

The parallel-postulate is stated in the non-Euclidean geometry as follows:

"If a straight line meeting two straight lines make those angles which are inward and upon the same side of it less than two right angles the two straight lines being produced indefinitely will meet each other on this side where the angles are less than two right angles."

It is stated by Manning[9] in the following language:

"If two lines are cut by a third and the sum of the interior angles on the same side of the cutting line is less than two right angles the line will meet on that side when sufficiently produced."

It is rather significant that in this postulate which is really a definition of space should be found grounds for such diverse interpretations as to its nature. Of course, the moment the mind seeks to understand the infinite by interpreting it in the unmodified terms of the apparently unchangeable finite it entangles itself into insurmountable difficulties. As a drowning man grasps after straws so the mind, immersed in endless abysses of infinity, fails to conduct itself in a seemly manner; but gasps, struggles and flounders and is happy if it can, in the depths of its perplexity, discover a way of logical escape. The pure mathematician has a hankering after the logically consistent in all his pursuits; to him it is the "Holy Grail" of his highest aspirations. He seeks it as the devotee seeks immortality. It is to him a philosopher's stone, the elixir of perpetual youth, the eternal criterion of all knowledge.

Failures to demonstrate the celebrated postulate of Euclid led, as a matter of course, to the substitution of various other postulates more or less equivalent to it in that each of them may be deduced from the other without the aid of any new hypothesis.

Among those who sought proof by a restatement of the problem are the following:

1. Ptolemy: The internal angles which two parallels make with a transversal on the same side are supplementary.

2. Clavius: Two parallel straight lines are equidistant.

3. Proclus: If a straight line intersects one of two parallels it also intersects the other.

4. Wallis: A triangle being given another triangle can be constructed similar to the given one and of any size whatever.

5. Bolyai (W.): Through three points not lying on a straight line a sphere can always be drawn.

6. Lorenz: Through a point between the lines bounding an angle a straight line can always be drawn which will intersect these two lines.

7. Saccheri: The sum of the angles of a triangle is equal to two right angles.

There were, of course, many other statements and substitutions used by mathematicians in their endeavors satisfactorily to establish the truth of the parallel-postulate. That their labors should have terminated, first, by doubting it, then by denying, and finally, by building up a system of geometries which altogether ignores the postulate is just what might naturally be expected of these men who have given to the world the non-Euclidean geometry. In doing what they did many, if not all of them, were not aware in any measure of the proportions of the imposing superstructure that would be built upon their apparent failures. All of them undoubtedly must have sensed the vague adumbrations forecast by the unfolding mysteries which they sought to lay bare; all of them must have felt as they executed the early tasks of those crepuscular days of pure mathematics that the way which they were traveling would lead to the inner shrine of a higher knowledge and a wider freedom; they may have been led by divine intuition to strike out on this new path and yet they could not have known how fully their dreams would be realized by the mathematicians of the twentieth century. If so, they were truly gods and mathesis is their kingdom.

The analyst proceeds upon a basis entirely at variance with that which guides the ordinary investigator in the formulation of his conclusions. The empirical scientist in arriving at his theories or hypotheses is governed at all times by the degree of conformity which his postulates exhibit to the actual phenomena of nature. He endeavors to ascertain just how far or in what degree his hypothesis is congruent with things found in nature. If the dissidence is found to predominate he abandons his theory and makes another statement and again sets out to determine the degree of conformity. If he then finds that the natural phenomena agree with his theory he accepts it as for the time being finally settling the question. In all things he is limited by the answer which nature gives to his queries. Not so with the exponent of pure mathematics. For him the truth of hypotheses and postulates is not dependent upon the fact that physical nature contains phenomena which answer to them. The sole determining factor for him is whether or not he is able to state with rational consistency the assumed first principles and then logically develop their consequences. If he can do this, that is, if he can state his hypotheses with consistency and develop their consequences into a logical system of thought, he is quite satisfied and well pleased with his performances. But the fact that this is true is of vital significance for all who seek clearly to understand the essential character of hyperspatiality.

It appears, therefore, that the science of consequences is the radical essence of pure geometry. The metageometrician enjoys unlimited freedom in the choice of his postulates and suffers curtailment only when it comes to the question of consistency. He is at liberty to formulate as many systems of geometry as the barriers of consistency will permit and these are practically innumerable. So long then as the laws of compatibility remain inviolate his multiplication of postulate-systems may proceed indefinitely. Is it strange then that under conditions where an investigator has such unbridled liberty he should be found indulging in mathetic excesses?

Kant held that the axioms of geometry are synthetic judgments a priori; but it appears that in the strictest sense this is not the case. It depends upon the type of mind which is taken as a standard of reference. If it be the uncultivated mind, it is certain that to it the relations expressed by an axiom would never appear spontaneously. If on the other hand, the standard be that of a cultivated mind it is also equally certain that to it these relations would be discovered only after methodical operations. All judgments arrived at as a result of logical processes should, it seems, be regarded as judgments a posteriori, i.e., the results of empirical operations. Confessedly, the facts adduced in course of experimentation serve as guides in choosing among all of the many possible logical conventions; but our choice remains untrammeled except by the compulsion arising out of a fear of inconsistency. The real criterion then of all geometries is neither truth, conformability nor necessity, but consistency and convenience.

The difficulty with the non-Euclideans resolved itself into the question as to whether it is more consistent, as well as convenient, to establish a proof of the postulate by taking advantage of the support to be found in other postulates or whether, by seeking a demonstration based upon the deliveries of sense-experience as to the nature of space and its properties, a still more consistent conclusion might be reached. They had further perplexity, however, when it came to a decision as to whether the organic world is produced and maintained in Euclidean space or in a purely conceptual space which alone can be apprehended by the mind's powers of representation. Unwilling to admit the existence of the world in Euclidean space, they turned their attention to the examination of the properties of another kind of space so-called which unlike the space of the Ionian school could be made to answer not only all the purposes of plane and solid figures, but of spherics as well. And so, the manifold space was invented by Riemann and later underwent some remarkable improvements at the hands of his disciple, Beltrami. But it may be said here, parenthetically, that the truth of the whole matter is that our world is neither in Euclidean nor non-Euclidean space, both of which, in the last analysis, are conceptual abstractions. Although it may not be denied that the Euclidean space is the more compatible.

The problem of devising a space, if only a very limited portion, in which could be demonstrated the assumed alternative hypothesis and its consequences logically developed, occasioned no inconsiderable concern for the non-Euclidean investigators; but neither Lobachevski, Bolyai nor Riemann were to be baffled by the difficulties which they met. These only cited them to more laborious toil. Having succeeded in mentally constructing the particular kind of space which was adaptable to their rigorous mathetic requirements it immediately occurred to them that all the qualities of the limited space thus devised might logically be amplified and extended to the entire world of space and that what is true of figures constructed in the segmented portion of space which they used for experimental purposes is also true of figures drawn anywhere in the universe of this space as all lines drawn in the finite, bounded portion could be extended indefinitely and all magnitudes similarly treated. From these results, it was but a single step to the conclusion which followed—that either an entirely new world of space had been discovered or that our notion of the space in which the organic world was produced is wholly wrong and needs revision. But notwithstanding the insurmountable obstacles which stood in the way of the investigators who made the attempt to discover the homology which might exist between the characteristics of the newly fabricated space and the phenomenal world, investigations were carried forward with almost amazing recklessness and loyalty to the mathetic spirit until it was discovered that all efforts to trace out any definite lines of correspondence were futile. Then the policy of ignoring the question of conformability was adopted and has since been pursued with unchangeable regularity by the analytical investigator.

Among the results obtained by the non-Euclideans in their profound researches into the nature of hyperspace are these: 1. It was found that the angular sum of a triangle, being ordinarily assumed to be a variable quantity, is either less or greater than two right angles so that a strictly Euclidean rectangle could not be constructed. 2. The angle sums of two triangles of equal area are equal. 3. No two triangles not equal can have the same angles so that similar triangles are impossible unless they are of the same size. 4. If two equal perpendiculars are erected to the same line, their distance apart increases with their length. 5. A line every point of which is equally distant from a given straight line is a curved line. 6. Any two lines which do not meet, even at infinity, have one common perpendicular which measures their minimum distance. 7. Lines which meet at infinity are parallel. But it is apparent that these results have not followed upon any mathematical consequence of other supporting postulates or axioms such as would place them on a coördinate basis with those used as a support for the parallel-postulate; for they are based upon the envisagement of an entirely new principle of space-perception and belong to a wholly different set of space qualities.

The final issue then of the non-Euclidean geometry is neither in the utility of its processes and conclusions nor in the increscent inclination towards a new outlook upon the world of mathesis; but resides solely in the possibilities yet to be developed in that vast domain of analytical thought which it has discovered and opened to view. To say that it sheds any light upon the nature of the universe is perhaps to take the radical view; yet it cannot be doubted that the researches incident to the formulation of the non-Euclidean geometry have greatly extended the scope of consciousness. Whether the extension is valid and normal or simply a hypertrophic excrescence of mental feverishness; whether by virtue of it we shall more closely approach an understanding of the true nature of the mind of the Infinite, or shall all fall into insanity, are certainly debatable questions. It nevertheless appears evident that humanity has gained something of real, abiding permanence by this new departure. If that something be merely an extended consciousness or an awakening to the fact that there are stages of awareness beyond the strictly sensuous, and every observable evidence points to this, then there has only begun the process by which the faculty of conscious functioning in this new world shall become the normal possession of the human species. But this new world cannot be said to be of mathematical import; for it is doubtful if mathematical laws such as have been devised up to the present time, would obtain therein. So that if anything, it must be psychological and vital.

On this view the worlds of hyperspace inlaid with analytic manifoldnesses and constant curvatures are but the primal excitants which will finally awaken in the mind the faculty of awareness in the new domain of psychological content. Then will come the blooming of the diurnal flower of the mind's immortality and the outputting of the organ of consciousness wherewith the infinite stretches of hyperspaces, the low-lying valleys of reals and imaginaries and the uplifting hills of finites and infinites shall be divested of their mysteries and stand out in their unitariness no longer draped in the veil of the inscrutable and the incomprehensible.

The fourth dimension, regarded by some as a new scope of motion for objects in space, by others as a new and strange direction of spatial extent and by others still as the doorway of the temple of exegesis wherein an explanation may be found for the entire congeries of mysteries and supermysteries which now perplex the human mind, may also be said to be the key to the non-Euclidean geometry. But it really complicates the situation; for one has to be capable of prolonged abstract thought even to envisage is as a conceptual possibility. Poincaré[10] says: "Any one who should dedicate his life to it could, perhaps, eventually imagine the fourth dimension," implying thereby that a lifetime of prolonged abstract thought is necessary to bring the mind to that point of ecstasy where it could even so much as imagine this additional dimension. Nevertheless by it (the fourth dimension) was the non-Euclidean geometry made and without it was not any of the hyperspaces made that were made. It is the view which geometers have taken of space in general that has made the fourth dimension possible, and not only the fourth, but dimensions of all degrees. The basis of the non-Euclidean geometry may be found then in the notion of space which has been predominant in the minds of the investigators.

Finally, it should be pointed out that the non-Euclidean geometry, though a consistent system of postulates, has been constructed upon a misconception based upon the identification of real, perceptual space with systems of space-measurements. Hyperspaces which are not spaces at all should not be confounded with real space. But they constitute the substance of non-Euclidean geometry; they are its blood and sinews. Their study is interesting, because of the possibilities of speculation which it offers. No mind that has thought deeply upon the intricacies of the fourth dimension, or hyperspace, remains the same after the process. It is bound to experience a certain sense of humility, and yet some pride born of a knowledge that it has been in the presence of a great mystery and has delved into the fearful deeps of kosmic mind. To the mind that has thus been anointed by the sacred chrism of the inner mysteries of creative mentality there always come that stillness and calm such as characterize the aftermath of reflection upon the incomprehensible and the transfinite.