Читать книгу The Listeners - Roy R. Manstan - Страница 16

CHAPTER 7 AMERICA AWAKENS

On the 24^th of March, 1916, at about 2.50 o’clock in the afternoon, the unarmed steamer Sussex, with 325 or more passengers on board, among whom were a number of American citizens, was torpedoed while crossing from Folkstone to Dieppe.

—President Woodrow Wilson¹

On April 18, 1916, with these words in his opening paragraph, President Woodrow Wilson delivered his ultimatum to Germany’s Secretary of Foreign Affairs Gottlieb von Jagow. Sussex was a cross-channel steamer, which had made this passage between England and France many times. The vessel, which did not transit via routes used by troop transports, was well-known, was unarmed, and only carried civilians. Although reports varied, there may have been in excess of eighty passengers lost in the attack. The torpedo destroyed the bow section forward of the bridge, yet Sussex remained afloat and was towed into Boulogne Harbor. There was no question that a German U-boat and not a mine was the cause, there being fragments of the torpedo found within the Sussex hull.

Wilson’s ultimatum continued: “[T]he Imperial Government has failed to appreciate the gravity of the situation which has resulted, not alone from the attack on the Sussex, but from the whole method and character of submarine warfare as disclosed by the unrestrained practice of the commanders of German undersea craft … in the indiscriminate destruction of merchant vessels of all sorts, nationalities, and destinations.”²

Less than eleven months had passed since the sinking of Lusitania. President Wilson, who had been continuously frustrated by German promises made and broken, ended by putting the German Government on notice: “If it is still the purpose of the Imperial Government to prosecute relentless and indiscriminate warfare against vessels of commerce by the use of submarines … the Government of the United States is at last forced to the conclusion that there is but one course it can pursue. Unless the Imperial Government should now immediately declare and effect an abandonment of its present methods of submarine warfare against passenger and freight-carrying vessels, the Government of the United States can have no choice but to sever diplomatic relations with the German Empire altogether.”³

The passenger ferry Sussex torpedoed while crossing the English Channel. (Wikipedia)

Wilson’s ultimatum was delivered to Germany’s Secretary of Foreign Affairs on April 18, 1916. The following day, Wilson addressed Congress, with an explanation of his blunt message to Germany: “…despite the solemn protest of this Government, the commanders of German undersea vessels have attacked merchant ships with greater and greater activity … in a way that has grown more and more ruthless, more and more indiscriminate …” Wilson then ended his address to Congress, reiterating his ultimatum to Germany that “if it is still its purpose to prosecute relentless and indiscriminate warfare against vessels of commerce by use of submarines,” the next step would be for the United States to sever diplomatic relations, an act that would surely be followed by a declaration of war.⁴

Gottlieb von Jagow, responding from Berlin on the fourth of May to Wilson’s ultimatum, continued to complain of Britain’s blockade of neutral shipping destined for German ports. “In self-defense against the illegal conduct of British warships, while fighting a bitter struggle for national existence, Germany had to resort to the hard but effective weapon of submarine warfare…. Moreover, Great Britain again and again has violated international law, surpassing all bounds in outraging neutral rights …”⁵ Nonetheless, Germany relented and von Jagow relayed the following decision by the Imperial Government:

In accordance with the general principles of visit and search and the destruction of merchant vessels, recognized by international law, such vessels, both within and without the area declared a naval war zone, shall not be sunk without warning and without saving human lives unless the ship attempts to escape or offer resistance. [original emphasis]⁶

The German Admiralty, in particular Reinhard Scheer, understood that once their submarines were required to operate in accordance with prize law, there would be little chance of forcing Britain to capitulate due to a lack of food and fuel. This opinion was shared by his submarine commanders, including Walther Schwieger, who declared that under these conditions there would be “little chance of decisive results.” Yet, Scheer relented to the new policy and instructed his submarine fleet to redirect their unrestricted warfare operations to now target naval vessels, including transports and armed merchantmen.⁷

German officials understood, however, that in spite of this latest agreement, the United States would soon enter the war; these diplomatic threats and promises were simply a tactic to stall the inevitable. In fact, Germany was quite willing to cease her policy of unrestricted warfare against commercial shipping. The respite provided an opportunity to intensify the production of long range cruiser submarines: “the monthly rate of commissioning new boats was never so favourable as between April 1916 and January 1917, averaging ten new craft per month…. In addition, fifty-two large and eighty-nine small boats were either under construction or about to be delivered.”⁸

As U-boat activities subsided, Allied navies also became overconfident in the effectiveness of their antisubmarine capability. This was based on not fully understanding the reasons that Germany had agreed to this slackening of attacks against commercial shipping. “It was both convenient and consoling to presume that counter measures were at last proving effective. For that complacent optimism a bitter price had, a year later, to be paid.”⁹ The high price of complacency would become evident when Germany unleashed her most destructive U-boat campaign in February, 1917. Meanwhile, throughout 1916, Germany continued her diplomatic fencing with the United States.

DEUTSCHLAND AND U-155

The German submarine Deutschland, the first cargo-carrying U-boat, left Bremen on June 14, 1916. Capt. [Paul] Koenig laid his course around the north of Scotland …¹⁰

In 1916, relying on America’s neutrality for access to safe ports, the merchant submarine Deutschland made two visits to the east coast. Although these were supposed peaceful missions, America’s vulnerability to submarines was made clear when the Navy published German Submarine Activities on the Atlantic Coast of the United States and Canada in 1920.

It is likely, however, that Deutschland was on a dual mission. Germany had purchased raw materials from various sources prior to America’s entry into the war and was crossing the Atlantic to collect the merchandise. Her west-bound transit of 3800 miles was accomplished in less than three weeks, including several delays due to potentially dangerous encounters with British submarine hunters early in her transit. This first trip brought Deutschland to the port at Baltimore on July 9, where she discharged a 750-ton cargo of a million dollars worth of chemicals and dyestuffs. During her 23-day stay, Deutschland loaded 401 tons of crude rubber, 378 tons of nickel, and 90 tons of tin, valued at about $1,000,000 [1916 dollars]. The 22-day return route was 4200 miles, of which only 100 occurred while submerged. Deutschland returned to her home at Bremen, Germany on August 23.¹¹

Deutschland was in all aspects in 1916, a merchant vessel. She had no torpedo tubes and did not carry the deck guns associated with German U-boats. Her hull, however, was built along the same designs as were the heavily-armed U-boat cruisers that were creating havoc among allied merchant shipping during those first years of the war. These submarines were capable of speeds of fourteen knots on the surface and seven and one-half knots submerged, making them efficient for both commercial and military uses. With a diesel fuel-oil capacity of 240 tons, lengthy cruises of several thousand miles could be expected without refueling.

Was Deutschland’s trip to the U.S. purely commercial, or was she also testing the navigation route to America’s east coast, in anticipation of our entry on the side of Britain and her allies? Captain Koenig, commenting after his successful Atlantic crossing, was not providing any hints as to his true motives, but did complain about Britain’s restrictions on neutral shipping.

Great Britain cannot hinder boats such as ours to go and come as we please. Our trip passing Dover across the ocean was an uneventful one. When danger approached we went below the surface, and here we are, safely in an American port, ready to return in due course. I am not in a position to give you full details of our trip across the ocean, in view of our enemies…. Needless to say that we are quite unarmed and only a peaceful merchantman.¹²

The allied countries would have none of this, and in August, submitted a joint protest to the U.S. urging “neutral Governments to take effective measures [for] preventing belligerent submarine vessels, whatever the purpose to which they are put, from making use of neutral waters, roadsteads, and ports.” Their concern was that such vessels can navigate unseen and without any controls, and “that it is impossible to identify them and establish their national character, whether neutral or belligerent, combatant or non-combatant, and to remove the capacity for harm inherent in the nature of such vessels.” The allied countries were concerned that neutral ports would effectively become “a base of naval operations” for German submarines operating under the guise of a merchantman.¹³

At a time when this country was still attempting to keep pressure on Germany to restrain from their relentless submarine warfare against merchant ships, the neutral U.S. was reluctant to distinguish a commercial submarine from a warship. The official reply, sent on August 31, a week after Deutschland had returned to Germany, notified the “Governments of France, Great Britain, Russia, and Japan that so far as the treatment of either war or merchant submarines in American waters is concerned … [the United States] holds it to be the duty of the belligerent powers to distinguish between submarines of neutral and belligerent nationality …”¹⁴

Late in September, another submarine was en route from its base at Wilhelmshaven on Germany’s North Sea coast, passing north of the Shetland Islands and down the coast of Newfoundland. It would take seventeen days for this well-armed naval submarine, U-53, to reach the coast of southern New England, where she was sighted three miles east of Point Judith, Rhode Island. At 2:00 p.m. on the seventh of October, U-53, accompanied by the U.S. submarine D-3, entered Narragansett Bay and proceeded to the Naval Station at Newport. When asked about the reason for this unannounced visit, U-boat captain Hans Rose stated that the visit was simply intended “to pay his respects, that he needed no supplies or assistance, and that he proposed to go to sea at 6 o’clock.” American naval officers were invited on board for tours of the vessel and given unexpected access to the submarine’s capabilities. The German officers spoke excellent, or at least understandable, English, and politely answered the American visitors’ questions.¹⁵

As promised, U-53 was underway after remaining at the Naval Station less than three hours. The cordial nature of this brief visit ended abruptly the following day when U-53 sank two British ships less than three miles from the Nantucket Lightship.¹⁶ Later that day a Norwegian, Dutch, and another British ship fell victim, as this U-bout remained briefly on the east coast before returning to Germany by the first of November.

U-53 during a port visit at Newport, Rhode Island, October 7, 1916. (Courtesy Marist College; Lowell Thomas Archive)

After Deutschland‘s very successful commercial venture across the Atlantic in June, she set out again for America on October 10 … this time headed for New London, Connecticut, again carrying dyestuffs and chemicals. She arrived on the first of November, the same day U-53 had returned to Germany. Leaving on November 17 with a cargo of copper and 360 tons of nickel purchased from Canada in 1914, Deutschland accidentally struck and sank the American Steamship T. A. Scott, Jr. near Race Rock Light, causing her to return to New London for repairs. She finally returned to Germany on December 10.¹⁷

The following spring, Deutschland would return to sea as U-155, now fully outfitted with torpedoes and heavily armed as a long range cruiser, operating off the west coast of Spain and around the Azores. During her initial cruise, which lasted 103 days, U-155 sank eleven steamers and eight sailing vessels, including the American schooner John Twohy. In January, 1918, U-155 returned to the waters between the Azores and Spain; during her 108 days at sea, U-155 netted ten steamers and seven sailing vessels. In August, this former merchant submarine returned to America … now a predator.¹⁸

Germany’s mercantile submarine Deutschland during her visit to New London, Connecticut, November, 1916. (NHHC NH 43610)

Refitted as U-155, she returned to the east coast of America with a much different mission during the summer of 1918. (NHHC NH 111054)

By the time Deutschland visited the east coast in 1916, the ground war in Europe had raged for two years. German submarines had sunk hundreds of merchant vessels, and it was becoming increasingly obvious to all countries involved that America would soon enter the war effort. This had been a concern for the German hierarchy, and after the sinking of Sussex, had resulted in a reduction of submarine predation on commercial shipping. By the end of 1916, however, increased pressure on politicians forced Germany to relent to the wishes of the navy and acknowledge that the only winning strategy was to return to a policy of unrestricted submarine warfare on commerce. If Germany couldn’t beat the allies in the trenches, then they would starve Britain into submission. If that brought America in on the side of the allies, the war would be over before she could mobilize and begin transporting troops and materials to Europe. It was a strategic gamble.

Germany knew that sending a fleet of battleships to engage the U.S. Navy was not possible; the only alternative would be her long-range cruiser submarines operating along the east coast. Mine fields would be needed across the primary transit lanes from the strategic port of New York and along the Atlantic seaboard as far south as Chesapeake Bay and Cape Hatteras. Knowing full well that the flow of men and materials could not be stopped, Germany hoped to slow the process, forcing a starving Britain and a war-weary France into capitulating before America could become fully involved.

With two successful Atlantic crossings by Deutschland and one by U-53, U-boat commanders could expect a transit time of less than twenty days. Much of the voyage from the protection of their Heligoland base to the coast of America was beyond the reach of allied submarine hunters, already stretched to their limit protecting the British Isles, France, and the Mediterranean. In spite of the loss of Bremen, sister ship of Deutschland, probably after striking a mine, much had been learned. The crossing could be accomplished almost entirely on the surface, with only limited need to submerge if a threat was encountered. These visits in 1916 were not simply commercial or social; they were intended to test the tactical and navigational ability to bring the submarine war to America, and would be the basis for the construction of additional U-boats capable of long-range, extended-duration cruises. Admiral Reinhard Scheer:

The favorable experiences of the commercial U-Boat U-Deutschland had led to the construction of U-cruisers, of which the first series had a displacement of 1,200 tons, which was later raised to 2,000 and more…. They were fitted with two guns of 15 cm. caliber and two torpedo tubes, and could carry about 30 torpedoes in accordance with the extended period during which they could be used on cruises, cruises which reached as far as the Azores and lasted up to three months.¹⁹