Читать книгу Hybrid - Ruth Colker - Страница 20

In a 1981 decision, the South Dakota Supreme Court thought it reasonable to ask Sandra Jacobson to forego a sexual relationship with a person of the same sex. “Concerned parents,” the Court wrote, “in many, many instances have made sacrifices of varying degrees for their children.”¹ The law of sexual orientation routinely gives bisexuals the “choice” of avoiding the negative consequences of the legal system (i.e., loss of custody of children, discharge from the military, imprisonment for sexual conduct) if they will disavow their attraction to people of the same sex and flaunt their attraction to people of the opposite sex. But as one Ninth Circuit judge asked: “Would heterosexuals living in a city that passed an ordinance banning those who engaged in or desired to engage in sex with persons of the opposite sex find it easy not only to abstain from heterosexual activity but also to shift the object of their sexual desires to persons of the same sex?”² Because bisexuals find some people of both biological sexes attractive, society considers it especially appropriate to visit upon them coercion that would be unthinkable for heterosexuals.

The blatantly coercive history of sexual-orientation policies should make us wary of developing any sexual-orientation categories under the law. Yet, some categories are necessary to develop ameliorative policies. Should the definitions that are used for ameliorative purposes parallel the definitions that have been used for subordinating purposes? Is it possible for society to create privileges and benefits for the gay, lesbian and bisexual communities without perpetuating negative stereotypes about these communities? We need to consider carefully which policies we are trying to promote as we construct these new categories in order to avoid importing destructive values and policies into the gay, lesbian, and bisexual communities.