Читать книгу The Whole Duty of Man, According to the Law of Nature - Samuel Pufendorf - Страница 15
ОглавлениеOf the Duty of one Man to another, and first of doing no Injury to any Man
I. Reciprocal Duties of two Sorts.
We come now to those Duties which are to be practis’d by one Man towards another. Some of these proceed from that common Obligation which it hath pleas’d the Creator to lay upon all Men in general; others take their Original from some certain Human Institutions, or some peculiar,*adventitious or accidental State of Men. The first of these are always to be practis’d by every Man towards all Men; the latter obtain only among those who are in such peculiar Condition or State.32 Hence those may be called Absolute, and these Conditional Duties.
II. No wrong to be done. L. N. N. l. 3. c. 1.
Among those Duties we account Absolute, or those of every Man towards every Man, this has the first Place, *that one do no Wrong to the other; and this is the amplest Duty of all, comprehending all Men as such; and it is at the same time the most easy, as consisting only in an Omission of acting, unless now and then when unreasonable Desires and Lusts are to be curb’d. It is also the most necessary, because without it Human Society cannot be preserv’d. For I can live quietly with him that does me no Good, or with whom I have no manner of Correspondence, provided he doth me no Harm. Nay this is all we desire from the greatest Part of Mankind; the doing mutually good Offices lying but among a few. But I can by no means live peaceably with him that wrongs me; Nature having instilled into every Man such a tender Love of himself and what is his own, that he cannot but by all possible means repel those Men who shall make any Attempt upon one or t’other.
III. So to do a Crime.
By this Duty are fenced not only what we have by the Bounty of Nature; such as our Laws, Bodies, Limbs, Chastity, Liberty; but whatsoever by any Human Institution or Compact becomes our Property; so as by this it is forbidden to take away, spoil, damage, or withdraw, in whole or in part, from our Use, whatsoever by a lawful Title we are possess’d of. Whence all those Actions are hereby made Crimes, by which any Wrong is done to others, as Murther, Wounding, Striking, Rapine, Theft, Fraud, Violence, whether practis’d directly or indirectly, mediately or immediately, and the like.
IV. Reparation of Wrong a necessary Consequence from thence.
Farther, hence it follows, That if any Harm or Damage be done to another, he who is truly chargeable as Author of the Wrong, ought, as far as in him lies, to make Reparation: For otherwise the Precept would be to no purpose, That no Man shall be hurt nor receive damage; if when he has actually sustain’d a Mischief, he must put it up quietly, and he who did the Injury shall enjoy securely the Fruit of his Violence without Reparation. And setting aside this Necessity of Restitution, the Pravity of Man’s Nature is such, that they would never forbear injuring one another, and it would be very hard for him who has suffered Wrong, to compose his Mind so as to live peaceably with the other, till Reparation were made.
V. Damage how to be accounted. L. N. N. l. 3. c. 1. §3.
Tho’ the Word Damage may seem properly to belong to Loss in Goods, yet we take it here in the large Sense, that it may signifie all Manner of Harm, spoiling, diminishing, or taking away what is already ours, or intercepting that which by an absolute Right we ought to have, whether it be bestowed upon us by Nature, or given us by Man and Human Laws; or lastly, the Omission or Denial of paying what by a perfect Obligation is due to us. But if such Payment only be stopt, as was not due by any perfect Obligation, it is not looked upon as a Damage that ought to be made good: For it would be unmeet to account it a Wrong suffered if I receive not such Stipends; and unreasonable for me to demand as my Right, what I cannot expect from another but under the name of a Free Gift, and which I can by no means call my own, till after I have received it.
VI. Damage in expectations.
Under the Head of Damage liable to Reparation, we must also comprise not only a Mischief, Loss or Interception of what is ours or due to us; but also such Profits as do naturally accrue from the Thing, or have already accrued, or may fairly be expected, if it was the Right of the Owner to receive them; allowing still the Expenses necessary for gathering in such Profits. Now the Value of Profits, thus in Expectation only, is to be high or low, according as they are certain or uncertain, and will be sooner or later received. And lastly, that also is to be called Damage, which upon a Hurt given, does of Natural Necessity follow thereon.
VII. Damage mediately or immediately done. L. N. N. l. 3. c. 1. §4.
One Man may damnifie33 another not only immediately or by himself, but also by others: And it may happen that a Damage immediately done by one Man may be chargeable upon another, because he contributed somewhat to the Action, either by doing what he ought not, or not doing what he ought to have done. Sometimes among several Persons who concurred to the same Fact one is to be accounted the Principal, others but Accessories; sometimes they may all be equally Parties. Concerning whom it is to be observed, that they are so far obliged to repair the Wrong as they were indeed the Causes thereof, and by so much as they contributed to doing All or Part of the Damage. But where any one did not actually assist in the Trespass committed; nor was antecedently a Cause of its being done, nor had any Advantage by it; there, though upon Occasion of the Injury done, he may be blame worthy, yet he cannot be any ways obliged to Restitution: And of this Sort are such as rejoyce at their Neighbour’s Misfortunes, such as commend the Commission of Outrages, or are ready to excuse them, who wish or favour the Practice of them, or who flatter the Actors therein.
VIII. Damage done by many. L. N. N. l. 3. c. 1. §5.
Where many have joined in an Action from whence Damage has come, he in the first place shall be chargeable with Reparation, by whose Command or powerful Influence the others were put upon the Action; and he who immediately perpetrates the Thing, to which he could not decline his helping Hand, shall be esteemed but only as the Instrument. He who without any constraint concerned himself in the Enterprize shall be chiefly liable, and then the rest who assisted in it. But this so, as that if Restitution be made by the former, then the latter are cleared, (which in Penal Cases is otherwise.) If many in Combination have committed an Injury, all are obliged for each one single, and each one single is obliged for all; so as that if all are seized, they must each pay their Shares to make good the Loss; and if all escape but one, he shall be obliged to pay for all; but where some amongst them are insolvent, those who are able must pay the Whole. If many, not in Combination, concur to the same Thing, and it can plainly be discerned how much each of them contributed to the doing of the Mischief; each shall only be accountable for so much as himself was the Cause of. But if one shall pay the whole, they are all discharged for the same.
IX. Damage by Negligence. L. N. N. l. 3. c. 1. §6.
Not only he who out of an evil Design does wrong to another, is bound to Reparation of the Damage, but he who does so thro’ Negligence or Miscarriage, which he might easily have avoided. For it is no inconsiderable Part of social Duty,34 to manage our Conversation with such Caution and Prudence, that it does not become mischievous and intolerable to others; in order to which, Men under some Circumstances and Relations, are obliged to more exact and watchful diligence: The slightest Default in this point is sufficient to impose the Necessity of Reparation; unless the Fault lay rather more in him who was harmed, than in him who did it; or unless some great Perturbation of Mind, or some Circumstance in the Matter, would not allow the most deliberate Circumspection; *as, when a Soldier in the Heat of Battle in handling his Arms shall hurt his Comrade.
X. Damage by Chance.
But he who by meer Chance, without any Fault of his own, shall do Harm to another, is not obliged to Reparation. Because nothing in this Case being done which can be chargeable upon him, †there is no Reason, why he who unwillingly did a Mischief should rather suffer, than he to whom it was done.
XI. Damage by a Vassal.
It is also agreeable to Natural Equity, if my Vassal, though not by my Desire, do Wrong to another, that either I make it good, or surrender him to the Party injured. For ’tis true, this Vassal is naturally obliged to Reparation; but he not having wherewith, and his Body being the Property of his Patron, it is but just that such Patron either repair the Loss sustained, or deliver him up. Otherwise such a Bond-man would be at liberty to do what Mischief he listed, if Amends cannot be had from him, because he is the Owner of nothing, no not of the Body he bears; nor from his Patron. For, let him beat the Slave never so severely, or punish him with the closest imprisonment, that gives no Restitution to the Person wronged.
XII. Damage by Cattle.
The same seems to be just in the Case of our Cattle or any living Creature we keep, that, when they against our Wills and by a Motion of their own, contrary to their Natures, do a Mischief to another, we either make Reparation, or give up the same. For if I am hurt by any Animal that lives in its Natural Liberty, I have a Right, by what means I can, to give my self Satisfaction by taking or by killing it; and this Right doubtless cannot be taken away by its being in the Possession of another. And whereas the Owner of this Animal makes some Gain by it, but I have suffered Loss by the same; and whereas the Reparation of Wrong is more to be favoured than procuring Gain; it appears that I may with reason demand Satisfaction from the Owner, or if the Animal be not worth so much, then that it at least be delivered to me on Account of the Damage sustained.
XIII. Recapitulation.
Thus then, he who without any evil Intention does an Injury to another, ought of his own accord to offer Reparation, and to protest himself to have done it unwillingly, lest the injured Person take him for his Enemy, and endeavour to retaliate the Mischief. But he, who with a naughty design shall wrong his Neighbour, is not only bound to offer Reparation, but to declare his Repentance for the Fact and to beg Pardon. On the other side, the wronged Party having Satisfaction made him, is obliged, upon the Repentance of the other, and at his Request, to grant him Pardon. For he that will not be content when Reparation is made him, and a fit Submission offered, but still seeks to revenge himself by Force, does nothing else but gratifie his own ill Nature, and so disturbs the common Peace of Men without cause. And upon that account Revenge is by the Law of Nature condemned, as proposing no other End, than doing Mischief to those who have hurt us, and pleasing our selves in their Sufferings. Moreover, there is great Reason that Men should be the more apt to pardon each others Offences, upon a consideration how often themselves transgress the Laws of God, and have therefore daily so much need of begging Forgiveness of Him. [Not still but that the Publick may inflict a Punishment on the Aggressor, tho’ he have given satisfaction to the Private Man, if the Act was Criminal, and in its Nature Evil.]
The Natural Equality of Men to be acknowledged
I. Equality of Mankind.
L. N. N. l. 3. c. 2. §1.
Man is a Creature not only most sollicitous for the Preservation of Himself; but has of Himself also so nice an Estimation and Value, that to diminish any thing thereof does frequently move in him as great Indignation, as if a Mischief were done to his Body or Estate. Nay, there seems to him to be somewhat of Dignity in the Appellation of Man: so that the last and most efficacious Argument to curb the Arrogance of insulting Men, is usually, I am not a Dog, but a Man as well as your self. Since then Human Nature is the same in us all, and since no Man will or can cheerfully join in Society with any, by whom he is not at least to be esteemed equally as a Man and as a Partaker of the same Common Nature: It follows that, among those Duties which Men owe to each other, this obtains the second Place, That every Man esteem and treat another, as naturally equal to himself, or as one who is a Man as well as he.
II. Wherein this Equality consists. L. N. N. l. 3. c. 2. §2.
Now this Equality of Mankind does not alone consist in this, that Men of ripe Age have almost the same Strength, or if one be weaker, he may be able to kill the stronger, either by Treachery, or Dexterity, or by being better furnished with Weapons; but in this, that though Nature may have accomplished one Man beyond another with various Endowments of Body and Mind; yet nevertheless he is obliged to an Observation of the Precepts of the Law Natural towards the meaner Person, after the same manner as himself expects the same from others; and has not therefore any greater Liberty given him to insult upon his Fellows.35 As on the other side the Niggardliness of Nature or Fortune cannot of themselves set any Man so low, as that he shall be in worse Condition, as to the Enjoyment of Common Right,36 than others. But what one Man may rightfully demand or expect from another, the same is due to others also (Circumstances being alike) from him; and whatsoever one shall deem reasonable to be done by others, the like it is most just he practise himself: For the Obligation of maintaining Sociality among Mankind equally binds every Man; neither may one Man more than another violate the Law of Nature in any part. Not but that there are other popular Reasons which illustrate this Equality; to wit, that we are all descended of the same Stock; that we are all born, nourished, and die after the same Manner; and that God has not given any of us a certain Assurance that our happy Condition in the World shall not at one time or other be changed. Besides, the Precepts of the Christian Religion tell us that God favours not Man for his Nobility, Power, or Wealth, but for sincere Piety, which may as well be found in a mean and humble Man, as in those of high degree.
III. This Equality should make us benevolent, courteous and complaisant to each other. L. N. N. l. 3. c. 2. §4.
Now from this Equality it follows, That he who would use the Assistance of others in promoting his own Advantage, ought to be as free and ready to use his Power and Abilities for their Service, when they want his Help and Assistance on the like occasions. For he who requires that other Men should do him Kindnesses, and expects himself to be free from doing the like, must be of opinion that those other Men are below himself and not his Equals. Hence as those Persons are the best Members of a Community, who without any difficulty allow the same things to their Neighbour that themselves require of him; so those are altogether uncapable of Society, who setting a high Rate on themselves in regard to others, will take upon them to act any thing towards their Neighbour, and expect greater Deference and more Respect than the Rest of Mankind; in this insolent manner demanding a greater portion unto themselves in those things, to which all Men having a common Right, they can in reason claim no larger a Share than other Men: Whence this also is an universal Duty of the Law Natural, That no Man, who has not a peculiar Right, ought to arrogate more to himself, than he is ready to allow to his Fellows, but that he permit other Men to enjoy Equal Privileges with himself.
IV. It ought to make us observe exact Justice in distributing to each his own. L. N. N. l. 3. c. 2. §5.
The same Equality also shews what every Man’s behaviour ought to be, when his business is to distribute Justice37 among others; to wit, that he treat them as Equals, and indulge not that, unless the Merits of the Cause require it, to one, which he denies to another. For if he do otherwise, he who is discountenanced is at the same time affronted and wronged, and loses somewhat of the Dignity which Nature bestowed upon him. Whence it follows, that Things which are in common, are of right to be divided by equal Parts among those who are equal: Where the Thing will not admit of Division, they who are equally concerned, are to use it indifferently; and, if the Quantity of the Thing will bear it, as much as each Party shall think fit: But if this cannot be allowed, then it is to be used after a stated manner, and proportionate to the Number of the Claimants; because ’tis not possible to find out any other Way of observing Equality. But if it be a Thing of that nature as not to be capable of being divided, nor of being possest in common, then it must be used by turns; and if this yet will not answer the point, and it is not possible the rest should be satisfied by an Equivalent, the best Way must be to determin Possession by Lot; for in such Cases no fitter Method can be thought on, to remove all Opinion of Partiality and Contempt of any Party, without debasing the Person whom Fortune does not favour.
V. This Equality a sufficient Remedy against Pride. L. N. N. l. 3. c. 2. §6.
The Consideration of this Natural Equality among Men, ought to take from us all Pride; a Vice that consists herein, When a Man, without any Reason, or, without sufficient Reason, prefers himself to others, behaving himself contemptuously and haughtily towards them, as being in his Esteem base Underlings, unworthy of his Consideration or Regard. We say, without any Reason. For where a Man is regularly possest of some Right, which gives him a Preference to other Men; he may lawfully make use of, and assert the same, so it be without vain Ostentation and the Contempt of others; as on the contrary every one is with good reason to yield that Respect and Honour which is due to another. But for the Rest, true Generosity has always for its Companion a decorous Humility, which arises from a Reflection on the Infirmity of our Nature, and the Faults, of which our selves either have been, or may hereafter be guilty, which are not less heinous than those which may be committed by other Men. The Inference we ought to make from hence is, that we do not over-value our selves with regard to others, considering that they equally with us are endowed with a free Use of their Understanding, which they are also capable of managing to as good Purpose; the regular Use whereof is that alone which a Man can call his own, and upon which the true Value of Himself depends. But for a Man, without any Reason, to set a high esteem upon himself, is a most ridiculous Vice; first, because ’tis in it self silly, for a Man to carry it high for nothing at all; and then, because I must suppose all other Men to be Coxcombs, if I expect from them a great Regard, when I deserve none.
VI. And against rude unmannerly and contemptuous Behaviour. L. N. N. 1. 3. c. 3. §7.
The Violation of this Duty is yet carried farther, if a Man shew his Contempt of another by outward Signs, Actions, Words, Looks, or any other abusive way. And this Fault is therefore the more grievous, because it easily excites the Spirits of Men to Anger and Revenge: So that there are many who will rather venture their Lives upon the spot, much more will they break the Publick Peace, than put up an Affront of that nature; accounting that hereby their Honour is wounded, and a Slur is put upon their Reputation, in the untainted Preservation of which consists all their Self-satisfaction and Pleasure of Mind.
Of the mutual Duties of Humanity
I. Doing good to others. L. N. N. l. 3. c. 3.
Among the Duties of one Man towards another, which must be practis’d for the sake of Common Society, we put in the third place this, That every Man ought to promote the Good of another, as far as conveniently he may. For all Mankind being by Nature made, as it were, akin to each other; such a Relation requires more than barely abstaining from offering Injury and doing Despight to others. It is not therefore sufficient that we neither hurt nor despise our Fellows, but we ought also to do such good Offices to others, or mutually to communicate the same, as that common brotherly Love may be kept up among Men. Now we become beneficial to our Neighbour, either indefinitely or definitely; and that either parting with something or nothing our selves.
II. Benefactors of the first Sort. L. N. N. l. 3. c. 3. §2.
That Man indefinitely promotes the Good of others, who takes such necessary care of his Mind and Body, that he may be able to perform such Actions as may be profitable to his Neighbour; or who by the Acuteness of his Wit finds out something that may be of Advantage to Mankind. So that those are to be accounted guilty of a Breach of this Duty, who betaking themselves to no honest Calling spend their Lives in Sloth, as if their Souls were given them but to serve as Salt to keep their Bodies from stinking, or as if they were born but to make up a Number, and eat their Share: And such as, being content with the Estates their Ancestors have left ’em, think they may give themselves up to Idleness without blame, because they have whereon to live by the Industry of others: And those who alone enjoy what they have got, not bestowing any Part upon others: Finally, all those who, like Hogs, do Good to no one till they die; and all that Sort of Wretches who only serve to load the Earth with their useless Weight.
III. Such deserve Honour as make themselves useful to the Publick. L. N. N. l. 3. c. 3. §3.
On the other side, to those who make it their Business to deserve well of Mankind, the Rest of the World owe thus much, that they don’t envy ’em, nor lay any Rubs in their way, while by their noble Actions they seek the Universal Good: And if there be no Possibility for themselves to imitate ’em, they at least ought to pay a Regard to their Memory and promote their Honour, which perhaps is all they shall get by their Labours.
IV. Good done to others without any charge or cost to the Benefactor.
Now not to do readily all that Good to others which we can do without Detriment, Labour, or Trouble to our selves, is to be accounted detestable Villany and Inhumanity. The following are wont to be called Benefits which cost nothing, or which are of Advantage to the Receiver, without being a Charge to the Bestower. Such as, to allow the Use of the running Water; the letting another light his Fire by mine; the giving honest Advice to him that consults me; the friendly Directing a wandring Man to the right Way, and the like. So, if a Man have a mind to quit the Possession of a Thing, either because he has too much, or because the keeping of it becomes troublesome, why should he not rather leave it fit for Use to others, (provided they are not Enemies) than to mar or destroy it? Hence it is a Sin for us to spoil Victuals, because our Hunger is satisfied; or to stop up, or cover a Spring, because we have quenched our Thirst, or to destroy Buoys set up to discover Shelves and Sands, or *Mercuries in Roads, when our selves have made use of them. Under this Head may be comprehended also the little Alms bestow’d by the Wealthy upon those who are in Want; and that Kindness which we justly shew to Travellers, especially if under Necessities, †and the like.
V. Good done to others with an Expence to the Benefactor. L. N. N. l. 3. c. 3. §15.
But it is a higher Degree of Humanity, out of a singular Favour to do a good Turn freely, which costs either Charge or Pains, that so another may either have his Necessities relieved, or acquire some considerable Advantage. And these, by way of Excellence, are called Benefits, and are the fittest Matter for rendring Men Illustrious, if rightly tempered with Prudence and Magnanimity. The Dispensation of which, and the Manner, are to be regulated according to the Condition of the Giver and Receiver. Wherein Care is first of all to be taken; 1. That the Bounty we are about to exercise do not more Hurt than Good to the Person to whom we design a Kindness, and to others: Next, 2. That our Bounty be not greater than consists with our Ability: Then, 3. That the Worthiness of Men be regarded in our Distribution, and Preference given to the Well-deserving. We must therefore consider how far each stands in need of our Help, and observe the Degrees of Relation among Men; moreover, ’tis to be observ’d what every one wants most, and what they can or cannot compass with or without our Assistance.‡The Manner also of exercising Acts of Kindness will render them more acceptable, if they be done chearfully, readily, and heartily.
VI. Gratitude. L. N. N. l. 3. c. 3. §6.
And then he who receives a Benefit ought to have a grateful Mind, by which he is to make it manifest, that it was acceptable to him, and that for its sake he has a hearty Respect to the Donor, and that he wants nothing but an Opportunity or an Ability of making, if possible, a Requital of the full value or more. For it is not absolutely necessary that the Returns we make be exactly tantamount to the Courtesy we receive, but our Good-will and hearty Endeavour are in lieu to be accepted. Not but that sometimes he who pretends to have done me a Kindness, may, notwithstanding, have no Reason to say, he has obliged me thereby; as if a Man shall drag me out of the Water, into which he pushed me before; in such a Case I owe him no thanks.
VII. Thanks.
Now by how much the more Benefits are apt to oblige and place Engagements on the Minds of Men, by so much ought the Party who is beholden to be the more eager to return his Thanks. If it be but because we ought not to suffer our Benefactor, who out of a good Opinion he had of us has done us a Kindness, to think worse of us; and because we should not receive any Favour, but with a Design to endeavour, that the Giver shall never have Cause to repent of what he has done for us. For, if for any particular Reason we are not willing to be beholden to such or such a Man, we may civilly avoid the Accepting of the Courtesy. And truly if no grateful Returns were to be made upon the Receipt of Benefits, it would be unreasonable for any Man to cast away what he has, and to do a good Turn where beforehand he is sure it will be slighted. By which means all Beneficence, Good-Will, and Brotherly-Love would be lost among Men; and there would be no such things as doing Kindnesses frankly, nor any Opportunities of procuring mutual Friendships, left in the World.
VIII. Ingratitude. L. N. N. l. 3. c. 3. §17.
And though the ungrateful Man, cannot be precisely said to do a Wrong; yet the Charge of Ingratitude is look’d upon as more base, more odious, and detestable than that of Injustice; because ’tis judged a Sign of an abject and rascally Soul for a Man to shew himself unworthy of the good Opinion, which another had entertain’d of his Probity, and not to be mov’d to some Sense of Humanity by Benefits, which have a Power to tame even the Brutes. But, let Ingratitude be never so abominable, yet simply considered as it is a bare Forgetting of a Courtesy, and a Neglect of making a due Return upon occasion, Courts of Judicature take no cognizance of it; for it would lose the Name of Bounty, if it were redemandable by Law, as Money lent is; because then it would be a Credit. And whereas it is a high Instance of Generosity to be grateful, it would cease to be a generous Action, when so to do could not be avoided. Beside that it would take up the Business of all Courts, by reason of the great Difficulty in making an Estimate of all the Circumstances, which either would enhance or lessen the Benefit: And that it was to this End I bestow’d it, (to wit, that I did not therefore demand a Promise of Repayment,) that so the other might have an Occasion of shewing his Gratitude, not for Fear of Punishment, but out of Love to Honesty; and to manifest, that it was not in Hopes of Gain, but only out of mere Kindness that I was liberal of that, which I would not take care should be reimburs’d to me. But for him who improves his Ingratitude, and not only gives no thanks to, but injures his Benefactor; *
