Читать книгу The Irish Civil War - Seán Enright - Страница 11

CHAPTER 2

A State in Chaos

‘We have no army, we have only an armed mob,’ said Michael Collins, speaking just after the siege of the Four Courts.1 Dozens of republican prisoners captured at the Four Courts had been allowed to escape from Portobello barracks by National Army men assigned to guard them. The doors of the holding area were left open and prisoners just swarmed over the barracks’ walls and disappeared into the night.

Lack of discipline in the National Army had become a major issue; desertion and drunkenness were rife.2 Some units were well run, but in many battalions officers went drinking with their men, making control of troops all but impossible. In Limerick, there were reports of sentries falling drunk at their posts and in Clonmel soldiers potted birds with handguns and leered intimidatingly at passersby on street corners. In the months that followed, National Army soldiers would commit an astonishing number of criminal offences unrelated to the war.3

The cause of it all was that the National Army had been created in a tearing hurry. In the spring, the Irish Republican Army had parted company with the provisional government over the Treaty and this brought with it the first hint of civil war. To guard against this threat, the provisional government had created the National Army and many less than savoury men were recruited in the rush. ‘We have put guns in the hands of criminals,’ admitted Collins. Many other recruits had come from the British Army which was downsizing. Soldiers, demobbed in England, were brought over on the ferry and collected in lorries to be taken to Beggars Bush barracks and signed up.4 In the summer of 1922, the National Army was still taking shape: ill-disciplined and short of guns, ammunition, uniforms, boots and bedding. Poor diet and late pay fuelled discontent out in the west.5

Lack of uniforms, boots and ammunition hampered operations against the anti-Treaty faction. In County Leitrim, dissatisfaction about pay and supplies led to a collapse of morale and the surrender of an army barracks.6 At Riverstown in Sligo, dozens of National Army soldiers surrendered to a small anti-Treaty force. The defenders of the garrison were not inclined to fight ‘for those who do not care for us’.7 Discipline was one issue and divided loyalties were another: in Mayo and Cork National Army soldiers sold guns or just gave them over to anti-Treaty men. In Limerick, many soldiers ‘handed over arms wholesale to the enemy’.8 In Kerry, soldiers sold ammunition to anti-Treaty fighters: the going rate for a full bandolier was 12s/6d.

The critical point that Collins had recognised was that he could not create an army without a legal process to impose discipline by court martial.9 He hurriedly convened a meeting with a small group of men. One was a young lawyer, Cahir Davitt, son of the land leaguer. Davitt was then just 28 years old; he had established his ability by serving as a judge of the Dáil courts during the War of Independence. Also present was Gearoid O’Sullivan the adjutant general, who had been Collins’ right-hand man for some years.

Collins asked Davitt to become the first judge advocate general of the National Army to run the army legal department and oversee courts martial. ‘Get into uniform as soon as possible,’ said Collins. Davitt agreed to take the post and was given a small office at Portobello barracks.10 Realising he knew nothing whatsoever about military law, he went out and bought a copy of the British Army Manual of Military Law and began to read up with a view to creating a legal service from scratch. The military court system that he brought into being would soon be utilised to try anti-Treaty prisoners captured in arms.

There were more immediate pressing problems for the embryonic legal service. Out in the west the National Army had been carrying out policing functions and occasionally trying civilians and Cahir Davitt began to review their efforts. The first case involved a man who had stolen a pair of trousers. Had the trousers belonged to a common soldier it might have rested there, but the owner was a National Army colonel. The prisoner had been tried and sentenced to three years and twelve strokes of the ‘cat’ to be administered every three months. Davitt went off to see the adjutant general to point out the obvious: the army had no power to try civilians and the barbaric sentence was not a punishment known to law. It was a small victory for due process: the prisoner was released.

One Dublin case concerned an anti-Treaty spy. Suspicion arose that one of the civilian staff at National Army headquarters was passing information to the anti-Treaty forces and officers began to keep watch on James McGuinness from Offaly who had a brother fighting on the other side.11 McGuinness was given access to a confidential file and followed that night to a pub where he met his contact. Both were arrested and notes from the file were recovered from his contact who turned out to be an anti-Treaty intelligence officer. McGuinness was taken to Wellington barracks and got a beating from which he never fully recovered. As he rested up in hospital, he learned that he had more serious difficulties to face. An order was made for his trial by court martial and the sentence on conviction was death. An acrimonious argument followed between Davitt and O’Sullivan. Davitt, the new JAG, questioned the legality of what was taking place. O’Sullivan, the adjutant general, simply maintained the man was a spy and had to be shot.

Only a year earlier, before the Truce with Britain, the IRA had routinely court-martialled suspected spies. These were often hurried night-time affairs and the result was very often inevitable. The habits of the revolution were ingrained. The trial of James McGuinness went ahead and he was convicted and sentenced to death by firing squad. Davitt intervened again and pointed out that if the man were executed, then after the conflict was over, they might all face a murder charge. In this, he was speaking no more than the literal truth. The trial was not lawful and obeying orders would be no defence to a murder charge: the law was beyond doubt. O’Sullivan relented a shade: the sentence was commuted to life and the prisoner stayed inside until after the war.

This situation had come about because the country lacked a coherent justice system or even a police force worth the name. In the spring, the Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC) had been disbanded. The bulk of the British Army marched out and with them went the Black and Tans and the Auxiliaries. Dublin was still policed by the Dublin Metropolitan Police – a legacy of the outgoing British regime.

The new police force, the Civic Guard, was still undergoing training, which had become a turbulent process. One night Dublin city centre echoed to the sound of ‘terrific volleys’ and a government minister, fearing the worst, asked an old man what the firing was about. ‘It’s them Civic Guards,’ said the old man. ‘They were paid last night.’12 In the summer, the Civic Guard rebelled and chased their commanders out of camp and later handed over lorry loads of guns and ammunition to the anti-Treaty faction. In the weeks that followed, the Guards were disbanded and the process of starting a police force was begun again.

In the provinces, law and order of a sort was maintained by the two opposing armies that were already beginning to fight. The country was riven by crime – land grabs, stock driving and gun-point robbery for personal gain – often on the pretext of defending the Republic. There were also shootings of ex-RIC men, attacks on the homes of Unionists and murder of a more domestic hue.13

The justice system was more problematic because there were now two competing court structures. In Dublin, the courts established under British rule was still functioning but so also were the Dáil courts. Out in the provinces, the only remnant of the British justice system was the coroner’s jury. The remainder of the justice system had been substantially supplanted by the Dáil courts. This dual system was unsustainable and it all came to a head when the Four Courts siege was broken by an artillery bombardment by the National Army. One of the republican prisoners captured was George Plunkett, whose father, Count Plunkett brought an application for a writ of habeas corpus before a Dáil court. Judge Diarmuid Crowley issued the writ after hearing legal argument.14 The writ required the release of George Plunkett and if taken to a logical conclusion, all the hundreds of republican prisoners. Unsurprisingly, the prison governor declined to obey the writ and passed it to the National Army headquarters at Portobello. The status quo had changed very suddenly and the provisional government ordered Crowley’s arrest. Judge Crowley was picked up late at night by an army officer, ‘one of the intelligence crowd’. He was held at Wellington barracks and his abiding memory was the brutal interrogation of an anti-Treaty prisoner in the adjoining cell and the sound of mock executions.15 Crowley got out some weeks later but only after an intervention by Cahir Davitt.

The provisional government’s formal response to the habeas corpus writ was even more robust. They retained the British justice system in Dublin and abolished with immediate effect all the Dáil courts except for the parish and district courts in the provinces.16 Two more momentous events took place that summer. Arthur Griffith, president of the provisional government died suddenly. His health had been on the wane for some months and his death was keenly felt, but he was hardly a war leader and so the loss was managed. Twelve days later, Michael Collins was killed in an ambush and this was a critical event.17

Collins’ body was brought up by sea to Dublin’s North Wall, arriving long after midnight. In the darkness, the cabinet of the provisional government and many others stood in silence as the coffin was brought onto the quayside and loaded onto a horse-drawn carriage. The cortege crossed the city with just the sound of a piper, the rattle of the gun carriage and murmured prayers for the dead. A procession of ministers, soldiers and many others followed. The funeral took place later that week: huge silent crowds lined the streets for 6 miles on the road to Glasnevin cemetery. Collins had been the last pro-Treaty leader who had both the inclination and the ability to forge a peace.

After the deaths of Griffith and Collins, William Cosgrave emerged as the new head of the provisional government. A quietly spoken man of slight figure with a silvery blond quiff, he was a grocer by trade although he had an incongruous fondness for a top hat. Many of the anti-Treaty faction reckoned that Cosgrave had not the mettle for the coming fight. He had last handled a gun at the South Dublin Union in 1916 and afterwards made his reputation as minister for local government, but as a leader he did not initially inspire many on his own side. This new government teetered as the war intensified. The threat of assassination was very real and the inner core of the government camped out in offices on Upper Merrion Street with a heavy guard. Some slept on mattresses that were rolled up each morning so that the business of government could begin.

There was much more to all this than fighting the war: the public sector pay bill had to be met, schools needed to run, hospitals had to remain open, the post had to be delivered. They were running a small country without allies in the North or in Britain.18 That summer and autumn one crisis followed another: the Four Courts siege, the death of two great leaders and a prison hunger strike – the prisoners were told they would be buried in unmarked graves. A postal workers’ strike was beaten off and also a long-running industrial action by railwaymen. There were other pressing political issues to be dealt with. Not least bringing in a new constitution consistent with the terms of the Anglo-Irish Treaty and therefore acceptable to the British government but palatable to the Irish electorate. It was a heavy burden.19 Not all of the ministers were weighed down by responsibility. Eoin MacNeill was writing what would become his most famous monograph on ancient Irish legal history: Franchise or Law. A big man with gold spectacles and a heavy grey beard, buried in Brehon law tracts, he occasionally waved away requests to go down to his office.

In the long evenings, ministers and their wives gathered in the main lounge, but the women became a source of friction and they were soon evicted while the men smoked, talked, read newspapers or played endless games of bridge that MacNeill often won. The only senior figure absent was Mulcahy, the new commander in chief. Mulcahy kept long hours at GHQ Portobello and spent the rest of the time at his home next door and did not often attend cabinet meetings. Kevin O’Higgins distrusted the army and also General Mulcahy in equal measure. O’Higgins was right about the National Army – it was malleable, riven by cliques and honeycombed with IRB members who were now without their leader (Collins). O’Higgins’ suspicions of General Mulcahy would prove to be entirely misplaced: the general, dark, wiry and a little intense, was driven by his work and, for the time being, was oblivious to the suspicions of his colleague.

It was still the war that dominated events. The casualties in the fighting grew on both sides and the National Army lost some of their best men – shot down in ambush or occasionally shot in the street or leaving church.20 In the streets of Dublin, anti-Treaty fighters threw grenades and planted mines with a singular lack of regard for civilian casualties. In the face of all this, the government began to formulate the execution policy and while this was developing a new trend became apparent. There began a covert campaign of kidnap and murder of men suspected or believed to be involved in the anti-Treaty cause. A review of inquests in the Dublin area alone shows that during the civil war thirteen suspected anti-Treaty men were kidnapped from their homes or workplaces and shot dead.21 There were ten other cases where the evidence showed that prisoners were shot after surrender or while in custody.22 These killings, never publicly disavowed by any government minister until the war was all but won, became part of the process by which victory was achieved.

One of the responses by the anti-Treaty side was a concerted legal challenge to the killing of prisoners. This could not be effected through the Dáil as it had been adjourned and when it finally reconvened it was boycotted by the anti-Treaty deputies. The press was heavily censored and so the focus of the challenge became the inquest system, which began with the inquest into the death of Cathal Brugha who was shot down at the end of the Four Courts siege. He had already surrendered some said, but the coroner declined to allow witnesses to be brought to court.23 A few weeks later, Harry Boland, another anti-Treaty deputy was killed.24 Here again, the coroner refused to allow evidence to be called to show Boland had been killed after capture.

A series of inquests into the deaths of anti-Treaty fighters killed in custody followed. Usually there was no one left to tell the tale to the inquest jury, but in a handful of cases there was evidence of state involvement. The Yellow Lanes affair concerned the kidnap and shooting of two unarmed youths in broad daylight. One of the killers wore a National Army uniform and the case caused profound embarrassment to the government. Another inquest concerned Patrick Mannion who was shot dead near Mount Street Bridge by a National Army patrol, but the evidence at the inquest showed that he was unarmed and in custody when he was shot. The jury returned a verdict of ‘wilful murder by National Army soldiers’.25 Journalists had their notebooks confiscated by plain-clothes men after the hearing and The Irish Times published a short report recording the verdict of ‘wilful murder by men in uniform’ and said little else.

In response to a letter of protest written by Count Plunkett, The Irish Times conceded the report had been ‘summarised by order of the government censor’.26 President Cosgrave told the Dáil the next day that the censor had intervened because the evidence was untrue and there the matter rested. What was done in Dublin was more easily done in isolated districts. Anti-Treaty prisoners in the custody of the National Army became particularly vulnerable. Three prisoners were killed in Kerry, six in Sligo, three in Cork and one each in Limerick, Tipperary and Mayo.27 It is likely that there were many more, but usually there was no one left to recount what took place apart from the national soldiers who had fired the fatal shots.

One prisoner was Tim Kennefick from Coachford.28 He was one of the many anti-Treaty fighters captured in early September as the National Army swarmed around Cork. The inquest jury viewed the body in the usual way and heard evidence that Kennefick was captured, badly beaten, shot in the head and dumped in a ditch. The inquest jury returned a verdict of ‘wilful murder by National Army troops’. This cut no ice with the government. In the Dáil, General Mulcahy stated that ‘the inquest was held under the auspices of Irregulars armed to the teeth, and before a jury that was apparently selected by Irregulars’. He announced that ‘no action has been taken to bring the so-called guilty troops to justice’.29 The local commander, Major General Dalton, issued a proclamation in Cork prohibiting further inquests without written permission.30

Another prisoner killed in custody was Jerry Buckley after an ambush on the road from Macroom to Kerry. A National Army convoy stopped to defuse the landmine in the road and thought they had made it safe, but this was a ‘trip mine’ and the detonation mortally wounded Commandant Tom Keogh and killed six of his men.31 Tom Keogh had been a long-time member of Collins’ Squad during the War of Independence. In the aftermath of the explosion, a group of Dublin officers also from Collins’ old Squad went looking for revenge. There had been extensive fighting around Macroom that day, but only a single man had been captured: 41-year-old Jerry Buckley, a no-rank prisoner.32 Buckley was seized, shot and tossed into the crater made by the explosion.

The local National Army commander wrote to General Emmet Dalton at HQ: ‘The shooting of a prisoner here in the operations has caused considerable contempt among the garrison here … They have paraded before me and gave me to understand that they would not go out on the hills anymore.’ The incident, he told his commander, had resonated for fifteen miles in every direction and brought the National Army into disrepute with local people. Dalton wrote to Commander in Chief Mulcahy about the killing:

This shooting was the work of the Squad. Now I personally approve of the action, but the men I have in my command are of such a temperament that they can look at seven of their companions being blown to atoms by a murderous trick without feeling annoyed, but an enemy is found with a rifle and ammn. They will mutiny if he is shot. On this account I think it would be better if you kept the ‘squad’ out of my area.

It may be taken that General Mulcahy understood all of the nuances; he did not ask questions but replied: ‘You are at perfect liberty to return here any officer you think well of so returning …’33 Afterwards, Dalton returned all the officers responsible to Dublin.34 No questions were asked by General Mulcahy about the identity of the killers or the steps taken to enforce discipline within the National Army.

That same week another letter arrived at National Army headquarters, sent by David Robinson, then a staff officer on the anti-Treaty side.35 Robinson, from Wicklow, was an ex-British Army tank officer who had been much decorated during the Great War where he had lost an eye and almost his legs. Tall and lanky, ‘Dead Eye’ had taken part in the War of Independence and went with the anti-Treaty side after the split. He was still hanging onto an old-fashioned sense of decency and expecting others to do the same. He wrote to his counterpart in the National Army headquarters asking him to raise the question of the killing of prisoners: ‘I cannot believe that Mulcahy would tolerate it for a moment.’36 Robinson also raised a concern about another prisoner, ‘a boy called Murphy’, who had been killed after capture.

The ‘boy called Murphy’ was 17-year-old Bartholemew Murphy from Castleisland. The National Army later maintained that Murphy had been a prisoner on an army lorry and was fatally wounded in an anti-Treaty ambush at Brennan’s Glen. He was in fact a prisoner of the National Army at their makeshift barracks at the Great Southern Hotel in Killarney where he had been in custody for some days and had been used to clear barricades laid in the road. The day of his death there was an ambush at Brennan’s Glen where a Dublin Guard convoy lost three men. Afterwards, there was a commotion at the barracks and Murphy was picked on because he was from that area and was thought to know who might be responsible. He was thrown down the steps by an officer and shot to death with a revolver.37 The allegations were specific, detailed and contemporaneous and having regard to what is now known about the activities of the Dublin Guard there is no reason to doubt that this young man was put to death in custody. David Robinson wrote: ‘The number of bullet wounds alone would make you suspicious.’

None of this came out at the inquest which was held the next day under the County Coroner William O’Sullivan and a jury. The local National Army commander, Brigadier Paddy O’Daly, gave evidence in uniform: a man of compact build and of slightly more than average height, he had a curiously cherubic appearance. He looked across the room at the mother of the dead youth: Julia Murphy, a widow with two children who ran a dressmakers shop on the Main Street in Castleisland.38 O’Daly related that her son had been killed while on a National Army lorry when the lorry had been ambushed and two soldiers were killed and nine others were wounded: ‘under no circumstances do we permit our political prisoners to be ill-treated’. O’Daly looked across the court to the bereaved mother: ‘I sympathise with you … I really do.’39 It may have been difficult for her to express a contrary view or to call witnesses. The Coroner’s Court had been convened at army headquarters at the Great Southern Hotel in Killarney, the very place where her son had been killed. It became a pattern in Kerry. The Dublin Guard killed prisoners and Brigadier O’Daly would go to the inquest to cover up for his men or limit the fall out.40

David Robinson also raised the killing of another prisoner, Jack Galvin, who had been captured by National Army forces in an attack on Killorglin. It seems he was suspected of having killed a National Army Officer, Captain Burke, who had been a friend of the colonel of the First Westerns. At least one National Army officer recognised the threat to Galvin and placed him at the centre of a group of prisoners clearing trees. Galvin was unfit to work because of a broken arm and soon became separated from the prisoners and was found shot dead soon after. David Robinson finished his request with a comment that resonates through the ages: ‘You may imagine what the result will be if this goes on.’ The killing of Jack Galvin raised a bit of a storm among National Army troops and the colonel of the Kerry 1st Brigade wrote to General Mulcahy and threatened to resign unless a full inquiry took place to vindicate ‘the honour’ of the National Army. He added that if these incidents were allowed to continue, ‘We would soon find ourselves in arms against a hostile population.’

The General Officer Commanding (GOC) in Kerry was W.R.E. Murphy. A photo of the time shows a tall scrawny officer with a small moustache. He was from Wexford, but like many of his generation, he had served with distinction in the British Army during the Great War and went back to his old career as a school teacher until he was recruited to the National Army. W.R.E. Murphy also wrote to Mulcahy about Galvin’s death but advised against any inquiry: ‘This scoundrel shot capt Burke. Signed a form and got out and took up arms again. He was the terror of the countryside.’ Therefore, the GOC wrote: ‘I will not sacrifice any officer or man of the 1st Western Division (a splendid lot of troops).’41

There was no army inquiry into the death of Galvin or Bertie Murphy and their deaths became part of a pattern that was already taking shape. Sean Moriarty from Tralee was killed the month before. He had been removed from his home late at night by armed men. He and another man, Healy, were taken to waste ground outside Tralee where they were questioned about their involvement in attacks on National Army troops. Moriarty was shot dead and although Healy was riddled with bullets, he recovered consciousness and crawled off to get help. He later told the full story at the inquest into the death of his companion.42 Some historians have described these events as part of ‘a ruthless counter insurgency campaign’.43 It is hardly an accurate description. Even in the extreme circumstances that existed, the law provided no special dispensation for soldiers or policemen.

There was one last organised effort to hold the government to account for killing suspects in custody. It was the inquest into the killing of three teenagers who had been posting anti-Treaty leaflets. The leaflets laid the blame for the recent spate of killings on CID officers attached to Oriel House and army intelligence and in turn, incited the murder of those officers. These young men were picked up by National Army men late one night and the following morning the bodies of two were found dumped by the roadside near the village of Red Cow. The bodies were still warm and it seemed they had been killed around dawn. The trajectory of the bullet wounds suggested they had been shot while lying down. The third had run for his life and was discovered in the quarry, lying in a clump of nettles riddled with bullets.

Witnesses soon came forward identifying Charles Dalton, a National Army officer, as having arrested the youths the night before. Dalton lived a few streets away from where the young men were picked up. He was, on the surface, every inch an officer: a photo shows a singularly handsome young man in uniform, but that was not the full story. During the War of Independence, Dalton had been part of Collins’ Squad and shooting opponents in cold blood had been part of their work.44 In the run up to the civil war, most of the Squad joined the new National Army. Dalton became part of the intelligence team that had grown up around Oriel House and Wellington barracks: the leafleting campaign had been directed against Dalton and that group of men. The Red Cow inquest took place in the reading room at the Carnegie Library in Clondalkin where tables were hurriedly pushed together for the lawyers and the coroner. The lawyers crammed in on one side of the table, the jury on the other with the witnesses nearly in touching distance of both. The rest of this windowless low-ceilinged room was packed with bereaved relatives and National Army men in an atmosphere that heaved with grief and anger.

The provisional government instructed John Byrne, a tall, thin, austere advocate who had great experience of defending hopeless cases. The killings had attracted nationwide publicity and there was no mechanism to dispense with inquest juries as was done in Cork. The evidence could not be suppressed as it was in the cases of Brugha or Boland or censored as in the Mannion inquest or explained away as in the case of the Yellow Lanes killings. It was going to come out in all its tawdry detail, but Byrne would play a subtle game distancing himself and the government from the accused officer and letting the other lawyers fight it out. Michael Comyn, KC, again appeared for the families. He was joined by two barristers representing the anti-Treaty GHQ. They squeezed in around the tables alongside their main opponent, Tim Healy, KC, who acted for the accused officer. Healy, a small, pugnacious, west Cork man, hated Michael Comyn and took every opportunity to let him know.

This was a case that was followed in the press by anyone who could read and raised issues that no one could ignore. Over the previous few months, Dublin had been assailed by ambushes; National Army soldiers shot in the back, at home or in the street. Landmines had been detonated and grenades hurled with little care for civilian life and there had been many casualties. The anti-Treaty faction now came to court to litigate the circumstances in which three of their own had been killed. All of this tended to obscure two important points: that these youths had been killed in the custody of the National Army and that it was part of a pattern which the state did not oppose or condemn, at least in public.

At the outset, the old coroner protested that he could not allow the anti-Treaty side to be represented, but it was pointed out to him that pending the creation of the Irish Free State, the provisional government had no legal status either. The duty of the coroner was to inquire into the cause of death and not allow the lawyers to pursue a political agenda, but like most coroners, he was not a lawyer just a local doctor who carried out the occasional inquest after a car crash or a fatal accident at a farm. Out of his depth and intimidated, the coroner lost control of the lawyers who began to fight it out for a verdict that would give comfort for their cause.45 Tim Healy called witnesses to prove that Dalton had carried out four arrests that night and taken the prisoners to Wellington barracks, but none of this established a watertight alibi and just confirmed Dalton was on duty and in the vicinity looking for anti-Treaty suspects. The evidence showed that much later that night the young men were driven from the barracks by intelligence officers to a quiet spot and murdered. But which officers were involved? All at Wellington barracks and Oriel House remained silent.

Michael Comyn argued that this was murder whether by Dalton or his colleagues, but the inquest did not go well for Comyn. During the inquest his home was raided by the National Army and he was briefly placed under arrest, and when he was at the inquest, Tim Healy, KC, was always ready with some withering put down. Comyn was heckled by a hostile gallery and questioned by exasperated jurors: ‘Why is this taking so long?’ one asked. It was not the function of the inquest jury to say whether Dalton was guilty or not, but it was part of their duty to send a suspect for trial before the criminal courts if there was a case to answer. The jury declined to indict him and perhaps that should not be surprising: Dublin was a small city and his reputation was well known. The jury did not even condemn the murders as was the custom at the time. The colourless verdicts simply recounted that the young men had died of ‘gunshot wounds inflicted by person or persons unknown’.

Counsels’ closing speeches in the Red Cow inquest received the widest publicity, and the failure of the jury to condemn the murders probably owed much to the advocacy of Tim Healy, KC. It was an open secret that he would soon be appointed governor general of the new Free State. His voice, in a very real sense, was that of the new establishment in Ireland and he delivered his closing remarks just before the official executions began. He argued that the inquest evidence could be ignored and that the rule of law could be abandoned. He asserted the war had been started by the anti-Treaty faction and as he put it: ‘What man can place bounds on the march of extermination?’