Читать книгу Industrial Democracy - Sidney Webb - Страница 4

Table of Contents

The two organisations in the Trade Union world enjoying the greatest measure of representative institutions are those which are the most distinctly modern in their growth and pre- eminence. In numbers, political influence, and annual income the great federal associations of Coalminers and Cotton Operatives overshadovii all others, and now comprise one-fifth of the total Trade Union membership. We have elsewhere pointed out that these two trades are both distinguished by their establishment of an expert civil service, exceeding in numbers and efficiency that possessed by any other trade.' They resemble each other also, as we shall now see, in the success with which they have solved the fundamental problem of democracy, the combination of administrative efficiency and popular contro l. In each case the solution has been found in the frank acceptance of representative institutions.

In the Amalgamated Association of Operative Cotton- spinners, which may be taken as typical of cotton organisa- tions, the "legislative power" is expressly vested " in a meeting comprising representatives from the various provinces and dis- tricts included in the association." * This " Cotton-spinners' Parliament" is elected annually in strict proportion to

> History of Trade Vnionhm, p. 298 ; see also the subsequent chapter on " The Method of Collective Bargaining." -^

2 Rules of the Amalgamated Association of Operative Cotton-spinners (Man- chester, 1894), p. 4, Rule 7.

Representative Institutions 39

membership, and consists of about a hundred representatives. It meets in Manchester regularly every quarter, but can be called together by the executive council at any time. Once elected, this assembly is, like the British Parliament, abso- lutely supreme. Its powers and functions are subject to no express limitation, and from its decisions there is no appeal. The rules contain no provision for taking a vote of the members ; and though the agenda of the quarterly meeting is circulated for information to the executives of the district associations, so little thought is there of any necessity for the representatives to receive a mandate from their constituents, that express arrangements are made for transacting any other business not included in the agenda.^

The actual " government of the association is conducted by an executive council elected by the general representative meeting, and consisting of a president, treasurer, and secretary, with thirteen other members, of whom seven at least must be working spinners, whilst the othef six are, by invariable custom, the permanent officials appointed and maintained by the principal district organisations. Here we have the " cabinet " of this interesting constitution—the body which practically directs the whole work of the association and exercises great weight in the counsels of the legislative body, preparing its agenda and guiding all its proceedings. For the daily work of administration this cabinet is authorised by the rules to appoint a committee, the " sub-council," which consists in practice of the six " gentlemen," as the district officials are commonly called. The actual executive work is performed by a general secretary, who himself engages such office assistance as may from time to time be necessary. In marked contrast with all the Trade Union constitutions which we have hitherto described, the Cotton-spinners' rules do not

' Rule 9, p. S- The general representative meeting even resembles the British Parliament in being able itself to change the fundamental basis of the constitution, mcluding the period of its own tenure of office. The rules upon which the Amalgamated Association depends can be altered by the general representative meeting in a session called by special notice, without any confirmation by the constituents. — Rule 45, pp. 27–28.

40 Trade Union Structure

■ give the election of this chief executive officer to the general body of members, but declare expressly that " the sole right of electing a permanent general secretary shall be vested in the provincial and district representatives when in meeting assembled, by whom his salary shall be fixed and deter- mined." ^ Moreover, as we have already mentioned, the candidates for this office pass a competitive examination, and when once elected the general secretary enjoys a permanence of tenure equal to that of the English civil service, the rules providing that he " shall be appointed and continue in office so long as he gives satisfaction."^

The Amalgamated Association of Operative Cotton- spinners is therefore free from all the early expedients for securing popular government. The general or aggregate meeting finds no place in its constitution, and the rules con- tain no provision for the Referendum or t he Initia tivg. _ No countenance is given to the idea of RotatiOT_of Officgj^ No officers are elected by the members themselves. Finally, we have the complete abandonment of the delegate, and the sub- stitution, both in fact and in name, of the representat ive. On' the other hand, the association is a fully-equipped democratic state of the modern type. It has an elected parliament, exercising supreme and uncontrolled power. It has a cabinet appointed by and responsible only to that parliament. And its chief executive officer, appointed once for all on grounds of efficiency, enjoys the civil-service permanence of tenure.^

> Rule 12, p. 6. , 2 Tiid.

^ The other branches of the cotton trade, notably the federations of weavers and cardroom hands, are organised on the same principle of an elected repre- sentative assembly, itself appointing the officers and executive committee, though there are minor differences among them. The United Textile Factory Workers' Association, of which the spinners form a part, is framed on the same model, a "legislative council," really an executive committee, being elected by the "conference," or representative assembly. (This organisation temporarily suspended its functions in 1896.) Moreover, the rules of the several district associations of the Amalgamated Association of Operative Cotton-spinners exhibit the same formative influences. In the smaller societies, confined to single villages, we find the simple government by general meeting, electing a committee and officers. Permanence of tenure is, however, the rule, it being often expressly provided that the secretary and the treasurer shall each "retain office as long as he gives satisfaction." More than half the total membership, moreover, is

Representative Institutions 41

We have watched the working of this remarkable consti- tution during the last seven years, and we can testify to the success with which both efficiency and popular control are secured. jThe efficiency we attribute, to the existence of the adequate, highly-trained, and relatively well-paid and permanent civil service.^ But that this civil service is effectively under public control is shown by the accuracy with which the cotton . officials adapt their political and industrial policy to the developing views of the members whom they serve. This sensitiveness to the popular ' desires is secured by the reaL sup remacy of th e elected r epresentativesj For the " Cotton-spimTerJ^ParliaSient *'^is no formal gathering of casual members to register the decrees of a dominant bureaucracy. It is, on the contrary, a highly -organised deliberative assembly, with active repre- sentatives from the different localities, each alive to the distinct, and sometimes divergent, interests of his own constituents. Their eager participation shows itself in constant " party meetings " of the different sections, at which the officers and workmen from each district consult together as to the line of policy to be pressed upon the assembly. Such consulta- tion and deliberate joint action is, in the case of the Oldham representatives at any rate, carried even further. The consti- tution of the Oldham Operative Cotton-spinners' Provincial Association is, so far as we know, unique in all the annals of democracy in making express provision for the " caucus." ^

included in two important " provinces," Oldham and Bolton, which possess elaborate federal constituJtioDS of their own. These follow, in general outline, the federal constitution, but both retain some features of the older form. Thus in Oldham, where the ofiScers enjoy permanence of tenure and are responsible only to the representative assembly, any vacancy is filled by general vote of the members. And though the representative assembly has supreme legislative and executive powers, it is required to take a ballot of all the members before deciding on a strike. On the other hand, Bolton, which leaves everything to its repre- sentative assembly, shows a lingering attachment to rotation of office by providing that the retiring members of its executive council shall not be eligible for re-election during twelve months.

> The nineteen thousand members of the Amalgamated Association of Opera- tive Cotton-spinners command the services of ten permanent officials, besides numerous local officers still working at their trade.

' The "caucus," in this sense of the term, is supposed to have been first VOL. I C 2

42 Trade Union Structure

The rules of 1891 ordain that "whenever the business to be transacted by the representatives attending the quarterly or special meetings of the Amalgamation is of such import- ance and to the interest of this association as to require unity of action in regard to voting by the representatives from this province, the secretary shall be required to summon a special meeting of the said representatives by announcing in the monthly circular containing the minutes the date and time of such meeting, which must be held in the council room at least seven days previous to the Amalgamation meeting taking place. The provincial representatives on the amalga- mated council shall be required to attend such meeting, to give any information required, and all resolutions passed by a majority of those present shall be binding upon all the representatives from the Oldham province attending the amalgamated quarterly or special meetings, and any one acting contrary to his instructions shall cease to be a repre- sentative of the district he represents, and shall not be allowed to stand as a candidate for any office connected with the association for the space of twelve months. The allowance for attending these special meetings shall be in accordance with the scale allowed to the provincial executive council."* But even without so stringent a rule, there would be but little danger_of_the.. representatives failing to express the desires of the rank and file. Living the same life as thefT constifu entiTand sub ject to annual election, they can scarcely fail tp be in touch, wjth ..the general body, of the members. The common practice of requiring each representatrve'To repor^ his action to the next meeting of his constituents, by whom it is discussed in his presence, and the wide circulation

introduced about the beginning of this century, in the United States Congress, by the Democratic Party. See the Statesman's Manual, vol. i. pp. 294, 338; Woodrow Wilson, Congressional Government, 1 2th edit. (New York, 1896), pp. 327–330; Lalor's Cyclopedia of Political Science (New York, 1891), vol. 1. p. 357. The "caucus" in the sense of "primary assembly" is regulated by law in many American States, especially in Massachusetts. See Nominations for Elective Office in the United States, by F. W. Dallinger (London, 1897).

1 Rule 64, pp. 41–42, of Rules and Regulations for the Government of thi Oldham Operative Cotton-spinners' Provincial Association (Oldham, 1891).

Representative Institutions 43

of printed reports among all the members furnish efficient substitutes for the newspaper press. On the other hand, the. facts that the representative assembly is a permanent insti- tution wielding supreme power, and that in practice its' membership changes little from year to year, give it a very real authority over the executive council which it elects every six months, and over the officers whom it has appointed. The t5^ical member of the " Cotton-spinners' Parliament " is not only experienced in voicing the desires of his constituents, but also possesses in a comparatively large measure that knowledge of administrative detail and of current affairs which enables him to understand and control the proceedings of his officers.

The Coalminers are, as we have elsewhere mentioned, not so unanimous as the Cotton Operatives in their adoption of representative institutions. The two great counties of Northumberland and Durham have unions which preserve constitutions of the old-fashioned type. But when we pass to other counties, in which the Miners have come more thoroughly under the influence of the modern spirit, we find representative government the rule. The powerful * associations of Yorkshire, Lancashire, and the Midlands are all governed by elected representative assemblies, which appoint the executive committees and the permanent officers. But the most striking example of the adoption of repre- sentative institutions among the Coalminers is presented by 1 the Miners' Federation of Great Britain, established 1887, This great federal organisation, which now comprises two- thirds of the Coalminers in union, adopted from the outset a completely representative constitution. The supreme authority is vested in a "conference," summoned as often as required, consisting of representatives elected by each county or district association. This conference exercises ' uncontrolled power to determine policy, alter rules, and levy unlimited contributions.^ From jits decision there is no

• This was expressly pointed out, doubtless with reference to some of the old- fashioned county unions which still clung to the custom of the Referendum or the

44 Trade Union Structure

appeal. No provision is made for taking the votes of the general body of members, and the conference itself appoints the executive committee and all the officers of the Federa- tion. Between the sittings of the conference the executive committee is expressly given power to take action to promote the interests of the Federation, and no rule savoring of Rotation of Ofifice deprives this executive of the services of its experienced members.

The " Miners' Parliament," as this conference may not improperly be termed, is in many respects the most im- portant assembly in the Trade Union world. Its regular annual session, held in some midland town, lasts often for a whole week, whilst other meetings of a couple of days' dura- tion are held as business requires. The fifty to seventy members, who represent the several constituent bodies, consti- tute an exceptionally efficient deliberative assembly. Among them are to be found the permanent ofificers of the county unions, some of the most experienced of the check weigh-m en and the influential leaders of opinion in the mining villages. The official element, as might be expected, plays a prominent part in suggesting, drafting, and amending the actual pro- posals, but the unofficial members frequently intervene with effect in the business-like debates. The public and the press are excluded, but the conference usually directs a brief and guarded statement of the conclusions arrived at to be supplied to the newspapers, and a full report of the proceedings—sometimes extending to over a hundred printed pages—is subsequently issued to the lodges. The subjects dealt with include the whole range of industrial and political policy, from the technical grievance of a particular district up to the ' " nationalisation of mines." ^ The actual carrying out of the

Imperative Mandate, in the circular summoning the important conference oi July 1893 : "Delegates must be appointed to attend Conference with full power to deal with the wages question. "

1 Thus the agenda for the Annual Conference in 1894 comprised, besides formal business, certain revisions of rules and the executive committee's report, the Eight Hours Bill, the stacking of coal, the making of Saturday a regular whole holiday, the establishment of a public department to prevent unscrupulous competition in trade, the amendment of the Mines Regulation and Employers'

Representative Institutions 45

policy determined on b y the conference is left unreserved ly '■• to the executive committee, but the conference expects to be called together whenever any new departure in policy iss required. In times of stress the executive committee shows its real dependence on the popular assembly by calling it together every few weeks.^ And the success with which the. Miners' Federation wields its great industrial and political power over an area extending from Fife to So merset and a

Liability Acts, international relations with foreign miners' organisations and the nationalisation of mines. It may here be observed that the representatives at the Federal Conference have votes in proportion to the numbers of' the members in their respective associations. This practice, often called "proxy voting," or, more accm-ately, " the accumulative vote," has long been characteristic of the Coalminers' organisations, though unknown to any other section of the Trade Union World. Thus the rules of the Miners' Federation of Great Britain are silent as to the number of representatives to be sent to the supreme "Conference," but provide "that each county, federation or district vote upon all questions as follows, viz. : one vote for every looo financial^members or fractional part of Idbo, and that the vote in every case shall be taken by numbers " (Rule lo, Rules of the Miners' Federation of Great Britain, 1895). A similar principle has always been applied at the International Miners' Conferences, and the practice prevails also in the several county unions or federations. The l>ancashire and Cheshire Federation fixes the number of representatives to be sent to its Conferences at one per 500 members, but expressly provides that the voting is to be " by proxy " in the same proportion. The Midland Federation adopts the same rule. The Yorkshire, Nottinghamshire, Durham, and West Cumberland associations allow each branch or lodge only a single representative, whose vote counts strictly inproportion to the membership he represents. This " accumulative vote " is invariably resorted to in the election of officers and in all important decisions of policy, but it is not uncommon for minor divisions to be taken, unchallenged, on the principle of " one man one vote." It is not easy to account for the exceptional preference of the Coalminers for this method of voting, especially as their assemblies are, as we have pointed out, in practice more " representative " in their character, and less trammelled by the idea of the imperative mandate, than those of any other trade but the Cotton Operatives. The practice facilitates, it is true, a diminution in the size of the meetings, but this appears to be its only advantage. In the absence of any system of " pro- portional representation " it affords no real guide to the relative distribution of opinion ; the representatives of Yorkshire, for instance, in casting the vote of the county, can at best express the views only of the majority of their constituents, and have therefore no real claim to outvote a smaller district, with whose views nearly half their own constituents may be in sympathy. If, on the other hand, the whole membership of the Miners' Federation were divided into fairly equal electoral districts, each electing a single member, there would be more chance of every variety of opinion being represented, whilst an exact balance between the large and the small districts would nevertheless be preserved.

 During the great strike in 1893 the Conference met eight times in six

months.

46 Trade Union Structure

membership numbering two hundred thousand, furnishes eloquent testimony to the manner in which it has known how to combine efficient administration with genuine popular assent.

The great federal organisations of Cotton Operatives and Coalminers stand out from among the other Trade Unions in respect of the completeness and success with which they have adopted representative institutions. But it is easy to trace a like tendency throughout the whole Trade Union world. We have already commented on the innovation, now _almgst universal, of entrustinglthej^k: of reyising^rules to a specially pIprtpH^ jrnmmittee. It was at first taken for granted that the work of such a revising committee was limited to putting into proper form the amendments pro- posed by the branches themselves, and sometimes to choosing between them. Though it is still -u&uaUbr ^ the revi sed rules to be formally ratified by a vote of the meinberA-tbe- revising Committees have been given an ever wider discretion, until in most unions they are nowadays in practice free to make_ changes according to their own judgment.^ But it is in "the constitution of the' central executive that the trend towards representative institutions is most remarkable, the old expedient of the " governing branch " being superseded by an executive committee representative of the whole body of the members.^

1 There is a similar tendency to disapprove of the Imperative Mandate in the principal Friendly Societies. The Friendly Societies Monthly Magazine for April 1890 observes that "Lodges are advised … to instruct their delegates as to how they are to vote. With this we entirely disagree. A proposition till it is properly thrashed out and explained, remains in the husk, and its full import is lost. Delegates fettered with instructions simply become the mechanical mouthpiece of the necessarily unenlightened lodges which send them, and there- fore the legislation of the Order might just as well be conducted by post."

' Thus the Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants (established 1872) administers the affairs of its forty-four thousand members by an executive committee of thirteen (with the three officers), elected annually by ballot in thirteen equal electoral districts. This committee meets in London at least quarterly, and can be summoned oftener if required. Above this is the supreme authority of the annual assembly of sixty delegates, elected by sixty equal electoral districts, !i and sitting for four days to hear appeals, alter rules, and determine the policy of the union. A similar constitution is enjoyed by the Associated Society of

Representative Institutions 47

This revolution has taken place in the National Union of Boot and Shoe Operatives (37,000 members) and the Amalgamated Society of Engineers (87,313 members), the two societies which, outside the worlds of cotton and coal, exceed nearly all others in membership. Down to 1890 the National Union of Boot and Shoe Operatives was governed by a local executive council belonging to a single town, controlled only by occasional votes of a delegate assembly, meeting, at first, every four years, and afterwards every two years. Seven years ago the constitution was entirely trans- formed. The society was divided into five equal electoral districts, each of which elected one member to serve for two years on an executive council consisting of only these five representatives, in addition to the three other officers elected by the whole body of members. To the representative execu- tive thus formed was committed not only all the ordinary business of the society, but also the final decision in cases of appeals by individual members against the decision of a branch. The delegate meeting, or " National Conference," meets to determine policy and revise rules, and its decisions no longer require ratification by the members' vote. Although the Referendum and the Mass Meeting of the district are still formally included in the constitution, the complication and difficulty of the issues which have cropped up during the last few years have led the executive council to call together the national conference at frequent intervals, in preference to submitting questions to the popular vote.

Locomotive Enginemen and Firemen (established 1880). It is this model that has been followed, with unimportant variations in detail, by the more durable of the labor unions v/hich sprang into existence in the great upheaval of 1889, among which the Gasworkers and the Dockers are the best known. The practice of electing the executive committee by districts is, as far as we know, almost unknown in the political world. The executive council of the State of Penn- sylvania in the eighteenth century used to be elected by single - member districts (Federalist, No. LVII.), and a similar arrangement appears occa- sionally to have found a place in the ever-changing constitutions of one or two Swiss Cantons. (See State and Federal Government in Switzerland, by J. M. Vincent, Baltimore, 189 1.) We know of no case where it prevails at present (Lowell's Governments and Parties in Continental Europe, London, 1896).

48 Trade Union Structure

In the case of the Amalgamated Society of Engineers the constitutional revolution has been far more sweeping. In the various editions of the Engineers' rules from 185 i to 1 89 1 we find the usual reliance on the Mass Meeting, the Referendum and the direct election of all officers by the members at large. We also see the executive control vested in a committee elected by a single district—the chairman, moreover, being forbiddten to serve for more than two years in succession. In the case of the United Society of Boiler- makers we have already described how a constitution of essentially similar type has resulted in remarkable success and efficiency, but at the sacrifice of all real control by the ^members. In the history of the Boilermakers from 1872 onwards we watch the virtual abandonment in practiceflo?" the sake of a strong and united central administration, of everything that tended to weaken the executive power. \5"he Engineers, on the contrary, clung tenaciously to every institution or formality which protected the individual member against the central executive.^ Meanwhile, although the very object of the amalgamation in 1851 was to secure uniformity of trade policy, the failure to provide any salaried official staff left the central executive with little practical control over the negotiations conducted or the decisions arrived at by the local branch or district committee. The result was not only failure to cope with the vital problems

1 In financial matters, for instance, though every penny of the funds belonged to the whole society, each branch retained its own receipts, subject only to the cumbrous annual " equalisation." The branch accordingly had it in its power to make any disbursement it chose, subject only to subsequent disallowance by the central executive. Nor was the decision of the centrah executive in any way final. The branch aggrieved by any disallowance couTd, and habitually did, appeal—not to the members at large, who would usually have supported the executive—but to another body, the general council, which met every three years for the express purpose of deciding such appeals. There was even a further appeal from the general council to the periodical delegate meeting. In the meantime the payment objected to was not required to be refunded, and it will therefore easily be understood that the vast majority of executive decisions were instantlv appealed against. And when we add that each of these several courts of Appeal frequently reversed a large proportion of the decisions of its immediate inllk-ior, the effect of these frequent appeals in destroying all authority can easily be imagined.

Representative Institutions 49

of trade policy involved in the changing conditions of the industry, but also an increasing paralysis of administration,^ against which officers and committee-men struggled in vain.' When in 1892 the delegates met at Leeds to find a remedy for these evils, they brought from the branches two leading suggestions. One party urged the appointment, in aid o^ the central executive, of a s alaried staff of distric t delegates, ' elected, in direct imitation of those of the BoiTeSrmaKefsTby the whole society. Another section favored the transforma- tion of the executive committee into a representative body, and proposed the division of the country into eight equal electoral districts, each of which should elect a representative to a salaried executive council sitting continually in London, and thus giving its whole time to the society's work. Probably these remedies, aimed at different sides of the trouble, were intended as alternatives. It is significant of the deep impression made upon the delegate meeting that it eventually adopted both, thus at one blow increasing the number of salaried officers from three to seventeen.^

Time has yet to show how faf thfs revolution in the constitution of the Amalgamated Society of Engineers wilT conduce either to efficient administration or to genuine popular control. It is easy to see that government by an executive committee of this character differs essentially from government by a representative assembly appointing! its own cabinet, and that it possesses certain obvious dis-J advantages. The eight members, who are thus transferrea by the vote of their fellows from the engineer's workshop tq the Stamford Street office, become by this fundamental change of life completely severed from their constituents, \ Spending all their days in office routine, they necessarily lose the vivid appreciation of the feelings of the man

' It is interesting to observe that the United Society of Boilermakers, by adopting in 1895 a Representative Executive, has made its foffi&I constitution almost identical with that of the Amalgamated Society of Engineers. The vital difiference between these two societies now lies in the working relation between the central executive and the local branches and district committees ; see the subsequent chapter on "The Unit of Government."

5© Trade Union Structure

who works at the lathe or the forge. Living constantly in London, they are subject to new local influences, and tend unconsciously to get out of touch with the special grievances or new drifts of popular opinion on the Tyne or the Clyde, at Belfast or in Lancashire. It is true that the representa- tives hold office for only three years, at the expiration of which they must present themselves for re-election ; but there would be the greatest possible reluctance amongst the members to relegate to manual labor a man who had once served them as a salaried official. Unless, therefore, a re- vulsion of feeling takes place among the Engineers against the institution itself, the present members of the representa- tive executive committee may rely with some confidence on becoming practically permanent officials.

These objections do not apply with equal force to other examples of a representative executive. The tradition of the Stamford Street office—that the whole mass of friendly- society business should be dealt with in all its details by the members of the executive committee themselves—involves their daily attendance and their complete absorption in office work. In other Trade Unions which have adopted"" the same constitutional form, the members of the represent- ative executi ve residj . in thpir r gnstituenc ies and, in some cases, even continue to work at their trade. They are called, together, like the members of a representative assembly, at ■quarterly or other intervals to decide only the more im- portant questions, the detailed executive routine being •(jfelegated to a local sub -committee or to the official staff! Thus the executive committee of the National Union of Boot and Shoe Operatives usually meets only for one day a month ; the executive committee of the Associated Loco- motive Engineers and Firemen is called together only when required, usually not more than once or twice a month ; the executive council of the Amalgamated Society of' Railway Servants comes to London once a quarter, and the same practice is followed by the executive committee of the National Union of Gasworkers and General Laborers. It is

Representative Institutions 51

evident that in all these cases the representative executive, whether formed of the salaried officials of the districts or of men working at their trade, has more chance of remaining in touch with its constituents than in the case of the Amalga- mated Society of Engineers.

/Butjybgre .is, la. our opinion,^ a fundamental drawback to government by a represejitajive executive, even under the most favorable conditions. | One jof_the chief duties of a "representative governing bod^^'lS to criticise, control, arid direct the permanent official staff, by whom the policy of the organisation must actually be carried out. Its main function, in fact, is to exercise real and continuous authority over the civir service. Now all experience shows„it to be. an essential ' condition that the permanent officials should be dependent; on and genuinely subordinate to the representative boHy. This condition is fulfilled in the constitutions such as those of the Amalgamated Association of Operative Cotton-spinners and the Miners' Federation, where the representative assembly^ itself appoints the officers, determines their duties, and fixesv, their salaries. But 'it is entirely absent in ^1 Trade Union constitutions based on a representative ex p^"tivp- Under thiy arrangement the executive committee neither appoints the] officers nor fixes their salaries. Though the representative^ executive, unlike the old governing branch, can in its corporate capacity claim to speak in the name of all the' members, so can the general secretary himself, and often each assistant secretary." All alike hold their positions from the same supreme power—the votes of the members ; and have their ( respective duties and emoluments defined by the same- written constitution—the society's rules.

This absence of any co-ordination of the several parts of the constitution works out, in practice, in one of two ways. There may arise jealousies between the several officers;^ or between them and some of the members o'f the executive committee. J We have known instances in which an incom- petent and arbitrary general secretary has been pulled up by one or other of his colleagues who wanted to succeed to

52 Trade Union Structure

his place. The suspicion engendered by the relation of competitors for popular suffrage checks, it may be, some positive malpractices, but results also in the obstruction of useful measures of policy, or even in their failure through dis- loyalty. ( More usually the^ executive conimittee^feelingjtself powerless to control the officials, te nds to ma ke a tacit and half-unconscious compact with themj_ based on mutual support against the criticism of their common constituenjsj If the members of the committee are themselves salted officials, they not only have a fellow-feeling for the'weak- nesses of their brother officials, but they also realise~viv^ly the personal risk of appealing against them to the popular vote. If, on the other hand, the Piembers-xontinue to work at their trade, they feel themselves at a hopeless disadvaatage in any such appeal. They have neither the business ex- perience nor the acquaintance with details~necessary for a successful indictment of an officer who is known from one end of the society to the otherj^nd who enjoys the aarontage^ of controlling its machinery. 'Thus we have in many unions governed by a Representative Executive the formation of a ruling clique, half officials, half representativ e^. \ fjThis i has all the disadvantages of such a bureaucracy as we have^ described in the case of the United Society of Boilermakers, without the efficiency made possible by its hierarchical organisation and the predominant authority of the head of the staffjjraPo sum up, if there are among the salaried repre- sentatives or officials restless spirits, " conscientious critids," or disloyal comrades, the general body of members may rest assured that they will be kept informed of what is going on, but at the cost of seeing their machinery of government constantly clogged by angry recriminations and appeals. If, on the other hand, the men who meet at headquarters in one or another capacity are " good fellows," the machine will work smoothly with such efficiency as their industry and capacity happens to be equal to, but all popular control over this governing clique will disappear^" } , \We see, then, that though government by a representa-1

Representative Institutions 53

Live exegutlye Js a real advance on the old expedients, it is IHielj^tq grove Jnferior to government by a representative, assembly, appointing its own cabinet and officers. But a great national Trade Union extending from one end of the kingdom to the other cannot easily adopt the superior form, even if the members desire it. ) The Cotton Operatives enjoy the special advantage of having practically all their member- ship within a radius of thirty miles from Manchester. The frequent gatherings of a hundred delegates held usually on a Saturday afternoon entail, therefore, no loss of working time and little expense to the organisation. The same con- sideration applies to the great bulk of the membership of the Miners' Federation, three-fourths of which is concentrated in Lancashire, West Yorkshire, and the industrial Midlands. Even the outlying coalfields elsewhere enjoy the advantage of close local concentration, so that a single delegate may effectively represent the hundreds of lodges in his own county. And it is no small consideration that the total membership of the Miners' Federation is so large that the cost of frequent meetings of fifty to seventy delegates bears only a trifling proportion to the resources of the union. Very different is the position of the great unions in the engineering and building trades. The 46,000 members of the Amalgamated Society of Carpenters in the United Kingdom, for instance, are divided into 623 branches, scattered over 400 separate towns or villages. Each town has its own Working Rules, its own Standard Rate and Normal Day, and lacks intimate connection with the towns right and left of it. The representative chosen by the Newcastle , branch might easily be too much absorbed by the burning local question of demarcation against the Shipwrights to pay much attention to the simple grievances of the Hexham branch as to the Saturday half-holiday, or to the multiplication of apprentices in the joinery shops at Darlington. Similar considerations apply to the 497 branches of the Amalgamated Society of Engineers, whose 80,000 members in the United Kingdom are working in 300 different towns. In view of the increasing

54 Trade Union Structure

uniformity of working conditions throughout the country, the concentration of industry in large towns, the growing facili- ties' of travel and the steady multiplication of salaried local officials,' we do not ourselves regard the geographical difficulty as insuperable. But it is easy to understand why, with so large a number of isolated branches, it has not yet seemed practicable to constitutional reformers in the building or the engineering trades, to have frequent meetings of repre- sentative assemblies.

The tardiness and incompleteness with which Trade" Unions have adopted representative institutions is mainly due to a more general cause. The workman has been slow to recognise the special function of the representative "vtC^ democracy. In the early constitutional ideals of Trade Unionism the representative finds, as we have seen, absolutely no place. The committee-man elected by rotation of offic e o r the de leg ate deputed to take part in a revision of ru les wa s habitua lly re garded only as a vehicle by which "t he voices " could be mecha nically conv eyed. His task required, therefore, no special qualification beyond intelligence to comprehend his instructions and a spirit of obedience in carrying them out. Very different is the duty cast upon the representative in such modern Trade Union constitutions_ as those of the Cotton Operatives and Coalminers. His 'main function is still to express the mind of the average man. But unlike the delegate, he is not a mechanica l yehicle of votes on particular subjects. The ordinary Trg.^e ' Unionist has but little facility in expressing his desires ; unversed in the technicalities of administration, he is unable to judge by what particular expedient his grievances can best be remedied. In default of an expert representative he has to depend on the professional administrator. But for this particular task the professional administrator is no more competent than the ordinary man, though for a different reason. The very apartness of hi s life fro m that of th e avera ge workman depr ives him of close acquaintan ce with th e actua l gr ievances of the mass of the people. Immersed

Representative Institutions 55

in office routine, he is apt to fail to understand from their inconsistent complaints and impracticable suggestions what it is they really desire. [To act as an interpreter between the people and their servants is, therefore, the first function of the representative.

But this is only half of his duty. To him is entrusted also the difficult and delicate task of CQiitrQlling-.±he_ pro-, fe ssional expert s.) Here, as we have seen, the ordinary man completely breaks down. The task, to begin with, requires a certain familiarity with the machinery of government, and a sacrifice of time and a concentration of thought out of the reach of the average man absorbed in gaining his daily bread. So much is this the case that when the administra- tion is complicated, a further specialisation is found necessary, I and the representative assembly itself chooses a cabinet, or executive committee of men specially qualified for this duty. A large measure of intuitive capacity to make a wise choic'ei of men is, therefore, necessary even in the ordinary repre- sentative. Finally, there comes the important duty qt- deciding upon questions of policy or tactics. The ordinkry citizen thinks of nothing but clear issues on broad lines. The representative, on the other hand, finds himself con-*' stantly called upon to choose between the nicely balanced expediencies of compromise necessitated by the complicated facts of practical life. On his shrewd judgment of actual circumstances will depend his success in obtaining, not all that his constituents desire—for that he will quickly recognise as Utopian—but the largest instalment of those desires that may be then and there possible.

To construct a perfect representative assembly can, therefore, never be an easy task ; and in a community ex- clusively composed of manual workers dependent on weekly wages, the task is one of exceptional difficulty. A community of bankers and business entrepreneurs finds it easy to secure a representative committee to direct and control the paid officials whom it engages to protect its interests. Constituents, representatives and officials are

56 Trade Union Structure

living much the same life, are surrounded by the same intellectual atmosphere, have received approximately the same kind of education and mental training, and are con- stantly engaged in one variety or another of what is essentially the same work of direction and control, More-

'over, there is no lack of persons able to give the necessary time and thought to expressing the desires of their class and to seeing that they are satisfied. It is, therefore, not surprising that representative institutions should be seen at their best in middle- class communities.^ In all these

^respects the manual workers stand at a grave disadvantage. Whatever may be the natural endowment of the workman selected by his comrades to serve as a representative, he starts unequipped with that special training and that general familiarity with administration which will alone enable him to be a competent critic and director of the expert pro-

/fessional. Before he can place himself on a level with tS? trained official whom he has to control he must devote his whole time and thought to his new duties, and must there- fore give up his old trade. This unfortunately tends to alter his manner of life, his habit of mind, and usually also" his intellectual atmosphere to such an extent that he gradually loses that 'vivid appreciation of the feelings of the man at the bench or the forge, which it is his function to express. There is a certain cruel irony in the problem which accounts, we think, for some of the unconscious exasperation of the wage-ear ners all over the world against representative institutions. pDirectly the working - man representative becomes properly equipped for one -half of] his duties, he ceases to be specially qualified for the other. If he remains essentially a manual worker, he fails to cope with the brain-working officials ; if he takes on the character of the brain-worker, he is apt to get out of touch with the constituents whose desires he has to interpretl It will, therefore, be interesting to see how the shrewd workmen of

.1 In this connection see the 'interesting suggestions of Achille Loria, Les Baits Economiques de la Constitution Sociale (Paris, 1893), pp. 150–154.

Representative Institutions 57

Lancashire, Yorkshire, and the Midlands have surmounted this constitutional difficulty.

In the parliaments of the Cotton-spinners and Coalminers we find habitually two classes of members, salaried officials| of the several districts, and representative wage-earners still working at the mule or in the mine. It would almost seeffr as if these modern organisations had consciously recognised the impossibility of combining in any individual representa- tive both of the requirements that we have specified. As it is, the presence in their assemblies of a large proportion of men who are still following their trade imports into their deliberations the full flavor^ of working-class sentiment. And the association, with these picked men from each industrial village, of the salaried officers from each county, secures that combination 0/ knowledge, ability, and practical experience in administration,'which is, as we have suggested, absolutely i iydispensab le for the exercise of control over the professional experts, irthe constituencies elected none but their fellow - w brker s. it is more than doubtful whether the representative assembly so created would be competent for its task. If, on the other hand, the assembly consisted merely of a conference of s alaried o fficials, appointing one or more of themselves to carry out the national work of the federation, it would inevitably fail to retain the confidence, even if it continued to express the desires of the members at large. J'he conjunction of the two elements in the sanie repre- sentative assembly h'asTn practice resulted in a very efficient working bodyjj

It is important to notice that in each of the trades the success of the experiment hasjdsperi^ed^n the iact that the organisation is formed on a (federal basis^ The constituent bodies of the Miners' Federation and the Amalgamated Association of Operative Cotton - spinners have their separate constitutions, their distinct funds, and their own official staffs. The salaried officers whom they elect to sit as representatives in the federal parliament have, therefore, quite other interests, obligations, and responsibilities than those of

58 Trade Union Structure

the official staff of the Federation itself. The secretary of the Nottinghamshire Miners' Association, for instance, finds himself able, when sitting as a member of the Conference o^^ the Miners' Federation, freely to criticise the action of the federal executive council or of the federal official staff, with-j out in any way endangering his own position as a salarieJ officer. Similarly, when the secretary of the Rochdale Cotton-spinners goes to the quarterly meeting at Manchester, he need have no hesitation in opposing and, if possible, defeating any recommendation of the executive council of the Amalgamated Association of Operative Cotton-spinners which he considers injurious to the Rochdale spinners. In the form of the representative executive, this use of salaried officers in a representative capacity is likely_ to tend, as we have seen, to the formation of a virtually irresponsible governing clique. But in the form of a federal representative assembly, where the federal executive and official staff are dependent, not on the members at large but on the assembly itself, and where the representatives are responsible to quite other constituencies and include a large proportion of the non-official element, this danger is reduced to a minimum.

We have now set before the reader an analysis of the constitutional development of Trade Union democracy. The facts will be interpreted in different ways by students of different temperaments. To us they represent the long and inarticulate struggle of unlettered men to solve the problem of how to <;qtnbin.e 3.dmimsJtra,.tive__ efficiency- with- popular control . Assent was the first requirement. The very formation of a continuous combination, in face of legal persecution and public disapproval, depended on the active concurrence of all the members. And though it is con- ceivable that a strong Trade Union might coerce a few individual workmen to continue in its ranks against their will, no such coercive influence could permanently prevail over a discontented majority, or prevent the secession, either individually or in a body, of any considerable number who were seriously disaffected. It was accordingly assumed

Representative Institutions 59

without question that everything should be submitted to the voices" of the whole body, and that each member should take an equal and identical share in the common project. As the union developed from an angry crowd u nanimously 'demandtflg the redress of a particular grievance mto an insurance company of national extent, obfigea" to followsoine^efiriite trade policy, the need for administrate efficiency' more and more forced itself on the minds of the , members. This efficiency involved an ever-increasing special ■ isation pfjunctiqn.^ .The growing mass of business and th ; difficulty and complication of the questions dealt with involved the growth of an official class, marked off by capacity, training, and^^Jiitof life Jrpm the rank and file. Failure to specialise the executive function quickly brought about extinction. On the other hand this very specialisation undermined the popular control, and thus risked the loss of the indispensable popular assent ) The early expedients of Rotation of Office, the Maas-MeeBng, arid the Referendum proved, in practice, utterly inadequate as a means of securing genuine popular "control. Atjeach particular crisis the individual member found himself overmatche3~by" the official machinery which he had created. At this^tage lrresponsible bureaucracy seemed the inevitable outcome. But democracy found yet another expedient, which in some favored unions has gone far to solve the problem.

(The specialisation of the executive into a^ permanent expert civTl^servTce was balanced by^the specialisation of the legis-

Jaiuri^ Jn the establishment of a supreme representative assembly, itself Undertaking the work of direction and control fo r wh ich the members at_large.. had proved incpm^etentj. We have seen how difficult it is for a community of manual workers to obtain such an assembly, and how large a part is

> " The progressive division of labour by which bofh science and government prosper."—Lord Acton, The Unity of Modern History (London, 1896), p. 3. " If there be one principle clearer than another, it is this : that in any business, whether of government or of mere merchandising, somebody must be trusted. … Power and strict accountability for its use, are the essential constituents of good government"—Woodrow Wilson, Congressional Government (^evYot)L, 1896), I2th edit.

6o Trade Union Structure

inevitably played in it by the ever-growing number of salaried officers. But in the representative assembly these salaried officers sit in a new capacity. The work expected from them by their employers is not that of execution, but of criticbjn and direction. To balance the professional civil servant we have, in fact, the professional representative.

This detailed analysis of humble working-class organisa- tions will to many readers be of interest only in so far as it furnishes material for political generalisations. It is there- fore important to consider to what extent the constitutional problems of Trade Union democracy are analogous to those of national or municipal politics.

The fundamental requisites of government are the same in the democratic state as in the Trade Union. In^ both cases the problem is how to combine administrative efficiency with popular control. Both alike ultimately depend on a continuance of general assent. In a voluntary, association, such as the Trade TTrilOn, this ge neral asstent is, as we have j;e(; ;n, the foremost requirement : in the demo cratic stat e rHinqiiishment of citizen s hip Js seldom a prac ticable alter n ative, whilct- the r\^p r r , \\nr \ rS changing gover nors i s_ not an pasy cxr\p Hence, even in the most democratic of states the continuous assent of the governed is not so imperative a necessity as in the Trade Union. On the other hand, the deg^ ree of adminis trative e fficiency necessary for the healthy existence of the state is far greater than in the case of the Trade Union. But whilst admitting this transposition in relative importance, it still remains true that, in the democratic state as in the Trade Union, government cannot continue to exist without com- bining a certain degree of popular assent with adequate administrative efficiency.

More important is the fact that the popular asspnt is in both cases of the same nature. In the democratic state, as in the Trade Union, the eventual judgment of the people is pronounced not upon projects but upon results. It avails not that a particular proposal may have received the prior

Representative Institutions 6i

authorisation of an express popular vote ; if th e results are

not ■■;iirVi^ as tVip p enplis. Hp-si rp, thp p Y prnt-ivp wt1t~n <;?)- rnnHniip

to rece ive their .s upport. Nor does this, in the democratic state any more than in the Trade Union, imply that an all-wise government would necessarily secure this popular assent If any particular stage in the march of civilisation happens to be momentarily distasteful to the bulk of the citizens, the executive which ventures to step in that direction will be no less ruthlessly dismissed than if its deeds had beei?_ evil. All that we have said as to the logical futility of the Referendum, and as to the necessity for the representative, therefore applies, we suggest, even more strongly to demo- cratic states than to Trade Unions. For what is the lesson . to be learned from Trade Union history ? (The Referendum, introduced for the express purpose of ensuring popular assent, has in almost all cases failed to accomplish its object This failure is due, as the reader will have observed, to the constant inability of the ordinary man to estimate what will be the effect of a particular proposal. W h at D emoeraey^^ requir es is assent tn rf.xul fr • Tnhnf ih« -f?i>fiatiM,liJM^gviii>t is 'a ssent to proiectsT ~\^o Trade Union has, for instance, deliberately desired^ laankruptcy ; but many Trade Unions have persistently voted for scales of contributions and benefits which have inevitably resulted in bankruptcy. If this is the case in the relatively simple issues of Trade Union admini- stration, still more does it apply to the infinitely complicated questions of national politics.

But though in the case of the Referendum the analogy is sufificiently exact to warrant the transformation of the empirical conclusions of Trade Union history into a political generalisation, it is only fair to point out some minor differences between the two cases. We have had occasion to describe how, in Trade Union history, the use of the Referendum, far from promoting popular control, has some- times resulted in increasing the dominant power of the permanent civil service, and in making its position practically! impregnable against any uprising opinion among its con-

62 Trade Union Structure

stftuents. This particular danger would, we imagine, scarcely occur in a democratic state. In the Trade Union the Executive committee occupies a unique position. It alone kas access to official information ; it alone commands expert professional skill and experience ; and, most important of all, St. monopolises in the society's official circular what corre- 'sponds to the newspaper press. The existence of political parties fairly equal in knowledge, ability, and electoral organisation, and each served by its own press, would always save the democratic state from this particular perversion of the Referendum to the advantage of the existing government. But any party or sect of opinion which, from lack of funds, education, or social influence, could not call to its aid the forces which we have named, would, we suggest, find itself as helpless in face of a Referendum as the discontented section of a strong Trade Union.

We have seen, moreover, that there is in Trade.Union government a certain special class of questions in which-the Referendum has a distinct use. Where a decisioiL will involve at some future time the personal co-operation_of the members in some positive act essentially optional in its nature—still more where that act involves a voluntary personal sacrifice, or where not a majority alorie~^but practically the whole body of the members must on.paiiTof failure join in it—the Referendum may be useful, not as a legislative act, but as an index of the probability that the members will actually do what will be required of ffiem. The decision to strike is obviously a case in point. Another instance may be found in the decisions of Trade Unions or other bodies that each member shall use his municipal or parliamentary franchise in a particular manner. Here the success or failure of the policy of the organisation depends not on the passive acquiescence of the rank and file in acts done by the executive committee or the officers, but upon each member's active performance of a personal task. We cannot think of any case of this kind within the sphere of the modern democratic state. If indeed, as Mr. Auberon Herbert

Representative Institutions 63

proposes, it were left to the option of each citizen to determine from time to time the amount and the application of his

 contributions to the treasury, the Chancellor of the Exchequer

would probably find it convenient, prior to making up the estimates, to take a Referendum as a guide to how much would probably be paid. Or, to take an analogy very near to that of the Trade Union decision to strike, if each soldier in the army were at liberty to leave at a day's notice, it would probably be found expedient to take a vote of the rank and file before engaging in a foreign war. In the modern democratic state, however, as it actually exists, it is not left to the option of the individual citizen whether or not he will act in the manner decided on. T he su ccess or failure of t he policy does not there fr"-" Ae-^c^-nA r.n obtaining universal assent and personal participation in tha ar t itself. Whether thg^ citizen likes it eve nnt-, \\e- Tc -<a<: M -n | i HllHi1 tn pay the t axes and obey ^he laws whirh ha^re been H p ri deH on by the co mpetent au thority. Whether or not he will maintaia that authority i n power, will depend no t on His original impulsive judgment as to the expedien cy_o f the ta x or the law, but oiT ^s deliberate approval or disapproval of the subse ^uenfTesul ts.

If 'Trade Union history throws doubt on the advantages of tKe~Eeiefendum, still less dofes it favor the institution of the delegate as distinguished from the representative. Even in the"comparatively simple issues of Trade Union admini- stration, it has been found, in practice, quite impossible to obtain definite instructions from the members on all the matters which come up for decision. When, for instance, the sixty delegates of the Amalgamated Society of Engineers met in 1892 to revise the constitution and trade policy of their society, they were supposed to confine themselves to such amendments as had previously received the sanction of one or other of the branches. But although the amendments so sanctioned filled over five hundred printed pages, it was found impossible to construct from this material alone any consistent constitution or line of policy. The delegates were

>^'4 Trade Union Structure

necessarily compelled to exercise larger freedom and to frame a set of rules not contemplated by any one of the branches. And this experience of the Engineers is only a type of what has been going on throughout the whole Trade Union world. The increased facilities for communication, on the one hand, and the growth of representative institutions, on the other, have made the delegate obsolete. Wherever a Trade Union has retained the old ideal of direct government by the people, it has naturally preferred to the Delegate Meeting the less expensive and more thoroughgoing device of the Referendum. For the most part the increasing complication and intricacy of modern industrial affairs has, as we have seen, compelled the substitution of representative institutions. These con- siderations apply with even greater force to the democratic state. )

r>. Trade Union history gives, therefore, little support to the Referendum or the Delegate Meetjng, and points rather to government by a Representative Assembly as the kst word of democracy.^ It is therefore important to see whether these Trade Union parliamAits have any lesson for the political student. The governing assemblies of even the most democratic states have, unlike Trade Union parliaments, hitherto been drawn almost exclusively from the middle or upper classes, and have therefore escaped the special difficulties of communities of wage-earners. If, however, we assume that the manual workers, who number four-fifths of the population, will gradually become the dominant influence in the elector- ate, and will contribute an important and increasing section of the representatives, the governing assemblies of the Coal-

 " There are two elements co-existent in the conduct of human affairs—policy

and administration—but, though the confines of their respective jurisdictions overlap, the functions of each must of necessity be exercised within its own domain by its own hierarchy—the one consisting of trained specialists and experts, intimately conversant with the historical traditions of their own depart- ment and with the minutest details of the subjects with which they are concerned, the other qualified by their large converse with whatever is influential and intelligent in their own country or on the European Continent, and, above all, by their Parliamentary talents and their tactful appreciation of public opinion, to determine the general lines along which the destinies of their country should be led."—Speech by the Marquis of Dufferin, Times, I2th June 1897.

Representative Institutions 65

miners or Cotton Operatives to-day may be to a large extent prophetic of the future legislative assembly in any English- speaking community.

One inference seems to us clear. Any effective participa- tion of the wage-earning class in the councils of the nation involves the establishment of a new calling, that of the professional rpprp«;f^ntflt"^ For the parish or town councH it is possible to elect men who will continue to work at their trades, just as a Trade Union branch can be administered by committee-men a^nd officers in full work. The adoption of the usual Co-operative and Trade Union practice of paying travelling expenses and an allowance for the actual time spent on the public business would suffice to enable workmen to attend the district or county council. But the governing assembly of any important state must always demand practically the whole time of its members. The working-man representative in the House of Commons is therefore most closely analogous, not to the working miner or spinner who attends the Coal jor Cotton Parliament, bu^ to the permanent and sglaried' official representatives, who, in both these assemblies,"~e5cEn:ise-thfr pi edouiluaul inliuence, and control the executive work. The analogy may therefore seem to point to the election to the House of Commons of the trained representative who has been successful in the parliament of his trade.

Such a suggestion misses the whole moral of Trade Union history. The cotton or coal -mining official repre- sentative succeeds in influencing his own trade assembly because he has mastered the technical details of all the business that comes before it ; because his whole life has been one long training for the duties which he has to discharge ; because, in short, he has become a professionals expert in ascertaining and representing the desires of his constituents and in bringing about the conditions of their fulfilment. But transport this man to the House of- Commons, and he finds himself confronted with facts and problems as foreign to his experience and training as his VOL. I D

66 Trade Union Structure

own business would be to the banker or the country gentle- man. What the working class will presently recognise is that the duties of a parliamentary representative constitute as much a new business to the Trade Union official as the duties of a general secretary are to the ordinary ftiechanic. When workmen desire to be as efficiently represented in the Parliament of the nation as they are in their own trade assemblies, they will find themselves compelled to establish a class of expert parliamentary representatives, just as they have had to establish a class of expert trade officials.

We need not consider in any detail what effect an influx of " labor members " of this new type would probably have upon the British House of Commons. Any one who has watched the deliberations of the Coal or the Cotton Parlia- ment, or the periodical revising committees of the other great unions, will have been impressed by the disinclination of the professional representative to mere talk, his impatience of dilatory procedure, and his determination to " get the business through" within working hours. Short speeches, rigorous closure, and an almost extravagant substitution of printed matter for lengthy " front bench " explanations render these assemblies among the most efficient of demo- cratic bodies.^

More important is it to consider in what respects, judging from Trade Union analogies, the expert professional representative will differ from the unpaid politician to whom the middle and upper classes have hitherto been accustomed. We have already described how in the Trade Union world the representative has a twofold function, neither part of which may be neglected with impunity. He makes it just as much his business to ascertain and express the real desires of his constituents as he does to control and direct the operations of the civil servants of his trade. With the

1 These representative assemblies present a great contrast to the Trade Union Congress, as to which see the subsequent chapter on " The Method qI Legal Enactment."

Representative Institutigns 67

entrance into the House of Commons of men of this type, the work of ascertaining and expressing the wishes of the constituencies would be much more deliberately pursued than at present. The typical member of Parliament to-day attend? to such actual expressions of opinion as reach him from his constituency in a clear and definite form, but regards it as no part of his work actively to discover what the silent or inarticulate electors are vaguely desiring. He visits his constituency at rare intervals, and then only to expound his own views in set speeches at public meetings, whilst his personal intercourse is almost entirely limited to persons of his own class or to political wire-pullers. Whatever may be his intentions, he is seldom in touch with any but the middle or upper class, together with that tiny section of all classes to whom " politics " is of constant interest. Of the actual grievances and "dim in- articulate " aspirations of the bulk of the people, the lower middle and the wage-earning class, he has practically no conception. When representation of working-class opinion becomes a profession, as in the Trade Union world, we see a complete revolution in the attitude of the representative towards his constituents. iTo fiad-QUt,^iat his constituents desire becomes an essential paxt-oLhis vrorlc.) "Ifwill not do to wait until they write to him, for the working-man is slow to put pen to paper. Hence the professional Trade Union representative takes active steps to learn what the silent members- are thinking. He spends his whole time, when not actually in session, in his constituency. He makes few set speeches at public gatherings, but he is diligent in attending branch meetings, and becomes an attentive listener at local committees. At his office he is accessible to every one of his constituents. It is, moreover, part of the regular routine of such a functionary to be constantly communicating with every one of his constituents by means of frequent circulars on points which he believes to be of special interest to them. If, therefore, the professional representative, as we know him in the Trade Union world, becomes a feature of

68 Trade Union Structure

the House of Commons, the future member of Parliament will feel himself not only the authoritative exponent of the votes of his constituents, but also their "London Correspondent," their parliamentary agent, and their expert adviser 1h all matters of legislation or general politics.^

It is impossible to forecast all the consequences that would follow from raising (or, as some would say, degrading) the parliamentary representative from an amateur to a pro- fessional. But among other things the whole etiquette of the situation would be changed. At present it is a point of honor in a member of Parliament not to express his constituents' desires when he conscientiously differs from them. To the " gentleman politician " the only alternative to voting as he himself thinks best is resigning his seat. This delicacy is unknown to any paid professional cigent The architect, solicitor, or permanent civil servant, after t endering his advice and supporting his views with all his expert authority, finally carries out whatever policy his employer commands. Thi s is also the view which the professional representative of the T rade Union world ta kes ot his own duties. It is his business not only to put before his constituents what he believes to be their best policy and to back up his opinion with all the argumentative power he can bring to bear, but also to put his entire energy into wrestling with what he conceives to be their ignorance, and to become for the time a vigorous propagandist of his own policy. But if, when he has done his best in this way, he fails to get a majority over to his view, he loyally accepts the decision and records his vote in accordance with his constituents' desires. We imagine that professional repre- sentatives of working-class opinion in the House of Commons would take the same course.^

' " Representatives ought to give light and leading to the people, just as the people give stimulus and momentum to their representatives."—J. Bryce, TH American Commonwealth (London, 1891), vol. i. p. 297.

 It is interesting to notice that in the country in which the "sovereignty of

Representative Institution!! 69

This may at first seem to indicate a return of the pro- fessional representative to the position of a delegate. Trade Union experi ence points, however, to the very reverse. In the grggit ^majority of cases a constituency cannot be said to have any clear and decided views on particular*^ projects. What th ey ask from their representative is that he shal l act in the manner which, in his opinion, will best serve to promote the irgeneral desires. It is only in particular instances, usually when some well-intentioned proposal entails im- mediately inconvenient results, that a wave of decided opinion spreads through a working-class constituency. It is exactly in cases of this kind that a propagandist campaign by a professional debater, equipped with all the facts, is of the greatest utility. Such a campaign would be the very last thing that a member of Parliament of the present type would venture upon if he thought that his constituents were against him. He would feel that the less the points of difference were made prominent, the better for his own.- safety. But once it came to be under^bod that the final command of the constituency would beWobeyed, the repre- sentative would run no risk of losing his seat, merely because he did his best to convert his constituents. Judging from^ Trade Union experience he would, in nine cases out Cff Ten, succeed~in converting them to His own view, and thus perform a valuable ~peeg" of "political education. In the tenth " case the campaigri would have been no less educa- tional, though in another way ; and, whichever was the fight view, the issue would have been made clear, the facts brought out, and the way opened for the eventual conversion of one or other of the contending parties.

Trade Union experience indicates, therefore, a still further development in the evolution of the representative. Working-

the people " has been most whole-heartedly accepted, the Trade Union practice prevails. The members of the Swiss " Bundesrath " (Federal Cabinet) do not resign when any project is disapproved of by the legislature, nor do the members of the " Nationalrath " throw up their legislative functions when a measure is rejected by the electors on Referendum. Both cabinet ministers and legislators set themselves to carry out the popular will.

70 Trade Union Structure

class democracy will expect him not only to be able to understand and interpret the desires of his electors, and effectively to direct and control the administrating executive : he must also count it as part of his duty to be the experjt parliamentary adviser of his constituency, and at times an active propagandist of his own advice. Thus, if any inference from Trade Union history is valid in the larger sphere, the whole tendency of working-class democracy will unconsciously be to exalt the real power of the representative, and more and more to differentiate his functions from those of the ordinary citizen on the one hand, and of the expert admini- strator on the other. The typical representative assembly of the future will, it may be suggested, be as far removed from the House of Commons of to-day as the latter is from the mere Delegate Meeting. We have already travelled far from the one man taken by rotation from the roll, and changed mechanically to convey " the voices " of the whole body. We may in the future leave equally behind the member to whom wealth, position, or notoriety secures, almost by accident, a seat in Parliament, in which he can, in such intervals as his business or pleasure may leave him, decide what he thinks best for the nation, fin his stead we may watch appearing in 'increasing numbers t he pro fessional representative—a man selected for natural aptitude, delibgrately trained for his new~- work as a special vocation, devoting his whole time to the discharge of his manifold duties, and actively maintaining an intimate and reciprocal intellectual relationship with his constituency.

How far such a development of the representative will fit in with the party system as we now know it ; how far it will increase the permanence and continuity of parliamentary life ; how far it will promote collective action and tend to increasing bureaucracy ; how far, on the other hand, it will bring the ordinary man into active political citizenship, and rehabilitate the House of Commons in popular estimation ; how far, therefore, it will increase the real authority of the people over the representative assembly, and of the repre-

Representative Institutions 71

sentative assembly over the permanent civil service ; how far, in fine, it will give us that combination of administrative efficiency with popular control which is at once the requisite and the ideal of all democracy—all these are questions that make the future interesting.