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FOR the Science of Society, the name «Sociology» was introduced by M. Comte. Partly because it was in possession of the field, and partly because no other name sufficiently comprehensive existed, I adopted it. Though repeatedly blamed by those who condemn the word as «a barbarism», I do not regret having done so. To use, as some have suggested, the word «Politics», too narrow in its meaning as well as misleading in its connotations, would be deliberately to create confusion for the sake of avoiding a defect of no practical moment. The heterogeneity of our speech is already so great that nearly every thought is expressed in words taken from two or three languages. Already, too, it has many words formed in irregular ways from heterogeneous roots. Seeing this, I accept without much reluctance another such word: believing that the convenience and suggestiveness of our symbols are of more importance than the legitimacy of their derivation.

Probably some surprise will be felt that, containing as this work does multitudinous quotations from numerous authors, there are no references at the bottoms of pages. Some words of explanation seem needful. If foot-notes are referred to, the thread of the argument is completely broken; and even if they are not referred to, attention is disturbed by the consciousness that they are there to be looked at. Hence a loss of effect and a loss of time. As I intended to use as data for the conclusions set forth in this work, the compiled and classified facts forming the Descriptive Sociology, it occurred to me that since the arrangement of those facts is such that the author's name and the race referred to being given, the extract may in each case be found, and with it the reference, it was needless to waste space and hinder thought with these distracting foot-notes. I therefore decided to omit them. In so far as evidence furnished by the uncivilized races is concerned (which forms the greater part of the evidence contained in this volume), there exists this means of verification in nearly all cases. I found, however, that many facts from other sources had to be sought out and incorporated; and not liking to change the system I had commenced with, I left them in an unverifiable state. I recognize the defect, and hope hereafter to remedy it. In succeeding volumes I propose to adopt a method of reference which will give the reader the opportunity of consulting the authorities cited, while his attention to them will not be solicited.

The instalments of which this volume consists were issued to the subscribers at the following dates: – No. 35 (pp. 1–80) in June, 1874; No. 36 (pp. 81–160) in November, 1874; No. 37 (pp. 161–240) in February, 1875; No. 38 (pp. 241–320) in May, 1875; No. 39 (pp. 321–400) in September, 1875; No. 40 (pp. 401–462, with Appendices A & B) in December, 1875; No. 41 (pp. 465–544) in. April, 1876; No. 42 (pp. 545–624) in July, 1876; and No. 43 (pp. 625–704) in December, 1876; an extra No. (44) issued in June, 1877, completing the volume.

With this No. 44, the issue of the System of Synthetic Philosophy to subscribers, ceases: the intention being to publish the remainder of it in volumes only. The next volume will, I hope, be completed in 1880.

London, December, 1876.