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The growing menace of the situation in the Far East had been for months attracting the anxious attention of the whole world, and at the beginning of 1904 it became evident that war was inevitable, unless one or other of the disputants was prepared to make a complete surrender of its essential claims. The unlikelihood of this remote possibility being fulfilled was confirmed by the steady and, on the Russian side at least, the feverish preparations for hostilities which were carried on as an accompaniment to the repeated protestations of pacific intentions by the Czar's Government and its diplomatic agents abroad. Those who still believed in peace were sustained by the conviction that one of the parties to the dispute was bluffing. Sympathizers with Russia pointed to the tremendous power and inexhaustible resources of the Northern Empire, and asked whether it were possible that a young and small country like Japan should dare to try conclusions with so gigantic an antagonist. On the other hand, the friends of Japan emphasized the weakness of the Russian position in the Far East and the well-known financial embarrassments beneath which her Exchequer was laboring. It is, therefore, apropos to survey at this point the military and strategic position in the Far East which revealed itself immediately before the final rupture of diplomatic negotiations and the beginning of active hostilities.

In any conflict between Russia and Japan it was obvious that the first struggle must be for the mastery of the sea, and it is, therefore, interesting to consider primarily the relative naval strength of the two Powers in Far Eastern waters. The navy of Japan has been built, not only on English models, but for the most part in English yards; and since the Chino-Japanese War it has been increased by a number of vessels of the latest and most powerful type. The result is that the most formidable feature of Japan's naval strength is its complete homogeneity. The tabular statement on page 41, gives the names and principal characteristics of what may be called Japan's first fighting line at sea.

Towards the close of 1903 the Japanese Government, with great enterprise, managed to secure a powerful accession to this fleet by purchasing from Argentina two freshly constructed cruisers of the most modern and efficient type. These two vessels, which have been re-christened the Nisshin and Kasaga, were hastily equipped for sea at Genoa, and, commanded for the time being by retired English officers and manned by English crews, started in January for the long voyage to the Far East. Although war had not yet been declared, it was clearly imminent, and the Russian squadron in the Mediterranean received orders to watch the new cruisers closely, with the object, of course, of capturing them in case hostilities broke out before the vessels had reached Japan. The taste of their quality, however, which the Nisshin and Kasaga were able to give to the Russians proved how valuable an addition they were to the Japanese navy, for they easily outdistanced their slow-footed pursuers, and what promised at one time to be an exciting race degenerated practically into a walk over. The new cruisers arrived safely at Yokohama on February 16th, and were at once sent into dock to refit and prepare for active service. These splendid fighting machines must, therefore, be added to the list.

JAPAN'S UP-TO-DATE NAVY.

BATTLESHIPS.
			Nominal	Gun	Weight of
Name	Displacement	I.H.P.	Speed	Protection	Broadside Fire
Hatsuse	15,000	15,000	18.0	14—6	4,240
Asahi	15,000	15,000	18.0	14—6	4,240
Shikishima	15,000	15,000	18.0	14—6	4,240
Mikasa	15,200	16,000	18.0	14—6	4,225
Yashima	12,300	13,000	18.0	14—6	4,000
Fuji	12,300	13,000	18.0	14—6	4,000
ARMORED CRUISERS.
Tokiwa	9,750	18,000	21.5	6—6	3,568
Asama	9,750	18,000	21.5	6—6	3,568
Yakuma	9,850	16,000	20.0	6—6	3,368
Adzuma	9,436	17,000	21.0	6—6	3,368
Idzumo	9,800	15,000	24.7	6—6	3,568
Iwate	9,800	15,000	24.7	6—6	3,568
PROTECTED CRUISERS.
Takasago	4,300	15,500	24.0	4-1/2—2	800
Kasagi	4,784	15,500	22.5	4-1/2	800
Chitose	4,784	15,500	22.5	4-1/2	800
Itsukushima	4,277	5,400	16.7	11—4	1,260
Hashidate	4,277	5,400	16.7	11—4	1,260
Matsushima	4,277	5,400	16.7	11—4	1,260
Yoshino	4,180	15,750	23.0	—	780
Naniwa	3,727	7,120	17.8	—	1,196
Takachiho	3,727	7,120	17.8	—	1,196
Akitsushima	3,150	8,400	19.0	—	780
Niitaka	3,420	9,500	20.0	—	920
Tsushima	3,420	9,500	20.0	—	920
Suma	3,700	8,500	20.0	—	335
Akashi	2,700	8,500	20.0	—	335

The table, it will be observed, does not include a number of coast defence vessels, nor—more important for offensive purposes—the torpedo flotilla, which is of great strength and of remarkable efficiency, and includes over a score of 30-knot destroyers of the most modern type. The first four battleships in the list were completed less than two years before the war, while the armored cruisers were built between 1899 and 1901. The protected cruisers include several of the vessels that defeated the Chinese fleet at the battle of the Yalu.

For the accommodation of her fleet Japan possesses four well-equipped dockyards, capable not only of repairing damaged vessels of any class, but of constructing new ones; and this is, perhaps, the greatest advantage which the island kingdom has over Russia in the present struggle.

The naval strength of Russia in the Far East at the outbreak of hostilities is shown in the tabular statement appearing on page 44, which, again, does not include vessels of the smallest class nor the torpedo-boat flotilla.

It will be remarked that the Russian battleships offered a great variety in design and fighting power—a serious disadvantage, for in manœuvring the efficiency of the whole squadron sinks to the level of that of the least effective vessel it contains. The Czarevitch and the Retvisan, which were the latest vessels to arrive at Port Arthur, were also the most powerful members of the fleet. The former vessel was built in France after the latest French model, and the latter in Philadelphia. This fleet was divided, at the outbreak of war, between Port Arthur and Vladivostock, the four powerful cruisers, Gromoboi, Bogatyr, Rossia, and Rurik being stationed at the latter port.

While negotiations were still proceeding, though at a critical point, Russia prepared to send out very formidable reinforcements to the Far East from her Mediterranean Fleet. These reinforcements included the Osliabia, a battleship of over 12,000 tons displacement, with a speed of 19 knots; the Dmitri Donskoi, an armored cruiser of 6,000 tons displacement and a speed of 15 knots; the Aurora, a swift protected cruiser of the largest class; several cruisers of the volunteer fleet, with troops, naval drafts, and supplies; and a number of torpedo craft. This squadron had begun to assemble at Port Said before the outbreak of war, and the vessels at once began to pass through the Canal. But before they were ready to sail for the China seas, war broke out, and the departure was delayed. The initial Russian reverses at sea made it practically impossible for this reinforcing fleet to proceed to the seat of war, as it would have been liable to interception by the Japanese fleet in overwhelming strength. Accordingly, after cruising aimlessly about in the Red Sea for some weeks, the ships were ordered to return to the Baltic; and in the beginning of March they passed through the Suez Canal again on their way north.

RUSSIA'S AVAILABLE NAVY.

BATTLESHIPS.
			Nominal	Gun	Weight of
Name	Displacement	I.H.P.	Speed	Protection	Broadside Fire
	Tons		Knots.	In.	Lbs.
Poltava	10,950	11,200	17.0	10—5	3,367
Petropavlovsk	10,950	11,200	17.0	10—5	3,367
Sevastopol	10,950	11,200	17.0	10—5	3,367
Peresviet	12,674	14,500	19.0	10—5	2,672
Pobieda	12,674	14,500	19.0	10—5	2,672
Retvisan	12,700	16,000	18.0	10—5	3,434
Czarevitch	13,100	16,300	18.0	11—6-3/4	3,516
ARMORED CRUISERS.
			Nominal	Gun	Weight of
Name	Displacement	I.H.P.	Speed	Protection	Broadside Fire
	Tons		Knots.	In.	Lbs.
Bogatyr	6,750	19,500	23.0	5—4	872
Askold	6,500	9,500	23.0	—	772
Varyag	6,500	20,000	23.0	5	510
Diana	6,630	11,600	20.0	4-1/2	632
Pallada	6,630	11,600	20.0	4-1/2	632
Boyarin	3,200	11,500	22.0	—	180
Novik	3,000	18,000	25.0	—	180
ARMORED CRUISERS.
			Nominal	Gun	Weight of
Name	Displacement	I.H.P.	Speed	Protection	Broadside Fire
	Tons		Knots.	In.	Lbs.
Gromoboi	12,336	18,000	20.0	6—3/4	1,197
Bayan	7,800	17,000	22.0	7—3	952
Rossia	12,200	18,000	20.0	2	1,348
Rurik	10,940	3,500	18.0	3	1,345

Though nominally the fleets of the two Powers were fairly equal, Japan possessed several very considerable advantages which, in the opinion of experts, changed that paper equality to marked superiority on her side. In the first place, the Chino-Japanese war only ten years ago had given her naval officers and men an invaluable experience of fighting on the grand scale under modern conditions; in the next place, their fleet was much more of a pattern; and in the third place it was operating from a base fully capable of providing all the needs and reinforcements entailed by losses in war, including a ready coal supply.

Russia, on the other hand, had for its only bases Port Arthur and Vladivostock, the one inadequate to the multifarious needs of her fleet, and the other ice-bound in winter, and so situated geographically as to be completely isolated from what promised to be the main scene of operations. Although Port Arthur had been rendered almost impregnable as a fortress, the Russians had not had time to complete it as a naval dockyard, and at the outbreak of war it possessed only one dry dock, and that not capable of accommodating vessels of the largest size. At Vladivostock the channel out of the harbor could only be kept free by ice-breakers. In the event of naval disasters, Russia, therefore, had no possibility of repairing her lame ducks, while the radius of her fleet's activity was limited by the fact that her only supplies of coal were to be obtained at Port Arthur. In the situation, therefore, which presented itself at the outbreak of war, this powerful naval force was practically deprived of mobility. It could not leave Port Arthur for more than a short cruise; and while it remained there it must be specially vulnerable to attack, lying in an open roadstead and huddled together in order to enjoy the protection of the guns of the fortress.

With regard to the land forces of the two belligerent Powers, it was only possible to reckon with certainty those of Japan; for it remained doubtful, until the progress of active operations revealed the facts, how much of Russia's enormous military strength had been concentrated in the Far East. Broadly speaking, Japan could put into the field in the last resort an army of between 400,000 and 450,000 men. The standing army amounts to almost 200,000 men, and it was immediately available for mobilization. To this number another 35,000 men was added by the reserve, while the militia of all arms could be reckoned at 200,000 men. The Japanese infantry soldier is armed with the Midji magazine rifle, and the artillery with the Arisaka quick-firing gun; but the adoption of this latter weapon has been so recent that the whole of the artillery is not yet supplied with it, and in this one respect at least the Russian gunners are believed to possess a very great advantage. The Japanese army has been organized largely on German models. It proved its efficiency as a fighting machine in the Chino-Japanese War; while the Japanese troops that took part in the relief of the Peking Legations earned the unstinted praise of all the military experts who watched their behavior. Until the present war, however, the Japanese army had never undergone the supreme ordeal of facing a European adversary.

Of the Russian military organization, the strength and weakness have long been known to the world, and the great question for strategists in contemplating the present hostilities was the number of troops which the Northern Power could bring into the field to confront her foe. Various estimates had been given, from the overwhelming army of 400,000 men confidently claimed by Russia's partisans, to a force of little more than a quarter of that strength. But though the actual figures were in doubt, it was possible by collating the information from various sources to arrive at an approximate estimate of the truth. At the time of the Boxer outbreak in 1900 Russia had 35,000 men in the Far East, and that force was, within little more than a year, trebled. Since the possibility of trouble with Japan had loomed on the horizon, reinforcements had been steadily dribbling over the Trans-Siberian Railway and over seas in the volunteer transports, until the army under the command of the Viceroy of the Far East could not number much less than 150,000 men of all arms, with 286 guns. Of this force, at least a half must have been absorbed in the defence of the long line of railway communications and in garrisoning fortresses; but the troops available for active operations consisted largely of Russia's most formidable fighting material—namely, the Cossacks, who possess an endurance and mobility which must be of the utmost value in such a country as that in which the present war was to be fought out.

ADMIRAL TOGO.		ADMIRAL KAMIMURA.
	ADMIRAL MAKAROFF.
ADMIRAL SKRYDLOFF.		ADMIRAL ROZHDESTVENSKY.

JAPANESE AND RUSSIAN ADMIRALS.

In the latter part of January the well-informed correspondent of the London Times at Peking telegraphed an estimate of the Russian forces east of Lake Baikal, which, in its circumstantiality and exhaustiveness, bore the evidence of truth. According to this authority, Russia had available at that time a total of 3,115 officers, 147,479 men, and 266 guns; and these numbers included the railway guards over the whole of the Manchurian railways and the garrisons of the principal fortresses. The infantry of this force numbered 108,000 officers and men, and the cavalry 22,000 officers and men, of whom nearly the whole were Cossacks. The garrisons of Port Arthur and Vladivostock alone absorbed 45,000 men, and remembering that the railway line to be guarded, east of Lake Baikal, was over 1,500 miles in length, and traverses a country of which the inhabitants were more or less hostile, it is evident that the troops available to take the field at the end of January could not have exceeded, on this estimate, more than 50,000 men. Lake Baikal is 400 miles in length, and though a railway round its southern extremity was in course of construction, it was far from completion at the outbreak of hostilities. The lake is frozen over during the winter months, when transit has to be effected by sledges. But in the emergency the Russians laid railway lines across the lake, and thus by the end of February had established a through service of sorts. But even then the number of reinforcements and the quantity of supplies that could be moved up to the theatre of war were strictly limited by the delays inseparable from the working of a single track railway, and it is doubtful whether more than 25,000 men at the outside had been added to the field force by the beginning of March.

The strategical problem which presented itself at the outbreak of hostilities was a comparatively simple one—for Japan at any rate. The power of Russia in the Far East depended on the maintenance of two great arteries of communication with the heart of the Russian Empire. One of these was the over-sea passage from the Black Sea or the Baltic through the Suez Canal and the East Indian Archipelago—a voyage occupying six weeks at least, and however feasible in time of peace, rendered particularly difficult and even precarious under war conditions owing to the possibility of interception and the absence of any intermediate coaling stations. The other connecting link between Port Arthur and St. Petersburg was the Trans-Siberian Railway, that gigantic enterprise which, completed in 1899, brought the capital of Russia within 15 days' journey of its furthermost outpost in the Yellow Sea. From Moscow to Port Arthur is a distance of some 4,000 miles, but at two-thirds of its length the railway is interrupted by the great inland sea known as Lake Baikal. At this point transshipment across the lake had to take place, a circumstance that offered an insurmountable hindrance to rapid transit. In the building of the railway, too, soundness had been sacrificed to rapidity of construction; the line was only a single track one, with stations and sidings at intervals of about 25 miles; and even when the whole service was monopolized for military purposes the number of trains that could be passed over the railway in one day was a fixed and very limited quantity. Even with this line open, therefore, the rate at which Russia could reinforce her troops in the Far East had to be determined by other circumstances than military urgency, and the number of her reinforcements also had to be governed by the capacity of the line to bring up not only men, but supplies; for Manchuria itself does not provide the means of support for a large army. The experience of the American Army in Cuba and of the British Army in South Africa proved what tremendous difficulties may be encountered in carrying supplies to a large force at a distance much less remote from its base than Russia's was. For years past Russia has sent out her troops and supplies to the Far East mainly by sea. For twelve months before the war broke out a constant stream of transports, colliers and supply ships had passed from the Black Sea to the Gulf of Pechili, and this stream was only interrupted on the outbreak of war—a significant admission of the incompleteness of the Russian preparations, as well as of the inadequacy of the Trans-Siberian Railway to supply her needs.

It was evident, therefore, that Japan's first object was to shut off Port Arthur from the sea, and her next to cut the railway communication to the North. This done, the Russian fortress, however impregnable to assault, must ultimately fall to investment. From Port Arthur, which, as a glance at the map will show, lies at the very tip of Liao-tung Peninsula, the railway runs due north for six hundred miles through Niuchwang and Mukden to Harbin, where it joins the branch line to Vladivostock. Though Russia has for several years been in occupation of this territory, her hold upon it is by no means secure. The population is distinctly unfriendly, and for the mere defence of the line thousands of troops are necessary. Indeed, it was this necessity that Russia urged as an excuse for her military occupation of Manchuria.

Within the triangle of which Harbin is the apex, of which the lines to Port Arthur and Vladivostock are sides, and of which the course of the Yalu River is the base, the sphere of immediate military operations practically had to be confined, as the ice-bound condition of the coast to the west of Port Arthur made a landing in force there impossible till the spring. The necessity of maintaining communications tied the Russian forces very largely to the railway lines. But for either belligerent the helpless kingdom of Korea, which lies south of a line drawn between Port Arthur and Vladivostock, for aggressive operations, afforded the most convenient line of advance. Through Korea Russia could menace Japan, and through Korea Japan could most easily march against Port Arthur. Naturally, therefore, Russia's first care was to mass her available troops on the line of the Yalu, and concentrate reinforcements at Harbin ready to be moved to whatever point might prove the objective of the Japanese attack.

But the command of the sea was the essential condition to attack by land by either combatant. With the Russian fleet masked or destroyed, Japan could choose as a landing-place for her armies any of the numerous ports on the western coast of Korea, and so approach in force the Yalu River, which divides Korea from Manchuria and the Liao-tung Peninsula. With imperfect command of the sea, Japan would have a second resource. She could land her troops at Masampo, separated only by a hundred miles of sea from her own ports, or she could, at a push, land her forces on the east coast of Korea, at Yuen San or Gensan. But the former plan of operations would have entailed a long overland march before the objective was reached, and the latter the maintenance of communications over difficult and mountainous country. Evidently, then, immeasurable importance attached to the result of the first naval engagements, and to their influence in giving the command of the sea to the one or the other of the two belligerent Powers.

On February 5th M. Kurino, the Japanese Minister at the Court of St. Petersburg, announced to the Government of the Czar that Japan could wait no longer for the long-delayed Russian reply, and that further negotiations were broken off. This startling news reached Europe and America on the evening of Sunday, February 7th; and while its significance was still being anxiously discussed in every capital, and while statesmen and jurists were still trying to convince one another that the rupture of diplomatic negotiations did not necessarily imply the beginning of war, there burst like a thunder-clap the further news that the first grim and irretrievable blow had been struck. Having decided that the arbitrament of war was inevitable, Japan acted on her decision with swift and terrible effect. On the night of Monday, February 8th, a daring attack by torpedo-boats was made on the Russian fleet lying at anchor in the Port Arthur roadstead, and at one fell swoop the boasted might of Russia at sea was hopelessly broken. This astounding intelligence was first conveyed to the world in an official telegram from Admiral Alexeieff to the Czar, couched in the following terms:—

"I most devotedly inform your Majesty that about midnight between the 26th and 27th of January (February 8th and 9th) Japanese torpedo-boats delivered a sudden mine attack on the squadron lying in the Chinese roads at Port Arthur, the battleships Retvisan and Czarevitch and the cruiser Pallada being holed. The degree of seriousness of the holes has to be ascertained. Particulars will be forwarded to your Imperial Majesty."

The stunning effect of this news was only enhanced when fuller details of the incident so baldly and laconically announced came to hand. No news of the movements of the Japanese fleet had been allowed to leak out, and its presence before Port Arthur was wholly unexpected by others as well as the Russians. On the 3rd of February the Russian fleet had put to sea, and for twenty-four hours the world was agog with the news of so momentous a movement. But the speculation died suddenly when it appeared that the fleet had returned immediately to its anchorage. The Japanese, with characteristic alertness, realized the splendid opportunity which the necessarily exposed position of the Russian ships afforded to an enterprising enemy.

While everything was still tranquil at Port Arthur, and the Russian authorities were confidently announcing that the foe could not be expected for three or four days, the blow fell. According to the graphic account of an eye-witness, every one at Port Arthur had settled down for the night, when suddenly across the bay reverberated the shock of three violent and successive explosions. In a moment all was bustle and confusion on the Russian warships. Searchlights flashed bewilderingly and without purpose across the waters, and quick-firing guns from vessel after vessel began a panic fusillade, which Admiral Alexeieff, in his official report, euphemistically described as "a well concentrated fire at the right time."

It was midnight, and in the darkness and confusion it was impossible for any one to know exactly what was happening; but when the morning light broke over Port Arthur the two proudest possessions of the Russian fleet, the powerful battleships Retvisan and Czarevitch, were seen passing slowly towards the harbor entrance, across which they presently lay in evidently a badly damaged condition. The cruiser Pallada followed, listing heavily to port, and she also was grounded outside the entrance to the harbor.

It was at ten o'clock the next day, the 9th of February, that the Russians obtained their first glimpse of the enemy. In the distance three Japanese cruisers were described hanging observant upon the Russian fleet, and immediately what remained of that once powerful squadron put to sea in pursuit of the audacious enemy. But, as before, this bold movement had no result, and the Russian ships returned to anchor. Scarcely had they done so when the Japanese squadron of sixteen vessels, including six battleships and four first-class cruisers, steamed into view in fighting formation. As the leading vessels at a distance of some three miles came into line with the harbor entrance the flash of their great guns broke through the mist, and for nearly an hour the Japanese shells continued to burst over the forts, along the beach and among the Russian ships, who replied vigorously, and whose fire was assisted by that of the powerful land batteries. Again the Russian squadron steamed out to meet the enemy.

Some of the cruisers advanced towards the Japanese fleet with great gallantry, the Novik, the Diana, and the Askold particularly distinguishing themselves, with the result that they were all rather seriously hit by the Japanese fire and were compelled to retire upon the main squadron. Several other of the Russian ships were damaged before the Japanese fleet drew off.

The official dispatch of Admiral Togo to his Government upon the momentous achievements of his fleet during these two days was a model of modesty and self-restraint. Dated "February 10th, at Sea," it ran:—

"After the combined fleet left Sasebo, on the 6th, everything went off as planned. At midnight on the 8th the advance squadron attacked the enemy's advance squadron, the latter being mostly outside the bay. The Poltava, Askold and others were apparently struck by torpedoes.

"At noon on the 9th the fleet advanced to the offing of Port Arthur Bay and attacked the enemy for forty minutes, I believe doing considerable damage. I believe the enemy were greatly demoralized. They stopped fighting at one o'clock, and appeared to retreat to the harbor.

GENERAL KUROKI.		GENERAL OKU.
	MARSHAL OYAMA.
GENERAL NODZU.		GENERAL NOGI.

JAPANESE GENERALS.

"The Japanese fleet suffered but very slight damage, and its fighting strength is not decreased. Our casualties were 4 killed and 54 wounded. The Imperial Princes on board suffered no harm.

"The conduct of the officers was cool, and not unlike their conduct at manœuvres.

"This morning, owing to heavy south wind, detailed reports from the vessels have not been received, so I merely report the above fact."

This dispatch, as we know both from the Russian official accounts and from independent witnesses, really understated the extent of the blow which the Japanese Admiral had dealt to the Russian fleet; the vessels torpedoed were not cruisers only, but the two crack battleships upon which Admiral Alexeieff necessarily placed peculiar dependence, and the "considerable damage" which Admiral Togo believed had been done by the subsequent bombardment had put out of action, for the time being, the battleship Poltava and the cruisers Diana, Askold and Novik. Of these the Poltava and the Novik were badly hit on the water line—damage the seriousness of which needs no comment.

The most significant confession, indeed, of the crushing character of the blow which at the very commencement of the war the Japanese had succeeded in dealing to their powerful adversary was contained in a subsequent dispatch from the Viceroy to the Czar. Telegraphing on February 11th, Admiral Alexeieff reported "the Czarevitch and the Pallada were brought on the 9th inst. into the inner harbor. The leak in the Retvisan is being temporarily stopped. The repairing of an ironclad is a complicated business, the period for the completion of which it is hard to indicate." This guarded language must be read in the light of the fact that the Russians had only one repairing dock capable of holding a large ship at Port Arthur, and the terrible character of the disaster which within forty-eight hours had befallen the naval power of the haughty Muscovite in the Far East will be realized. The losses in men were not very serious, amounting in all to 10 men killed and 2 officers and 41 men wounded, but the injury to the fleet was practically irreparable. Seven out of Russia's best vessels had been placed hors de combat, her battleships' strength being reduced to 4, namely, the Petropavlovsk, Peresviet, Pobieda and Sevastopol (the last two being themselves under repair when the war broke out), and her already small cruiser force being reduced to two, namely, the Bayan and the Boyarin. The following is the list of the damaged ships:—

Czarevitch, battleship, torpedoed.

Retvisan, battleship, torpedoed.

Poltava, battleship, shelled on the water-line.

Novik, cruiser, shelled on the water-line.

Askold, cruiser, shelled on the water-line.

Diana, cruiser, shelled on the water-line.

Pallada, cruiser, torpedoed.

It should be added that the repairs to the Askold were quickly executed, and that she was able to take part in the subsequent operations a few days later.

Admiral Alexeieff's dispatch to the Czar stated that the majority of the wounded belonged to the Pallada. The reason for this was that they were "poisoned by gases produced by the explosion of the torpedo charged with melinite."

The Japanese fleet, naturally, did not emerge from such an action unscathed. Its losses in men were officially reported as 4 killed and 54 wounded; and although the fighting efficiency of the fleet was not seriously impaired, two armored cruisers, the Iwote and the Yakumo, were injured, and, as the casualties show, several other vessels were struck. But the most remarkable circumstance was that the torpedo-boats by which the night attack had been delivered escaped scot-free.

While the Russian capital was still reeling under the shock of this unexpected disaster, there came the news of a fresh blow struck by the Japanese arms in another quarter of the theatre of war. This was the naval engagement at Chemulpo—a port on the northwest coast of Korea—in which two of the Czar's warships and one transport steamer were destroyed. It is true that only one of these vessels had any fighting capacity, and that the conflict in itself was of much less consequence than the battle at Port Arthur, but the incident gave a further and mortifying revelation of the disorganization of the naval forces of Russia in the Far East, and of the total absence of anything like a bold and definite plan of operations from the minds of her commanders. In spite of the critical position in which the negotiations between the two Powers had been standing for weeks, the Russian fleet in the Yellow Sea was unconcentrated and generally unprepared for war. The outbreak of hostilities found two vessels, the Varyag, a protected cruiser of 6,500 tons, and the Korietz, a gunboat, old, indeed, but not without some use for coast defence, quietly stationed at Chemulpo, a ready prey for a Japanese squadron.

On the 8th instant a Russian steamer called the Sungari, which was employed for the transport of stores, entered the harbor with the news that a large fleet, which her captain believed to be Japanese, was fast approaching. The Korietz was sent out to reconnoitre. The columns of smoke on the horizon did indeed come from the funnels of the enemy's ships. The advancing squadron consisted of a first-class battleship flying the flag of Admiral Uriu, and the cruisers Akashi, Takachiho, Naniwa and Chiyoda, as well as seven torpedo-boats, the whole convoying transports with 2,500 Japanese troops on board. The Korietz cleared her decks for action and fired—one account says that the shot was accidental—upon the rapidly approaching foe. The latter replied by discharging two torpedoes at the daring gunboat, which then retreated back into harbor. It is interesting to note that, whether the gunner of the Korietz acted under orders or not, he fired the first shot in the war, for the incident occurred several hours before the torpedo attack upon Port Arthur.

The Japanese took no further notice of the Russian ships until the disembarkation of their troops had been carried out, a process which was commenced immediately and was carried out through the night with great celerity and in the most perfect order. In this matter, indeed, as in all the preliminary stages of the war, the operations of the Mikado's forces showed how carefully thought out were the plans of his naval and military advisers. Not a detail appeared to have been omitted, every eventuality had been skilfully calculated beforehand, and as a result the whole machinery of warfare moved like clockwork.

By four o'clock on the morning of the 9th the process of disembarkation had been successfully completed, and the soldiers had all found their pre-arranged billets on shore. The Japanese squadron then put out to sea once more, and waited for daylight before taking any action. At seven o'clock, however, the captain of the Varyag was served with an ultimatum from Admiral Uriu declaring that hostilities had broken out between Russia and Japan, and summoning him to leave the harbor by midday. Should he refuse to do so, then the Japanese fleet would be compelled to attack the Varyag and the Korietz within the harbor. A correspondent of a London paper who was present on the spot states that the commanders of the other warships stationed at Chemulpo—namely, the British cruiser Talbot, the Italian Elba and the French Pascal, held a meeting and drew up a strong protest addressed to the Japanese Admiral against his proposal to attack the Russian vessels in a neutral port. The message was sent out in the Talbot's launch.

The protest, however, was not needed, for the captain of the Varyag, in spite of the overwhelming disparity of forces, determined to face his enemies in the open. It was an act of conspicuous gallantry, only to be expected, it must be said, from the representative of a country whose sons, whatever their faults, have never been slow to die for her sake. The manner, too, in which the Varyag set about her voyage to inevitable destruction was well worthy of the finest naval traditions of all countries and all ages. We are told that as the drums beat to quarters, and as the doomed ship steamed out amid the cheers of the foreign crews in the port, the band was massed upon her deck and burst into the strains of the Russian Hymn, the National Anthem. It was like that "flourish of insulting trumpets" with which Raleigh faced the guns of Cadiz, and the bravado of which Stevenson said he liked "better than the wisest dispositions to ensure victory; it comes from the heart and goes to it." No one, indeed, who is capable of generous emotions can fail to be uplifted by the story of the Varyag's passage to death. It is well to know that the cold science of modern naval warfare and all those mathematical calculations and inventions which have displaced the ancient ascendency of brawn and muscle at close quarters have not quenched the eager spirit of the sailor, or diminished his "heroic superstitions and his strutting and vainglorious style of fight." It was with a spirit not less high and intrepid that the captain of the little Korietz, disregarding the orders of his superior officer to remain within the shelter of the harbor, followed in his wake and strove desperately to meet the same fate.

Slowly but steadily the two ships held on their course towards the Polynesian Archipelago, where lay in wait their powerful foe. The Varyag had reached Round Island, when at a distance of nearly two miles the Japanese flagship opened fire with one of her big guns. The aim of the gunners was true. Right amidships burst the great missile, doing terrible execution, and shell after shell followed with relentless rapidity. The Varyag, wheeling around in a small circle, responded dauntlessly with her 6-inch guns, but with little or no effect upon the battleship, and now Admiral Uriu's cruisers joined in the cannonade. Within half an hour of this fearful raking fire her bridge was shot away and her sides were gaping with holes, but she kept afloat and still withstood the onslaught, endeavoring heroically but in vain to find an opening by which to break through and escape out to sea. At last, after an hour's terrible pounding, she was compelled reluctantly to give up the attempt as hopeless, and, taking refuge among the islands, with difficulty crept back into Chemulpo harbor, disabled beyond repair and with her decks reduced to veritable shambles. Her desperate struggle had not left the enemy utterly scathless, for there seems no doubt that one of the Japanese cruisers received a good deal of damage.

In the meanwhile the little Korietz, with extraordinary bravery, but with absolutely pathetic ineffectiveness, had been attempting to imitate the manœuvres of her consort and to do some injury to the big ships of the enemy. As well might a warrior with a popgun try to engage a battery of field artillery. It was magnificent, it certainly was not war. The range was hopelessly beyond her powers, and perhaps it was the bitterest drop in the cup of her commander and crew that the Japanese soon ceased to pay her any attention at all, concentrating all their efforts upon the more dangerous Varyag. When that vessel retreated at length into harbor, the Korietz followed her unharmed but undisgraced.

The wounded of the Varyag, numbering 4 officers and 214 men, were removed in boats to the British, Italian and French warships. The dead were left on board, for it was decided to scuttle the ship. At the same time arrangements were made to blow up the Korietz. Just as the Japanese fleet again appeared in sight the latter vessel blew up, and the shattered hull, after one great burst of flame and smoke, sank beneath the waters. The Varyag refused to sink so easily, and the Russian sailors therefore again boarded her to set her on fire. After a little more than an hour she had burned down to the water's edge and, heeling over, disappeared. The Sungari was the next to meet its fate, the Russians setting fire to it also to prevent its falling into the hands of the enemy.

The Japanese fleet then steamed out to sea once more, having left behind it no further obstacle to the landing of troops on the west coast of Korea.

Thus within forty-eight hours of the rupture of diplomatic relations, the first decisive action in the struggle for sea-supremacy had been fought, and the result left to the enterprising and intrepid Navy of Japan not only the immense moral value of a victory well contrived and unerringly accomplished, but the solid material advantage of a superiority in fighting strength which was incontestable.

GENERAL LINEVITCH.		GENERAL GRIPENBERG.
	GENERAL KUROPATKIN.
GENERAL KAULBARS.		GENERAL RENNENKAMPFF.

RUSSIAN GENERALS.