Читать книгу History of Jacksonville, Florida and Vicinity, 1513 to 1924 - T. Frederick Davis - Страница 6

Menendez left Spain on his return voyage to Florida about the time De Gourgues sailed out of the St. Marys and headed for home; they passed somewhere on the broad Atlantic, one sailing westward and the other eastward. It is not difficult to imagine the fury that shook the frame of Menendez when he arrived at St. Augustine and learned what had taken place at the mouth of the San Mateo during his absence. Nevertheless, he set to work rebuilding the large fort and again garrisoned it, but never afterward with as many men as were there at the time of the Frenchman's attack. The small forts destroyed by De Gourgues do not seem to have been rebuilt, though maps of a later day show other posts along the river.

Following the tragic scenes when French and Spanish fought for the possession of Florida, a long period elapsed before events having a direct bearing on this immediate vicinity again shaped themselves to become recorded history. It was a sort of inactive interim in local history, between the long ago and the beginning of development attending the actual English occupation in 1764. However, during this period there were occasional forays between St. Augustine and the English settlements to the north in which English, Spanish and Indians took part. War parties now and then camped for a while on the bluff that sloped down to the river at the foot of our present Liberty and Washington Streets. In Spanish times this bluff was described as imposing and timbered with live-oak, palm (palmetto), and wild orange. At the foot of Liberty Street there was a rather bold spring of clear, good water," (an outcropping, perhaps, of the stream that is known at the present day to underlie the surface in that section of the city). Back from the river a short distance stood a small Indian village.

One of the earliest Spanish maps shows an Indian village here called Ossachite. This liquid Indian name, Os-sachl-te is the earliest record of a name applying to the locality of Jacksonville. It was a Timuqua village of probably not more than half a dozen houses thatched in the Timuqua style, as shown by Le Moyne's drawings.

Indian Fords and Trails

The Indians had fording places at different points along the river. It is not known what they originally called these fords, but with the introduction of cattle into the country the name "Wacca Pilatka" was applied, signifying a ford or place where the cows crossed over. The first English name for the vicinity of Jacksonville was "Cow Ford," and it was often referred to by that name even long after Jacksonville was founded.

One of the most popular fords along the St. Johns was at this point – from the foot of our present Liberty Street to a point on the south side of the river directly opposite. A Timuqua trail led up from the lower east coast through the New Smyrna district, on to St. Augustine and thence to the Cow Ford (South Jacksonville and Jacksonville). On this side of the river it took a northwesterly course through a black-jack ridge where Hemming Park is now and there branched, one trail leading northwesterly and the other on toward the west."

The westerly trail crossed the sand hills (for a long time called Trail Ridge) that divide the waters of Black Creek from those of the St. Marys River; leading around the head branches of the San-ta-fee; joined the old DeSoto trail near where the railroad crosses the Olustee, which led to the Suwanee; near the upper mineral springs, and westward to Alapaha, Aucilla, Micasuki, and Tallahassee, towns of the Apalachees. The Jacksonville-Lake City highway follows closely the route of this trail.

The northwesterly branch led to the St. Marys River to a point opposite where Colerain, Ga., afterward stood. In the course of time these Indian trails grew into a beaten track through the forest. The pack-ponies of the traders followed them; then came the ox-carts of a later day, following the course of least resistance. Thus a kind of highway evolved as a natural consequence of the matchless judgment of the Indian in picking the easiest route.

Great Britain Acquires Florida

The English captured Havana from Spain in 1762. By the treaty in 1763 England acquired Florida in exchange for Havana. The English took actual possession in 1764, when practically the entire Spanish population departed.

English Land Grants

About 1765, the Marquis of Hastings secured a British grant on the north side of the St. Johns comprising 20,000 acres along the river from Trout Creek to the mouth of Maxtons (McGirts) Creek, including the present site of Jacksonville. There is no record of a settlement on this land during the English occupation. The Marquis of Waterford secured a grant, also of 20,000 acres, on the opposite side of the river between Pottsburg Creek and Julington Creek, including the site of South Jacksonville. This tract was developed in the vicinity of the ford. Bartram visited the Cow Ford in 1774, and he noted in his book that a ferry for crossing the river was in operation (for travelers) and near it was an indigo plantation from which he procured a sailboat for a trip up the river.

The St. Johns country was highly advertised in England for a time, stress being placed on the profitable cultivation of the indigo plant here. There were several English plantations along the river above the Cow Ford. What we now call Ortega was settled by Abraham Jones under an English patent of January 12, 1770, granting him 2,000 acres of land "in our province of East Florida, situation the neck or point of land between St. Johns River and Maxtons Creek, known by the name of Maxtons Creek Island. Bounded South and Southeast by vacant lands; West and Northwest by Maxtons Creek, and Eastwardly by St. Johns River." Jones built his house half a mile above where Maxtons Creek emptied into the river. About the year 1780, Colonel Daniel McGirts was living on this tract, which was then called McGirts Place and Maxtons Creek was called McGirts Creek.

Kings Road

The English had not been long in Florida when they set to work making a highway out of the old trail leading to the St. Marys River. They started at New Smyrna; thence to St. Augustine; to the Cow Ford; to the St. Marys at Colerain, and on into Georgia. All land travel between the northern Colonies and East Florida came down over this route and consequently through the sites of Jacksonville and South Jacksonville. Kings Road today follows the original route.

The Spaniards Return

Interest in Florida by England waned when the tide turned against her in the war of the Colonies for independence, in which Florida did not join. In 1783, England ceded Florida back to Spain, in a ridiculous exchange for several unimportant islands. The Spaniards returned to Florida in 1784, and practically all of the English left. The British land grants reverted to the Spanish crown, but the agreement included a provision that the British settlers should be remunerated for their lands. The English estates on the St. Johns were abandoned and remained vacant for some years, falling into rapid decay.

Mcintosh and the Spaniards

About the year 1790, John H. Mcintosh, of Georgia, arrived in the vicinity of the Cow Ford. Here he was appointed to some office by the Spanish governor, but he does not seem to have obtained an actual grant of land. Mcintosh apparently was a turbulent man of restless and reckless disposition and it is not surprising that he and the Spaniards eventually clashed. The result was that he was arrested for intrigue in 1794 and sent to Havana, where he was confined for a year in Morro Castle. After his release from prison, he returned to Georgia, gathered together a band of adventurers, and swept down upon the Spanish post (San Nicholas) at the Cow Ford. This he destroyed, together with the "Boats of the Royal Domain" on the river. Mcintosh and the Spaniards seem to have patched up their differences, however, for some years later he was again living in the vicinity of the Cow Ford engaged in the exportation of lumber on a large scale and incidentally living like a lord.

Prior to 1800, there were bona-fide settlers in the vicinity of the Cow Ford, regardless of the fact that this locality had by that time become the stamping ground of many undesirables-criminals from the States, slave catchers, ruffians, and banditti of varied kind. This was a condition that gave the Spanish governors a world of trouble and there were frequent exchanges of charges and counter-charges by Spaniards and Georgians which resulted in a sentiment that awaited only a pretext for an armed invasion of Florida. It came in 1812.

Patriot Revolution

Prior to the declaration of war between the United States and Great Britain in 1812, the United States Congress in secret sessions as early as January, 1811, considered seriously the question of seizing Florida although it was a possession of Spain, on the pretext that in the event of war the English might use it as a base of operations. There followed a chain of correspondence between the United States Secretary of State and the Governor of Georgia on the subject and instructions were finally issued by the government, with the consent of the President (Madison), for emissaries to proceed to Florida and try to procure its cession to the United States by peaceable means if possible, and failing in this they were to use their own judgment in the matter. The outcome was an armed invasion of East Florida by Georgians "unofficially" supported by United States regulars, accompanied by an uprising of Americans living in northern Florida. This armed attack upon the Spaniards is usually referred to in history as the "Patriot Revolution" in Florida.

General Matthews, of Georgia, to whom this delicate task of taking Florida over had been entrusted, found no difficulty in enlisting volunteers for an invasion of Florida. The first attack was upon Fernandina, which they captured without bloodshed. Eight armed United States sloops co-operated, and on the following day United States forces took possession of Fernandina and raised the American flag over the fort. This was in March, 1812, and war with Great Britain was not declared until the following June. Without the preliminaries usual to the establishment of governments, the Patriots at once set to work organizing a government of their own for Northern Florida, elected John H. Mcintosh (the same Mcintosh of Cow Ford fame) director-general, appointed judges and established a legislature. It proved to be a paper government and never functioned.

The next move of the Patriots was against St. Augustine, the Spanish capital of East Florida. They marched 300 strong to a point near the town and encamped. Here they were joined by a detachment of United States regulars. The Spaniards mounted some cannon on a schooner and shelled the camp, forcing the Americans to retreat. The Patriots retreated to the Cow Ford and established their camp. The United States troops remained in the vicinity of St. Augustine until a detachment was attacked near twelve-mile swamp by a body of negroes sent out from St. Augustine and several killed, when they too retreated, first to a blockhouse near where Bayard is now and then to the St. Johns.

An outstanding feature of the Patriot invasion was a campaign against the Indians of central Florida by Colonel Daniel Newnan and a battalion of Georgia volunteers. The experience of this battalion was remarkably similar to that of Major Dade's command 23 years later, except that Major Dade's perished and Colonel Newnan's escaped. Considerable history is given in Colonel Newnan's official report of this expedition and for that reason is here published in full. The report was addressed to the governor of Georgia. The parts in parentheses are explanatory insertions by the author:

New-Hope, St. Johns, Oct. 19, 1812.

Dear Sir; I have now the honor of transmitting to your excellency an account of the several engagements which have taken place between the Lotchaway and Alligator Indians, and the detachment of Georgia. volunteers under my command. As the object of this expedition, and the views of the persons engaged in it, have been misconstrued, and misstatements, relative to its protraction circulated, I ask the indulgence of your excellency to detail every transaction from its commencement to its termination.

I arrived upon (the) St. Johns, in obedience to your orders, about the 15th of August ( 1812) with the whole of my detachment, consisting, including officers, of about 250 men, and with few on the sick report. I immediately waited on Col. Smith (U. S. A.) before St. Augustine, and received orders dated the 21st of August, to proceed immediately against the hostile Indians within the province of East Florida, and destroy their towns, provisions and settlements. I then returned to the detachment upon the St. Johns, and made every preparation to comply with my orders, by dispatching parties to procure horses from the few inhabitants that had not fled from the province, in preparing packs and provisions, and taking every step which I deemed necessary to insure success to the enterprise. In consequence of the sickness of myself and nearly one-half of the detachment, the period of our marching was delayed until the 24th of September (1812); and when just upon the eve of departing, an express arrived from Col. Smith informing me that his provision wagons and the escort was attacked by a body of Negroes and Indians, and ordering me to join him immediately with 90 men, and bring all the horses and carriages (any wheeled vehicle). I could command, for the removal of his baggage, field-pieces, and sick, he having only 70 men fit for duty. I marched to the relief of the colonel with 130 men and 25 horses, and assisted him in removing to the block-house upon Davis's creek (near Bayard). This service delayed for a few days our expedition to the (Indian) nation; and when the detachment again assembled upon the St. Johns, and were about to commence to march, the men had but six or seven days to serve. About this time I received a letter from Col. Smith, advising me to propose to the detachment an extension of their service for 15 or 20 days longer, as the time for which they were engaged was deemed insufficient to accomplish any object of the expedition. This measure l had contemplated, and its sanction by the colonel met with my most hearty approbation; for I was unwilling to proceed to the enemy's country with a single man, who would declare that, in any event, he would not serve a day longer than the time for which he had originally volunteered. I accordingly assembled the detachment, and after stating the necessity of a tender of further service, proposed that the men should volunteer for three weeks longer; when 84 men, including officers, stepped out and were enrolled, which, with the addition of 23 volunteer militia sent to my aid by Col. Smith, and 9 patriots under the command of Capt. Cone, made my whole force amount to 117. With this small body, provided with four days' provisions and 12 horses, I was determined to proceed to the (Indian) nation and give those merciless savages at least one battle; and I was emboldened in this determination by the strong expectation of being succored by a body of cavalry from St. Mary's, and which it has since appeared did assemble at Colerain (Ga.), but proceeded no farther.

On the evening of the 24th of September (1812) we left the St. Johns, marching in Indian file, Capt. Humphrey's company of riflemen in front, Capt. Fort's company, under the command of Lieut. Fannin, in the center, and Capt. Coleman's company, with Cone's detachment, under the command of Lieut. Broadnax, in the rear. A small party marched in front of the main body, and another in the rear, the openness of the country, except in particular places, rendered it unnecessary to employ men upon the right and left. Our encampment at nights, there being three companies, was in the form of a triangle, with the baggage in the center, the men with their clothes on, lying with their feet pointing outwards, and their firelocks in their arms. In case of attack, the officers were instructed to bring up their companies upon the right and left of the company fronting the enemy, and attend to the Indian mode of fighting until ordered to charge. In case of meeting the enemy upon our march, Humphrey's company was instructed to file off to the right, Fort's company to advance and form to the front in single rank, and Coleman's company to file oft' to the left; the whole then to advance in the form of a crescent, and endeavor to encircle the enemy.

On the morning of the fourth day of our march, when within six or seven miles of the Lotchaway towns (near Newnan's Lake, Alachua County), our advance party discovered a party of Indians marching along the path meeting us, and at the same moment they appeared to have discovered us. As soon as I was informed of it, I lost no time in giving the necessary directions for the companies to advance, and obey the instructions which had been previously given to them, and which appeared exactly suited to the situation in which we found the enemy. As soon as Fort's company, at the head of which I had placed myself, had advanced to the proper ground, I discovered the Indians falling back, and making every preparation for battle, by unslinging their packs, trimming their rifles, and each man taking his place. We continued to advance, taking advantage of the trees in our progress, until we were within 130 yards of the Indians, when many of them fired, and I immediately ordered the charge, which drove them from behind the trees, and caused them to retire with the greatest precipitation; our men all the while firing at them, slew several, and by repeated charges drove them half a mile, when they took shelter in the swamp. It unfortunately happened, I presume through inadvertence, that Humphrey's company in filing to the light took too great a circuit, got a small swamp between them and the enemy, and thereby rendered the victory less decisive than it would have been had the whole charged together, and before the Indians had dispersed themselves and extended their force, which they soon did, nearly half a mile up and down the swamp. The company, however, was of service afterwards in preventing the enemy, after their dispersion, from entering our camp, retaking their baggage and provisions, all of which fell into our hands, or falling upon the wounded, that had been sent to the rear. The action, including the skirmishing upon the flanks, lasted two hours and a half, the Indians frequently attempting io outflank us and get in our rear, but were repulsed by the companies extending to the right and left. We had one man killed and nine wounded, two of which have since died of their wounds. The loss of the enemy must have been considerable. I saw seven fall to the ground with my own eyes, among whom was their king, Payne; two of them fell near the swamp, the rest our men had the curiosity to scalp. The rifle company on the right and Broadnax's on the left, speak of killing several near the swamp, who were borne off by their comrades, it being a principle among the savages to carry off their dead at the risk of their lives.

We remained on the battle ground watching the movements of the Indians, who were near the swamp painting themselves, and appeared to be in consultation, all of which indicated an intention to renew the combat. Accordingly a half an hour before sunset, having obtained a considerable reinforcement of Negroes and Indians, from their towns, they commenced the most horrid yells imaginable, imitating the cries and noise of almost every animal of the forest, their chiefs advancing in front in a stooping serpentine manner, and making the most wild and frantic gestures, until they approached within two hundred yards of us, when they halted and commenced firing. Our men were not to be alarmed by their noise and yells, but as instructed, remained perfectly still and steady behind logs and trees until the enemy by this forbearance bad approached somewhat nearer, when a brisk and well-directed fire from our line soon drove them back to their original ground. I would now have ordered the charge, but being under the necessity, from the extension of the enemy's line, of detaching nearly one-half of my force to protect our camp and wounded, the assailing of which is a great object with Indians, I was left to contend with a force three times as numerous as my own. The action lasted until eight o'clock (in the evening), when the enemy was completely repulsed in every attempt whether made upon our center or flanks. We had two men killed and one wounded; the enemy carried off several of their men before it was dark – after which all firing, of course random, was at the spot from whence the flash arose.

After fighting and fasting the whole day, we had to work throughout the night, and at daylight had a tolerable breastwork of logs and earth, with port holes, on the ground on which the battle was fought. We were reduced to this necessity, for in dispatching Capt. Whitaker about dark to the St. Johns for a reinforcement, six more men took the liberty to accompany him, taking with them our best horses; our pilot and surgeon, who was sick, was among the number.

The two days succeeding the battle, we neither saw nor heard anything of the enemy, but on the evening of the third day they commenced firing at our work at a long distance, and renewed it every day for five or six days, but without killing or wounding any of our men. After killing two or three of them through our port holes they seldom came within gunshot. Seven or eight days had now elapsed since our express had left us, hunger was staring us in the face, and we were now reduced to the necessity of eating one of our horses; we had no surgeon to dress the wounded, and apprehensions were entertained that the enemy would receive reinforcements from Augustine or the Makasukie Indians. Expecting relief every hour, I was unwilling to leave our breastworks while we had a horse to eat, but I understood from some of my officers that a certain captain was determined to leave us with his company, and that many of the men, giving up all hopes of relief, talked of deserting in the night rather than perish, or fall a sacrifice to the merciless Negroes and Indians, whom they were taught to believe would surround us in great numbers in a few days. In this trying situation, when our few remaining horses were shot down by them (the Indians), and the number of' our sick daily increasing, 1 reluctantly assented to leave our works that night, and directed the litters to be prepared to carry the wounded.

About 9 o'clock we commenced our distressing march, carrying five wounded men in litters and supporting two or three more. We had not proceeded more than eight miles, when the men became perfectly exhausted from hunger and fatigue, and were unable to carry the wounded any farther. About two hours after we left our breastworks, 25 horsemen, with provisions, arrived to our relief, on a different road from the one we had taken, but, from motives best known to themselves, instead of following us, returned to the St. Johns, and we were left to encounter new difficulties, two men that I bad dispatched on the path the horsemen came, by some means or other missing them. We again constructed a place of defense, and I dispatched Sergeant-Major Reese with one private to Picolata, to learn what had occasioned the delay of our expected supplies, and told him I should remain where I was until I could hear from him, and endeavored to procure cattle, as we discovered signs of their being near us.

The evil genius of Captain ––– again prevailed, and I have since learned from Captain Cone, that this person instigated not only him, but many of the privates to urge a departure from our works even in the day time, when I was convinced that the Indians knowing our weak situation would endeavor to ambuscade. This gentleman, if innocent, will have an opportunity of proving himself so before a court-martial. With a burning fever on me and scarcely able to walk, the march was ordered about three o'clock in the afternoon. I had directed the adjutant, Captain Hardin, to march in front, to avoid all places where there could be an ambuscade, and the litters should be distributed among the different companies. Being extremely weak, I marched in the rear with Captain –––, who carried my firelock, Lieut. Fannin, and about fifteen or twenty privates. We had scarcely marched five miles before the front of the detachment discovered the heads of several Indians on both sides of the path, from among several pine trees that were laid prostrate by the hurricane; the same instant, the enemy fired upon our advanced party, and shot down four of them, one, a Spaniard, died on the spot, and two survived a few days; my negro boy was one of them. 'Ihe moment I heard the firing I ordered the detachment to charge, and the Indians were completely defeated in fifteen minutes, many of them dropping their guns, and the whole running off without ever attempting to rally. Four were left dead on the field, and I am convinced from the constant fire we kept up, that many more must have been slain, but were hid from our view by the thick and high palmetto bushes.

We lay on the battle ground all night, and started next day at 10 o'clock, marched five miles and again threw up breastworks between two ponds, living upon gophers, alligators and palmetto stocks, until Sergeant-major Reese arrived with provisions and 14 horses, when we were enabled to proceed to the St. Johns with all our sick and wounded, where a gun-boat (schooner) by the direction of Colonel Smith was in waiting for us, which conveyed us to his camp, where we met with every attention that humanity or benevolence could bestow.

I cannot refrain from expressing the high sense I have of the care and anxiety which Colonel Smith has manifested for the detachment under my command, and his promptitude in affording every aid in his power, when apprised of our situation. My pen can scarcely do justice to the merits of the brave officers and men under my command, their fortitude under all their privations and distresses never forsaking them. Captain Hamilton, who volunteered as a private, his company having left him at the expiration of their time; Lieutenant Fannin, Ensign Hamilton, and Adjutant Hardin distinguished themselves in a particular manner, being always among the first to charge, and first in pursuit; Sergeants Holt and Attaway likewise acted very bravely, and Polk's company in general, being always near me, and under my immediate view, advanced to the charge with the steadiness of veterans. Lieutenant Broadnax showed a great deal of courage and presence of mind, and Ensign Mann who was wounded in the first action fought well. Captain Cone who was wounded in the head early in the action behaved well and Lieutenant Williams did himself great honor in every action, but particularly in the bold and manly stand he made in the night engagement. Sergeant Hawkins and Corporal Neil of Coleman's company acted like soldiers, and Sergeant-major Reese's activity was only surpassed by his courage; he was everywhere and always brave. Captain Humphrey's company acted bravely, particularly Lieutenant Reed, Sergeant Fields, Sergeant Cowan, Sergeant Denmark and many of the privates. I can only speak of Captain Humphrey from the report of some of his men, who say he acted well; it so happening he never met my eye during either of the engagements, while the conduct of every other person that I have mentioned, except one or two, came under my personal observation.

The number of Indians in the first engagement, from every circumstance that appeared, must have been !rom seventy-five to a hundred; in the second engagement, their number, including Negroes who were their best soldiers, was double ours, and in the third engagement there appeared to be fifty, which was nearly equal our force, after deducting the sick and wounded. From every circumstance, I am induced to believe that the number killed and wounded among the Indians must be at least fifty.

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your most obedient servant,

DANIEL NEWNAN.

His excellency David B. Mitchell.

The star of fortune shone over Colonel Newnan's battalion, for its escape was miraculous. There are some interesting inferences in this report besides the fighting: What is meant by "scalping the Indians out of curiosity" is not clear; maybe it was a custom, for in a later private letter Colonel Newnan stated that Zephaniah Kingsley's house on Fort George Island was "handsomely decorated with Indians' scalps."

The flag of the United States flew by the side of the Patriot flag on Spanish soil for a year. When the U.S. troops were withdrawn in the Spring of 1813, the Patriot bands disintegrated rapidly, but not before they had pillaged and destroyed a great amount of property in this section.

The Patriot Banner

The design of the Patriot flag was: Field, white; figure, a soldier in the act of charging bayonet; inscription, "Salus populi lex suprema" (Safety the supreme law of the people). Thus another banner was added to the array of flags signifying actual or attempted possession that have flown in Florida in times past.

The country between the St. Johns and the St. Marys Rivers did not enjoy a lengthy peace after the departure of the "Patriots." A peculiar chapter in Florida's varied history was written here when an attempt was made to organize the "Republic of Florida" based on the American system, but under the jurisdiction of the Spaniards – a form of compromise between the Spaniards and the settlers in this section. The republic functioned under this system for a year or two and really bore the imprint of law and order. Trouble again arose, however, when M'Gregor and his so-called "Carthagenians" or "Venezuelan Patriots" took possession of Fernandina and turmoil continued until the negotiations of the United States for the acquisition of Florida were begun.

Fort San Nicholas

An early Spanish map indicates a block-house or a Spanish post on the south side of the river in the vicinity of the present South Jacksonville. Thenceforth its history is lost, but it was probably the parent of the post that later became known as San Nicholas.

There is no record to indicate that the English had a garrisoned post at this point. When the Spaniards returned in 1784, they reestablished the military post under the name San Nicholas.

The history of Fort San Nicholas was an exciting one. Mcintosh destroyed it in 1796, and the Patriots doubtless did likewise in 1812. The post was temporarily abandoned in 1817 out of fear of an attack by the "Carthagenians", who held Fernandina. During the last years of its existence it was maintained principally for the purpose of preventing smuggling, although the commanders seem not always wideawake in this respect, according to an article written by Rev. J. N. Glenn (a Methodist missionary at St. Augustine in 1823), as follows: "General (John H.) Mcintosh told me once that he had two boatloads of cotton that he had raised up the St. Johns River (probably at Ortega) that he wished to pass the Spanish post at Cow Ford without paying the Spanish duties. Accordingly he approached the officer in command on the subject. Just then the boats hove in sight coming down the river. The commander put up his spy-glass and remarked, 'There is too much cotton to let it pass'. The General gave him a doubloon. He put the coin to one eye and the spy-glass to the other and said, 'Too much yet'. The General gave him another doubloon. He then put a doubloon to each eye and said, 'I see no cotton now'."

(Francis S.) Hudnall acquired the land on which the old fort stood, even while a part of it was still in existence. He leveled the timbers for use on his farm. The fort was enclosed by an excavation 100 feet square. Mr. Hudnall built his house directly on the east side of the moat, and while excavating found a number of Spanish coins."

The St. Johns River

The Indian name for the St. Johns River as interpreted by the early Spaniards was "Illaka", meaning unusual, different from any other, moves along with the south wind.' The French interpretation was "Welaka", a chain of lakes. The former seems more in unison with the characteristic reasoning of an Indian.

Ribault first saw the river on the afternoon of April 30, 1562, but he did not enter it until the following day, May 1st. From this fact he named it Riviere de Mai – the River May.

The destruction of Fort Caroline by Menendez took place within a day of the festival of St. Matthew and in celebration of the "victory" he named both the fort and the river San Mateo. The Spaniards later changed the name of the river to San Juan, and the English retained it as St. Johns.