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Chapter 10

EN ROUTE TO THE PHILIPPINES AND CANTON

[105] In December 1923 I arrived in Canton. The journey from Moscow to Canton gave rise to many different impressions and led to all kinds of adventures, too many to write about, particularly at this time of paper shortage. And I had just as many impressions and adventures in my innumerable journeys from Canton to Nanyang, ASLIA.¹ I use the term ASLIA to refer to the area that covers Annam, Siam, Burma, Malaya, Indonesia, and the Philippines.

On several different occasions, had I made one false step, been a minute late, or put a word out of place in my answers, I would have fallen into an imperialist jail. The paper shortage forces me to omit the story of these adventures too. But there is another reason, one of no less importance: Western imperialism, which has held Asia in its grasp, is now divided. Since the Japanese defeat, one section—Britain and America—has already returned to its former places of occupation, although doing so in new forms. The other section—France and the Netherlands—is now struggling to return by force to the territories it held before being kicked out by the Japanese. Who knows how long we and our descendants will have to struggle to achieve 100 percent independence? In the meantime we have to preserve all the “strategies” used to carry on our work and overcome the traps set by imperialist agents to obstruct our efforts. It is best that I keep to myself both the “strategies” and the adventures that made them necessary. If there are pemuda [youth] who have a right to be given hints or “strategies” so as to evade this or that, I am prepared to impart the information privately.²

[106] It was quite normal to meet great revolutionaries in Russia, but it was quite something else to meet such people in Asia, since real revolutionaries were still hard to come by. I met Dr. Sun Yat-sen through one of his comrades in arms, the late T’an P’ing-shan, leader of the Communist party’s Canton branch.³ The father of the Chinese republic was then president of the Republic of South China whose area covered only the provinces of Yunan and Kwantung, his birthplace.⁴ Our meeting took place in December 1923 in Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s house beside the Pearl River, which flows through the center of Canton.

Dr. Sun had only recently recovered from a serious illness. Although he still appeared to be very weak, he was always happy to receive guests who were part of the struggle, particularly those from Asia. Also present at this meeting were his son, Dr. Sun Fo, the late Liao Chung-k’ai, and I think also the late Hu Han-min and Wang Ching-wei, the last three being well known at that time as Dr. Sun’s most loyal followers.⁵

Dr. Sun opened the conversation with me by saying: “In this case you can cooperate with Japan.” I was absolutely amazed to hear this! Only a few weeks previously I, and other Communists from China, Korea, and even Japan, had been examining and attacking Japanese imperialism in Korea, Manchuria, Taiwan, and China itself.⁶ (Bear in mind the “21 demands” Japan presented to China in 1915.)⁷ Certainly for us there was no difference in principle between Japanese imperialism and that of America, the Netherlands, Britain, or France. The only difference was in the form and origins of the various imperialisms.

I was struck dumb. Obviously it was not the place to engage in debate; I was a guest and in any case I was too young to contradict one of the greatest figures in all of Asia. Also I knew, or had gathered from Dr. Sun’s tone of voice, that he intended to give me carefully considered advice. And finally, was it not the case that Dr. Sun desired the unity of Asia, had long lived in Japan, had many friends there, and had even used Japanese cadres in his struggle to seize central power in China? In short, this advice came from someone who in his heart of hearts was sympathetic to the Indonesian movement. So I did not debate the question of whether Indonesian revolutionaries could work together with the Japanese empire.⁸

[107] Perhaps Dr. Sun himself felt that the door to such a debate was closed, perhaps because he knew a lot about the practice of such cooperation with Japan or because he had only wanted to test my reaction on this question. Whatever the reason, the conversation was turned in a different direction.

It was clear that Dr. Sun’s knowledge of details, particularly as regards Nanyang, was extraordinary. It was also apparent that Dr. Sun was a fugitive who had many “strategies” and who had friends everywhere. The presence of Chinese people in all corners of the world made things easy for his movement.

“A passport from my government would make things even more dangerous for you than having no passport at all,” he said, “since such a passport would be examined by the British in Hong Kong, the gateway to Kwantung. And their examination would be very thorough. But it will help if I introduce you to the leaders of the Seamen Union based in Hong Kong.”⁹

I thought for a long time about his admonition to “cooperate with Japan.” Coming from a great revolutionary like Dr. Sun, it could not simply be disregarded. Perhaps because British, French, and American imperialism still stood between Japan and Indonesia, he felt that Japan could not (or could not yet) pounce on Indonesia directly. And he did begin with the words “in this case.” But it was true that one of his most important tactics was to embrace one country today and another tomorrow.

It is unfortunate that I did not try to fathom the real reason for Dr. Sun’s statement. He was an opportunist revolutionary (seizing every opportunity), and his intuition was frequently correct.¹⁰ Is it not so that after some twenty years those same words were taken up again by Indonesia’s foremost “nationalist” leaders, when they stretched out welcoming hands to their “older brother” in order to “work together” to establish the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere? Can we forget the words in the Panca Dharma, “faithful to Dai Nippon up to and after the final victory”?¹¹ Did not Indonesia’s leaders say that we were not helping Japan out of any calculation of gain, but because “Japan stands for truth, justice and purity”? I see this as the fulfillment of the prophecy that the Chinese leader made on the banks of the Pearl River.

[108] I have read Dr. Sun’s books San Min Chu I and China’s International Development.¹² They contain much for practical application, but also much that contradicts reality—for example, the proposal that international capital could industrialize China, for the welfare of the Chinese people and for world peace. Of course, one must admit that that is fine in theory. But I think the proposal gives insufficient attention to the competition or even conflict among the capitalist nations themselves, who would have to work together to “advance” China; and, just as important, it gives insufficient attention to the competition and conflict between an industrialized China and the Western capitalist nations. In spite of this, in his spirit and way of thinking Dr. Sun Yat-sen was as different from that “holy” man of India, Mahatma Gandhi, as day is from night. I find Dr. Sun’s writings far more informative than those of the Mahatma on politics and economics or on concrete actions.

Dr. Sun was not a Marxist, and his way of thinking was logical, not dialectical. When he criticized Marxism in San Min Chu I, he used the cheap arguments of bourgeois professors that the class struggle is a mere accident. Dr. Sun analyzed problems in a scientific manner, and he expressed his viewpoint clearly, precisely, and attractively. He was not only an expert writer, but also an effektive [sic] speaker, clear from start to finish and able to win the interest of the people.

But, in my opinion, Dr. Sun’s strength did not rest in his intellect, his speaking skills, or his theory of “nationalism, democracy, and socialism.” I myself attended some of his speeches. They were indeed good and technically proficient. But Wang Ching-wei was just as good, if not better. I have read Dr. Sun’s writings and theories. Other Chinese writers like Professor Dr. Hu-Shih were, I think, also capable of developing such theories.¹³ But in three areas none surpassed or even equalled him: not Wang Ching-wei, Professor Dr. Hu-Shih, or the tens of other modern Chinese speakers and thinkers.

[109] The first was in the area of sincerity. Well-known Chinese people, even those who were not followers of Dr. Sun in his time, and all the other Asians who met the doctor of the Pearl River stress Dr. Sun’s sincerity and honesty. The father of the Chinese republic acted in accordance with his words and spoke in accordance with his pure heart. Dr. Sun was neither a Tammany politician nor a “revolutionary” who used words to collect enough votes to get elected or to empty the pockets of the common people. Dr. Sun’s theories, speeches, and actions were directed toward what he considered important for his country and his people. Human beings are fallible, and if Dr. Sun made errors, they were not born of deceit.

The second was in the area of confidence, perseverance, and his unselfish nature. Several of his Chinese seaman comrades have recounted to me with pride the sixteen failures of Sun Man in attempting to seize China’s independence from the Manchu dynasty. Only on the seventeenth try was he victorious.¹⁴ These failures were presented to me proudly, and I considered that proper. The word “although” was always slipped in at the beginning of the sentence describing these failures, meaning: “Remember, although Sun Man failed sixteen times he did not give up hope.” In this perseverance (thoroughness) Sun Man exemplified a characteristic of the Chinese people as a whole. I believe that the people’s continued faith in Dr. Sun was based on his honesty and lack of greed. He was always ready to sacrifice everything, including his life, to achieve what he was fighting for.

The third was in the area of closeness to the people. His title of Dr. and his ability to mix easily with even the upper classes of his own people and foreign nations did not separate Sun Man from the poor people, the proletariat. The common people of China would not have tied their hearts to his struggle had he not been able to hold their faith.

It was not a coincidence that the victory of the Kuomintang in 1911 was supported by secret societies of the people such as the Kola Hui, which were very close to Dr. Sun.¹⁵ After several failed putsches staged by heroic members of the intelligentsia, apparently Dr. Sun finally realized the importance of securing the help of the common people organized in the many secret societies, which in the time of the Manchu dynasty were politically revolutionary. Dr. Sun, a descendant of small farmers, did not have his spirit destroyed by Western intellectualism and was able to maintain a rapport with the common people.

[110] But the reader should not think that during his lifetime Dr. Sun received undivided praise, even from his own comrades in arms. Even soon after he became president in 1911, his life was threatened by Yuan Shih-k’ai, a “rebel” general who later became president himself.¹⁶ And at the time I was in China, shortly before his death, Ch’en Ch’iung-ming, another of his former generals, almost succeeded in arresting Dr. Sun.¹⁷ I frequently heard Chinese intellectuals and bourgeoisie refer to Dr. Sun during his lifetime as being indeed a great man, but an idealist. And Dr. Sun himself said that under his government the Cantonese traders ridiculed him as an “empty cannon,” meaning that he had a loud voice with nothing behind it.

In fact it was really only after he died that I saw respect and even praise given to Dr. Sun. Through the vicissitudes of public appreciation some great people are praised, applauded, and worshipped today, but cursed tomorrow. Others, like Dr. Sun, are praised only after their deaths. Dr. Sun would not have been Dr. Sun had he struggled and sacrificed merely for temporary popularity. He was aware that appreciation of his work would rise and fall at different moments, and he devoted all his energy, skill, will, and emotions to the independence and greatness of the nation he loved to the bottom of his heart, the Chinese people. Neither his friends nor his enemies can deny this love of his, nor his honesty and determination.¹⁸

One day when I was in the South carrying out my obligations as Comintern representative (a fact that I no longer need to hide since outsiders have long since broadcast it), I received instructions from the center to find delegates from Indonesia to attend the Asian Transport Workers Conference to be held in Canton. The results of this conference have long been public knowledge, and my role in it was well known in the Philippines as a result of my arrest there. By August 1927 Western imperialism was smart, experienced, and wealthy enough to know everything that went on in the organizations of its enemies.

The official view of the Canton Conference, as recorded in the Encyclopaedie (same volume as quoted above), p. 535 is as follows:¹⁹

International Communist Trade Union Action

The Fourth Congress of the Comintern, November/December 1922, decided to carry out active propaganda for the national liberation of all the nations of the Pacific.

[111] The Red International of Trade Unions (Profintern) also proposed this in its Second Congress, held simultaneously with the Fourth Congress of the Comintern, and it was decided to call a large conference of delegates of transport workers of all the nations around the Pacific Ocean.

This Pan-Pacific Conference was held in Canton at the end of June 1924. Canton was the only place near the tropics where they could work undisturbed to organise a Red International of sailors and labourers in the principal ports of the Pacific. This International was seen as the link in the chain uniting the revolutionary national liberation movements with the proletarian class struggle in the West. The question of how to implement this link, which had to be accomplished without straying too far from theoretical axioms of the class struggle, had long been under consideration by the E.C.C.I. (Executive Committee of the Communist International). The importance of this first conference of the transport workers can be seen to some degree in the Manifesto addressed to the workers of the East and to the proletariat of Europe and America (published in Internationale Presse Korrespondenz 6 September 1924, No. 36).²⁰ This manifesto pointed out the fact that in Canton, in the revolutionary part of South China, representatives of transport workers from North and South China, from Java (Alimin and Budisutjitro) and from the Philippines had gathered at a conference convened by the Red International of Trade Unions. The aim of establishing an international link was shown, inter alia, by the following call: “We call on all organisations of transport workers in colonial and semi-colonial countries to unite themselves and join the revolutionary transport workers of the world.”

The conference, which lasted for six days, decided to establish in Canton the Bureau of the Red Eastern Labour Union to unite the transport workers of all the Eastern countries, to which would be attached Secretariats for China, Indonesia, the Philippines, Japan and India.²¹

And on page 537 of the Encyclopaedie:

[112] At approximately the same time (21 December 1924) the P.K.I. seemed to move towards establishing the Red Labour Union Secretariat for Indonesia in Surabaya. The Central Leadership of the P.K.I. in Jakarta took the initiative and sent draft statutes for this Secretariat to the leadership of the V.S.T.P. (Railway Union), the S.P.P.L. (Seamen’s Union), the S.B.G. (Sugar Workers Union), and the Serikat Pelikan (Oil and Mineworkers Union). These draft statutes stated that the Secretariat would be a branch of the Canton Bureau, and would be a member of the Profintern in Moscow. The P.K.I. leadership stated in so many words that “to achieve a revolutionary class struggle in Indonesia it is necessary to establish unity among the Asian industrial and transport workers’ organisations.”

In the old areas of communist work, particularly Semarang, there was more of a desire to strike. Initially, in P.K.I circles, there was a proposal to stage a strike on 8 May 1925 to commemorate the second anniversary of Semaun’s arrest. Having learned from the 1923 rail strikes, the V.S.T.P. rejected the strike plan.²² The P.K.I. leadership postponed the strike date until the S.P.P.L. (Indonesia) united with the S.P.P.L. (Netherlands).²³ But because members were tired of waiting, it was proposed to stage a general protest strike as a demonstration against the (Dutch East Indies) Government’s rejection of Tan Malaka’s request to return to Indonesia from exile (a more detailed explanation will follow—T.M.). However, it seems that people were reluctant to move without real support from the large unions like the V.S.T.P. They were awaiting a suitable strike atmosphere, in which economic motives could be synchronised with and used as camouflage for political ones.

Meanwhile, it appears that in Semarang people became impatient. On 21 July 1925 the long-awaited strike broke out, initially among the printing workers of a Chinese firm that published a Chinese-Indonesian newspaper. The strike was precipitated by the firm’s refusal to meet the demand of the Sarekat Buruh Cetak, the Printing Workers Union, that a dismissed worker be re-hired, which was coupled with other demands relating to general job security. The strike spread to several other printing concerns, and on 1 August a strike broke out at the Centrale Burgerlijke Ziekeninrichting [Central Civil Hospital] in Semarang. At the same time a strike broke out at the Semarangsche Stoomboot en Prauwenveer [Semarang Steam and Ferry Boat Co.]. Within a few days, some one thousand Indonesian captains and sailors stopped work on the urging of the Seamen’s Union (S.P.P.L.), which was advancing demands for improvements in working conditions to the management of the ferry company. The strike gradually diminished from that point and came to an end in mid-September. According to Government Decision No. 2 of 17 December 1925, three strike leaders and propagandists of the P.K.I.—Darsono, Aliarcham and Mardjohan—were interned.²⁴

The main points in the above passages are as follows:

[113] 1. The Canton Bureau, which united all transport workers of Asia and branches of the Profintern, was established in June 1924 at a conference at which Indonesian delegates were present (from the PKI);

2 As a direct result of that conference, in December 1924 a Red Labour Union Secretariat for Indonesia led by the P.K.I. was established in Indonesia;

3 The strikes staged in several industries in mid-1925 were directly under the leadership of the Red Labour Union Secretariat for Indonesia and the PKI;

4 The strike wave was apparently very weak and, apart from spreading a little in Semarang, did not catch on in all of Java, let alone the whole of Indonesia.

It is my opinion that the lack of spirit in the economic actions, which in essence were directed towards a seizure of economic and political rights, resulted from the economic situation at that time. The Economic Curve shows clearly that the lowest point was reached in 1922, and by 1925 the world economy was on the upswing towards the peak of 1927-1928. One cannot deny that our organization had certain weaknesses, ones that we, as a tropical nation, still manifest today. However, the main reason for the downturn in political strikes in mid-1925 was the exhaustion of the revolutionary spirit throughout Indonesia as a result of the improvement in the economic crisis.

So much for the developments in the politico-economic strikes in 1925, which resulted in the exile of several leaders of the PKI who were desperately needed, particularly in the period leading up to the 1926 events. Let us return to the Canton Bureau.

The Encyclopaedie gives an account that is not far from the truth, since in fact it quoted from the official source, the Comintern organ Internationale Presse Korrespondenz. But, apart from drawing a few conclusions of its own, the Encyclopaedie saw only the surface and was not able to discern what went on beneath.

[114] Actually, I was happy that the Dutch East Indies government in its Encyclopaedie did not see what was happening beneath the surface, because I myself was down there. There are still other similar matters that cannot yet be disclosed, but that I was in charge of the Canton Bureau was an open secret in the Philippines and made things difficult for me there. In fact it was not really a secret any longer. And the existence of the Profintern and its older sibling, the Comintern, was already a fact of history.

I had only just arrived in Canton with the two delegates from Indonesia after an exhausting trip and had not yet had time even to catch my breath, when I went to meet two representatives from the center. One was the Comintern representative who was in contact with me at that time, and the other was the Profintern representative with whom I was to be connected in the future and whom I had known well in Moscow.²⁵ (I call them representatives, because they were responsible to those two bodies of the International. Alimin’s statement in his book Analysis that I was appointed as a Comintern and Profintern representative by two “functionaries” is a great insult to these two organizations of the International.²⁶ This illustrates Alimin’s longstanding characteristic of indifference and irresponsibility even to his comrades in arms when his interests are at stake. I may remind the reader of Alimin’s attitude toward his former leader, the late Tjokroaminoto, in the Afdeling B trial of Sarekat Islam in 1928.²⁷

The meeting went as one would expect between close friends. Before I had even sat down, the Profintern representative began. “Comrade,” he said, “the central leadership of the Profintern has decided to establish a Bureau of Transport Workers, to be located here in Canton. You are to run this bureau, organizing whatever is necessary. A newspaper or magazine shall be published and you are to be in charge of that too. In addition, you must be prepared to speak at the Transport Workers Conference this evening. Your future position as head of the bureau is an independent one, and you will report directly to us in Moscow.”

I was astonished. After recapturing my breath and my thoughts, I worked out a few questions. “Isn’t there anyone else to head this bureau? Aren’t my responsibilities to the Comintern enough in themselves? How can I be in charge of an English-language magazine when I know only enough English to ask directions?”

“We have already taken all this into consideration and have reached the decision unanimously,” answered the comrade from the Profintern.

[115] “We don’t have a shortage of people, do we? In China alone there are several professors among our comrades . . .” I added.

The comrade from the Profintern gave me a short answer that put an end to all my reservations: “As a disciplined Communist, you surely will accept the decision.”

The Transport Workers Conference went very smoothly. At first Dr. Sun was scheduled to appear, but it was decided that politically that would be unwise, so he was represented by Liao Chung-k’ai. On the first day the Profintern representative chaired the sessions, and the second day I was in the chair, and on the third day a Chinese delegate, and so on. In the election for the head of the bureau I was chosen.²⁸

At the close of the conference the delegates returned to their homelands. The Indonesian delegates left Canton. I was alone, left with the task of printing and circulating the speeches and resolutions to all corners of Asia.