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The Horizons of Islam

As can easily be seen, social, political and economic life is directly influenced by the fundamentals which we have just analysed. Man, who enjoys a real and fundamental freedom, ought to bear in mind these dimensions of property, law and responsibility. His life is a witnessing. It is in this “landscape of meaning” that the idea of the individual is defined, and wherein the notion of “community” is born. From the latter, the general principles of law take shape. Indeed, it is one of the specificities of Islam to have engendered a mode of thought the essence of which is, before anything else, juridical. This, regardless of whether it is on an individual level, or at a worship, social, political, financial or economic level. The law, insofar as it is the codification of responsibilities, liberties or principles of co-existence, is primal.

Jurists “of the sources of law”, following the formulations developed by al-Shāṭibī in his famous book al-Muwāfaqāt, have established five principles the respect of which orientates all religious regulations. These principles, a fortiori, affect social, political and economic perspectives. The five principles in question are: religion (al-dīn), the person (al-nafs), the mind (al-‘aql), progeny (al-nasl) and property (al-māl). All religious obligations and prohibitions derive from a strict observance of these fundamental principles. ¹ In fact, the legislation of the different domains of human activity should seek to preserve this basic orientation; i.e. it should act as the point of reference, as a kind of memorandum of finalities, that believers cannot afford to neglect.

I. Social Principles

If there is a domain whereby the fundamental respect of the principles so identified requires vigilance at all times, it is surely that of the social sphere. Whether at the level of worship (al-‘Ibādāt, that which relates strictly to the pillars of Islam), ² or that of daily life, Islam is the carrier of a teaching which is entirely directed towards the collective and social dimension. This, to the extent that we can say that there is no real practice of religion without personal investment in the community. The serenity of our solitude in front of the Creator cannot occur unless it is fed by our relation with our fellow beings, this being something which is renewed daily. We understand, thus, that it is a responsibility which weighs on each individual in front of God. There exists, by extension, a determining requirement addressed to the group and to society. This is the location where the destiny of each of its members is decided. In fact, it is necessary to offer to each individual the optimum conditions which allow him to respond to his moral and spiritual aspirations.

Hence, the social dimension is undoubtedly fundamental, for upon this rests all religious and cultural points of reference. To organise the social space is to give one the means to live fully and serenely one’s own identity. Any reflection on a project of society whose aim is to pinpoint the challenges of “modern life”, whether in the West or in the East, should, without mediation, articulate itself around this space. When one considers the crises which today face the United States and Europe, whether it be unemployment, exclusion, violence and xenophobia, one realises just how urgent a rethink of “the social fact” is, and this well before any economic or political preoccupations. Let us also be clear that Asian countries, as also the countries of the South do not escape this rule either. If nothing comes “to disturb” actual by-products, the future so announced will be very sombre for all.

If we are to reverse the order of things concrete answers are what is needed, for it is not enough to present a project of a theoretical society based on general and idealistic conceptions. To refer to Islam is to describe a horizon of faith, thought, culture and civilisation. But it is not yet time to elaborate solutions. For, if the expression “Islam is the solution” is a unifying slogan, it, nonetheless, remains a slogan empty of any strategy or planning. To forget this is to come close to a trap which more than one Muslim has already become a victim of. This is often the result of thinking that it is enough to cite the sources in order to convey the dimension of their just applicability in an actual context. History should have taught us, however, that there are two ways of betraying the teachings offered by our sources. To curtail the text is the most common way; but to apply the text outside its context and orientation (qaḤd) is an even more pernicious betrayal. This because, in appearance, everything leads one to believe that one has respected the latter. Islamic window displays are dangerous, and in their superficiality they are outright lies. This formalism is one of the worst enemies of the person, who in all sincerity, wants to respect the Qur’ānic and traditional teachings. For it allows that person to apply them as they are cited, without any effort of research or great cost but with great ensuing harm.

We must warn against this tendency. It is also fitting though not to fall into the other extreme which consists of attaching little importance to points of reference and expect of Muslims – at least those wishing to remain faithful to the orientations of the Qur’ānic Revelation – to render a project outside of any predetermined finality and outside of any cultural or religious dimension. To think modernity requires that we present in a clear fashion the imperatives and priorities of the grand orientations of social action. Once this framework is laid out, it is then possible for us to suggest a perspective of enquiry for contemporary problems.

1. The Individual

As we have already noted, man is a responsible being; not only before God but also before his own fellow men. Building a society requires that one has, beforehand, specified a conception of the individual who constitutes this society. In this, Islam, as indeed have all the spiritualities and religions of the world, has stressed three fundamental principles (which are as such aspirations): the requirement of truth and transparency; the moral dimension (ethics) and the priority of values, and the imperative of respect of men and the norms of balance. Each human being has to try to live, to feed himself and to give sense to that which makes up his humanity; to acquire knowledge in order to draw near to what is truer; to give force to his values in order to achieve good; to listen and participate in order to better respect. The appeal of the Prophet (peace be upon him) to seek knowledge (“Seeking knowledge is an obligation upon every Muslim”); the Qur’ānic requirement for one to get involved in the good vis-à-vis one’s person and one’s society (“You ought to command good and forbid evil”); and finally all the recommendations for fairness and kindness that we find in the Qur’ān and the Sunna (“Speak in the best manners”, “Do not forget to treat one another with generosity, goodness, and kindness”) clearly leads us in this direction. It is, therefore, impossible to think a society without starting with the individual who should make it his business to reform his own being.

God changes not what is in a people, until they change what is in themselves. (Qur’ān, 13:11)

The change from the singular of people to the plural of individuals who constitute the former is perfectly clear as far as the extent of the injunction is concerned. The social dimension takes meaning at the source of the conscience of each human being. To the one who is a carrier of faith, this comprehension is made in a perpetual concern for balance.

… but seek, amidst that which God has given thee, the Last Abode, and forget not thy portion of the present world; and do good, as God has been good to thee. And seek not to work corruption in the earth; surely God loves not the workers of corruption. (Qur’ān, 28:77)

Thus, society ought to allow each person not to neglect “(his) share of life in this world”. Society must be thought of in terms of the function of the individual, and it ought to offer him the possibility of fully living the requirement of his humanity. In other words, it should enable each individual to choose and know the situation well enough. It is, therefore, a question of not being mistaken about the content. To choose in ignorance and illiteracy is not really choosing, to steal while suffering from destitution and misery is not really stealing, and to respect under constraint and repression is not really respecting.

2. The Family

The family remains the constitutive point of reference for everyone. Equally, the modern epoch is characterised by the will for independence, freedom and individualism. One must make oneself on one’s own, fly with one’s own wings as soon as possible, and in this sense the familial space becomes something of a prison. Yet, to listen to any mother or father, we are persuaded that what everyone wants as best for their children is a balanced, open and serene familial environment. Daily life today, however, makes things increasingly difficult: couples are separating, break-ups are multiplying and imbalances increasing. No one is pleased at this state of affairs, any reading of divorce, and single-parent family statistics can only be accompanied by bitterness and anxiety. Is this the price we have to pay for modernity? Are we facing an irreversible process against which the fight is in vain? Real, answers should be found to these urgent questions. The Islamic point of reference is, in the most clearest of fashions, opposed to this splintering process. If modernity can only be obtained at this price, then we understand why the Qur’ān and the Sunna reject the actualisation of such modernisation. Similarly, if the whole world is caught in the rising of this vogue, being ashamed to refer to the family, then the Muslim, wherever he is, should remind others of its importance, its meaning and its finality. The family makes the human being. To ask man to be without family is tantamount to asking an orphan to give birth to his own parents. How can man do it? Do we have the right to give this lie to our children only and then remain passive? The Islamic point of reference requires exactly the opposite attitude from us.

Islam does not depart from the sense of this priority. It is an obligation for all Muslim societies not to spare anything in their effort to preserve those structures which allow for respect of family life. This includes work, education, taxes and allowances and even policies of urbanisation which we know today can have a huge impact on the private lives of city dwellers.

The general orientation within the family is that of complementarity and this should be lived from a starting principle of equality. The Prophet (peace be upon him) had clarified this: “Certainly, women are the sisters of men”, and both have the same duties and rights before God and will be rewarded in the same way:

And the Lord answers them: ‘I waste not the labour of any that labours among you, be you male or female – the one of you is as the other.’ (Qur’ān, 3:195)

In this equality, each will have to give account of his conscience and his life. However, it is together that the first social nucleus must be built, the first home of sociability and the first normative structure. In all this, marriage and the family are of an affective essence. It is love, tenderness and peace which give sense to things.

And of His signs is that He created for you, of yourselves, spouses, that you might repose in them, and He has set between you love and mercy. Surely in that are signs for a people who consider. (Qur’ān, 30:21)

Between a man and a woman there must be a relation of consultation, discussion and mutual participation. ³ The Qur’ān even goes as far as to indicate that the father and the mother should consult one another as to whether or not the mother should continue breast-feeding their child.

… a mother shall not be pressed for her child, neither a father for his child. The heir has a like duty. But if the couple desire by mutual consent and consultation to wean, then it is no fault in them. (Qur’ān, 2:233)

If consultation is required in such a precise context, then it is only to be expected in the larger affairs that concern the couple. If the man is the respondent of the family, in that he is asked to respond to its material needs, this has nothing to do with the notion of “the chief of family” who alone decides for, and sometimes against, the rest of his family. We shall say later a few words about those cultural habits of a certain number of countries with Muslim majorities that attribute to Islam attitudes which in fact Islam reprobates.

Children’s respect for and towards their parents, in light of Islamic points of reference as also that of the savants (‘ulamā’), is one of the fundamentals of religion. This to the extent that the gratitude of filiation is understood as second condition of the truthfulness of faith after worship of the Creator. The Qur’ānic verse in this regard is clear:

Thy Lord has decreed you shall not serve any but Him, and to be good to parents, whether one or both of them attains old age with thee; say not to them ‘Fie’ neither chide them, but speak unto them words respectful, and lower to them the wing of humbleness out of mercy and say, ‘My Lord, have mercy upon them, as they raised me up when I was little.’ (Qur’ān, 17:23–4)

The Prophet (peace be upon him) never ceased to remind his Companions of the importance of the family, that of parenthood and the gratitude which children should accord them. The following ḥadīth is well known by Muslims. Abū Hurayra reported that a man came to the Prophet (peace be upon him) and asked him: “O Messenger of God! Who is most deserving of my company?” He replied: “Your mother.” The man again asked: “And then who is next?” “Your mother”, came the answer. The man again asked: “Who is next?” He said: “Your mother.” “And then who is next?” The Prophet said: “Your father.” ⁴ The recommendation here is explicit and further underlines the threefold role of the mother. The space of this “home” is to be created and society must offer to each one the means of this finality.

We also find in Islamic legislation other general principles which deal with the family. This is, for example, the case with that which deals with marriage ⁵ and inheritance. ⁶ Here again, they are to be understood in relation with the whole social order which must allow their respect in justice. So if one of the rules relating to private life provokes an injustice because of the general social order (poverty, shanty towns, etc.) the public powers ought to anticipate appropriate planning. This can either be by the temporary suspension of a rule, or by a compensation – financial or otherwise – until social reform has re-established things. ⁷

3. Social Organisation: The Principle of Justice

We have, above, insisted on the responsibility of the individual, and it is a fact that the organisation of society rests on the degree of consciousness of those individuals who make it up. There is not a single element in Muslim worship, from prayer to pilgrimage to Makka, which does not emphasise and give priority to the dimension of the community. To practise one’s religion is to participate in the social order and, thus, there cannot be a religious conscience without social ethics and, nothing is more explicit in Islamic teaching. Yet, to say this is still not to say everything. One must again specify the modalities of social action as well as the place of reference to authority.

In the Islamic conception of human being, what characterises man is the fact of his being able to choose and, in so doing, to be responsible. On the moral plane, human liberty holds in itself the sense of a certain number of obligations. Any society must consequently offer to each individual the possibility of responding to the requirement of these obligations. Thus, it clearly appears that individual duties before God will be conveyed, on the social plane, by as many fundamental and intangible rights. Without making an exhaustive analysis of each of these rights, we can here identify seven which are essential. Any breach of one or the other of these rights requires that measures be taken towards reforming the social sphere:

a. The right to life and to a vital minimum. We have pointed out above five principles around which all Islamic obligations revolve. It is clear that the first condition for their applicability is respect for life. Each being must have the right, in any society, to the minimum of nourishment in order to be able to live. This it should be emphasised, is a question of living and not one of solely surviving. All the sources of Islam call the Muslim to live as a practising Muslim in dignity and in respect of himself and others. A social organisation which does not offer its members this minimum, constitutes an infringement of their dignity as created beings, of beings who have to give an account of their persons before the Creator. Being, by essence, responsible, is to necessarily have the means of the responsibility that one conveys. In the absence of this, innocent people are made “guilty”.

b. The right of the family. Let us specify again that each person has the right to enjoy a family life and that, in this sense, by the intermediary of the politicians in charge, society must offer to all the possibility of living with the family in a sound environment. It is imperative if this is to be achieved that adequate local structures are conceived. To have eight people living in one room is not conducive to sound family life, but is rather akin to running a prison, representing little other than suffocation. This is also conducive to creating future rifts, tomorrow’s solitude and marginalisation.

c. The right to housing. The expression of this right ensues directly from what we have just said. Housing is the first condition of family life and Islam insists upon the sacredness of private space. A society must give to each one of its members a roof; this is a responsibility which is hugely incumbent upon it. A man without a residence is not a citizen, he is an excluded person and a victim. Dispossessing man from his humanity and making him pay for his essence is doubly unjust. Being before God requires being in oneself and at oneself, both in the literal and figurative senses.

d. The right to education. Education must be insisted upon, a fortiori, in our times. Being able to read and write, finding in learning the paths of one’s identity and human dignity is essential. To be a Muslim, is clearly “to know”, and straightaway, almost naturally, to walk towards a greater knowledge. The Qur’ān is a little more explicit on this question, for to know, according to it, is to draw nearer to reading the signs, as also to accede to a greater knowledge of the Creator:

Even so only those of His servants fear God who have knowledge, surely God is All-mighty, All-forgiving. (Qur’ān, 35:28)

It is this that the Prophet (peace be upon him) never ceased to confirm: “Seeking knowledge is an obligation on every Muslim.” ⁸ All types of knowledge are contained within this, but in the first instance, the imperative of basic education and learning does not suffer from lack of discussion. The first Qur’ānic verse revealed is: “Read, in the name of your Lord Who created.” This is indeed the specificity of man which gives him prominence over the angel in the story of Creation. ⁹ A society which does not respond to this right loses its sense of its priority. Even more clearly, a society that produces absolute or functional illiteracy hampers the dignity of its members. Such a society is fundamentally inhuman.

e. The right to work. Man should be able to provide for his needs. In this sense, work, just as learning, is part of the inalienable rights of the social being, and each should find his place in the society where he lives. According to Islam, man is by virtue of his action and work. ¹⁰ It is clear then that a society that prevents a man from working is one which does not respond to the elementary social contract. We know the words of the Prophet (peace be upon him): “It is better for one of you to take his ropes, go to the mountain and carry a bundle of fire-wood on his back and then sell it, than to beg of people, who will either give him or deny him charity.” ¹¹

Work is a religious claim which goes far beyond the strict framework of the practice of worship; rather it seems more like a duty. This shows how the fight against unemployment must be a political priority; not only is it imperative, but in the broader sense, it is also both religious and humanitarian.

f. The right for justice. Justice is the foundation of life in society besides being, for Islam, a major imperative of the modalities of action. We read in the Qur’ān: “Indeed, God commands you justice.” This principle of justice applies to all, rich or poor, presidents or citizens, Muslims or non-Muslims. Eight verses from Sūra al-Nisā’, “The Women”, were revealed to prove innocent a Jew and put the responsibility of action on a Muslim. ¹² The verse associating the testimony of faith with the expression of justice makes the subject more explicit.

O believers, be you securers of justice, witnesses for God, even though it be against yourselves, or your parents and kinsmen, whether the man be rich or poor; God stands closest to either. Then follow not caprice, so as to swerve; for if you twist or turn, God is aware of the things you do. (Qur’ān, 4:135) ¹³

Social organisation must imperatively guarantee respect to the rights of each individual, and this by the expression of a double preoccupation. It is certainly a question of seeing to it that judicial power applies the laws with equity for each member of the social corpus. But it is equally important that society responds to the whole requirements of organisation which are linked to the fulfilment of the rights that we have noted earlier. To think social justice is to determine a project, to fix priorities, and to elaborate a dynamic current which, in the name of the fundamental points of reference, orientate social, political and economic action.

We should not have any difficulty in considering that the pursuit of this social reform is fundamental. It is part of the condition of intervention in the social sphere. Furthermore, this teaching is manifest in the gradual Revelations of the Qur’ān which lasted 23 years. Any reflection on the Sharī’a must take root in the source of this temporality, ¹⁴ otherwise one betrays what it came to defend.

g. The right to solidarity. It is not possible to apprehend the Islamic religious universe without finding oneself straightaway facing a concept which places the duty of solidarity at the heart of the living expression of faith. Being before God is tantamount to showing solidarity. The third pillar of Islam, the social purifying tax (zakāt), is placed exactly at the axis of the religious and social practice. As duty before God, it responds to the right of human beings. The Qur’ān is clear when it refers to sincere believers:

… and the beggar and the outcast had a share in their wealth. (Qur’ān, 51:19)

The Qur’ānic injunction resonates here with force:

You will not attain piety until you expend of what you love… (Qur’ān, 3:92)

The responsibility of each person lies in actively participating in social life. In this, the obligation to pay zakāt is but a part of a broader social solidarity. Engagement on personal and familial levels must be accompanied by care towards one’s neighbours, life in the neighbourhood as well as towards national and international preoccupations. Certainly, Islam has devised an institutional support for fighting against poverty (by the intermediary of zakāt), but it seems clear that the solution is not firstly of a structural nature. It is rather a question of conscience and ethics. The strength of this fraternity and human solidarity is the living source of the fight against social injustice, poverty and misery. Whosoever has faith carries the duty of this engagement; whosoever has faith knows the right to claim it.

The seven rights mentioned above do not cover all the elements that concern the individual and social spheres. However, they give a sufficiently clear idea about what the founding orientations of a Muslim society should be. At the source and heart of reflection one finds, with the acknowledgement of the Creating God, finalities which all revolve around the idea of justice. This justice is basic and primal and all human activity, in all its steps, must maintain this determination. In order to achieve this, it is appropriate to analyse situations rather than apply rules absolutely. This because the context may turn the most legitimate or most logical rules into unjust or obsolete ones, and, thus, betray in practice what they should defend in spirit.

One would be right in pointing out, upon reading the preceding lines, that the picture so described is indeed ideal, but unfortunately nothing that concerns men or their intentions is this marvellous. One would also be right to add that the observation of contemporary Muslim societies – something hardly meticulous – systematically contradicts each point so far put forward. One would also be right that the general orientations of Islam do not have a great deal to do with the daily lot of Muslims at the end of this twentieth century. Nor is it a question of heaping on the West a load of blames and insults, making “the enemy” guilty of all our own shortcomings. This would be to lie, and indeed to lie on two accounts. On the one hand by refusing to assume our own responsibilities, and on the other by demonising, in caricature and without any discernment, a “West” that we do not exactly know.

To think the ideal without preoccupying ourselves with the kind of reality that surrounds us is dangerous. Equally dangerous, is the attitude of some Muslims who think that it is enough to “return to Islam” in order that things be sorted out with one strike. In truth, the danger is twofold:

♦ The first is that it tends to present things in too simplistic and crude a manner. We convince ourselves that poverty will be resolved by the imposition of zakāt, that the economy will be cleansed by the prohibition of interest (ribā) and that society will be united because “the believers are brothers of one another”. We are then content with some well-intended speeches, and as far as the rest is concerned we would have to rely on God. As if “reliance on God” means a lack of intelligence or competence in action; as if the Qur’ānic Revelation has not distinguished between orientation and state, between where we should go and where we are; between the actualised foundation of a social project and the well-intended expression of its form. There is no place for such an attitude and “God’s tradition” (sunnat Allah) throughout the history of humanity shows ¹⁵ us that things are more complicated than this, and that the success of a human project is guaranteed, in the light of faith, to whoever knows how to develop the characteristics of his human nature. In other words, drawing near to the Divine recommendations is tantamount to multiplying the qualities of one’s humanity. But this does not mean emptying oneself in order to annihilate it in a fatalism which combines mysticism and passivity. This no matter how good our intentions are.

♦ The second danger is of a sensibly different nature, but it is nevertheless no less widespread. In fact, we can read today from the pens of certain ‘ulamā’ and Muslim intellectuals discourses which transform the profoundness of Islamic teachings in these orientations and objectives (maqāḤid) into a literal application of rules called Islamic only because they formally refer to the Qur’ān and the Sunna. Without taking the time to consider the context, the state of society, the modalities of application of laws and regulations, we demand an immediate application of certain measures which are often measures of constraint, as if to be a good Muslim today one must be less free. This formalism has consequences which are properly dramatic, for by wanting to plaster a façade of Islam on the problems of contemporary societies we do not go back to the cause of fracture and we, thus, prevent ourselves from finding solutions. The situation, therefore, cannot be improved; and by becoming worse, we intervene in a more coercive manner so as to “apply Islam”. Good intention, whether real or presumed, is thus rendered into a daily nightmare, this especially so when making a society more Islamic means prohibiting further, censuring permanently, reprimanding, imprisoning and punishing without respite. It, therefore, remains for us to ask ourselves how is it that a message which, at the source of the original permission, has put so much trust in men for the treatment of their affairs and, which has counted on their responsibility, ends up as the tool of a generalised suspicion which only a totalitarian and police regime can uphold. Formalism here kills the essence of the message, which it pretends to defend. It is indeed this betrayal that we find in the discourses of many a head of state and governments tell us that they want to apply the Islamic Sharī’a, and who in order to maintain themselves are equipped with an arsenal of the most repressive laws against their people. Whether military presidents, kings or princes, they candidly confuse the project of social reform, which is the real application of the Sharī‘a today, with the application of a penal code from which they will, at worst, only acquire greater power. It is a display of “Islamisation” used as a cover by dictators and from which many people suffer. ¹⁶

4. What is the Sharī’a?

Nowadays reference to the Sharī’a, in the West, has the effect of a bugbear. To see it applied is to start the sordid, detailed account of amputated hands, floggings, and so on and so forth. It is further seen as men’s moralist repression through which they impose on women the “wearing of the chador” as well as considering them as legal minors. Fed by such imagery, references to the Sharī’a appear as obscurantist confinement, medieval stubbornness, and fanaticism. Wherever a discourse raises the notion of the Sharī’a, the actors seem to turn their backs on contemporary reality and reject progress and evolution by arming themselves against the perils of the future.

One should also add that some kings and presidents do nothing to facilitate the comprehension of this notion. Repression had not been the way of the Prophet (peace be upon him). That law has a role in the total scheme of reform is not disputed; what should be clearly understood is that moral and social transformation is a multi-dimensional process. The penal sphere is not the be-all and end-all of the Sharī’a. It does not consist of adding prohibition to prohibition, and of reprimanding transgressors in the most exemplary manner. The Sharī’a aims at the liberation of man and not merely of whittling down liberties. The Islamic model must not be confused with the destruction that has been perpetrated by certain dictators in the name of the Sharī’a.

It is appropriate, nonetheless, to take very seriously this interpellation of a central notion of Islamic thought; a notion which today suffers from an incredible misunderstanding, when it is not a question of reprehensible betrayal. To tackle the question of modernity presumes that we have a precise idea of what is entailed in the orientations of Islamic sources. These sources being the essence of what we call, in Islamic law, the Sharī’a.

We have identified above ¹⁷ the two fundamental sources of Islamic law, and what the role of ijtihād is in the formulation of a legislation which is in tune with its time. One must here insist that the Sharī’a cannot be reduced to the penal sphere and that, a fortiori, such reduction is of a nature that belies its very essence.

“Al-Sharī’a” is an Arabic term which literally means ‘the way’, and more precisely ‘the way which leads to a source’. We understand from this notion, in the domain of juridical reflection, all the prescriptions of worship and social injunctions which are derived from the Qur’ān and the Sunna. On the level of acts of worship, the said prescriptions are more often than not precise, and the rules of practice codified and fixed. The domain of “social affairs”, however, is more vast and we find in the two sources a certain number of principles and orientations which the jurists (fuqahā’) must respect when they formulate laws which are in tune with their time and place. It is indeed ijtihād, the third nominal source of Islamic law, which provides a link between the absoluteness of the points of reference and the relativity of history and location. Fed at the source and by the source, the jurist must think his time with a clear conscience of the course which separates him from the ideal of general and oriented prescriptions. He must take into consideration the specific social situation in order to think the stages of his reform. ¹⁸ His pragmatism must be permanent.

Thus, only that which is derived from the Qur’ān and the Sunna is absolute, and this, as we have noted before, covers the expression of general orientations. Beyond this, reflection is subject to the relativity of human thought and rationality. We can, at the same time, witness in two different locations two different legislations regarding the same question, but both legislations still remain “Islamic”. Similarly, we can, in the same place but at two successive epochs, introduce two different regulations, both determined by socio-historical evolution, while still remaining “Islamic” in both applications. Fiqh ¹⁹ is the way whereby jurists, in light of the Qur’ān and the Sunna, have thought out a legislation which is in tune with their times. Their efforts, respectable as they are, remain however only human attempts which cannot be convenient for all stages of history. In fact, each epoch must bring forth its own “comprehension” and make use of the intelligence of the scholars then extant.

Pointing out the confusion between the Sharī’a and fiqh and reminding that the Qur’ān and the Sunna convey expressions of absolute finalities, is not a question of sanctifying the decisions of such or such a jurist of such and such a time. For it is still not enough to respond to what the application of the Sharī’a can cover today. We have said above a few words about the necessity of Muslim jurists’ pragmatism, and it is necessary to be particularly precise on this subject. For the Muslim, pronouncing the attestation of faith (there is no deity except God and Muḥammad is His Messenger), praying five times a day, contributing zakāt, fasting during the month of Ramaḍān and making the pilgrimage, is already an application of the Sharī’a. ²⁰ It is important to understand this notion from this angle, and one should realise that it is not playing with words or their meanings. The man of faith engages himself in fulfilling the orientation, practice, as well as the individual and collective legislation, whether public or private, from the moment he gives to his actions the sense of acknowledgement of the Creator. When he does so he is clearly on the way of the source.

This application, as much on the personal as on the social level, is the object of tension between the ideal design and the procedure of its daily actualisation. It is the share of each man, just as it is that of humanity in its entirety. Life is this course we take towards closeness of what is better, in the love of the best, while being conscious of insufficiency. Faith, then, must be the conscience of this humility. The Qur’ān, whose revelation was completed in 23 years, itself notes the essence of this tension in that it presents itself truly as a divine pedagogy. It has trained the men of the Arabian peninsula to rapprochement. It initiated them, from one revelation to another, and from one phase to another, in the best practice as much on the individual as on the collective level. Once engaged on this path, they never betrayed the meaning of the Sharī’a. Rather, they lived its accomplishment and perfection until the day when this plentitude was achieved:

Today I have perfected your religion for you, and I have completed My blessing upon you, and I have approved Islam for your religion. (Qur’ān, 5:3)

Thus, on the individual plane, each person learned by means of three successive revelations (in the span of nearly nine years) that the consumption of alcohol is forbidden. ²¹ Similarly, on the collective plane, four revelations progressively confirmed and enhanced the prohibition of interest and usury (al-ribā) before the Prophet (peace be upon him) clarified the imperative scope of this prohibition during his farewell pilgrimage. ²² The ‘ulamā’ who specialise in the study of the sources of legislation (‘ilm uḤūl al-fiqh) have derived from this pedagogical procedure a rule of primal importance for the elaboration of a social project. It consists of thinking and determining the phases of its general actualisation. It is appropriate, therefore, to fix priorities, to plan the phases which create a context within which the application of a rule will remain faithful to the Qur’ānic objective (qaṣd).

Considering the present state of our societies, to apply the Sharī’a from the starting point of an institutional penal code is tantamount to taking the wrong way twice. In the first instance, it is nothing less than starting from the end by not having taken into account a social context which is profoundly different and disrupted. It is, moreover, the height of injustice, for it means transforming the most deprived of victims into guilty people. Above all, it is betraying the scope of the Qur’ānic message which makes social justice the priority of all legislative activity. Hence, from the moment we admit that we are engaged according to our individual and collective abilities in an actualisation of the Sharī’a, it is necessary that we fix the priority of a greater social justice. Any procedure, measure, regulation, or law that moves towards more equity and to the defence of those fundamental rights which we identified above, is a concrete application of the Sharī’a. It is impossible here to be satisfied with a miserable formalism which, in order to appease consciences, is of itself a violation of the Revelation.

The application of the Sharī’a is nowadays the priority given to the actualisation of a social project founded on the principles of justice and collective participation. It entails engaging oneself in eliminating illiteracy, in ensuring training, in managing the distribution of resources, and national and regional development. Legislation must accompany and encourage this dynamic, and power must be a guarantor on all the rungs of political representation. There exists, very explicitly, a contradiction in terms between dictatorship and the application of the Sharī’a. ²³

In fact, the Sharī’a is applied in the immediacy of the daily lot of each practising person, in a more or less complete manner, but always in tension and search; for each person, according to his capabilities, applies it in the hope of always going further in deepening his spirituality and practice. On the social plane, prayer in congregation and zakāt are already an engagement in this way, and each step which is carried out towards a better acknowledgement of the rights of people, is a step forward towards the achievement of a model. Therefore, we cannot begin with sanction when everything on the social plane drives us to transgression, theft, lying and delinquency. Such an intervention on the social field dictates that we consider things from the bottom up and also in depth. Legislation becomes here the support of a social reform, and in the interplay of their reaction, the one rests on the other in order to give birth to real change. We may think, at this phase of reflection, that there is here nothing specifically Islamic. It remains, in any case, that the orientations we have already spoken about remain the fundamental point of reference and that, in fact, there cannot be a will for Islamic social or political reform without the concrete conveyance of its priorities. In other words, for social action to be Islamic, it must, in the first instance, give witness of its respect to ethics; it can never be justified by its formalism.

5. The Situation of Women

It is within this domain of women, without doubt, that the fight against formalism is one of the most urgent. This is so not because the subject has become the favourite theme of the Western media, but rather because Muslim societies today do not have much to do with what Muslims might wish in terms of faithfulness to Qur’ānic and Prophetic sources. Before God and in conscience, Muslims cannot satisfy themselves by repeating what the texts say and then snap their fingers at daily social realities: that would be to speak of an ideal while at the same time blind themselves as to their daily betrayal.

The tendency which we have denounced above and which consists, from the moment we pretend to apply the Sharī’a, of starting with sanctions, penalties and the restriction of liberties, finds eloquent illustration with regard to women, their status and social role. We always put forward the imperative of wearing the Islamic veil, the limited participation of women in social life, and legislative reforms which codify the domains of marriage, inheritance, and the like. Here again, it is the “appearance” of “more Islam” which will be the proof of the Islamic quality of procedure. Moreover, it is often in light of permissive Western society that Islamic specificity is justified. If such liberties lead to a Western model, then to restrain them is tantamount to “proving” that we produce the Muslim ideal well. This apparent logic blinds us to the extent of this sophism. It is not more or less liberties, even less a rapport with a real or imagined West, which attests to the Islamic character or to a social or political project. It is, rather, the degree of faithfulness to the principles of the points of reference which alone is credible.

Here, one must also, analyse things in depth. We have said above that Islam offers to the woman, besides absolute equality before God, inalienable rights that all societies must respect. ²⁴ We remember, moreover, that the Qur’ānic revelation produced a progressive reform of mentalities and drove new Muslims to reconsider the status of women in society. In the same manner, during the last 23 years of the Prophet’s life, it became possible for women to understand, from within and by means of spirituality, their private and social duties and rights. This parameter of time, of evolution and of accomplishment is inescapable on the personal plane just as it is within social strategy. It is a question of putting in place a long-term process which takes into account actual realities in order to move ahead in respect of Muslim points of reference.

a. The individual dimension: the example of the veil

This reflection seems obvious on a personal development level. There still exists, however, many parents who, having understood the Islamic obligation of wearing the veil, impose the same upon their daughters without the latter understanding its meaning and import. Furthermore, very often such children do not practise, pray, nor are open to the inward dimension of faith. They respect an obligation which they do not feel – indeed refuse – but appearances are safer; to whoever sees them from the outside, they will look like good Muslims. Some parents will even obstinately begin the religious education of their daughters by what ought to be its culmination (a desired and voluntary culmination). They forget in all this that the veil was introduced in the fifteenth year of revelation; 15 years which were for the first Muslims as many years of learning, deepening of knowledge and, especially, of intense spiritual life. We find here exactly the same problem we have noted in the application of the Sharī’a, i.e. one of pure “display”. To offer women the horizon of an inward message of Islam by beginning with the imposition of the veil is tantamount to committing the same reductionism as that which consists of immediately applying a range of sanctions on the social plane without having undertaken the necessary reforms. It is an act of ignorance in some instances, but above all it is due to intellectual laziness and resignation. Repeating at will that Islam asserts that there is “no constraint in religion” does not change the reality of pressure, and oppression, that some Muslim women today are subjected to. Moreover, we reproach those who have refused to submit as having opted for the bad “choice”. Yet we have often not presented to them the terms of any real choice. For certain women, it is a question of either blindly obeying amidst discrimination, or revolting amidst transgression. The Qur’ānic verse:

No compulsion is there in religion. (Qur’ān, 2:256) ²⁵

shines forth in a space which is eminently exigent, and we would be wrong to make the economy of the condition of education that it supposes. It offers human beings a choice; it is giving him, beforehand, sufficient education and knowledge in order to assert himself while possessing full knowledge of the cause. The responsibility of parents, educators, or trainers consists in giving to their children or pupils knowledge and the means to make their own choice of responsibility. Religious education does not go against this rule, even less the education of girls. They have the fundamental right to learn and it is here that is born personal responsibility before God and before society. This responsibility, lastly, has no sense unless women possess a real freedom to determine and choose for themselves.

What we have just said regarding the veil is a good illustration of a disfunctioning still too frequent in Islamic societies. The example of the veil is very vivid, but we can find this same tendency towards formalism in a great number of domains. By making the economy of reforming things in depth, we stop at what is in reality an Islamic varnish, when it is not a question of a social do-it-yourself, whereby we merrily mix restriction, confinement and cultural habit. Such situations are legion in all Arab-Muslim countries, in some Asian regions and in neighbourhoods of Europe and the United States. There is an urgent need for education and training not only of girls and women, but also of fathers and of all men. The worst enemy of the rights of women is not Islam but ignorance and illiteracy, to which we may add the determining role of traditional prejudices.

b. The social dimension

To be convinced, in light of the Qur’ān and the Sunna, that Islam recognises and defends the fundamental rights of women; to remind ourselves with conviction of our equality before God and of our prescribed social complementarity – for the man as for the woman – within familial priority; to call for a recognition of Muslim identity as the source of a social project which offers to the woman a space for life that returns to her all the rights that Islam bestowed upon her, but which present-day societies daily deny her – to do all this is to hold a very critical view on the contemporary ²⁶ situation and to be engaged in changing things in consequential fashion for the long-term. This patience in action, which is the exact definition of the Arabic word “ṣabr”, ²⁷ must be armed with the conviction that it is more appropriate to approach a model slowly than to hastily put make-up on the form.

To make any reference to Islam today, on the plane of social identity, is clearly to call for the liberation of women within and by Islam. It will certainly not be the model of liberation which has taken course in the West (this in consequence of its specific history and in which we will be poorly inspired if we do not recognise a certain number of gains), but one which nonetheless takes Muslim societies out of their serious and difficult situations.

It must first involve engaging in a vast enterprise of education and schooling. Great efforts are provided today by caring associations by NGOs and broadly speaking by movements that function on the model of South American based communities, but this cannot be sufficient. It is important that this reform is presented as a priority for states and that it is carried out and defended by a real political will. We know that this is not the case today and that nothing in what the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or the World Bank (WB) do makes this work a priority. For example, the rate of schooling for women in the Maghreb today is the lowest in the world. This situation is inadmissible from the point of view of Islam. The Muslim woman, like the Muslim man, has a right to learning. It is an inalienable right that any social organisation must respect.

The religious education of women should take the form of foundational instruction. For if Islam gives rights to women, it remains that they need to know these rights in order to defend them. The good, theoretical speeches of men have never remedied the daily sufferings of women. Consequently, the latter should have access to a different religious education, one which allows them to contribute in abstracting the essence of the message of Islam from the accidents of its rustic, traditional or Bedouin reading. This would be a means to facing up to the distortions of such readings. One that requires that we respect the orientations of the Revelation and not the strictly masculine pretensions of such and such a custom, or of any paternal “habit”. Women are nowadays more and more engaged in the sense of this education in all Muslim countries. Still we are far from what ought to be achieved. However, the progress, although not spectacular, is tangible. This work of depth is already an application of the Sharī’a. Its application is progressive, for the long-term and is fed by the memory of the path of its source. It is with human beings, for the respect of their rights, without ever forgetting God.

At one time women used to trade, and participate in meetings; they were even in-charge of the market at Madina under Caliph ‘Umar. Furthermore, they engaged in social life in the seventh century. Is it possible to posit that a process of “Islamisation” at the end of the twentieth century will be rendered by a definitive return to home, house confinement and infantilisation? ²⁸ By what twist of the mind have we managed to disfigure the Islamic message while asserting a willingness to defend it? Undoubtedly, as we have suggested above, it is because nowadays we think Islam more in contrast to “Western derivatives” than in function of its proper essence (which indeed has rules to be respected but which has no reactive twist). It is, therefore, necessary to return, serenely we must say, to the original teachings of Islam and allow women, at all levels of social life, to take an active part in the achievement of the reforms that we would like to bring forth. This is the prolongation of the education which they have the right to and which will allow them to run their affairs, to work, to organise themselves, to elect and be elected without any contravention of Islamic ethics or the order of priorities. Women must be able to play a social role. And if Islam clearly stipulates the priority of the family, this has never meant that a woman cannot move out of this space. Priority conveys the idea of a hierarchy but not the expression of an exclusivity. ²⁹ Wearing the veil, in this sense, does not mean the confinement of woman. If it is freely worn, ³⁰ then it must express an exacting and moral presence on the plane of social activity. It marks a limit in the proximity of which man understands that the woman – a fortiori one who is socially active – is a being before God. It should instil respect of privacy, before any inclination towards seduction due to her appearance.

The debate on the role of woman drags to its wake a broader reflection on modernity. Is it possible nowadays to defend the idea of a moral presence of men and women in the field of social activity together with a well-defined role for the family? Does wanting to differently apprehend the contemporary world, or the life described as modern, imply rejecting progress or the fact of modernity? One must acknowledge the impressive advancements of industrial societies as one should delight in the progress achieved today. Yet, one must not forget to take account of the dismantling of the social tissue, the profound crisis of values and the generalised doubt which lies at the heart of such. We cannot be so blind as not to notice the consequences of this “very modern” life, which makes out of speed a norm and out of meaning a secondary question. By essence, Islamic civilisation cannot recognise itself in such a strange inversion of priorities. By essence, it measures the evolution of societies by the level of their faithfulness to fundamentals, preferring quality of life (social, spiritual and moral) over quantity of productivity and consumption. There are women nowadays, whose number is constantly increasing, who wish to participate in the construction of a new society, but who at the same time do not want to deny any of their faithfulness to Islam. They defend both access to modernity and the principles of their religious and cultural practices at one and the same time. They are “modern” without being “Western”. Those in the West are often incredulous in the face of such a strange “mixture”, for it seems hardly possible. The Western media reinforce this dubitative reflex as long as they report with high publicity the words of women from Algeria, Egypt, or Bangladesh who, while opposed to “Islamic obscurantism”, think “like over here”.

Thus, the trait of these intellectual women is first to have a discourse which is accessible only because it resembles the formulations used in Europe or the United States. They then represent the progressist forces because they claim the same progress and the same modernity as that of the West. This logic does not, however, suffer any discussion: the West is progress, so the one who speaks the ‘‘Western language’’ is progressist. The conclusions are illuminating! ³¹

These conclusions, if anything, are simple and dangerous. It is not a question here of simple cultural imperialism but, more insidiously, of a kind of thought dictatorship which fixes and determines the “right thinking” by giving itself the air of openness and freedom. Certainly, one acknowledges the difference of belief and cultural relativism as far as difference is limited to folklore and exotism with the condescension that is accorded to beautiful customs, but these are so outmoded. One should one day take an inventory of the measure of real violence that non-Western cultures are today subjected to.

Islam abolishes this hegemony, and Muslim women, who in the name of Islam demand their right status and freedom in Islamic society, put their finger exactly where the wound is. In effect, one finds it hard, today, to hear a veiled intellectual who affirms her totally autonomous engagement and her claims for women while rejecting in a determined fashion the Western model. This attitude is more and more frequent in universities. Everywhere from Morocco to Bangladesh, from Norway to South Africa and passing by England, France and even Saudi Arabia, one meets with Muslim women who demand from the societies in which they live faithfulness and respect to, as well as a real application of, the principles of Islam. Against local customs, ancestral traditions, despotic patriarchy and daily alienation, they are convinced that more Islam means more rights and more freedom. In this, their contribution to the profound comprehension of the Qur’ānic message and of the reform of societies is a deciding factor and shall be even more so in the coming decades. Up until now, the West seems to be deaf to the force of this discourse, whereas everything lends itself to believe that it is at its source that tomorrow’s Muslim societies will be fashioned. Without considering that there may be some advantages for the West to see itself questioned on the meaning and form of the society which it offers today to its new generations, this external and critical view may be enriching. This because it may lead to relativising the fatality of the unique thought model which drags the world towards more egoism, individualism and finance; this in a great void of meaning and hope.

The presence of such Islam resides, willy-nilly, in the future of the world, and the Muslim woman is a compelling part of it. One must choose responsibly the line of reciprocal questioning and not opt for that of conflict.

6. The Call to Jihād

How often has one heard apropos the expressions “the holy war”, the fanatic mobilisation of “God’s madmen” and this “new flow of rampant fundamentalism”. The world of Islam, which is lately haunted by the gangrene of jihād, scares and terrorises minds.

How is it, then, that one of the most fundamental notions of Islam has itself come to express one of the most sombre traits? How can a concept, which is loaded with the most intense spirituality, become the most negative symbol of religious expression? The reading of events of recent history certainly has its share of the blame, but the distortion goes far back to an advanced date of the Middle Ages. The understanding of certain Islamic notions was from very early on confined to an exercise of pure comparison. There were the crusades as there were also Muslim expansions; there were holy crusades and, thus, there were also “holy wars”, the famous jihād. Even if the West has happily gone beyond the initial stage of religious war and crusade, the spectator is indeed forced to notice that the Muslim world is still today lagging behind. This because we see everywhere groups, movements, parties and governments that call for jihād, armed struggle and political violence. The symbolical arsenal seems medieval and obscurantist, to say the least. Here also then the question arises, will Islam evolve?

This question seems legitimate and its expression brings up, nonetheless, another misunderstanding which is nowadays undoubtedly upheld voluntarily. But, one must go back to the source of this notion and try to better understand its spiritual and dynamic scope. Jihād is the most fulfilled expression of a faith which seeks to express balance and harmony. One must say a word here about its individual scope and its literally “international” dimension, and finally, since it is the subject which interests us here, about its social actualisation.

a. Peace of heart

Can any human being assert, from the depth of his heart, that he has never been subject to violence, aggression, hatred, anger and even the excitement of a destructive instinct. Mastery over self, serenity, respect of others and gentleness are not natural, but are acquired by means of a permanent, personal effort. Such is the lot of men. They board the shores of their humanity by means of a long, thoughtful and measured work on the self. Everyone knows this and each heart feels it.

All the world’s literature, from the dawn of time, is plain in its representation of this tension. A tension which is sometimes appeased, sometimes agitated and at other times tears apart men’s inward focus. From the Baghavad Gita to the Torah and Gospel, from Dostoevsky to Baudelaire, the human horizon remains the same. The Qur’ān, too, confirms the most daily of experiences:

By the soul, and That which shaped it and inspired it to lewdness and godfearing! Prosperous is he who purifies it, and failed has he who seduces it. (Qur’ān, 91:7–10)

The two paths are explicit, at one and the same time, apprehended in the most vivid and moral fashion coupled with remembrance of the life to come. Life is this test of balance for men who are capable of inducing both the best and the worst from themselves.

Here, we are in proximity of the notion of jihād which cannot be understood except in regard to the conception of man which implies it. Tension is natural and the conflict of the inward is properly human. Moreover, man proceeds and realises himself in and by the effort that he furnishes in order to give force and presence to the inclination of his least violent, irascible and aggressive being. He struggles daily against the most negative forces of his being, as he knows that his humanity will be the price of their mastery. This inward effort and this struggle against the “postulations” of interiority is the most appropriate (literal and figurative) translation of the word “jihād”.

It is not a question here of reducing jihād to a personal dimension (jihād’l-nafs), but rather returning to its most immediate reality. Jihād is to man’s humanity what instinct is to an animal’s behaviour. To be, for man, is to be responsible and such responsibility is linked to a choice which always seeks to express the goodness and respect of oneself and others. Choosing, in the reality of inward conflict, is to have a resolve for peace of heart.

We know the words of the Prophet (peace be upon him) in a ḥadīth whose chain of transmission is acknowledged as weak (ḍa’īf) but from which we can draw an instruction, since its meaning and scope are confirmed by other traditions. Coming back from an expedition against the Muslims’ enemies, the Prophet (peace be upon him) is reported to have described war as “a lesser jihād” in comparison to “the greater jihād” which is the effort of inward purification and of a human being’s spiritualisation before his Creator. More than the simple comparison, what should be retained here is the association of faith with the experience of effort in order to attain harmony and serenity. Life consists of this trial, as spiritual force is signified by the choice of good as well as good action as also oneself and for others.

… [He] who created death and life, that He might try you which of you is fairest in works. (Qur’ān, 67:2)

The real meaning of Islamic spirituality lies in reforming the space of one’s interiority, appeasing one’s heart at the level of acknowledgement of the Creator and within a generous human action; it is loving in transparency and living in the light. This spirituality joins the horizons of all other spiritualities which require man to be equipped with a force of being rather than being subjected to the despotic fierceness of a life which is reduced to instinct. This tension towards the mastery of the self is conveyed in Arabic by the word jihād. Understanding this dimension is a necessary part of a larger discussion on the meaning of armed conflict. What needs to be retained in the first instance, on the individual plane as well as on the international plane, is that God has willed this tension. He made it by His management of one of the conditions of access to faith and to humanity.

“The Prophet (pbuh) exclaimed one day: ‘Who is the strongest among men?’ The Companions responded: ‘It is him who overcomes his enemy’, and the Prophet (pbuh) responded: ‘No, the strongest is him who keeps his anger in check.’ ” ³²

b. The reality of conflict

We have recalled above that Revelations present diversity as the Creator’s choice:

If God had willed, He would have made you one nation; but that He may try you in what has come to you. So be you forward in good works…(Qur’ān, 5:48)

Thus, while it is a fact of a choice, diversity nonetheless turns out to be a trial for men. Management of differences is presented as a challenge that must be addressed in the same way as inward tensions must be addressed. The greatness of men is in the function of their choice, and the Qur’ān orientates the latter, by aspiration, to a rivalry about good (one finds in another verse the idea that the finality of the diversity of nations and tribes finds its meaning in the fact of seeking to understand one another). Diversity and pluralism may be the means to an elevation of man – it ought to be. However, it would be naïve not to take account of the reality of conflict. The latter exists, and Revelation informs us, that they are necessary for the preservation of harmony and justice among men:

Had God not driven back the people, some by the means of others, the earth had surely been corrupted; but God is bounteous unto all beings. (Qur’ān, 2:251)

Thus, diversity and the conflicts which ensue are inherent to Creation. Man addresses the challenge of his humanity not in his rejection of pluralism and differences, but rather in their management. It is man’s conscience, nourished by principles of justice and ethics, which must guide him to defend the rights of every community as that of every individual. It is indeed this that the following verse adds to the meaning of the preceding one:

Had God not driven back the people, some by the means of others, there had been destroyed cloisters and churches, oratories and mosques, wherein God’s name is much mentioned . (Qur’ān, 22:40)

Here, we note that monasteries, synagogues and oratories are mentioned before mosques. It is clearly a question of the expression of their inviolability and, at the same time, of the respect due to the adherents of different religions. The formulation cannot be more explicit:

And if thy Lord had willed, whoever is in the earth would have believed, all of them, all together. Wouldst thou then constrain the people, until they are believers? (Qur’ān, 10:99)

Difference of belief, as of colour and language, are facts which we must live with. Although we have already expressed this, it is appropriate to forcefully repeat it here. The first principle of coexistence in diversity is that of respect and justice. Once again, the Qur’ān is clear:

O believers, be you securers of justice, witness for God. Let not detestation for a people move you not to be equitable; be equitable – that is nearer to godfearing. (Qur’ān, 5:8)

In the face of inevitable conflicts of interest and power, true testimony of faith lies in respect for the rights of each individual. If the latter is suppressed and if injustice is widespread, then it is the responsibility of men to oppose such a state of affairs. It is exactly in these conditions that the first verse calling for jihād and armed resistance was revealed:

Leave is given to those who fight because they were wronged – surely God is able to help them – who were expelled from their habitations without right, except that they say ‘Our Lord is God.’ (Qur’ān, 22:39–40)

After 13 years of living in Makka, after almost an equivalent period of violent persecution and after being exiled to Madina, this verse allowed the Muslims to defend themselves in the name of justice and in respect of their faith. Abū Bakr understood straightaway the scope of this message and maintained that with the revelation of this verse: “We understood that it was going to be about armed struggle.” One finds here an explicit expression of what jihād covers on the inter-community or inter-national planes. As we have pointed out with regard to the inward plane, where it is a question of struggling against the forces of aggression and violence which are inherent in all human beings, it is similarly appropriate to oppose every aggressor, power and exploitation which are naturally manifest in all human communities, and which snap at our fundamental rights.

Everything, in the message of Islam, calls for peace and coexistence between men and nations. In all circumstances, dialogue must be preferred over silence and peace over war. That is to the exception of one situation which makes of struggle a duty, and of opposition a testimony of faithfulness to the meaning of faith. Jihād is the expression of a rejection of all injustice, as also the necessary assertion of balance and harmony in equity. One hopes for a non-violent struggle, far removed from the horrors of armed conflict. One loves that men will have this maturity of spirit which allows for a less bloody management of world affairs. However, history has proven that the human being is bellicose by nature and that war is but one means by which he expresses himself. Resisting the very violent expression of this tendency and trying to implement the necessary balance of forces seem to be the conditions for an order that looks human. The latter being the only situation whereby violence is given legitimacy; situations whereby violence is sustained, repression imposed or rights denied, to the extent that, if one succumbs, one loses one’s dignity: ³³

Surely God bids to justice… (Qur’ān, 16:90)

This verse clearly expresses the sense of men’s actions. This lies in fighting for good and rejecting injustice with all the force of one’s being. To have faith is tantamount to carrying the testimony of this dignity by resistance. The latter is for the community what mastery over anger is to the inward of each person.

One may notice nowadays an effervescence in the Muslim world, and many condemn the violence which accompanies the awakening of a “fanatical, radical and fundamentalist Islam”. One must understand this worry, as one must denounce political violence which finds its expression in the assassination of tourists, priests, women, children and in blind bombings and bloody slaughters. Such actions are indefensible, nor do they respect, in the least, the Qur’ānic message. Again, one must also condemn the violence which expresses itself prior to such actions. Such violence is perpetuated by dictatorial powers that are often supported by superpowers. Every day that passes, entire peoples sustain repression, abuse of power, and the most inhumane violations of rights. Until when will these peoples remain silent or see themselves deemed “dangerous”, by the West, whenever they dare to express their rejection? Here, it is not a question of defending violence but rather of understanding the circumstances wherein it takes shape. North-South imbalances and the exploitation of men and raw materials, combined with the resignation of the peoples of the North, produce a much more devastating violence than that of armed groups, even if the latter are spectacular. As the end of the twentieth century draws close, can we call all men to mobilise themselves towards more social, political and economic justice, for it seems to us that this is the only way to give back to men the rights that will silence arms? Such an effort would be the literal translation of the word jihād. The latter is the testimony of a heart that illuminates faith and the witness of a conscience which fashions responsibility.

c. Towards a social jihād

This brief clarification about the central notions of the Muslim religion allows us to shed new light on the question of social action. All Muslims know and repeat that the practice of Islam does not stop at the exercise of prayer, zakāt, fasting and pilgrimage. Every act of daily life which is fulfilled with remembrance of the Divine Presence is, in itself, an act of gratitude and worship. Moreover, we know the close link, which is established in the Qur’ān, between believing and acting through the oft-repeated expression “Those who believe and do good deeds.” Thus, to have faith is tantamount to believing and acting, and action here is of a multiple nature. It is the honesty that one imposes on oneself, goodness and generosity towards one’s relatives, just as it is the determined engagement in social reform, or even mobilisation against injustice. All these efforts which are deployed in action are part of jihād in the sense whereby they are oriented towards that which is more just and more respectful of the revealed principles. The following verse clarifies the same:

The believers are those who believe in God and His Messenger, then have not doubted, and have struggled with their possessions ³⁴ and their selves in the way of God; those – they are the truthful ones. (Qur’ān, 49:15)

One may read this formulation in the strict sense and maintain that it only addresses the question of armed struggle, and that this armed struggle imposes itself whenever there exists aggression. However, it would be reductionist to draw just that instruction. In a broader sense, a sense which is confirmed by the entire Qur’ānic message and that of the traditions, “fighting in the path of God” means mobilising all our human forces, directing all our efforts and giving of our properties and of our own persons in order to overcome all adversities whether they be injustices, poverty, illiteracy, delinquency or exclusion.

The Qur’ān offers such latitude in the interpretation of the word jihād, and this in its first revelation:

So obey not the unbelievers, but struggle with them thereby mightily. (Qur’ān, 25:52) ³⁵

There is here mention of a struggle (jāhid and jihādan) which is of a learned and scientific nature, one which relies on dialogue, discussion and debate. The Qur’ān, in its content and form, appears as an arm in the hands of Muslims. On another level, it is the Prophet (peace be upon him) who presents an extensive interpretation of the word when he asserts, for example, that “Pilgrimage is a jihād”. ³⁶ One realises that the troubles, efforts and suffering endured by the faithful during a few days in Makka, in order to give strength to their faith and answer the call of the Creator, are a jihād in the path of God.

In our daily lives, to live in faith in our societies is tantamount to recognising the sense of effort. Faith involves putting one to the test; it is, in fact, a test itself. In our representation of an ideal of life, respect and coexistence, actual social fractures, misery, illiteracy, unemployment are many elements of the new adversity that the modern epoch has engendered. Mobilisation, as already noted, imposes itself when man’s dignity is in peril. But, it is not always a question of an armed appraisal. Nowadays, many women and men see their dignity suppressed, their existence denied and their rights violated. This situation necessitates an urgent response as also a general call for jihād. Here, it is about giving from one’s own person and property, calling all the forces of all diverse societies and engaging in the work of reform that we have already discussed.

We will not deny that there are struggles wherein circumstances lead us to direct confrontation, in order to oppose a purge here, a military occupation there, or another type of aggression such as the one we have witnessed in Bosnia and Chechnia. However, it cannot simply be a question of focusing our attention on these events alone and forgetting the broader type of fight which occurs daily and is, therefore, so much more urgent. Nowadays, our enemies, in the path of God, are hunger, unemployment, exploitation, delinquency and drug addiction. They require intense efforts, a continuous fight and a complete jihād which needs each and everyone’s participation.

How many are those Muslims who want to fight beyond their own doorsteps, who want to offer, in the most sincere fashion their own persons for the cause of Islam. But, filled with this intention, they forget and remain blind to the fight that must be carried out here in their own locality, to the cause that ought to be defended in their own neighbourhoods, cities and in every country. To those who sought to assist Palestine in its fight against Zionist colonisation in the 1940s, and who perceived this expedition as representing the fulfilment of their ideal, Hasan al-Banna said: “Dying in the way of God is difficult, but living in the way of God is still more difficult.” This jihād is a jihād for life, in order that every human being is given the rights which are his. The entire message of Islam carries this requirement as well as its necessary achievement.

To think modernity is to reflect on all the strategies and modalities which are apt to change the order of things. Following the example presented by Yusuf al-Qaradawi in his book on the problem of poverty, ³⁷ we should reflect on the sources and on the reality of our societies nowadays. We have spoken briefly already, but we must go still further and think, in a very pragmatic manner, about the strategies which will allow us to find local solutions to the problems identified. Social action has to be a priority and it should mobilise the majority of our energies.

Indeed it is a question of war; for we are at war. This is what Abbot Pierre meant when he forcefully asserted that “I am in war against misery”, or when Professor Albert Jacquard and Monsignor Jacques Gaillot said that they “go to war” to shelter those who are homeless. In his social Encyclical, Centesimus Annus, ³⁸ the Pope calls for a general mobilisation against poverty and the imbalance of wealth and asserts that it is the duty of Christians to act in this sense. The jihād of Muslims is, of course, part of this engagement in the West, but it is equally so in all the countries of the South. It is a wholehearted jihād along the line of South American communities who express it in the form of liberation theology, or as it is manifested in the popular and trade unionist forces in the Near East and Asia. Future inter-religious dialogue will undoubtedly find its fulfilment in such strategy and actions. However, we cannot think of the future in terms of political and economic reform without working for the reconstitution of a social tissue which is nowadays torn apart the world over.

II. Political Orientations

Things are very clear: either the political has a link with the religious, and in this case, we are dealing with a theocratic organisation, the dogmatic drifts of which have already been shown by history. Or, the political is separated from the divine point of reference and, hence, there opens the horizon of the state of law, which is founded on rationality, the perfection of which can be found in the democratic model. The terms of the alternative are plain, and it would be premature to maintain that Islamists’ claims are a retreat, and a dangerous, fanatic obscurantism. Analyses sometimes go very far and are not congested by embellishments. It is the whole Islam, which seems irreducible to “democratic reason”. Additionally, in order to prove the soundness of this anathema, the declarations of such and such an “Islamic leader” are relied on, a practice much in vogue nowadays. It is suggested that one must choose either Islam or democracy. In other words, either a theocratic organisation or a state of law? All seems to have been said. So much so that certain governments and intellectuals attribute to themselves “a democratic quality” not through a concrete exercise of democratic principles, but rather simply because of their nominal opposition to Islamists. If the latter are “obscure theocrats”, their opposites are surely “democrats”. This regardless of whether there is torture, suppression or death accompanying the political process. The powers in place have cleverly played on this hypersensitivity.

Yet, one must go back to fundamental principles which are as much orientations of political activity in Islam. First, as we have already indicated in Part One, the articulation between the religious fact and the rational fact, in Islam, does not correspond to what it is, nor to what it used to be historically, in the strictly Judaeo-Christian culture. There is a methodological exactness that we cannot be distracted from when we approach the points of reference of these two civilisations. This consists, first, of looking for a general concept behind the terms used, a concept that gives these terms meaning. Then, extracting a conceptual range out of the logic from which these terms emanate. This, unless one insists on engaging in a political analysis of Islam, newly named “political Islam”, starting from the principle that all actions related to government are of the same nature in all religions, cultures and civilisations, and that it is sufficient to judge all by the established norm in the West. This formulation smells of excess, and yet it is this perfume that nowadays emanates from the declarations of some researchers. Furthermore, absolute rejection of the questioning suggested by Western intellectuals is also thoughtless. In everything, and a fortiori in politics, one must take things into consideration.

One often stumbles on words and notions without taking into account the real content of the respective points of reference. Thus, some Muslims reject the word “democracy” because it is part of Western history as also because “it is not found in the Qur’ān”. Similarly, some Western intellectuals have only a very vague notion of the Islamic concept of “shūrā”. For, they often ignore the latter or suspect it “hides” the famous model of theocratic organisation already referred to. It is, therefore, appropriate to clarify these elements.

1. The Religious and the Political

We have noted, in Part One, the status of the Qur’ān and that of the Sunna within Islamic thought. They are the points of reference that, in offering a concept of the universe and man, orientate thought by means of providing it with general principles. The latter are absolute, as they are for the believer the essence of what he believes in. Concrete realisation of these, according to time and place, is not given in the sources. Moreover, specific situations do not find a single and definitive solution. It is the ijtihād of the jurists which connects the general principle to its practical application. Ijtihād requires a rational process which imposes upon savants (‘ulamā’) the development of a specific and understood reflection by means of an internal logic, and this via a search of consensus (ijmā’) to deduction by analogy (qiyās), and from taking account of the historical or geographical context to consideration of customs (‘urf).

Islamic law swiftly accepted, in its formulation, the idea of plurality in interpretation and this even in rules of worship and from as early as the time of the Prophet himself (peace be upon him). ‘Ā’isha in this respect reports the following tradition: “One day in Ramaḍān, I travelled with the Prophet (peace be upon him) to perform the lesser pilgrimage (‘Umra). On the way, he broke his fast while I kept mine; he shortened his prayer whereas I performed the full version of it. Then, I said to him: ‘May my father and mother be ransom to thee! You eat while I fast, you shorten your prayer whereas I perform them fully’, and the Prophet answered: ‘You have done well.’” ¹

Without a shadow of doubt, there are rules of interpretation. However, there exists, in a less certain fashion, a latitude in the reading and application of principles. The latter varies in function of the intelligence and experience of the reader and jurist. This plurality was lived, as it is nowadays, by the diversity of juridical schools, the most well known of which among the Sunnis are four. The ‘ulamā’ (savants) are in agreement with regard to the pillars and fundamental principles of Islam. However, their differences are numerous with regard to the domain of worship, just as they are substantial in that which concerns social affairs (in their ramifications, furū?). Each scholar thus developed his own method with its rules of reading and modalities of verification. Some by virtually thinking the most particular and potential (AbūḤanīfa), and others abstaining from doing so (al-Shāfi‘ī and Mālik). But all were influenced by the milieu in which they lived. ² We know the story of the meeting between al-Shāfi‘ī and IbnḤanbal who were in disagreement about the qualification of one who does not observe prayer, that is whether he is a Muslim or not. This is an important question of theology, one which gave place to an exchange of views revolving around reasoning and logic. In this respect, al-Subkī reported the following story: “Al-Shāfi‘ī and Aḥmad disagreed one day on the subject of the person who fails to observe prayer. Al-Shāfi‘ī said: ‘O Aḥmad! Do you say that the person who does not observe prayer is an infidel?’ Aḥmad responded: ‘Certainly he is.’ Al-Shāfi‘ī continued: ‘And if he wants to become Muslim what should he do?’ Aḥmad answered: ‘He should declare that there is no deity but God and Muḥammad is His Messenger.’ ‘But our man has already pronounced the formula and has never denied it’, retorted al-Shāfi‘ī. Aḥmad said: ‘He becomes Muslim by performing prayer.’ But al-Shāfi‘ī concluded: ‘The prayer of the infidel is not allowed and it is not it that makes a person a Muslim.’ Imām Aḥmad at this point remained quiet.”

This, however, is but a difference of opinion on a point which is certainly fundamental and one can multiply such examples. Nonetheless, this has not prevented any Muslim from thinking that all juridical responses (fatāwā, sing. fatwā) are Islamic as long as they do not contradict the two sources which are accepted by all, and as long as they are given by acknowledged, competent persons. We can, therefore, retain at least four interdependent, fundamental principles regarding the relation of the religious with the political. The fundamentals which follow are part of the universe of Islamic rationality:

1. The Qur’ān and the Sunna are the two basic sources of reference. By means of these, a holistic concept of man and life is conveyed. However, these two sources do not respond concretely to the needs and relativity of historical and geographical situations.

2. Reflections based on these two sources, ijtihād, can be numerous so long as they do not contradict the former.

3. Each epoch and each community is responsible for the sane management of this diversity of situations and plurality of views.

4. The field of rational experimentation is huge and offers to reason a consequent autonomy to the point whereby very different applications are considered as “Islamic” if they respect the second enunciated principle. Thus, reason, backed by logic and the most modern scientific means, produce answers which are religious, in the sense of being Islamically qualified and justified.

We can see that the comprehension of “the religious” here does not cover what is meant by the same in the Judaeo-Christian tradition. The spheres of the religious and the rational, the sacred and the profane are defined differently. They do not have the same limits, and they are articulated very specifically from one tradition to another. It is undoubtedly in the domain of the management of the political that these specificities are meaningful today. The debates on secularisation, laicity and democracy are there to prove the point. We realise, moreover, that it is very difficult for Western intellectuals to think the political with categories other than those which are the product of their history. Any formulation which departs slightly from that which is known is suspect. As for that which is only reducible to social categories with difficulty, it is appropriate for them to invent expressions which makes that which is unknown accessible. It is this that Louis Gardet undertook in the middle of this century when he described Islamic, political organisation as “a laic, egalitarian theocracy”. ³ A truly strange expression which tends to confuse anyone who tries to see clearly.

a. The domain of the political: the Islamic framework

What has just been said is of prime importance to the question which concerns us here. In effect, it is fundamental to attempt to arrange and distinguish that which belongs properly to the domain of Islamic sources revealed by God and/or stipulated by the Prophet (peace be upon him) from that which pertains to human contribution, which allows the applicability of the project according to time and place.

In the political domain, as also in social and economic spheres, there exists a framework of the Islamic point of reference defined by the Qur’ān and the Sunna which corresponds, more or less, to the status of a fundamental law – the constitution (in that it allows its formation) – vis-à-vis national legislations. ⁴ One finds therein the general orientation, and the fundamental principles and laws which should respect the legislative instances of diverse communities. This respect does not, however, mean that national legislations will be identical everywhere. Instead, we shall see that the principles are general enough to allow the formulation of very diversified laws. For Muslims, this frame is of Divine origin and the directives which are related to it are intangible. This is what is understood – here in public affairs – by the term al-rabbāniyya, which consists of placing action in a permanent link with the remembrance of the Divine ordinances.

On an ethnological level, we can say that the sources imply a concept of the universe, of man and his organisation of the city as a system of values and as a culture which engenders a mode of structuration which is proper to it. Incidentally, nothing is more legitimate than to assert that Islam, in Muslim majority countries, is a fact which should be taken into account. To think that only French or English legislations are good, no matter to which populations they are addressed, smacks of colonialism. What a great number of Muslim intellectuals say today is that Islam is their point of reference; it is part of their history and identity. To deny this is to want to amputate a part of their being by imposing the idea that Western norms are the only universals (we note, in passing, that this view reveals the nonsense of its own conclusion). That this point of reference be religious is not sufficient to disqualify it, under the pretext that it will take us back to the most obscure periods of human history. Moreover Islam, and this is indeed proof for them, has a law which codifies barbarity and the most inhuman of punishments. It is, therefore, concluded that one cannot, under the pretext of respecting religions and cultures, admit the inadmissible. ⁵ It is appropriate here to recall that references to religious tradition are present in a great many Western countries’ constitutions. These clearly mention religion (at least the ones they recognise) and even go so far as to limit access to the crown or presidency on the basis of religion, for example to Catholic or Protestant. ⁶

As for the second objection, we limit ourselves here to pointing out that the general principles of Islam are both exigent and open. Moreover, they orientate human beings towards respect for justice and the dignity of everyone. Louis Gardet, reminding of the central place of the Qur’ān, rightly clarifies this as follows: “But in fact the Qur’ān is the seal of prophecy. It operates for men, and until the Judgement of the end of the world, the ‘separation of good and evil’. Now, that which God has thus decreed ‘good’ in the Qur’ān finds itself taking a number of principles, which are objectively of morals and natural laws. These include observing justice, keeping one’s word, respecting ‘the rights of God and men’, etc. It has prescribed obedience to those who hold power. But it has also ordained the faithful to ‘consult one another’. On voluntary and uniquely positive bases we find ourselves joining, in fact, a certain number of facts that are susceptible of founding a democratic notion of authority.” ⁷ This reflection is interesting because it looks beyond the simple fact of referring to the Qur’ān, and that it is the holder of a prescribed message. Louis Gardet points out that similarities exist between certain fundamental principles decreed by the Islamic sources and the foundations of natural law, even if their formulations are different. This author mentions further the Islamic notion of shūrā which is at the heart of the thought of the ‘ulamā’ (savants) and intellectuals in the political domain. Shūrā, then, is the first major principle that we must study.

b. The notion of shūrā

Shūrā is the space which allows Islam the management of pluralism. The Arabic word signifies “consultation”, “concertation” or “deliberation”. It appears in several instances in the Qur’ān. However, two verses are generally cited, since it is from these that the principle of general orientation is conveyed. In Sūra 42 which has the same name (al-Shūrā) we read:

… but what is with God is better and more enduring for those who believe and put their trust in their Lord. And those who avoid the heinous sins and indecencies and when they are angry forgive, and those who answer their Lord, and perform the prayer, their affair being counsel between them, and they expend of that We have provided them… (Qur’ān, 42:36–8)

Gradation, here, owes nothing to chance and we should notice, after qualifying the believer on the moral plane, an expression of the classification of attitudes. Response to God (meaning here the following of His ordinances), the performance of prayer (the second pillar of Islam after the testimony of faith), then, on the collective plane, the practice of deliberation and supportive social engagement. Thus, the formulation is clear, the very fact of submitting to God on the personal level does not mean that there exists ready-made solutions to settle collective affairs. We have said, above, a word about the concertation (the same verbal root) which must exist between the wife and the husband on the question of weaning the child. In the same way, the faithful are characterised here by the fact that they deliberate among themselves on the subject of their affairs. We know that the Prophet (peace be upon him) continually practised concertation with his Companions, and the traditions which report this are numerous. Whenever a situation, about which no revelation had intervened, presented itself the Prophet (peace be upon him) used to listen to those around him and consequently take decisions. Upon the first confrontation with the people of Makka at Badr, Muḥammad called his Companions: “O people! Share with me your views.” Ibn al-Mundhir asked him whether the placement chosen for confrontation was the object of a revelation or whether it was a personal decision. The Prophet responded that it was his own choice. Ibn al-Mundhir suggested a different strategy which meant the Muslims taking up a different position. Muḥammad (peace be upon him) yielded to this argument and moved his entire army. In running affairs, the Prophet (peace be upon him) himself took into consideration and distinguished the absolute origin of the principles and the relativity of his own personal opinion. This, as it is in this instance, even in a situation which might determine the life or death of the whole community.

This fact is even more explicit in the context of the revelation (sabab al-nuzūl) of the second verse which acts as a point of reference. Before the Battle of Uḥud, there were different views about whether to advance to encounter their Makkan adversaries or whether to wait for them. The Prophet was of the opinion that they should wait. However, upon deliberation, it was the other view, following the opinions of the majority, which prevailed. The Muslims advanced, thus, and after the actions taken in the fight whereby a group did not follow their orders, the Muslims lost the battle. It was in these conditions of defeat that the verse in question was revealed:

It was by some mercy of God that thou wast gentle to them; hadst thou been harsh and hard of heart, they would have scattered from about thee. So pardon them, and pray forgiveness for them, and take counsel with them in the affair; and when thou art resolved, put thy trust in God; surely God loves those who put their trust in Him. (Qur’ān, 3:159)