Читать книгу The Political Thought of Calvin Coolidge - Thomas J. Tacoma - Страница 8
A Note on Methodology
ОглавлениеThis book is not and does not intend to be an intellectual biography of Calvin Coolidge. I do not attempt in every instance to provide the full context of his every statement or stray remark, nor to present them as they developed over time in strict chronological order. Though historians, among others, may repudiate any examination of ideas that takes place without a complete survey of their historical environment, I can only point to them for my own justification to the sharper insights of wiser political thinkers than I.[26]
Nevertheless, the very real criticism of studying Coolidge a historically deserves a fuller answer. Careful readers will note that throughout the following chapters, I quote from numerous Coolidge speeches and bring together ideas that were separated by a distance of many years when he first said them. How can it be proper to study Coolidge’s political thought in this way, as if he never matured or changed in his views? To these I give a simple response: Coolidge was a remarkably consistent thinker. Every student of Coolidge has noted his consistency. Coolidge wrote his own speeches and chose his words with care. When Coolidge repeated a phrase, even decades after its initial use, it is clear from the text and context that he referred to the same ideas in the same light. In other words, by reading through everything that Coolidge wrote, readers can discern that the content of his ideas remained substantially unchanged for decades.[27] This is not to say, however, that Coolidge’s ideas underwent no change or development. Those shifts are noted, when significant, in the chapters to follow.
My goal, and my method of realizing it, has been to bring together Coolidge’s numerous statements on a given issue. This first involved reading Coolidge’s complete works. Once collected, I sought to disentangle the various concepts woven together throughout speeches, and by sifting them, to present them as logically as possible. For example, Coolidge regularly referred to the American founding, even in speeches on other subjects. Yet his remarks in such speeches often illuminated his view of the founding better than a full speech on an individual or event from the founding era. Consequently, by bringing such remarks together, I believe that I have been able to reconstruct more fully what Coolidge thought about politics and civilization, and how his ideas stood relative to the Progressive currents of his day.
Chapter 1 sets the stage for examining Coolidge’s political thought by surveying the principles of Progressivism as they stood during his own day. Progressives recognized that life in the United States had changed, due in large part to industrialization and the growth of huge cities. As a consequence, Progressive reformers responded by rejecting the political theory of the Declaration of Independence and the forms of the Constitution as they sought to solve America’s problems through pragmatic experimentation. This chapter analyzes the theoretical background informing the Progressive revolution in the science of politics—its philosophic roots—and identifies particularly the rise of the historical school, philosophic pragmatism, and the social gospel theology as the keys to understanding progressive era ideas. Finally, the progressives were successful in implementing many of their reforms, especially at the state level. This, then, was the context in which Coolidge operated, and these ideas provide some contrast with his own.
Chapter 2 looks more particularly at Coolidge’s education, especially the influence of two of his Amherst professors. The argument of this chapter is that while Coolidge held some progressive ideas, especially during his youth, his intellectual framework was informed more by the Whiggish Republicanism of his Amherst College professors Anson D. Morse and Charles Edward Garman than by Progressive theorists such as Richard T. Ely or John Dewey. Morse was a historian, and his particular contribution to Coolidge’s way of thinking was limited to a few key ideas: his notion of historical progress, his defense of American history, and his attempt to vindicate political parties for representative government in the United States. Garman was a philosopher and psychologist. He taught Coolidge social ethics and psychology, and more importantly, taught Coolidge how to think and gave him confidence in his own powers of reasoning. Garman’s lessons point to the place of Laurens P. Hickok, the Kantian American moral philosopher, as the intellectual predecessor of Garman and of Coolidge. Most importantly, he instructed Coolidge about the necessity of psychological individualism, man’s spiritual nature, and the limits of social reform.
Chapter 3 opens up Coolidge’s understanding of civilization—what it is, what it should be, what it could be. Civilization was at the heart of Coolidge’s political thought. If he can be said to have had a political philosophy, it was the philosophy of civilization. Coolidge believed that the distinction between civilization and barbarism was real. Civilized peoples stood higher on the scale of human progress, and he believed that civilization’s principal elements were the rule of law, individualism, the law of service, and the rejection of expediency in politics. All of these receive a full explanation below, but suffice it to say now that each principle contained significant implications for evaluating forms of government and the policies that would sustain or undermine civilization. Backsliding from civilization into barbarism, always a real danger, was one which Coolidge strove to prevent.
Chapter 4 turns to Coolidge’s interpretation of America’s place in the story of civilization, with special reference to his understanding of the American founding. Coolidge believed in the dignity of the American founding—it was a key step in the advance of civilization. He therefore argued against those Progressive historians who contended that the principles of the Declaration of Independence were obsolete, or that the Constitution was written to secure the property interests of the wealthy. To the contrary, said Coolidge: American civilization was based on America’s spiritual heritage. From its colonial days, its people had cultivated religion and beliefs which developed into political democracy. The Declaration of Independence synthesized such beliefs and should be understood as a great spiritual document, pointing to the equality of mankind as rooted in the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man. Coolidge also presented George Washington as the exemplary statesman, one who rose above sordid motives and sacrificed everything for his nation. Beardian critiques of self-interest could not hold against Washington. Finally, Coolidge defended the drafting and ratification of the Constitution as a completion of the revolution. It brought the principles of good government into practical effect. Its long success since 1787 proved its worth—it was even a modern document, still well-adapted to modern life.
Chapter 5 steps forward to Coolidge’s own day and spells out in some detail how Coolidge’s civilizational conservatism affected his view of the American regime and how it formed the basis for his criticisms of progressive political theory. Coolidge believed that the Constitution remained relevant for his day as a charter of liberty for all. He interpreted the Constitution as a formalist, in contrast to the newer, elastic readings of the Constitution as a “living” document. Coolidge defended a smaller role for the president and strove with special vigor to uphold the independence of the judiciary. The independent judiciary was among the most fundamental elements of civilized, modern government, and progressive plans to restrict its independence were steps backward. Finally, though Coolidge rarely criticized his political opponents, he had much to say about Progressive ideas in general. Coolidge opposed the trends of centralization and growth of national governmental power. They had begun to change the very form of the American regime, to the nation’s detriment. Direct democracy was particularly to blame, but the decay of the party system was also at fault for the weaknesses of Congress as a legislative body. Coolidge also critiqued the Progressive vision of separating politics from administration. He was a student of human nature and aware that self-interest could never be removed as an element of government administration. However, Coolidge provided very little by way of an alternative to Progressive models of government regulation. This failure to articulate a more constitutional method of dealing with the real problems of modern industrial democracy was among Coolidge’s greatest shortcomings.
Chapter 6 then takes up Coolidge’s economic thought, setting it specifically in the context of his philosophy of civilization. Coolidge was a believer in economic laws, and he affirmed that civilized nations must live in accordance with such laws in order to thrive. More to the point, Coolidge believed that domestic policies should seek to maintain and advance the quality of American civilization. Since this took place mostly in the private sector—in homes, families, and churches—he believed that the best service the federal government could offer was to step out of their way. This was “constructive economy,” which he pursued through budget reduction and tax cuts. Rising material wealth for all people, even if distributed unequally, made possible the spiritual development that would genuinely improve the nation. Lastly, Coolidge opposed plans that he believed were economically unsound—such as the McNary-Haugen farm relief bill—on the basis that they pursued “expedient” solutions in violation of the laws of economics. No law or policy could be called humane which set up the whole of society for collapse.
Chapter 7 concludes with Coolidge’s philosophy as translated into the world of international affairs. American civilization existed in a global context. For it to survive and to flourish, the entire structure of world civilization needed to be defended and encouraged. While this meant pursing the good of the United States first and foremost—Coolidge often spoke of the real meaning of “America First”—it included promoting good will and neighborliness for all nations. The United States needed to maintain its own military for defensive purposes, and it needed to promote its own well-being first of all as a means of demonstrating for the rest of the world that decent self-government was possible. But Coolidge believed that the United States had a duty to promote the cause of civilization worldwide, and he did so through encouraging American citizens to help other nations. At the political level, Coolidge encouraged the efforts to codify international law such that all nations would know and understand their duties to each other. He also argued that the United States should adhere to World Court protocols as a means of promoting peace. However, he did demand that European nations pay their war debts to the United States; debt relief was an unsound policy that would undermine American confidence in their ability to pay back any loans in future times of emergency. With respect to smaller nations, and to American imperial possessions, Coolidge strove to honor American obligations while respecting the sovereignty of foreign peoples. This proved a vexing task.
My goal throughout this book is to understand Calvin Coolidge on his own terms. He represents a forgotten type in American political thought, influenced by the American tradition of moral philosophy and the Anglo-American respect for law. I would contend that his thinking on public questions could be useful for Americans today, yet my purpose has not been to speak at any time about contemporary American politics, nor even to argue for a return to Coolidge’s thought. Certainly his ideas are instructive, but such conclusions as might have contemporary application I leave to the reader. Instead, my aim has been to present Coolidge’s political thought as systematically and logically as possible with the hope that, were Coolidge able to read this study, he could see himself accurately represented in my interpretation. Whether I have succeeded is another question I leave for the reader to answer.