Читать книгу When Culture Becomes Politics - Thomas Pedersen - Страница 7

Culture and democracy are closely related phenomena. As I shall argue, cultural identity has acquired a strong, personalized layer. Political culture used to be measured as a purely sociological phenomenon, each social grouping being assumed to possess certain cultural characteristica. In contemporary Europe the reality is much more messy and complex. It would be going too far to argue that cultural identity has become entirely individualized. We can all point to examples of similar responses to given social challenges across borders in Europe. Yet, it is equally true that globalization for instance has very different consequences upon different individuals. Some embrace it; others fight it. New technologies have empowered many more – though not all – citizens. As a result, socialization is becoming less important. Institutions are also losing importance as explanatory variables. Against this background, how are we to continue using rather vague and highly aggregate concepts such as organizational culture or post-modern nations. Clearly there is a need for differentiation. A need for more precise, conceptual language.

If – for better or worse – (political) culture increasingly overlaps with democracy in Western societies, this has several implications: First, it means that prediction becomes more difficult. Secondly, it means that researchers must pay more attention to the attitudes of citizens, even when studying longer term trends. As culture becomes democratized, citizens become constitutive in a new sense. Please note that my argument is not normative: It may well be that we ought to lament the blurring of the borders between elite and citizen. However, it appears to be a fact, at least in some parts of the world. Thirdly, to the extent that agency is becoming more important, context- and situation-specific logics are gaining in importance at the expense of group-logics. It may soon be more important to analyze typical situations confronting individuals than to analyze typical forms of group consciousness.

Do European citizens feel that they belong to a community called “Europe” – represented by the European Union? Obviously, “Europe” and the EU are not identical concepts and may mean different things to different people – and nations. We tend to assume that Europe has a common, political language, but is it really the case, once we move beyond generalities? In other words, the ubiquitous diversity in European culture may not only be caused by historical legacies but also by cultural democracy or, to be more precise, by a more individualist version of cultural democracy, better informed and less patient with democratically elected leaders.

To enquire about European identity begs the questions, which identity? Although Eurobarometer polls are often very useful, the questions asked are not always the most relevant, and they are based upon a number of specific, theoretical assumptions regarding the sources of identity. We still know little about European cultural identity apart from scattered evidence on European symbols and values. Eurobarometer has, however, recently broadened its repertoire of questions somewhat. In a 2006 report it thus deals with what it calls “new topics” such as common values.¹ Eurobarometer has compared personal “values” with “values representing the EU”. It turns out that whereas peace and respect for human life and human rights in that order are the most important personal values for European citizens, when asked about the values that best represent the EU, respondents place human rights and democracy at the top, and peace in third place. Respect for human life is not seen to be accorded the same importance by the EU as by individual Europeans (13 % regards it as representing the EU well), and peace is not regarded as having the same importance for the EU as for individual citizens. These are of course aggregate figures covering considerable differences between member societies.

Interestingly, in view of the debate about a European economic model, a clear majority of Europeans appears to reject state interventionism, 64 % stating that “free competition is the best guarantee of economic prosperity” and that … “the state interferes too much in their lives” (62 %). However, these figures should not be read as a rejection of social justice. Eurobarometer has also examined attitudes to a number of “societal questions” and as many as 64 % of Europeans agree that … “we need more equality and justice even if this means less freedom for the individual”. However, the reliability of these figures is limited, since equality and justice are lumped together, and we do not know the relative importance of equality compared to other values. One is thus left with the impression that at the level of citizens, support for a truly social market economy is not as big as at the level of the political elite.

This impression is confirmed, if one examines speeches by European politicians. Thus ten days before the referendum on the European Constitution, the French President, the German chancellor and the Polish president Kwasniewski met in Nancy, voicing their support for the “yes”-camp in France. In this connection the then German chancellor stated i.a. that … “the European social model is a success story” and that … “a strong Europe is needed to be able to develop this model further”. Chirac for his part indicated that in his view the European social model has three elements … “social security, the right to unemployment benefit and the protection of cultural identity”.² The commitment to a social Europe is confirmed in the Berlin declaration, which refers to justice, social responsibility and solidarity as European values.³

Europeans are deeply divided on the issue of the place of religion in society with 46 % saying that it is too important and 48 % disagreeing. On this question many French and German politicians take opposite views with German Christian democrats advocating the inclusion of a reference to Christianity in the EU constitution and French politicians calling for a clear separation between religion and politics in European – as well as national – politics.

We may, however, be dealing with a spurious relationship in that many respondents may have been thinking about Muslim immigration when responding to the general question about religion. Unfortunately, Eurobarometer tends to ask one-off questions without following up with control questions, which is also the case here. However, in a separate question Eurobarometer does enquire about attitudes to immigrants. Interestingly, a majority of Europeans do not agree with the proposition that … “immigrants contribute a lot to our country”. Thus probably the surprisingly high number of people saying that they think religion plays too big a role in European society should not be interpreted as an indication that many Europeans are becoming atheists, but rather as a sign that there is widespread concern about the strong presence of a non-European religion on European soil.

Homosexual marriages and child adoption by homosexual couples are rejected by a clear majority of European citizens with only 32 % in support, and there is even stronger opposition to the legalisation of cannabis. This pits the majority of Europeans against very libertarian nations like the Netherlands.

What has not been examined by Eurobarometer in the wider EU-27 context is the extent to which European citizens feel they share a common historical and cultural legacy. To what extent, for instance, do they feel they share a common philosophical tradition? Is there perhaps a “hidden Europe” in the sense of Europeans sharing a set of ideals and common cultural reference points originating in philosophy, literature, art etc? At the level of governments, we know more about this question: Thus the German chancellor, Angela Merkel, regards Europe as the “continent of tolerance”.⁴ But her conception of tolerance is a tolerance based on commitment to the European tradition. Thus in early 2007, Angela Merkel told the weekly Focus that she still regretted the fact that the current draft constitution does not include any mention of God or Christianity.⁵And in her speech in connection with the celebration of the 50th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Rome, the German chancellor referred not only to a European identity and to “basic European values”, but also – and more importantly – to Europe’s “Jewish-Christian roots” and to “the European way of life” as well as the “European social model”.⁶ The statements are historical, especially the use of the term “a European way of life”. The term a European way of life is cultural, and the use of it by a German chancellor raises the question, how she defines the European way of life, and what from her point of view are the implications for future, day-to-day politics in Europe – also keeping in mind the much more vague common statement on the 50th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Rome.

The French political elite on the whole remains attached to the vision of a strong Europe, l’ Europe puissance, which has been French policy since the 1950s with de Gaulle’ s reign as a brief, intergovernmental interlude. The former Prime Minister, Dominique de Villepin, expresses it clearly and with a very French sense of the dramatic in a speech to the Humboldt University in 2006 … “there is such a thing as a European duty … Europe’s political ambition is immense: to find a balance between the multiple memories and the common future.” He later refers to “the European social and economic model” and to his belief in “a European, economic patriotism”. De Villepin also stresses that … “we affirm a European identity”; “Europe has its roots” and “there is such a thing as a European humanism”. One notes, however, that he does not talk about common European roots. Where the German chancellor refers to Christianity, De Villepin refers to humanism and secularism. He also – unlike the German chancellor – explicitly raises the question of Europe’s borders. In a rather sharp formulation and with a veiled criticism of the UK and the US, De Villepin states that … “there is no such thing as a natural or historical right to admission to the EU. And the promise of enlargement cannot be the only instrument for stabilizing Europe’s neighbouring regions”.⁷

If we turn to the opposite pole in the debate on this issue, the UK, we find a different position, but one that has evolved considerably in recent years, at least if one focuses upon the now former prime minister’s views. In a speech in 2001, Blair still emphasized the goal of efficiency in his statements on the future of Europe.⁸ In 2005 and 2006 the tone and message had changed: In a speech to the European Parliament in 2005, Blair declared … “I am a passionate pro-European”. He went on to state that … “this is a union of values, of solidarity between nations and peoples, of not just a common market in which we trade, but a common political space in which we live as citizens”. Gone was the talk of Europe as an economic enterprise … “I believe in Europe as a political project. I believe in a Europe with a strong and caring social dimension. I would never accept a Europe that was simply an economic market”.⁹ A year later, Blair had essentially taken on board the vision of France, Germany and its allies … “the issue at present is not the long term vision, but the short term strategy to realign today’s reality with it … I see a Europe around me that has a long term vision in need of a short term strategy … the vision is one that I share with Europe’s founders”.¹⁰

As regards the proposed European constitution, over half of the people living in the countries, which at the time of the survey had not yet ratified the treaty establishing the European constitution, supported the constitution (53 %). This represents an improvement of 6 % compared with spring 2006. But it is a far cry from the large majorities normally associated with constitutional decisions.

The European citizens’ attitude to the European institutions is not very well analyzed by Eurobarometer. Significantly, in a 2006-poll the question is not asked, what Europeans think about the European institutions as a whole, but instead a comparison about trust in individual institutions is made. This is a clever tactical move in that it sidesteps the fundamental question, if the current set of European institutions are deemed worthy of support and trust.

The European Parliament remains the most trusted European institution with 52 % of all EU-citizens trusting it. The European Commission is trusted by 48 % of Europeans. Once again, the validity of this polling can be questioned. In recent years the summits (European Council) have gained in importance as an agenda-setting institution. Yet, neither the attitude to the European Council nor the attitude to the Council of ministers has been examined.

Turning to more traditional questions, one notes a very considerable support for a common European foreign policy (68 %), and an even higher support for a common security and defence policy (75 %). The latter figure is surprisingly high and probably to some extent reflects context-specific factors such as widespread concern over US-policy in Iraq.

To enquire about European identity also begs the question, which Europe? Not only in geographical terms but also in cultural and ideological terms. Our knowledge on this matter is imperfect in a number of respects. Thus a number of the existing polls, for instance on attitudes to citizens from other countries, only cover attitudes in the EU-15. We do however have data on EU-25 attitudes to further enlargement. On average, 46 % of EU citizens support further enlargement, while 42 % oppose it. This is a very significant opposition and a politically relevant opposition, since an important country such as France intends to hold a referendum on future enlargements beyond the most recent one (Bulgaria and Romania). Support for further enlargement tends to be considerably higher in the ten new member states than in the former EU15 (72 % versus 41 %!). Support is now strongest in Poland and Slovenia. After these countries Greece and Slovakia follow. Support for continuing enlargement is lowest in Germany (30 %), Austria and France (34 %).

If one defines Europeanness in terms of behaviour, an important indicator of trust could be argued to be interaction with other Europeans. This argument is based upon the assumption that dense interaction produces understanding, and understanding over time makes for solidarity. Not that solidarity is an automatic outcome of interaction – there are intervening variables, and it is not unimportant who interacts and under which material conditions. There are even levels of dense interaction that tends to produce conflict. Thus in the case of the Netherlands scepticism about immigration is correlated with a high degree of socializing with other foreigners.

Almost one out of two citizens in the EU socializes with other European nationals (43 %). However, this figure covers big differences. Citizens from the Netherlands (74 %) and Northern Europe tend to socialize most with fellow Europeans from other member states. And conversely, citizens from Hungary (19 %), Portugal (22 %), Spain (24 %) and Greece (31 %) socialize less.¹¹ Among the Baltic countries, Estonia was clearly above average (50 %). Latvia below average (40 %) along with Lithuania (38 %). Socializing with other Europeans presupposes an ability to speak foreign languages. Unlike, for instance, India and the US – but much like Switzerland – the EU has no lingua franca or Union language. However, 56 % of Europeans say they are able to hold a conversation in at least one language apart from their mother tongue. 28 % answer that they are able to converse in at least two languages apart from their mother tongue. More interesting perhaps is that as many as 44 % answer that they feel unable to converse in any other language than their own. This constitutes a significant, though not immutable, barrier to any notion of inter-cultural dialogue. On the whole, however, these figures do not support Karl Deutsch’s interactionist theory.

Socializing is related to patterns of travelling, another issue covered by Eurobarometer polls. Over a period of 12 months just over a third of European citizens had visited another European union country.

If we turn to attitudes, it is interesting to note that whereas 63 % of European citizens take an interest in their own country’s politics, only 47 % show an interest in European politics. 30 % of the people, who are interested in national politics are not interested in European politics. Obviously this is a static measurement and generational change may change this. A study by Lutz et.al. thus estimates that over time the number of Europeans having multiple identities is likely to grow.¹²

Evidence from other continental unions like the USA indicates that we are also dealing with a basic dilemma between geographical size and democracy. Distance tends to produce disinterest. One should, however, also be aware of a validity problem: not every definition of Europeanness requires the individual citizen to take an interest in European POLITICS. Theoretically speaking, one can feel a strong cultural affinity with Europe and be disinterested in Europe at the strictly political level. A number of sources of Europeanness do however pre-suppose involvement in European politics (see chapter 7). What then are seen to be the main sources of European citizenship broadly defined? When asked to choose two out of eight reforms with a view to strengthening a feeling of European citizenship, the majority (32 %) mentioned a European social welfare system and a European constitution (27 %). Not only a bill of rights but also everyday democracy seems to play a role in forging common identities: 21 % of Europeans would particularly welcome being able to vote in all elections organized in the member states where they lived. Purely symbolic gestures, such as creating a common Olympic team elicited very limited support (5 %). Overall then, it appears that Europeans tend to conceive of Europeanness in predominantly rational and utility-oriented terms.

Table 3.1 How to strengthen European citizenship?

However, the empirical evidence is far from unequivocal: Another poll indicates that a majority of Europeans associate Europeanness with immaterial values. Thus when asked the question, “When you hear the words ‘European Union’, what comes to your mind first?” a majority emphasized soft, immaterial aspects … “the European Union is above all a symbol of cooperation between the member states” (22 %). Others – but far fewer (15 %) – mainly associate the EU with the Euro.

Demarcation towards the outside world is often associated with group identity (see below). Is there then a “club feeling” in the EU? A Eurobarometer poll examining attitudes to EU enlargement could be read that way: 53 % of Europeans feel either indifference, fear, annoyance or frustration at the prospect of further enlargement. As we have seen, a very significant majority of Europeans support a common foreign and security policy. The significant score of “indifference” is particularly interesting: It could be a sign that Europeans are becoming more introverted, inadvertently erecting an emotional wall against outsiders, who are not members of the club. This ties up with another poll showing, perhaps less surprisingly, that 52 % of Europeans take the view that Turkish EU-membership … “is primarily in the interest of Turkey”.¹³

All in all, then, one can note on the one hand a growing emphasis upon Europe’s values, identity and culture on the part of the European political elite; on the other hand, a considerable discrepancy between these elite views and the attitudes of European citizens. While European citizens appear to endorse the idea of a “social European model” and would like to see a greater emphasis upon European welfare, enlargement is regarded with considerable scepticism. Some of the values espoused by European politicians, such as sexual non-discrimination, meets with limited understanding among European citizens. Most importantly, however, we know very little about the attitude of European citizens to some of the crucial issues relating to European identity: for instance, the question of whether Europeans see themselves as rooted in a common European tradition and experience, and whether there is such a thing as a “European way of life”.

1 Eurobarometer 66. First results. Brussels: December 2006.

2 Developing the European social model. Statements by Gerhard Schröder and Jacques Chirac in Nancy. www.deutscheaussenpolitik.de. 23.5.2005.

3 Statement in connection with the 50th anniversary of the signing of the Rometreaties.

4 I.a. in her inaugural speech to the European Parliament as chairman of the EU, see Das Parlament, no. 04-05, 22.1.2007.

5 DW-World.de. Deutsche Welle, 21.1.2007. “Merkel wants EU Charter to make reference to Christianity.”

6 Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Angela Merkel beim Festakt zur Feier des 50. Jahrestages der Unterzeichnung der “Römischen Vertrage”. www.deutscheaussenpolitik.de.

7 “L’ Allemagne, la France et L’Avenir de L’Union europenne”. Speech by Dominique de Villepin, premierminister Francais at the Humboldt University in Berlin on 18 January 2006. FCE 11/05.

8 “Britain’s role in Europe”. Prime Minister’s speech to the European Research Institute. 23 November 2001.

9 Speech to the European Parliament by Tony Blair. 23 June 2005. www.number10.gov.uk.

10 Speech by Tony Blair on the Future of Europe to commemorate Holocaust Memorial Day. 17 April 2007.

11 Eurobarometer, no. 251, 2006.

12 The Demography of growing European identity. Science, Vol. 314. October 2006.

13 Eurobarometer, no. 255, 2006.