Читать книгу The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Vol. 6 (of 9) - Томас Джефферсон, Thomas Jefferson - Страница 72

Monticello, June 21, 1813.

Dear Sir,—Your favor of the 6th has been received, and I will beg leave to add a few supplementary observations on the subject of my former letter. I am not a judge of the best forms which may be given to the gunboat; and indeed I suppose they should be of various forms, suited to the various circumstances to which they would be applied. Among these, no doubt, Commodore Barney's would find their place. While the largest and more expensive are fitted for moving from one seaport to another, coast-wise, to aid in a particular emergency, those of smaller draught and expense suit shallower waters; and of these shallow and cheap forms must be those for Lynhaven river. Commodore Preble, in his lifetime, undertook to build such in the best manner for two or three thousand dollars. Colonel Monroe, to whose knowledge of the face of the country I had referred, approves, in a letter to me, of such a plan of defence as was suggested, adding to it a fort on the middle grounds; but thinks the work too great to be executed during a war. Such a fort, certainly, could not be built during a war, in the face of an enemy. Its practicability at any time has been doubted, and although a good auxiliary, is not a necessary member of this scheme of defence. But the canal of retreat is really a small work, of a few months' execution; the laborers would be protected by the military guard on the spot, and many of these would assist in the execution, for fatigue, rations, and pay. The exact magnitude of the work I would not affirm, nor do I think we should trust for it to Tatham's survey: still less would I call in Latrobe, who would immediately contemplate a canal of Languedoc. I would sooner trust such a man as Thomas Monroe to take the level, measure the distances, and estimate the expense. And if the plan were all matured the ensuing winter, and laborers engaged at the proper season, it might be executed in time to mitigate the blockade of the next summer. On recurring to an actual survey of that part of the country, made in the beginning of the Revolutionary war, under the orders of the Governor and Council, by Mr. Andrews I think, a copy of which I took with great care, instead of the half a dozen miles I had conjectured in my former letter, the canal would seem to be of not half that length. I send you a copy of that part of the map, which may be useful to you on other occasions, and is more to be depended on for minutia, probably, than any other existing. I have marked on that the conjectured route of the canal, to wit, from the bridge on Lynhaven river to King's landing, on the eastern branch. The exact draught of water into Lynhaven river you have in the Navy office. I think it is over four feet.

When we consider the population and productions of the Chesapeake country, extending from the Génissee to the Saura towns and Albemarle Sound, its safety and commerce seem entitled even to greater efforts, if greater could secure them. That a defence at the entrance of the bay can be made mainly effective, that it will cost less in money, harass the militia less, place the inhabitants on its interior waters freer from alarm and depredation, and render provisions and water more difficult to the enemy, is so possible as to render thorough inquiry certainly expedient. Some of the larger gun-boats, or vessels better uniting swiftness with force, would also be necessary to scour the interior, and cut off any pickaroons which might venture up the bay or rivers. The loss on James' river alone, this year, is estimated at two hundred thousand barrels of flour, now on hand, for which the half price is not to be expected. This then is a million of dollars levied on a single water of the Chesapeake, and to be levied every year during the war. If a concentration of its defence at the entrance of the Chesapeake should be found inadequate, then we must of necessity submit to the expenses of detailed defence, to the harassment of the militia, the burnings of towns and houses, depredations of farms, and the hard trial of the spirit of the Middle States, the most zealous supporters of the war, and, therefore, the peculiar objects of the vindictive efforts of the enemy. Those north of the Hudson need nothing, because treated by the enemy as neutrals. All their war is concentrated on the Delaware and Chesapeake; and these, therefore, stand in principal need of the shield of the Union. The Delaware can be defended more easily. But I should not think one hundred gun-boats (costing less than one frigate) an over-proportioned allotment to the Chesapeake country, against the over-proportioned hostilities pointed at it.

I am too sensible of the partial and defective state of my information, to be over-confident, or pertinacious, in the opinion I have formed. A thorough examination of the ground will settle it. We may suggest, perhaps it is a duty to do it. But you alone are qualified for decision, by the whole view which you can command; and so confident am I in the intentions, as well as wisdom, of the government, that I shall always be satisfied that what is not done, either cannot, or ought not to be done. While I trust that no difficulties will dishearten us, I am anxious to lessen the trial as much as possible. Heaven preserve you under yours, and help you through all its perplexities and perversities.