Читать книгу Post-War Identification - Torsten Kolind - Страница 6

Bosnia Herzegovina experienced a fierce war from 1992 to 1995, a war which divided the country ethnically. The Dayton peace agreement of December 1995 retained Bosnia Herzegovina’s international boundaries and created a joint multi-ethnic and democratic government. Also recognised was a second tier of government comprised of two entities roughly equal in size: the Bosniak/Croat Federation of Bosnia Herzegovina, and the Bosnian Serb-led Republika Srpska (RS) (see map). The Federation and RS governments were charged with overseeing internal functions.

The war in Bosnia Herzegovina was initially an act of aggression and territorial conquest instigated by Serbian political leaders. However, as the war progressed, it increasingly came to consist of several minor wars, one of them fought in Western Bosnia Herzegovina between Croatian and Muslim forces. This was the one that affected the inhabitants of Stolac the most. At the beginning of the war, Bosnian Croats and Muslims had joined forces, primarily because they faced the same enemy, the Serbs, who had already conquered large parts of Bosnia Herzegovina in the first month of the war. Croatia had already suffered from Serbian attacks, so in Croatia people felt sympathy for their neighbours. However, the alliance was a marriage of convenience, made up of rather different strategies.

The Bosnian Croats were divided between those living in central Bosnia, who considered themselves as much Bosnian as Croat, and the Croats living in areas dominated largely by Croats, mainly Western Herzegovina, who were eager to forge closer ties with Croatia proper, rather than with the other ethnic groups of Bosnia Herzegovina. The Herzegovinian Croats only constituted around a third of the total Croat population of Bosnia Herzegovina, but when the war started they were the most influential. This influence was primarily due to the existence of what some have called ‘the Herzegovinian lobby’ (Donia and Fine 1994: 249; Grandits 2007: 107-9), a hard-core nationalist group of mainly émigré Croats. The Herzegovinian lobby had contributed greatly to the Croatian President Tuđman’s presidential campaign in 1990 (Woodward 2000). Tuđman – himself strongly nationalistic, with his dream of annexing substantial parts of Bosnia Herzegovina¹ – rewarded his backers by supporting their desire to divide up Bosnia and make Herzegovina a part of Croatia. In July 1992, the Herzegovinian Croats, led by Mate Boban, leader of the HDZ-BiH (Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica – Bosna i Hercegovina; the Croatian Democratic Union – Bosnia Herzegovina, a strongly nationalist Croat political party) convened a self-proclaimed Presidency of the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna and declared a self-governing community (Donia and Fine 1994: 248-51; Glenny 1996: 192-9; Bennet 1995: 198-202).

The Herzegovinian Croats, despite the declaration of the self-governing community, lacked the strength to pursue the annexationist design and felt that in the long term an alliance with the Bosnian government was still the best way to realise their nationalist dreams. But it was clear from the start of the takeover of the HDZ-BiH by Mate Boban that the Muslim-Croat alliance was fragile: fighting broke out between Muslims and Croats at several places in Bosnia Herzegovina, and Croats started driving out Muslim inhabitants of villages under Croat control (Donia and Fine 1994: 250, Glenny 1996: 194, Cigar 1995: 125). For their part, the Muslims, who were desperately pursuing the goal of an autonomous unitary Bosnia Herzegovina, had no alternative but to form an alliance with the Bosnian Croats and uphold the best possible relation with Croatia. The Bosnian forces (of which the majority was Muslims) were illequipped and would have stood no chance if they were to face both the Serbs and the Croats. Furthermore, they depended on good relations with the HVO (Hrvatsko Vijeće Odbrane, the Croatian Defence Council, the army of the Bosnian Croats) in order to receive the illegal weapons supplies (illegal because of the international weapons embargo) coming through Croat-held territory, as well as food supplies to major Bosnian cities (Glenny 1996: 195, 228).

Croatia and Bosnia Herzegovina, then, were officially war allies during 1992 and the beginning of 1993, and in Herzegovina Muslims fought in the ranks of the HVO against the Serbs. But in spring 1993, the latent Muslim-Croat conflict escalated into full-scale war. A prime reason was probably the international community’s Vance-Owen peace proposal, which, in addition to ratifying the carving up of Bosnia Herzegovina along ethnic lines, also allotted a proportionally large amount of territory to the Bosnian Croats. For the Bosnian Croats the Vance-Owen peace proposal was an incentive to consolidate their respective positions and assume full control of the area assigned to them under the plan, as well as to seize additional areas from the Bosnian government, including areas where Croatians were in a distinct minority (as in Stolac).

In many areas of Western Herzegovina the Bosnian Croats’ policy resulted in open fighting between Muslims and Croats. The Croats wanted to cleanse the territories ethnically and unite them with Croatia, while the Muslims wanted to keep the areas under the control of a multi-ethnic Bosnian state. Some of the fiercest fighting of the entire war broke out between Muslims and Croats in Mostar. And in areas south and south-west of Mostar (among them Stolac) the entire Muslim population, including former Muslim co-combatants, was disarmed and arrested, then placed in horrendous prison camps (logori) or expelled to territory held by the Bosnian army. At the same time the Croats and Muslims were still fighting together against the Serbs, in Sarajevo for instance.

A year later the fighting between the Muslims and Croats was stopped by the signing of the Washington agreement by both parties on 1 March 1994. It was a federation agreement, and though not respected as such – the Croats did not dismantle their newly created republic of Herceg-Bosna, and joint command of the two armies remained a fiction – it was a step towards stopping the war in Bosnia Herzegovina. The Dayton agreement, which officially put an end to almost four years of total destruction and ethnic cleansing in Bosnia Herzegovina, was signed on 21 November 1995. The agreement was not a formal division of Bosnia Herzegovina (see however Mertus 2000), but in reality the country has been ethnically divided ever since. The Serb Republic is controlled and mainly inhabited by Serbs, and the Federation (between Muslims and Croats) is itself divided in Croat and Muslim areas and jurisdictions. As a case in point, today the country has in reality three different armies.

Today Bosnia Herzegovina faces huge problems. One of the hardest to solve has to do with the repatriation of displaced people. Between 100,000 and 200.000 people died during the war, and more than 2 million out of a total pre-war population of 4.3 million were internal or external refugees after the war.² So besides facing a completely ruined economy, a destroyed production apparatus, enormous unemployment, war traumas en masse, corruption and a general mood of despondency, the Bosnian people and Bosnian political system in cooperation with the Office of High Representatives (OHR) also have to solve the impossible puzzle of relocating people to their houses, houses which have in many cases been ruined or occupied. When the war was brought to an end, a pilot project facilitating inter-Federation returns in four towns was initiated. One of these was Stolac, where the Muslim and Serb populations were to be supported in returning. The return of the Muslim population to Stolac was met with resistance by the Croats, many of whom had fled to Stolac from central Bosnia during the war. These Croats feared for ‘their’ (the Muslims’) property as well as their newly won political power in town. And on the ideological level, the Croats worried about the decreasing prospects for realising the independent state of Herceg-Bosna. Of the four pilot projects, the Stolac project has been the most difficult one to realise,³ due to the immense obstruction from the Croats living in town. With this background in mind, I will now focus more closely on Stolac and offer some details.