Читать книгу This Is Bioethics - Udo Schüklenk, Ruth F. Chadwick - Страница 36

3.29 In public debates about the introduction of new technologies you will frequently come across arguments of the kind that the use of certain technologies is variously ‘unnatural’ or ‘abnormal’, and that that establishes their moral wrongness. Historically we have seen this initially not so much in the context of technologies but in the context of opposition to homosexuality. The view expressed here was that homosexuality is morally objectionable because it is seen as unnatural and/or abnormal. But what is meant by unnatural or abnormal? Homosexuality is something that occurs in nature, both human (Crooks and Baur 2014) as well as non‐human (Sommer 2006) It is something that does not violate the laws of physics, so it definitely is a natural thing. What proponents of the view that homosexuality is unnatural really mean is that in their view homosexuality violates their normative understanding of what human nature should be like. Influential thinkers as varied as the Catholic theologian Thomas Aquinas⁴⁷ (1225–1274) and enlightenment philosopher Immanuel Kant⁴⁸ (1724–1804) have tried to deliver rationales in support of such an understanding, with limited success (Soble 2003⁴⁹).

3.30 Similar problems arise in arguments involving claims of abnormality. Normality describes nothing other than a statistical average. And while it is true that homosexuality is not your average expression of sexuality, it’s also true that describing that tells us nothing about the morality, or the desirability or otherwise of homosexuality. People driving Rolls Royce motorcars, flying on private jets, or those owning golden Rolex wristwatches are all abnormal, compared to the average person driving a car, flying on a plane, or owning a watch. None of that tells us anything about the morality of owning luxury cars and watches or flying on a private airplane. The reason for this is that these types of arguments commit a naturalistic fallacy.

3.31 David Hume ⁵⁰, one of the most influential philosophers of the English‐speaking world, argued in his Treatise of Human Nature (1739–1740) that it is ‘altogether inconceivable’ (and a logic error) to form or derive value judgments from facts alone. According to this view empirical premises cannot give rise to normative conclusions (Hume, T3.1.1.27). There is a great entry⁵¹ in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy on fallacies. Henry Sidgwick also offers a good discussion of the problems surrounding ethical arguments based on ‘God’s will’, nature and abnormal in his Methods of Ethics⁵² (Sidgwick 1907, Book 1, Chapter VI, §1– §2). Give these a read if time permits.

3.32 A naturalistic fallacy is committed when we deduce – always falsely – from the way how things are how they ought to be. So, when people say that reproductive human cloning or IVF – i.e. a new way of making babies – is unnatural or abnormal, and therefore wrong, they have committed such a fallacy (Pence 1998). We cannot deduce a moral ought or should from a description of something that merely is. Even if we accepted that these technologies are unnatural – and, arguably we should not even do that – it would not follow that their use is unethical. If we did agree with such a faulty line of reasoning we would quickly find ourselves in a precarious situation where, for consistency’s sake, we would have to object to the use of most human invented technologies. Radiation therapy for various cancers, or MRI scans are no more natural by that definition of naturalness.