Читать книгу 1997 Special Investigation in Connection with 1996 Federal Election Campaigns - United States Senate Committee - Страница 9

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Although its investigation had then been underway in earnest -- with Senate-approved funding and an adequate staff -- only for three and a half months, the Committee started holding public hearings in July 1997. By the time public hearings had concluded at the end of October, the Committee had held 32 days of hearings at which 72 witnesses testified.17

With jurisdiction encompassing such a broad range of wrongdoing and with such little time available, the Committee’s selection of witnesses and subject matter for its public hearings required making difficult choices. The choice of subject matter for individual days and segments of hearings at this early stage of the inquiry, as outlined by Chairman Thompson in his “twophase” approach, was dictated both by a focus on campaign finance illegalities and by a process of issue triage, whereby the Committee restricted itself to the most serious matters it was capable of properly developing in the time available.

Because much of the Committee’s initial inquiry focused on the most troubling issues of foreign contribution-laundering, the first month of hearings focused largely on these matters. Much information relevant to this aspect of the inquiry remained unknown because of the large number of potential witnesses who chose to flee the country or invoke their Fifth Amendment rights. Furthermore, because it implicated sensitive U.S. intelligence and counter-intelligence activities, much of the relevant information was classified by executive branch agencies and could not be disclosed in open session. While Committee members obtained a picture of the U.S. intelligence and law enforcement communities’ understanding of such issues, it proved impossible for the Committee to convey more than the mere outlines of the situation to the American people. The Committee was able, however, to bring to light evidence that foreign-source contributions to the DNC were laundered through domestic “straw donors” during the 1996 election cycle.

In addition to illegal foreign contributions and the laundering of such funds, the hearings focused on campaign fundraising that took place on government property. The Committee heard evidence, for example, of widespread fundraising in the White House. It also heard testimony regarding fundraising solicitations from government offices using government telephones, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 607. The hearings also inquired into whether the DNC, particularly its fundraising and advertising activities, were run out of the White House by federal employees.

The Committee uncovered a donation-laundering scheme involving a prominent Democratic fundraiser and the exploitation of a foreign religious institution that began at least as early as 1993 and continued through the 1996 election, the principal architects of which have reportedly been linked to the intelligence service of a foreign government.

Having discovered that part of the scheme to raise large contributions for the DNC involved the sale of access to senior government officials -- thereby also offering major donors the concomitant opportunity to purchase policy concessions through an implicit quid pro quo arrangement, the Committee also turned its attention to these matters.

The Committee also held hearings to explore the legal context in which the abuses of the 1996 elections occurred. Although the Committee lacks legislative jurisdiction over campaign finance reform legislation, its hearings had established a record of the operation of current laws.

The Committee sought to explicate the legal and institutional context in which the abuses and evasion of law which its investigatory hearings were highlighting occurred, and it heard from leading experts on campaign finance issues, who helped explain what had gone wrong in 1996.

On October 1, 1997, as these “policy” hearings came to a close, the Committee learned that the White House had only recently discovered a large number of video and audio tapes responsive to requests for information the Committee had made as early as April and called for in the July subpoena as well. The story of the White House video tapes, the contents thereof, and the White House’s failure to produce them in a timely manner would become a focus of the remaining month of public hearings.

As the first phase of the Committee’s hearings moved towards completion, the Committee had to determine whether to proceed with the second phase, in which it had intended to focus on the political activities of various non-profit groups. Because most of the significant non-profits groups had failed to comply with the Committee’s subpoenas, however, the Committee had little information beyond that already in the public domain. By October 1997, moreover, because of the deadline the Committee had neither the time nor the recourse to judicial proceedings that would have been necessary to acquire more information. As a result of the poor compliance or non-compliance from many of the non-profit groups it subpoenaed, the Chairman decided not to hold hearings on the role of non-profit groups, and it is accordingly inappropriate to reach conclusions about their activities in the 1996 election.18 This phase of the investigation would surely have added significantly to the Senate’s and the American public’s understanding of campaign finance illegalities and improprieties. Because of the December 31 deadline forced on the Committee, however, it was unable to undertake this task.

The Committee closed its public hearings by examining one particular quid pro quo, the clearest instance yet uncovered, on which it could obtain witness testimony, of a change of government policy undertaken in return for campaign contributions: the denial of a license to three Indian tribes in Wisconsin for an off-reservation casino. Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt was one of the witnesses who testified on this matter. As a direct result of his testimony before the Committee, at the time of this writing the Justice Department is considering whether an independent counsel should be appointed to investigate Secretary Babbitt’s role in this matter.

After 32 days of hearings in July, September, and October, Chairman Thompson announced on October 31, 1997, that the Committee was suspending public hearings, although continuing its investigation through the end of the year. He determined that the most important information obtained by the Committee had already been the subject of public hearings, and that given existing time constraints and the Committee’s lack of judicial recourse, the remaining material should not be pursued in public hearings. The Chairman left open the possibility that new hearings would be held if warranted by new information developed during the remaining two months of the investigation. Although certain investigative threads were followed during November and December and interviews and depositions were conducted, no additional public hearings were held. The Committee continued to receive documents and videotapes in December. The DNC’s delivery of 15 boxes of documents on December 22, 1997, about one week before the expiration of the Committee’s authority, marked the final production of information to the Committee as officially constituted. In January 1998, after its jurisdiction had expired, the White House produced documents on Johnny Chung, which were responsive to its April 1997 document request, to the Committee. Any relevant information developed after the public hearings were ended is included in this report.