Imperialism and Mr. Gladstone

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Various. Imperialism and Mr. Gladstone

INTRODUCTION

PURCHASE OF THE SUEZ CANAL SHARES (1876)

ENGLAND, RUSSIA, AND AFGHANISTAN (1876)

THE QUEEN AS EMPRESS OF INDIA (1876)

BULGARIAN ATROCITIES (1876)

I. Thunder from Mr. Gladstone

II. Cold Water from Disraeli

SIR THEOPHILUS SHEPSTONE'S COMMISSION (1877)

RUSSIA DECLARES WAR ON TURKEY (1877)

IRISH OBSTRUCTION IN ITS EARLY DAYS (1877)

PLEVNA AFTER THE SIEGE (1877)

STRAINED RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA (1878)

I

II

PEACE WITH HONOUR (1878)

THE SECRET AGREEMENTS IN BEACONSFIELD'S POCKETS (1878)

GLADSTONE INDIGNANT AGAIN (1878)

RUSSIAN INTRIGUE AT CABUL (1878)

SHERE ALI (1878)

DEATH OF SHERE ALI (1879)

THE GANDAMAK TREATY (1879)

THE CABUL MASSACRE (1879)

THE MIDLOTHIAN CAMPAIGN (1879)

BEACONSFIELD KEEPS COOL

THE MAIWAND DISASTER (1880)

THE BRADLAUGH CASE (1880)

SOCIAL AMELIORATIONS (1880)

Employers' Liability

Funded Municipal Debt

Electric Light, The Telephone, New Hotels

PARNELL AND THE LAND LEAGUE (1880)

CAPTAIN BOYCOTT (1880)

THE BOER RISING (1880)

Proclamation

BEFORE MAJUBA (1881)

AFTER MAJUBA

I

II

RITUAL CONTROVERSY (1881)

A SHORT WAY WITH OBSTRUCTION (1881)

THE DEATH OF BEACONSFIELD (1881)

I

II

THE WITHDRAWAL FROM CANDAHAR (1881)

THE SALVATION ARMY (1881)

ARABI (1881)

THE FIRST CLOSURE (1882)

BIMETALLISM (1882)

BRIGHT'S RESIGNATION (1882)

THE ILBERT BILL (1883)

FENIANS AGAIN (1883)

THE MAHDI (1883)

END OF CAREY THE INFORMER (1883)

SLAUGHTER OF HICKS PASHA'S ARMY (1883)

TRANSVAAL CONVENTION (1884)

GORDON'S MISSION TO KHARTOUM (1884)

I

II

III

DIFFICULTIES OF GORDON'S CHARACTER (1884)

I

II

ZOBEIR PASHA (1884)

I

II

III

SOME OF GORDON'S TELEGRAMS (1884)

CROSS PURPOSES (1884)

GORDON'S POSITION (1884)

I

II

GORDON'S OWN MEDITATIONS (1884)

THE FRANCHISE AND REDISTRIBUTION (1884)

FEEDING POOR SCHOOL CHILDREN (1884)

THE DEATH OF GORDON (1885)

THE GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSIBILITY (1885)

THE VOTE OF CENSURE (1885)

MORE FENIANISM (1885)

NEW LABOUR MOVEMENTS (1885)

THE UNEMPLOYED (1885)

WORKING MEN MAGISTRATES (1885)

TORY OLIVE-BRANCH TO IRELAND (1885)

THE FIRST SUBMARINE (1885)

THE UNAUTHORIZED PROGRAMME (1885)

THE IRISH VOTE (1885)

THE NEW ELECTORATE (1885)

THE OPENING OF THE RIFT (1886)

"ULSTER WILL FIGHT" (1886)

SALISBURY ON HOME RULE (1886)

MR. GLADSTONE'S APPEAL (1886)

LIBERAL UNIONISM (1886)

THE UNEMPLOYED RIOTS (1886)

BIMETALLISM AND LABOUR DISPUTES (1886)

PASTEUR AND HYDROPHOBIA (1886)

THE FINAL HOME RULE RUPTURE (1886)

THE COMING OF TECHNICAL EDUCATION (1887)

THE FIRST "GUILLOTINE" CLOSURE (1887)

JUBILEE RETROSPECTS (1887)

I

II

"REMEMBER MITCHELSTOWN" (1887)

"BLOODY SUNDAY" (1887)

FIRST REPORT ON THE RAND (1887)

Отрывок из книги

Mr. Disraeli: … When we acceded to office two years ago an International Commission had only just ceased its labours at Constantinople upon the dues of the Suez Canal, and upon the means of ascertaining and maintaining a limit of them, and it had arrived at reasons entirely protested against by the proprietary. What was the state of affairs there? Lord Derby had to deal with them. The proprietary of the canal threatened, and not only threatened, but proceeded, to stop the canal. They refused pilots; they threatened to change the signals; they took steps which would have interrupted that mode of intercourse with India… From that moment it became a matter of interest to those responsible for the government of this country to see what could be done to remedy those relations with the Suez Canal… But it suddenly comes to our knowledge that the Khedive, on whose influence we mainly depended, is going to part with his shares. We received a telegram from Cairo informing us that the Khedive was anxious to raise a considerable sum of money upon his shares in the Suez Canal, and offered them to England. We considered the question immediately, and it appeared to us to be a complicated transaction – one to which there were several objections; and we sent back to say that we were favourably disposed to assist the Khedive, but that at the same time we were only prepared to purchase the shares outright. What was the answer? The answer was that the Khedive was resolved, if he possibly could, to keep his shares, and that he could only therefore avail himself of a loan. There matters seemed to end. Then suddenly there came news to the Government of this country that a French society – Société Générale – was prepared to offer the Khedive a large sum of money – very little inferior to the four millions – but on very onerous conditions. The Khedive communicated with us, and said that the conditions were so severe that he would sooner sell the shares outright, and – which I had forgotten to mention – that, in deference to his promise that England should always have the refusal of the shares if he decided to sell them, he offered them to the English Government. It was absolutely necessary to decide at that moment what course we should take. It was not a thing on which we could hesitate… To pretend that Lord Derby has treated this business as a mere commercial speculation is idle. If he did not act in accordance with the principles of high policy, I should like to know what high policy is, and how a man can pursue it.

Apart from looking upon this as an investment, if the shares had been offered, and if there had been no arrangement of paying interest for nineteen years, so far as I am concerned, I should have been in favour of the purchase of the shares. I should have agreed with Lord Derby in thinking that England would never be satisfied if all the shares of the Suez Canal were possessed by a foreign company. Then it is said, if any obstacles had been put in your way by the French proprietors of the canal, you know very well that ultimately it must come to force, and you will then obtain at once the satisfaction of your desire. Well, if the government of the world was a mere alternation between abstract right and overwhelming force, I agree there is a good deal in that observation; but that is not the way in which the world is governed. The world is governed by conciliation, compromise, influence, varied interests, the recognition of the rights of others, coupled with the assertion of one's own; and, in addition, a general conviction, resulting from explanation and good understanding, that it is for the interests of all parties that matters should be conducted in a satisfactory and peaceful manner… I cannot doubt that the moral influence of England possessing two-fifths of the shares in this great undertaking must have made itself felt, must have a considerable influence upon the conduct of those who manage the company… England is a Mediterranean Power; a great Mediterranean Power. This is shown by the fact that in time of war always, and frequently in time of peace, she has the greatest force upon those waters. Furthermore, she has strongholds upon those waters which she will never relinquish. The policy of England, however, is not one of aggression. It is not provinces she wants. She will not interest herself in the redistribution of territory on the shores of the Mediterranean, as long as the redistribution does not imperil the freedom of the seas and the dominion which she legitimately exercises. And therefore I look upon this, that in the great chain of fortresses which we possess, almost from the Metropolis to India, that the Suez Canal is a means of securing the free intercourse of the waters, is a great addition to that security, and one we should prize.

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It was on the 20th of April that the insurrection broke out in Bulgaria… On the 9th of May Sir Henry Elliot … observing a great Mohammedan excitement, and an extensive purchase of arms in Constantinople, wisely telegraphed to the British Admiral in the Mediterranean expressing a desire that he would bring his squadron to Besika Bay. The purpose was for the protection of British subjects, and of the Christians in general… These measures were substantially wise, and purely pacific. They had, if understood rightly, no political aspect, or, if any, one rather anti-Turkish than Turkish. But there were reasons, and strong reasons, why the public should not have been left to grope out for itself the meaning of a step so serious as the movement of a naval squadron towards a country disturbed both by revolt and by an outbreak of murderous fanaticism. In the year 1853, when the negotiations with Russia had assumed a gloomy and almost a hopeless aspect, the English and French fleets were sent eastwards; not as a measure of war, but as a measure of preparation for war, and proximate to war. The proceedings marked a transition of discussion into that angry stage which immediately precedes a blow; and the place, to which the fleets were then sent, was Besika Bay. In the absence of information, how could the British nation avoid supposing that the same act, as that done in 1853, bore also the same meaning?.. The expectation of a rupture pervaded the public mind. The Russian funds fell very heavily, under a war panic; partisans exulted in a diplomatic victory, and in the increase of what is called our prestige, the bane, in my opinion, of all upright politics. The Turk was encouraged in his humour of resistance. And this, as we now know, while his hands were so reddened with Bulgarian blood. Foreign capitals were amazed at the martial excitement in London. But the Government spoke never a word… And this ostentatious protection to Turkey, this wanton disturbance of Europe, was continued by our Ministry, with what I must call a strange perversity, for weeks and weeks…

What we have to guard against is imposture – that Proteus with a thousand forms. A few months ago the new Sultan served the turn, and very well. Men affirmed that he must have time. And now another new Sultan is in the offing. I suppose it will be argued that he must have time too. Then there will be, perhaps, new constitutions; firmans of reforms; proclamations to commanders of Turkish armies, enjoining extra humanity. All these should be quietly set down as simply zero. At this moment we hear of the adoption by the Turks of the last and most enlightened rule of warfare – namely, the Geneva Convention. They might just as well adopt the Vatican Council or the British Constitution. All these things are not even the oysters before the dinner. Still worse is any plea founded upon any reports made by Turkish authority upon the Bulgarian outrages… I return to, and I end with, that which is the Omega as well as the Alpha of this great and most mournful case. An old servant of the Crown and State, I entreat my countrymen, upon whom far more than perhaps any other people of Europe it depends, to require, and to insist, that our Government, which has been working in one direction, shall work in the other, and shall apply all its vigour to concur with the other States of Europe in obtaining the extinction of the Turkish executive power in Bulgaria. Let the Turks now carry away their abuses in the only possible manner – namely, by carrying off themselves. Their Zaptiehs and their Mudirs, their Bimbashis and their Yuzbachis, their Kaimakams and their Pashas, one and all, bag and baggage, shall, I hope, clear out from the province they have desolated and profaned. This thorough riddance, this most blessed deliverance, is the only reparation we can make to the memory of those heaps on heaps of dead; to the violated purity alike of matron, of maiden, and of child; to the civilization which has been affronted and shamed; to the laws of God, or, if you like, of Allah; to the moral sense of mankind at large. There is not a criminal in a European gaol, there is not a cannibal in the South Sea Islands, whose indignation would not rise and overboil at the recital of that which has been done, which has left behind all the foul and all the fierce passions that produced it, and which may again spring up, in another murderous harvest, from the soil soaked and reeking with blood, and in the air tainted with every imaginable deed of crime and shame.

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