Читать книгу Hamam Balkania - Vladislav Bajac - Страница 25

Orhan Pamuk and I both came to our next session fully equipped: with chronicles, travelogues, notes, peripheral notes from German, French, Venetian, Hungarian, Serbian, Polish, and Turkish travellers, those from Dubrovnik as well, but also civil servants, explorers, emissaries, spies, educated slaves, merchants and all kinds of other people who found it worthwhile to leave behind a trace of their view on events in the Ottoman Empire.

We seemed amusing even to ourselves: like kids trading football cards, we almost began to taunt each other about who had the better collection! Pamuk first offered his own thoughts about Sokollu.

“At the critical moment, Sultan Selim figured out two important facts about his Grand Vizier, in this particular order. First, Mehmed-pasha showed exceptionally high moral standards, thereby looming over all the others around him, because he never referred again to his warning before entering the war and thereby not exploiting the chance to entice the (vulnerable and gullible) Sultan to expose the pasha’s opponents to punishment.”

I interjected, “There was a reason why they called him ‘the Tall one’”.¹⁷

“Well, that’s true. You know that the women at the court first noticed his physical appearance. Everyone spoke of his posture, saying that they had never seen such dignified carriage,” Pamuk added.

“It’s fortunate that he was also handsome, or as they would say back then – pleasing to the eye,” I tried to go on light-heartedly. But Pamuk became serious again,

“Second, without a moment’s hesitation, the vizier showed a steadiness, decisiveness and certainty in his proposals that they must take action immediately. The Sultan could not have wished for anything of greater use to the empire in the dangerous state of his own cowardice, and the general cowardice that prevailed. With his idea to build a new fleet immediately, the pasha did not mean to say that they should go straight back to war, but rather to make their enemies think twice about doing further battle. Above all, the message meant: the Ottoman Empire will not bow down!”

I had a commentary of my own.

“They also had a bit of luck. The Europeans, for their part, were ecstatic with their unexpected victory, and because of their similar feelings of unwarranted or overindulged security, they sent their ships back to their home ports, counting on finishing up the job the next year. In fact, it must be admitted, the winter had already set in, and all acts of war at sea were becoming harder and harder to carry out.”

“Yes. You’re right. Perhaps Mehmed-pasha, foreseeing such a course of action or knowing that it was certain, was actually able to insist on renovating the fleet. Although it became clear very quickly that their enemies would not attack the capital, the Grand Vizier rushed to put his ideas into action: it was necessary to show everyone, both at home and abroad, that the great power had once again become the centre of the world.”

It was true. History records that, through the exceptional organisation of the task, the Grand Vizier re-built the Ottoman fleet in just a few months! Mehmed-pasha first had several shipyards built which then proceeded to build a fleet of new ships, one hundred and fifty strong! All in the period from the end of 1571 to the beginning of 1572. In addition, when the Sultan wanted to praise and reward him personally, Sokolović said that they should not believe in him, but in the strength of the empire. What sultan would not want to have such a man beside him?

Truth be told, a part of his internal self-confidence (which he did not allow to surface in the presence of others often) actually came from the vizier’s earlier experience, when a quarter of a century before, as the high commander of the Ottoman navy, he had hundreds of new ships built. He was better at that task than at going to war at sea. That was why he let those with greater skill than his own lead the naval battles. During that same period, he built new arsenals for shipbuilding, all together forming a terribly powerful shipbuilding industry. At the same time, he executed a fundamental reform of the navy and made plans for the future conquests of territories in the Indian Ocean, north Africa, and the European parts of the Mediterranean. With his knowledge, his diplomatic skill, his sense of order, discipline and hierarchy, and with his realistic visions, he completely prepared the field for his commanders to turn his plans into their actions.

In the revival of the fleet after the defeat, Mehmed-pasha activated the entire country: there was not a class or a strategic entity that did not have to respond to the decrees in its own way. The vizier intentionally made such a far-reaching noise about it in order to motivate the demoralised citizens across the country by the breadth of the action, and to warn those outside the country that the Turkish Empire was indeed still to be reckoned with.

The vizier knew what he was doing. Immediately after the defeat, he was visited by the Venetian diplomat Mark-Antonio Barbaro, who had not left the Ottoman capital despite the war, so that he could somehow determine the further intentions of the empire. Mehmed-pasha, as an experienced politician, received him in a friendly but cynical atmosphere, “You’ve come to see if we’ve lost our courage after the defeat.” Then he surprised the diplomat with a comparison, “There’s a huge difference between your loss and ours. By snatching the Kingdom of Cyprus, we have cut off your hand; by battering our fleet, you have set our beard on fire. A hand cut off will never grow back, but a singed beard will grow back even thicker.”

He was right.

“But the Grand Vizier treated his own people the same,” I said to Pamuk when he told me these facts. “When the newly-appointed kapudan-derya, who was his most direct helper in the job of rebuilding the fleet, and who longed in every imaginable way to have a strong armada, began to doubt that the vizier’s plans and decrees would succeed, the crucial part of their conversation went like this, or so a chronicler says:

Kilij Ali: ‘It’s easy to build ships, but in such a short time it is impossible to obtain enough anchors, ropes and other equipment.’

Mehmed-pasha: ‘The power and wealth of the High Porta is such that, if necessary, it is possible to make anchors of silver, ropes of silk scarves, and sails of satin and velvet. Ask me for whatever is missing on any of the ships, and you will get it.’

At these words, says the chronicler, the admiral fell on his knees before the vizier, his hand outstretched, he touched his forehead and palms to the ground and said, ‘I knew that you were the only one who could build the new navy.’

Both Pamuk and I concluded together that this is a real example of a story with a moral to it. Both sides in the conflict allowed their vanity to overwhelm them: the Turks before the battle, and the Europeans after it. And both sides, each in their own way, paid with historical consequences for that weakness. No matter how skilfully and quickly they diluted, diminished and hid those consequences – and however praiseworthy their efforts – they still had to pay the price.