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CHAPTER 2 | 1600s–1800s

42

INTELLIGENCE IN THE

ERA OF NAPOLEON

Like other national leaders, the French emperor Napoleon received a mass of

intelligence reports. He consequently faced the perennial problem of what to judge

as valuable information and what to discard as rubbish or outright disinformation from the

enemy. It was a conundrum he was never able to properly solve during a series of conflicts

with France’s neighbors, known in the English-speaking world as the Napoleonic Wars.

Napoleon Bonaparte, the most successful general of the

French Revolution, crowned himself Emperor of the French

in 1804. In doing so, he became the undisputed leader of

the most powerful country in Europe. With a large and

highly experienced army at his disposal, Napoleon

immediately began to prepare for war against his neighbors.

He also inherited an efficient intelligence service, but he

held ambivalent views about the importance of espionage,

often preferring to trust in his own military ability over

reports from his spies.

DECEIVING THE AUSTRIANS

For his first great campaign in 1805, which culminated in

the decisive defeat of a combined Austro-Russian army at

Austerlitz in 1805, Napoleon did rely on one of his more

audacious spies, Carl Schulmeister, a businessman and

smuggler from the Alsace region bordering France and

Germany. Schulmeister ostensibly worked for Austrian

intelligence, but he was in fact a double agent who had

offered his services to the French.

Schulmeister managed to persuade the

Austrians that French forces stationed in

southern Germany were on the point of

collapse. The Austrian commander in the

area, General Mack, advanced toward them in

anticipation of an easy victory, only to find his

troops surrounded by the main French army at

Ulm. Mack was forced to surrender, and the

Austrians never fully recovered from this setback.

SPIES IN THE FRENCH COURT

Later in his reign, Napoleon was less receptive to good

intelligence, whether from spies or decryption, and

by 1810, France had fallen behind Russia in intelligence-

gathering capability. The Russian Minister of War, Mikhail

Barclay de Tolly, had created an efficient black chamber.

Russia had been at peace with France since 1807, but by

1810, Tsar Alexander and his government were increasingly

fearful of a French invasion. Fortunately for them, they had

two spies at the heart of Napoleon’s court in Paris. Carl von

Nesselrode, deputy head of the Russian embassy, gained

detailed information on French strategic intentions. Prince

Alexander Chernyshev, the Tsar’s personal representative

to Napoleon, operated a ring of agents in the French

government. One agent

provided Chernyshev with a

monthly audit of the strengths

and positions of every unit in

the French army. Together, the

two spies gained a detailed

picture of French preparations

for the invasion of Russia in the

summer of 1812. The ensuing

military disaster was the

beginning of the end of

Napoleon’s empire.

Above: Prince Alexander Chernyshev

Below: Deceived Austrian general Karl Mack von Leiberich

was forced to surrender his force of 30,000 men to Napoleon

at Ulm after minimal fighting.