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The

leadership

paralysis

in the ANC

The limits of a liberation legacy

The inability to transform from resistance movements into effective governing parties lies at the heart of the governmental failures of many African independence and liberation movements. Such movements, of which the African National Congress (ANC) is a case in point, come to power with an extraordinary amount of legitimacy, given their history of opposing colonial governments or white minority regimes.

This ‘struggle legitimacy’ gives them a much stronger political, economic and moral mandate than that of governments in most other developing countries (except some in East Asia that have also emerged from colonial domination). Their social capital gives them the ability to mobilise societies behind their programmes for long periods, without serious challenges to their legitimacy. But, if such power goes unchecked, it also means that they can get away with service delivery failure, autocratic behaviour and wrongdoing in the name of advancing the liberation or independence project.

Members, supporters and voters are extraordinarily lenient to these movements and they, in turn, have extraordinary power to bestow legitimacy on individuals, institutions and behaviour. Conversely, their struggle credentials also allow them to delegitimise individuals, institutions or behaviour, of which they disapprove. In power, they have an additional legitimising tool: the new state and its apparatus. Combined, if used for the widest possible national, public good and democratic interest, this legitimacy should arguably be a powerful tool for African independence and liberation movements turned government to transform their societies for the better. Yet, most such movements have, once in power, squandered this opportunity.

Because they have such hegemony, the political culture that is manifested within these movements is also replicated within the new state. In their attempts to transform their societies, leaders of these movements fuse their parties with the new state to form a kind of ‘party state’, with the movement and the party becoming almost indistinguishable. There is no firewall between the party itself and the executive, legislatures and public institutions. In fact, independent democratic institutions are seen as an extension of the party, and not only are the heads of such institutions ‘deployed’ by the party leadership, they are also expected to defer to it.

The difficulty for many African countries is how to reverse the negative impact on the state if the political culture of the dominant movement turns undemocratic, autocratic or authoritarian. Given the nature of the independence and liberation struggles, these movements are organised in a top-down, secretive and military-like fashion, with power in the hands of a small leadership group. When the leadership decides, the members are expected to obey according to the principle of democratic centralism.

Most independence and liberation movements which are still in power see their movements as the embodiment of the ‘people’ and therefore see themselves as able to speak for the whole nation, with the leader as the tribune of the ‘people’. Typically, during their liberation struggles, nations were divided between those on the side of the liberation movement and those that were aligned with the colonial or minority government or their allies. In power, many independence and liberation movements still divide the world between those on their side and those belonging to the old order. Opposition or criticism, whether from within or from outside the movement, is therefore often wrongly construed as ‘opposition’ to the demands of the ‘people’. The result of such reasoning has been that independence and liberation movements rarely feel obliged to own up to their failures or examine themselves.

The ANC seems to have fallen into this trap as well. Former ANC secretary-general, and now deputy president, Kgalema Motlanthe’s famous report on the state of the movement’s internal organisation and values has spoken volumes about such behaviour. To realign itself with its original mission, the challenge for the ANC would be to face up to Motlanthe’s call to transform itself from the inside out. Its members, supporters and activists should play a more active role in keeping the ANC democratic and holding its leadership accountable.

In South Africa, we are fortunate that a range of other progressive groups also have ‘struggle’ legitimacy. Some of these movements are outside the ANC family: the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) and the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM). These movements have, of course, now lost most of their struggle legitimacy as leadership squabbles and weak policies, combined with the ANC’s dominance, have contributed to their demise, but importantly, ANC allies, such as the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), have struggle legitimacy in their own right, even though they are in alliance with the ANC.

Moreover, progressive civil society organisations, of which many participated or had their genesis in the United Democratic Front (UDF), can also claim legitimacy from the same source. It is their responsibility to stop the ANC from backsliding into undemocratic behaviour by being assertive civic watchdogs. This role should not be seen as inimical to their alliance with the ANC. Pro-democracy activists from the ANC, together with progressive civil society groups, unions and SACP members could, for example, form a pro-democracy lobby within the ANC that could push for the total internal democratisation of the party at all organisational levels.

But society must also be less tolerant of non-delivery, mismanagement and leaders’ autocratic behaviour. The current wave of protest against public representatives should be viewed positively, provided that it stays within the restrictions of the law. It is a form of public criticism which helps to hold the ANC leadership accountable when democratic institutions do not. COSATU General Secretary Zwelinzima Vavi summed it up when he said: ‘The election of a progressive leadership [does not] mean the end of the struggle and that we must now step back and hand over everything to these progressive, trusted leaders as though they are messiahs and will deliver everything on a silver platter, while we are in our beds sleeping.’

Individual leaders of the ANC deployed by the party leadership to head independent oversight institutions, such as the Chapter 9 institutions, must become more independent, and serve the public interest and not the interests of the ANC leadership, which do not always coincide. In summary, if a critical mass of individuals, institutions and communities with struggle credentials from within the ANC family are assertive in their dissent when the ANC acts against the public interest, the organisation’s leadership is likely to become more accountable and responsive to criticism. At the same time, consistent dismissal of such criticism on the grounds that it is counter-revolutionary will become increasingly difficult to sustain.

In Mauritius (one of the two most successful post-independence African societies with Botswana) the independence movement split in half a decade after independence. The split went right through the middle, not only of the party, but also of the trade unions and civil society groups that were aligned to the movement. Both the old and the breakaway movement had ‘struggle’ credentials, which meant that the electorate could now choose between two ‘legitimate’ progressive movements. The problem with the Congress of the People (COPE), which broke away from the ANC, is that, although its members have struggle legitimacy, it has been unable to shake off the perception that it represents the rejected leadership elite of the ANC. Now off course, COPE is engulfed in leadership struggles similar to those that caused the PAC and the BCM to implode.

The mistake that the Democratic Alliance (DA) made in the past is that it did not position itself as a liberation movement, albeit a ‘liberal’ one. Its policy and leadership positioning in the past reinforced the perception among the black majority that it defended the interests of a white minority or the apartheid order. Now in power in the Western Cape, the DA has the opportunity to show that it can be an alternative but relevant party which can not only govern better but also more inclusively. It must be able to show that service delivery to the black communities in the Western Cape will in five years be better at all levels than in provinces run by the ANC.

COPE can build on its struggle legitimacy if it repositions itself as a party for the black poor rather than the middle class, and if it uses the next five years to build a real presence in poor, working-class black communities.

The mandate President Jacob Zuma received is not ironclad: South African society is restless, and the credibility of the ANC may be wearing thin in the face of increasing delivery deficits, dashed expectations and an inability to communicate the reasons behind this state of affairs. These factors, combined with increasing economic hardships relating to the effects of the global financial crisis, could yet threaten the ANC’s struggle legitimacy, the main reason for its electoral success.

SA Reconciliation Barometer, Vol. 7, Issue 2, August 2009

The ANC has much to be proud of on its birthday, but little to celebrate

As the ANC celebrates its centenary, the party has much to look back on with pride. Compared with other African liberation movements, the ANC had the unique ability to unite diverse groups. The others were formed on the basis of one ethnic or regional group, and could never transcend this; the ANC created a broad alliance that spanned the ideological spectrum, from shopkeepers to communists. It became what was called a ‘multi-class’ organisation.

Furthermore, the ANC turned the struggle against apartheid into a moral struggle – and a global one. By the 1980s the ANC had formed links with groups ranging from churches and youth groups in the West and developing world, to ruling powers in the Eastern bloc. The ANC also produced pragmatic and visionary leaders with global appeal, such as Nelson Mandela and Albert Luthuli (the first African to receive the Nobel prize for peace).

The ANC’s armed struggle did not dominate every aspect of the movement, as it did in Zimbabwe’s ZANU-PF or Angola’s MPLA. In the ANC there were democratic forces that opposed the domination of a violent guerrilla culture. In the main, the ANC’s operation ethos, whether in exile or in prisons such as Robben Island, genuinely attempted to emphasise internal democracy – consultation, inclusiveness, freedom of expression and the right to dissent – even if there were some appalling incidents to the contrary.

But as the ANC reaches its 100th birthday, antidemocratic groups appear to have a stranglehold on the party. Key ANC leaders wrote South Africa’s post-apartheid Constitution – which set out a clear democratic, human rights and values framework for a new South Africa. Today, incredibly, some leaders are saying that the Constitution, particularly its freedom of expression provisions, ‘undermines’ development.

The intelligence and security forces, as well as the police, are routinely used in ANC leadership battles to trip up political rivals. Even corruption appears to be sometimes selectively prosecuted to sideline opponents. The cloak-and-dagger style of operations of the rogue elements of the ANC’s military and intelligence wings has now become dominant within the party.

One of the fundamental clauses in the ANC’s guiding ‘strategy and tactics’ document says members ‘must be informed by the values of honesty, hard work, humility, service to the people and respect for the laws of the land’. The current reality is embarrassingly opposite. This is illustrated in the contrast between the moral authority of a Mandela, an Oliver Tambo or a Luthuli – all former presidents of the ANC – and the murkiness of a Jacob Zuma, who is seeking re-election as party leader this year.

In his 2007 campaign to become leader, many Zuma supporters were 100% Zulu in their support for the man from KwaZulu-Natal. Out of the window went the inclusive, non-tribal and nonracial ethos of the ANC’s long struggle. The ANC Women’s League backed Zuma’s leadership bid even after he claimed he knew a woman wanted sex with him because she didn’t cross her legs.

Increasingly, top leaders in the ANC are chosen by small cliques – selected for how best they can balance factional and patronage interests. ANC leaders talk about efforts to tackle poverty, yet wastage of public resources and conspicuous consumption by elected officials have rocketed. The ANC in government runs the risk of making the same mistake as other failed African liberation movements – enriching the few, mostly those who are politically connected, rather than the poor masses.

Despite all this, the ANC is likely to be in power for some time. Opposition parties at the moment are perceived to be largely irrelevant, too disorganised or too white. There is, of course, the possibility that disillusioned sections of the ANC can break away. However, most supporters will be reluctant to do so given the miserable performance of the most recent splinter group, COPE.

The lack of a credible challenger encourages complacency in the ANC – with leaders perceiving no reason to shape up. However, with the party seemingly assured of victory in elections for the foreseeable future, largely paying lip service to the values that sustained it for a century, South Africa will struggle to reach its full potential – of becoming a global example for genuine democracy, equitable economic development and peaceful racial integration – unless truly democratic groups quickly take control of the ANC and steer it back to its roots.

The Guardian, 6 January 2012

ANC leadership battles should be open and democratic

Much of the infighting in the ANC, which is paralysing both government and the party, is the result of outdated codes, traditions and rituals governing the elections of leaders of the party, especially the president.

The opacity in internal ANC elections opens the system to manipulation, corruption and the abuse of state institutions such as the intelligence services, the police and the judiciary, and also raises the possibility of selective prosecutions to sideline rivals. Because of this opacity, incumbents and dominant factions can rewrite and manipulate the rules to favour their leadership campaigns and to undermine opponents.

The problem faced by many African liberation movements is that the top leadership is usually selected by very small cliques and presented to branches and national conferences for rubber-stamping. The leadership candidates are usually presented as one slate of candidates (if you vote for one candidate you are forced to vote for all the other candidates on the slate of that specific candidate) with the preferred presidential leader at the head (in some cases a two-slate system was allowed). These practices usually stem from a time when these movements operated as clandestine opposition parties, when such practices were defended as preventing disunity and fostering cohesion. In many cases, including that of the ANC, such non-democratic practices continue – even now that these movements are in government. This devalues democracy.

President Jacob Zuma and ANC General Secretary Gwede Mantashe have banned all public talk about the leadership succession in the party, saying such talk is premature. Yet the reality is that almost every political manoeuvre by the ANC leadership now is aimed at influencing the direction of the party’s leadership election at the 2012 national elective conference in Bloemfontein.

No matter what one’s views are of ANC Youth League leader Julius Malema, it is fair to say that if he still supported a second term for Zuma it is most unlikely he would have been suspended. Some kind of face-saving compromise would have been cobbled together.

Zuma says he would ‘never defy’ a nomination for a second term as ANC and South African president. Meanwhile, one has to be politically blind not to see he is running a tough and determined campaign. The other day, Deputy President Kgalema Motlanthe unexpectedly issued a statement that as a ‘loyal and disciplined member of the ANC’ he is ‘not involved in any campaigning or lobbying for the presidency of the ANC’, but meanwhile others are running spirited campaigns on his behalf.

Worse, since the 2007 Polokwane conference, presidential candidates are mobilised around a slate of candidates to the ANC’s National Executive Committee (NEC). Then, in 2007, the slate was limited to one for the then president Thabo Mbeki and the other for Zuma, with one candidate for each position on either the Mbeki or the Zuma slate. This meant that individuals were not elected on merit but on the basis of their allegiances. In such a situation, mediocre candidates are usually elected to key senior positions in the ANC.

It is likely that the ANC’s 2012 leadership election will be decided on slates, probably two only: one slate for a second presidential term for Zuma, the other against. But democracy within the ANC and in the country generally would be better served if the ANC democratised the way it elects leaders.

The very obvious problem with the current system of internal elections in the ANC is that elected presidential and other leadership candidates will always have their mandates questioned. Losing groups will always feel afterwards that the winning candidates won unfairly. The winners will continually be challenged by those who lose out, especially in situations such as that now faced by the ANC, where the winning slate monopolises state patronage, positions and business deals, and could even hound those on the losing slate out of the party.

Democratising the ANC’s presidential elections would therefore bring better leaders to the fore. There is a higher premium on quality leaders in infant democracies such as South Africa, where democratic institutions, political cultures and nation-building efforts are still nascent, and where undemocratic leaders can damage the system.

Among the worst failings of the system of African liberation movements, whereby leaders are chosen by small cliques, is that the most talented, those with the best ideas, especially young leaders from outside the old patronage networks, are almost never elected to the top leadership. This is because the cliques that supervise elections fear they may shake up existing, lucrative patronage networks. In fact, in most cases the leaders chosen by such small cliques in these liberation movements are not selected for their holistic leadership qualities, such as the ability to bring new ideas to the party and the country, but for how best they can balance factional interests.

Thus, African liberation movements may have quality leaders but they almost never rise to the presidency. The criteria for leadership nomination are narrowly delineated and produce leaders who may have struggle credentials but little skill in leading complex and changing societies. In the environment of increasing global uncertainty, and in a world driven by fast-changing technology, the certainties of the past cannot offer a reliable guide to the future. The existing system favours patriarchy and older leaders, or it favours younger leaders who mimic the old in their thinking and behaviour. Partly as a result of this phenomenon, very few African countries since independence have been able to elect more dynamic new leaders.

South Africa’s democracy would be much enhanced if the ANC were to introduce the idea of American-style party primaries into its presidential election campaign, with presidential hopefuls going directly to both the ANC membership and their own supporters, making a case for why they should be elected as president.

Groups within the tripartite alliance – trade unions, civic groups, communists – could nominate candidates. A period could then be set for campaigning and defending manifestos. All party members could then vote. All parties receiving public money should be required to prove that their internal elections are conducted in ways that are in keeping with the democratic norms of South Africa’s Constitution.

More broadly, and moving beyond the internal elections of parties such as the ANC, South Africa’s current electoral system of proportional representation should be changed to a constituency-based system. This would make members of parliament, legislatures and local government directly accountable to those in their constituencies who elected them, not to party leaders, as is now the case.

COSATU, in a prescient argument in a 2006 discussion paper, said that the current system ‘undermines independent thought’, because individual careers depend on endorsement by the party leadership and by the ANC deployment committee. The document argued that unless the system changes, ‘the movement towards sycophancy is inevitable’. Proportional representation reinforces the party’s power to make or break the careers of independent-minded leaders, even if they are competent. It makes it possible to protect leaders who are incompetent but who are perceived to be loyal to the party leader.

Both the Mbeki and Zuma presidencies have ignored the very useful proposals made by a government task team appointed in 2002 to investigate the most suitable electoral system for South Africa. The team, led by the late Frederik van Zyl Slabbert, proposed that three quarters of the current 400 MPs be elected on the basis of a constituency system. Such a system would increase accountability in our electoral system, allowing communities to elect their representatives directly and to recall them if they are felt to be failing that community.

This far into South Africa’s post-1994 democracy, voters, especially ANC members and supporters, have simply stayed away from the polls if they are unhappy with the party. Many ANC members and supporters view other parties as inadequate. A vote means little if opposition parties are weak – the norm in many poorly governed African and developing countries.

Perhaps we could add to every South African ballot paper a box that gives voters the opportunity to vote for none of the parties on the ballot paper. In this way, they can still exercise their vote while expressing their disapproval of the quality of all the political parties and leaders up for election.

Mail & Guardian, 15 December 2011

The sources of Malema’s power

Why is it that President Jacob Zuma and most of the ANC leadership appear to be currently held prisoner by ANC Youth League President Julius Malema? The source of Malema’s power is that he played a leading role in helping to oust President Thabo Mbeki from the leadership of the ANC and the country. Malema helped rally significant sections of the ANC behind Zuma in his successful battle with Mbeki for control of the ANC. This means that Zuma owes Malema a gigantic political favour.

In addition to this, the Youth League, with its thousands of members, many of whom are idle, are a useful press gang to be mobilised for campaigns, protests and rallies. Throughout Zuma’s rape trial, corruption hearings and fights with Mbeki, they almost daily embarked on mass protests, helping to convey the impression that support for Zuma was an unstoppable ‘tsunami’.

Furthermore, in the run-up to the battle of Polokwane, Youth Leaguers, during branch polls, flooded ANC meetings, increasing voting numbers and influencing results. At ANC branch level, voting mostly operates with a show of hands in public and a faction that floods a meeting with a block of voters can easily swing the outcome.

New terms of political engagement emerged in the battle for control of the ANC between Zuma and Mbeki. Both groups on occasion used underhand means, whether selectively leaking confidential information, or using state institutions, such as the intelligence agencies, to trip up adversaries. Vote buying became a norm – money has now become so important in ANC political contests that a presidential candidate without a massive war chest, whether drawn from state coffers or private donors, has a very slim chance of success.

This kind of undemocratic political culture is now entrenched within the ANC family and the Youth League is a formidable force in the context of this new political environment. For Zuma and the current ANC leadership, who came to power with the help of the Youth League, it now becomes difficult to ask the proponents of these tactics to desist.

Given Malema and the ANC Youth League’s success in ousting Mbeki, many senior ANC figures with presidential ambitions now see the Youth League as important foot soldiers in their proxy presidential battles and generously fund its leaders in order to woo them. Malema himself, a wily operator, appears to play candidates off according to who can offer the most generous financial terms or can best advance his political career. He clearly sees himself as a contender for the ANC presidency in the future and this fact now influences all his decisions. And in the eyes of many ANC members, Zuma crowned him as a future president of the ANC when he announced last year that Malema was ‘presidential’ material. This undoubtedly raised Malema’s stock in the ANC.

But Malema’s power also lies elsewhere. Traditionally, the ANC Youth League has always been given the latitude to be contrary and Malema’s power lies in the fact that the controversial views he expresses are at least partially resonant with significant numbers of black South Africans. If he calls for nationalisation, the truth is that there is widespread anger that redistribution to the poor has not worked. Of course, the answer is not traditional nationalisation, but finding ways to make existing government departments and state-owned enterprises work more efficiently – by reducing cronyism, doing away with jobs for pals and encouraging business to be more proactive in terms of job creation and skills transfer. However, this does not mean that Malema’s views do not resonate with many people.

The youth of South Africa are significant in electoral terms. Statistics tell us that they are likely to be unemployed; poor and without hope; resentful of both the white establishment and the new black elite. The ANC leadership has problems reaching out to them, but Malema has managed to become their spokesperson – they can identify with him because he is like them (he is the embodiment of black marginalised youth: poor education, no job except for working for the ANC). But more than this, he is an inspiration – he has moved from rural poverty to a life of fine clothes, fast cars and expensive whiskies.

Beeld, 28 June 2010

Putting the people’s needs over the leaders’ wants

Given the extreme poverty of the majority of ordinary South Africans, it is an affront that political leaders elected after promising to change the lives of the poor live in extraordinary opulence on public money.

The majority of South Africans are living without jobs, houses and food. They have given the ANC a mandate to lift them out of this grinding poverty as quickly as possible. Given this situation, our leaders must start to live modestly. Some political activists, during the past election, were driving Hummers while campaigning in squatter camps, urging poverty-stricken people who do not know where their next meal will come from to vote for them. This really is an insult to the majority of South Africans who struggle to make ends meet in these tough economic times.

Elected leaders are living the high life on taxpayers’ money, and in their bubble of luxury they are forgetting about the poor. Jacob Zuma must change the culture of opulence so pervasive in government. For starters, Zuma must ban extravagant ‘blue-light’ convoys, where one minister is transported in a large convoy of cars driving at breakneck speed, pushing other ordinary motorists and pedestrians off the road.

The crowd of security guards that surround ministers must be cut down to one per minister. It is a disgrace that they are surrounded by so many bodyguards, while an ordinary citizen in Soweto must face the brunt of daily crime, without bodyguards or responsive police, without the money to buy expensive private security.

Better still, leaders must start to use public transport. Ken Livingstone, the former mayor of London in the United Kingdom, took the bus and the train to work and meetings every day. This also made him more accessible to ordinary citizens who could vent their anger at lack of delivery at him in person.

If local politicians take minibus taxis, trains and buses every day, they will experience first-hand the daily dance of death that ordinary citizens experience using public transport.

Leaders must also drive more humble cars. Imagine President Zuma decreeing that all ANC-elected public officials should drive less expensive official cars, say cars costing under R200 000. Leaders must also live modestly.

Elected leaders must live in the constituency areas which they represent. This means that if they represent Soweto, they must live there. This will also ensure that they are reminded daily of the hardships and poverty of ordinary South Africans. This will also make them immediately accessible to the ordinary citizens they claim to represent.

Elected public officials must behave with more humility. President Zuma must issue an instruction that ministers should no longer be addressed as ‘Your Excellency’ or ‘The Honourable’; instead the president should instruct all his ministers to address ordinary citizens in this way. This should help install a culture of elected officials who are there to serve citizens. Ministers must stand in queues in shops like ordinary citizens – there should be no jumping of queues because the person is a minister or a ‘VIP’.

Secondly, all VIP areas at public events that are funded by taxpayers must be banned. Leaders must mingle with ordinary people. Furthermore, extravagant parties for publicly elected officials that are funded by taxpayers should be banned. So too must the huge banquets available at meetings of government officials. This will save taxpayers huge amounts of money which can then be redirected to poverty-alleviation projects.

Excessive bonuses in the public sector should be curtailed. In many state-owned companies executives give themselves performance bonuses when they have managed failing and loss-making institutions. This must stop.

President Zuma has a golden opportunity to bring accountability to South Africa’s political system. Elected leaders who do not deliver must be fired, especially if they are close allies and friends of the president. Under Mbeki, the most incompetent deployees were never fired if they were slavishly loyal to the president. Zuma’s proposal to open a direct line to him, where ordinary citizens can complain about poor service delivery, corruption and indifference, is a good idea, but what matters is whether action will be taken against callous government officials following complaints by ordinary citizens.

Sowetan, 16 July 2009

Has the ANC become a tenderpreneur?

What is happening to South Africa’s ANC and its leadership? There can be no doubt that if the ruling party is a shareholder in a private company that tenders for state contracts this represents a clear conflict of interest.

The ANC has a financial arm, Chancellor House, which owns a 25% stake in Hitachi Power Africa. Hitachi has been awarded a contract by Eskom, the electricity utility, to supply and install boilers for power stations. The ANC’s stake in the deal through Chancellor House was estimated in 2008 to be R5,8 billion. For the sake of transparency, accountability and clean governance there has to be a firewall between the ruling political party and its leaders, on the one hand, and state and private companies, on the other. It is hardly unlikely that when a company that is partially owned by the ANC is bidding for a government or parastatal tender, such a company will not be awarded the contract.

Soon after the ANC’s national conference in December 2007, the then newly minted party treasurer Mathews Phosa promised, as part of a post-Polokwane spring-cleaning, to disinvest the party’s shares in Hitachi. This has not happened. The ANC must do so, and it must close down Chancellor House.

Good ruling parties govern in the broadest public interest. Private companies have a narrow motive – that of expressly securing a profit for their shareholders. They rarely work for the benefit of the public interest. It would be a shame if the ANC leadership governs in a way that maximises its profits in its investments, rather than maximising the prosperity of the whole of SA Inc.

If the party is a major shareholder in Hitachi, how can one be certain that the ANC leadership applied their minds objectively in the proposed 35% tariff hike proposed by Eskom? The tariff increase is likely to hit the struggling economy, families and businesses at the worst possible moment. Ultimately, ordinary black South Africans – the ANC’s bedrock constituency – are going to suffer the most.

To get our economy back on an even keel demands tough choices, difficult trade-offs and decisions. Some of these will no doubt be very painful. Knowing such decisions are taken with the best long-term interests of the country at heart, rather than for the profit of a few individuals, makes such choices more palatable.

Similarly, to award state contracts for critical services to black economic empowerment (BEE) companies on the basis of their owners’ political connections or liberal donations to the ANC, while knowing that they do not have the capacity to deliver, and so again robbing the poor of ‘a better life’, is equally wrong. It is unacceptable that state-owned companies disburse finance or tenders to businesses linked to their own board of directors. It is just silly for someone to say, ‘I recused myself from the meeting where the decision was made.’ Neither is it enough for state-owned companies to say they have disclosed such transactions in annual reports. The point is: If your friends and comrades are on the board that will make the decision to award a tender to your company, you do not need to be physically there.

Ultimately, we also need to bring greater transparency to the funding of political parties. Knowing which companies or individuals have donated to the ANC, DA or COPE is almost the only way to know whether they have secured their tenders solely on the basis of this, rather than merit. Almost every African liberation and independence movement lost the plot when they, or individual leaders, started to dabble in business, securing state tenders and contracts, trying to make profit, for themselves or the party leadership, rather than at all times governing in the broadest public interest.

Sowetan, 28 January 2010

Doublespeak paralyses society and the economy

If one listens to public statements from many senior ANC-COSATU-SACP tripartite alliance leaders, one cannot help but notice that doublespeak has now – sadly – become the dominant culture. Leaders say one thing, but do the opposite. Some leaders say they are pro-poor, but they drive R1,2-million cars paid for with public money. Others call for strong measures against corruption, but behave in dodgy ways themselves. And yet others defend gender equality while in the same breath making outrageously sexist statements.

Some argue for nationalisation of the mines, saying that this will redistribute resources to the poor. If only this was genuine. In reality, they want to bail out struggling BEE tycoons or put their friends in charge of the proposed nationalised companies – and so extend their web of patronage. Others defend our democratic institutions, but in their actions undermine them. They defend the rule of law and call for those who transgress it to be harshly punished. Yet, they themselves – as senior politicians – appear to be untouchable. When they do wrong, they can manipulate things in such a way that they will go scot-free.

Leaders ‘talk left, but act right’. Some say they are communists, but their real actions indicate they are not. In public ANC leaders say everything is hunky-dory, that they are ‘united’, but in private they fight viciously among themselves. Nobody knows any more what the genuine policies of leaders and organisations within the ANC family are.

It is now difficult to distinguish between fact and fantasy. It is a circus. If the consequences were not so tragic, one could joke about it. Firstly, the policy confusion that the double talk is causing means that those who devise and implement policies either do not have adequate information, or have the wrong information, to do so effectively. The same goes for those who want to make new investments. They cannot do so, because they do not know the real policy position of government.

Mixed messages from politicians make it very difficult for government planners to allocate resources efficiently. They also cause implementation paralysis. Senior civil servants are reluctant to implement policies they are not sure are backed by the influential politicians in the ANC. It could be career-ending.

The double talk also opens the door for corruption. Since there is no certainty about policies, those with enough money can pay to have policies that favour their interests implemented.

Ordinary people are totally confused. Government leaders make outrageous promises, even if they know the resources are not available (not to mention the capacity). They talk up the expectations of ordinary citizens. Not surprisingly, promises made this way are hardly ever met fully. No wonder that many deflated communities then vent their frustration in angry outbursts by burning down municipal buildings, trains and the homes of local elected representatives.

It is better if there is total honesty about policies. It is also better to state the real motivation for particular decisions and approaches. Then society can debate the various proposals on their merits and honestly decide our core priorities – which we cannot do effectively now, in a culture where doublespeak is the norm.

If only for selfish reasons, the ANC, COSATU and the SACP must stop the doublespeak. It erodes the trust their members and supporters have in them, and without that trust their membership will leave them sooner rather than later. Importantly, ordinary citizens will become more cynical and withdraw from politics altogether, or start to express their preferences increasingly violently.

Sowetan, 21 January 2010

Riding out the storm of political uncertainty

Developing countries that have prospered since the Second World War have generally had focused political leadership at the helm. After the ANC’s National General Council (NGC) in Durban recently it must now be clear that the people leading South Africa don’t necessarily possess this quality. In fact, it is obvious that the ANC’s leadership has lost direction.

The ANC’s NGC deferred all critical policy decisions until the national conference in 2012, which means South Africa will have more of the same until then – loud bickering between the ANC’s different factions over policy – which will continue to paralyse government. And if Jacob Zuma succeeds in his bid for another five-year term, this cycle of paralysis will likely be repeated.

For the past two years it appears that whatever positive developments, whether new investment or outbursts of national unity during the Soccer World Cup, happened not because of the quality of our political leadership, but rather, in spite of its paucity. Can South Africa prosper when its leadership is weak, disorganised and inept? And can those outside politics make any difference?

Firstly, it is very rare for a developing country to advance economically unless the political leadership in charge is focused. Over the last 50 years we have seen many developing countries – in Latin America, Africa, the Middle East and Southeast Asia – with high economic growth rates where the benefits of this growth have not been reinvested productively, because the political leadership only looked after themselves or simply lacked the depth to give direction.

In most advanced democracies the democratic institutions are strong and generally independent. Furthermore, politics at municipal level is quite often independent from national politics and municipal leaders are in power because they deliver on local issues, rather than because they hold allegiance to the governing party. In many cases local governments can raise taxes, and are mandated to deliver public services such as education, health, water and energy at a local level.

Italy is an example of a country which has a legacy of poor political leadership. Yet the country’s public service is relatively independent from the ruling political party and is meritocratic. Italy’s public service. Italy’s public service is also ring-fenced – public servants remain in their jobs no matter which party is in power – and this means that high-quality public services can still be delivered even if those leading the country are inept and corrupt or, as is often the case in Italy, there are rapid changes in government.

Furthermore, nongovernmental sectors in Italy – business, civil society, the press and academia – are generally aggressively independent, and continue to function no matter which party is in power. And although the judiciary and the police have been criticised regularly in recent years, there are huge pockets of excellence that, ultimately, compensate for the corrupt elements, and make the overall system function.

How does contemporary South Africa compare? Within the ANC there are obvious differences over policy and the resultant administrative paralysis will continue until the party has its national conference in December 2012. The irony, of course, is that the ANC is a single entity but operates as if it were different parties with different policies. South Africa has poor-quality political leadership and most of the public service and state-owned company sectors are inefficient because they have more often than not become places of patronage for the elite of the ruling party. And because critical appointments are mostly dependent on the ruling party, and sometimes even the faction in control, a change at the top also means a turnover of management. Consequently, the public service in South Africa does not offer a buffer for misguided decisions from inept political leaders. On top of this, every changeover appears to bring in new policies. The implementation of policy is therefore constantly interrupted and in such a context it becomes near impossible to plan for the long term, which is crucial to ensure prosperity.

In South Africa’s case, pockets of excellence in the public service and state-owned companies operate side by side with less effective structures. Such pockets include the Treasury, the Reserve Bank, the Revenue Service, the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) and the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA). Some public service departments and state-owned companies may not be centres of excellence, but they function reasonably well – Eskom and Transnet, for instance. There are also centres of excellence among some of South Africa’s regulatory bodies, such as the Office of the Auditor-General. Others, such as the Commission for Gender Equality and the Independent Communications Authority of SA (ICASA), are appallingly ineffective.

What counts in South Africa’s favour is that it has many pockets of excellence outside the governmental sphere – which is not the case in many developing countries. Even if the public sector is erratic, the private sector equivalents – providing health care and education, for example – can compete with the best in the world. Furthermore, South Africa has private sector companies, nongovernmental organisations and civil groups that are highly effective – the latter ranging from organisations like the Institute for Democracy in Africa (IDASA) to the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC).

One way for South Africa to ride out the current storm of political uncertainty, at least in the short term, is for the pockets of excellence in the public and private sectors to step into the breach. In the absence of coherent political leadership the centres of excellence in the public and private sectors, as well as in civil society, will have to provide leadership. For example, in May 2010 South Africa’s two largest business organisations, Business Leadership South Africa and Business Unity South Africa, pledged to come up with self-generated initiatives to help government increase electricity capacity. Or Business Leadership South Africa’s initiative to triple the size of South Africa’s economy within a generation. Or their initiative to get CEOs to commit to skills development and more responsible corporate behaviour.

Companies, of course, have to focus on maximising returns for shareholders. However, in our context companies must also be better corporate citizens. Rather than pursuing narrow black economic empowerment, to enrich a few black individuals in the right faction, adopt 100 of the poorest black schools – the benefits will be so much greater.

The investment arms of COSATU-affiliated trade unions have billions in their kitties. This money can, for example, be used to make more ethical and productive investments, rather than funding narrow BEE enterprises. Other COSATU affiliates must follow the Southern African Clothing and Textile Workers’ Union (SACTWU) and the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) in organising winter schools and bursaries for the children of their members and skills training for workers who have been retrenched.

But what can individuals do?

Efforts such as the launch of the Council for the Advancement of the South African Constitution (CASAC) by prominent South Africans are crucial to defending our democratic rights. Furthermore, it is crucial that individuals and nongovernmental organisations continue to express their outrage at the proposed media tribunal, which would allow the state to regulate the media, and the information bill, which would in practice hinder public awareness of official corruption and wrongdoing.

The instinctive reaction of many who care about their country is to turn inwards at a time such as this. However, what South Africa needs right now is for individuals to become more involved in their communities, whether it is sitting on school boards, attending the meetings of local municipalities (and challenging the councillors there) or supporting community organisations and charities. Ideally, we want government to actually do its job, but this kind of public mobilisation can fill the gap when government fails.

Furthermore, individuals who are members and supporters of political parties must hold their leaders to account. ANC members should do more to make their party more responsible; members of opposition parties must do more to make them more relevant.

Lastly, in the absence of responsible political leadership, corporate, civil and church leaders must fill the vacuum.

Beeld, 1 October 2010

ANC must spring-clean, nothing less

These are unsettling times. Among both black and white South Africans there is a paralysing feeling of anxiety, drift and imminent collapse. This in itself damages the economy because many, especially in the public sector, feel that their hard work will be cancelled out by those greedily eating away scarce public resources. There is a choking sense that the current generation in government may not have the ideas or political will to lead us out of this malaise.

Many supporters of the ANC also wonder whether we will be struck by that curse of African liberation movements – the failure to improve the lot of the widest number of people and to create a better and caring society. This is a cataclysmic shift in the political climate. Are there any solutions?

There are new task teams, calls for more debate on morality, new laws . . . But with no urgent amendment of the electoral law to allow citizens to elect their representatives directly, rather than for party leaders to choose them, these will be band-aid measures. This crisis has deep institutional, moral and leadership dimensions, and only a spring-clean of leadership, ideas and institutions will lift the gloom.

In most democratic societies the obvious way out of such stagnation is an electoral solution. This is not realistic in our case. The opposition parties are too limited and the ANC is too dominant.

The alternative is for the ANC itself to spring-clean. This will mean making itself more democratic, transparent and responsive. It will demand political courage, will and resolve from the ANC’s leadership, and a change of culture – as any ANC leader who championed a shake-up of the party in the current climate would be likely to have their career killed off.

The ANC desperately needs a better calibre of leadership at all levels. Amilcar Cabral, one of the great thinkers of African liberation ideology, said the success of liberation movements that become governments depends on the personal moral behaviour, decency and honesty of their leaders and members. Cabral argued that these qualities were more important when they were in government than an adherence to ideology and a mechanical dedication to the rules and policies of the party.

Inside the ANC, prospective leaders must be elected on a truly competitive basis. The ANC leadership must open all internal party elections. Candidates must apply openly for all vacancies, as one applies for a job in the private sector. Interviewing panels must be independent, staffed by neutral veterans, or even independent outsiders with status. Candidates must be judged on the basis of merit, moral character and commitment to public service. This will help to bring fresh blood into the party.

The policy of African leadership must be done away with, because it is being manipulated. If Trevor Manuel, for example, is the best candidate for the ANC presidency, he must be elected as the ANC president. In the public sector, appointments to senior government positions, state-owned enterprises and commissions must be opened up beyond the ANC membership pool, across colour and political affiliations.

Importantly, the system of merit must be applied across the party and the public service. The lack of such a system has not only made these areas less appealing to the talented, it has also allowed the mediocre, by bootlicking the local party strongman, to flourish. It has also meant that independent-mindedness, which is needed to hold elected officials accountable, has been discouraged, because advancement is based on sucking up to authority.

The ANC leadership must rid itself of the most corrupt senior party leaders first. Ministers and public servants who are underperforming, even if they are powerful in the party, must also be sacked.

The reality is that behavioural change among citizens is only going to be fostered if ANC party leaders are seen to follow the rules applicable to everyone else. Flagrant disregard of the new democratic laws by post-apartheid leaders will only encourage the apartheid-era culture of evading the law to persist. There should not be two sets of laws: one for the party aristocracy and another for ordinary citizens. A lifestyle audit of all party leaders and public servants is absolutely crucial – it will also boost public confidence.

Drop black economic empowerment as a policy and give companies BEE points for how much they invest in job creation, black education and housing; and for uplifting the physical and social infrastructure of townships and rural areas, and supporting the five million entrepreneurs in the informal sector.

Honesty must also be restored to the centre of public debate. In a crisis, it is better for any government to stick with core policies, provided these are genuinely in the interest of the whole country, and then resolutely implement them. Doublespeak to try to please everyone will just compound the uncertainty, drift and paralysis.

Only substantial reform at the centre – in party, government and individual behaviour – will inject fresh public confidence and unlock the paralysis. If the ANC leadership continue with ‘business as usual’ in the face of our current crisis, it will hit the electoral fortunes of the party. If public service delivery remains sluggish, and leaders keep on looting, more and more ANC members and supporters will desert the party.

Doing nothing will continue a negative cycle of waning public trust in the government, which can only lead to more violent community rebellions and more self-enrichment at the top as those in power loot as much and as quickly as possible before the resources dry up. Inevitably, those in the private sector with the talent and money will then either cut their losses in South Africa and run, or eschew public commitment to look after themselves and their families.

Mail & Guardian, 23 March 2010

Where will the ANC be in another 100 years?

More than 100 000 people celebrated the ANC’s centenary by attending three days of festivities in Mangaung township, Bloemfontein – the birthplace of South Africa’s ruling party. The nature of the celebration mirrored the state of the ANC today. Leaders dressed in the latest fashions were served expensive food and drink in air-conditioned VIP tents while ordinary members sat in the scorching sun with their free bottled water.

President Zuma lit a centenary flame, which is now touring South Africa as a symbol of the fight against apartheid. The South African Post Office released a commemorative stamp to celebrate Africa’s oldest liberation movement. But, sadly, the ANC is in danger of having only past glories to celebrate. It seems as if the ANC leadership of today and their values are at odds with the party’s rich heritage. The challenges of being in government are threatening to overwhelm them, just as they did other African liberation movements.

A leitmotif that runs through the history of the ANC has been its ability to revitalise itself in times of decline by taking in new progressive groups. This was either done by democrats from within or by the ANC incorporating other democratic movements and in the process transforming itself. In many ways these waves of renewal over the past 100 years showcase the different eras which the ANC has gone through.

The first, the foundation era, started when the ANC was formed in 1912 by a group of black leaders (mostly chiefs, professionals and businessmen) to fight for black rights and freedoms in the new Union of South Africa. In the Anglo-Boer War of 1899-1902 (also called the South African War) the two Boer republics were defeated by the British. In 1910 they were brought together with the two colonial provinces to form the Union of South Africa, but blacks were denied political rights in the new dispensation.

By the time the Union of South Africa came into being, the British had also broken the power of the last of the African kingdoms, and in 1906 suppressed the last organised African rebellion in Zululand – the Bambatha rebellion. On 8 January 1912 the South African Native National Congress was formed at the Wesleyan Church in Waaihoek, Bloemfontein. In 1923 it changed its name to the African National Congress.

The founding leaders of the ANC were lawyers such as Pixley ka Isaka Seme, Richard Msimang and Alfred Mangena, journalists such as Sol Plaatje and religious leaders like the Reverend John Dube. This group of leaders called not only for the emancipation of black South Africans, but also, in the words of Seme, for ‘the regeneration of Africa’ as a whole.

A second era came when the ANC turned to socialism in the 1920s, under the leadership of Josiah Tshangana Gumede and Eddie Khaile, its general secretary. They were the first African members of the SACP leadership and were influenced by the radical revolutions in Europe.

A third era spans the 1930s, when the ANC leadership, again under the presidency of Seme, focused on economic self-realisation and starting societies and businesses for blacks. Thereafter came an era during which the ANC was radicalised by members of the ANC Youth League – the generation of Nelson Mandela, Oliver Tambo and Walter Sisulu. In their 1949 programme of action document they forced the lacklustre ANC leadership of the time to adopt the strategy of mass action. During this era the Freedom Charter was adopted and mass protests, like the Women’s March and the mass burning of pass documents, took place.

The late 1960s and early 1970s belonged to the generation of Steve Biko, the leader of the Black Consciousness (BC) movement, which had its roots in the black student movement. Biko argued that blacks had to shake off their inferiority complexes, ingrained by centuries of white oppression, if they were to achieve national liberation. He also called for democratic practices to be at the centre of the anti-apartheid struggle.

The 16 June 1976 Soweto uprising by high school pupils, led by the likes of Tsietsi Mashinini, brought a new radicalism to the ANC. They protested against the introduction of Afrikaans as the compulsory medium of instruction in black schools and were recruited en masse into the ANC, providing the organisation with a new street-smart generation.

Then came the 1980s, which brought two parallel waves within the ANC. First, the idea of the ‘intifada’ was brought to the organisation by a new generation who were prepared to sacrifice their lives for liberation. They used the slogan ‘victory or death’. At the same time there were ‘adult’ movements like the United Democratic Front (UDF) – an internal umbrella group of civil groups – nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) and black professional associations, the revitalised trade union movement and white issue-based groups that were opposed to apartheid.

Throughout South Africa’s history, colonial and apartheid governments ruled blacks through divide-and-conquer tactics in an attempt to make effective black opposition against oppression impossible. Mac Maharaj, transport minister in the cabinet of former president Nelson Mandela, said the ANC’s key success was its ability to unify black people against these divisionary tactics. The ANC, through its fierce resistance, gave many blacks a sense of self-worth and a cause. It offered a positive alternative.

The ANC’s success as a liberation movement was due to its visionary leadership, its mission to be inclusive of all races, ethnicities and classes, and the fact that it practised inclusive democracy.

In the main, the ANC’s internal operation ethos, whether among cadres in exile or political prisoners on Robben Island, was one of consultation, inclusiveness, freedom of expression and the right to dissent. This is not to say that there were not incidences of autocracy or the torture of independently minded members, especially in the exiled armed wing and intelligence structures, or that there were not Stalinist elements, eager to crush dissent, but these were mostly held in check by more democratically minded members.

One of the ANC’s biggest successes as a liberation movement was to turn the struggle against apartheid into a moral battle which was fought on a global scale. This strategy was one of the reasons Western churches strongly backed the ANC from the 1980s onwards, generously providing funding and lobbying their governments and congregations to put pressure on the apartheid government.

The ANC produced visionary leaders such as Nelson Mandela, Albert Luthuli and Desmond Tutu. These leaders had moral authority – and by their individual ethical and moral conduct also reinforced the moral dimensions of the struggle. The influence of the church on the ANC during the struggle is often overlooked. In fact, many of the ANC’s leaders were deeply influenced by Christianity. They put morality and ethics at the heart of their leadership.

Although started mainly by Africans, the ANC transformed into an organisation which embraced South Africa’s diverse communities, including whites. The ANC was also allied to various social, civic, student, traditional and professional organisations. These organisations all influenced the ANC and this helped the movement to avoid becoming ideologically rigid or too narrow in its policy outlook. It was forced to come to terms with diversity, something which time and again helped to revitalise the ANC by providing it with a regular stream of new ideas, leaders and funding.

Historically, the ANC has also been able to successfully incorporate virtually all civil movements and grass-roots activism in South Africa into the party, frequently taking over some of the ideas and campaigns of these organisations and even of its rivals, such as the now almost defunct Pan Africanist Congress (PAC). This has helped the ANC to put itself at the centre of the official history of the South African liberation struggle.

For instance, ANC leaders actively sought to recruit Steve Biko and after his death they lured most of the brightest young talent from the BC movement to the organisation. This generation of black activists and intellectuals, with fresh ideas on genuine participatory democracy, helped the ANC to reach out to a younger, more radical black generation, who at that stage might have perceived the ‘old’ ANC as irrelevant.

In the 1980s, the organisation brought the new generation of democratic trade unions that had regrouped under the umbrella of COSATU into the ANC fold. It did the same with the 1980s ‘civics’ movements – where black communities formed their own councils and tried to manage their municipal affairs in a participatory manner.

The ANC also swallowed up the UDF, one of Africa’s most effective grass-roots civil movements. The UDF had galvanised a broad range of groups across different classes and races, including black professional organisations and the growing black middle class, who by the 1980s were starting to become sceptical of a ‘radical’ ANC. It also incorporated liberal white issue-based groups who opposed the apartheid government, such as the End Conscription Campaign.

Compared to other African liberation movements, the ANC had the unique ability to unite diverse groups within South Africa against apartheid. Most other African liberation movements were formed around one ethnic or regional group, and could never transcend this. The ANC created a broad-church alliance that spanned the ideological spectrum, from shopkeepers to communists, and became what was called a ‘multi-class’ organisation.

The ANC is also one of the few liberation movements that embraced minority communities, including what other liberation movements referred to as ‘settlers’ (white groups). Joel Netshitenzhe, former editor of the ANC journal Mayibuye, once said that ‘over the years, the organisation projected itself as a parliament, first, of the African people; and it later sought recognition as the legitimate representative of all the people of SA’. This was the strength of the ANC: the ability to portray itself as a more racially inclusive alternative to colonial and apartheid governments.

Three other constituencies – organised women’s groups, trade unions and churches – have also been influential in the ANC’s long history. In many other African liberation struggles these constituencies may have been present, but were not as prominent as in the ANC.

Of all the African liberation movements, the ANC had the most influential and organised women’s wing. Yet, when the ANC was formed it did not accept women as members.

In 1918 when the white-controlled government of the Union of South Africa threatened to introduce pass laws for black women, the ANC was going through one of its most vulnerable periods. Supporters and members of the party were disillusioned with the leadership’s ineffectual strategy of petitioning the Union government and the British monarch to give concessions to the oppressed black majority. The militancy of black female activists and their strategy of mass protests against the pass laws filled the conservative ANC male leadership with awe.

The Bantu Women’s League was formed in 1918, and joined as a branch of the ANC. It was later succeeded, in 1948, by the ANC Women’s League (the ANC first accepted female members in 1943). Women activists also played a part in the penning of the Freedom Charter of 1955.

The ANC has had an extraordinary number of capable churchmen – or lay clergymen – who cut their organisational teeth within the church, but became brilliant mass campaigners. James Calata, who was refused the bishopric of Transkei because he was black, stands out. During one of the ANC’s most lethargic periods just before the Second World War, when its finances were in a mess, James Calata was elected general secretary of the ANC. He set up new branches, re-energised dormant ones and balanced the books.

The ANC’s alliance with trade unions not only brought the trade-union emphasis on internal democracy, broad consultation and sensitivity to bread-and-butter issues, but also boosted the organisation at critical moments when it seemed to lose direction. The ANC’s alliance with the SACP bought funding, resources and training for ANC members from the SACP’s main backer, the Soviet Union, and brought dedicated strategic thinkers, such as Joe Slovo, into the ANC.

Unfortunately, as the ANC celebrates its centenary, antidemocratic leaders and groups seem to have a stranglehold on the party. Members are deeply divided over the spoils of government and its current leader Zuma is being accused of using state resources to enrich his family, friends and political allies.

Key ANC leaders wrote South Africa’s post-apartheid Constitution, which set out a clear framework for a new South Africa. Globally it is accepted as among the most progressive, but the ANC appears to find it very difficult to internalise its democratic value system and apply it to its own day-to-day practices. The intelligence and security forces, as well as the police, are routinely used in ANC leadership battles. Corrupt officials appear to be selectively prosecuted as part of campaigns to sideline opponents. One fears that these cloak-and-dagger-style operations are a sign that rogue elements within the ANC’s military and intelligence wings have now become dominant.

Control of the leadership of the ANC has now become a no-holds-barred war between different factions. Winning office increasingly translates into control of state patronage and the ability to put oneself above the law. Or, at least, some ANC leaders seem to think this way.

The contrast between the moral authority of a Nelson Mandela, an Oliver Tambo or an Albert Luthuli, and the murkiness of a Jacob Zuma, who is seeking re-election as party leader this year, shows how far the ANC has regressed. In his 2007 campaign to become leader of the ANC many Zuma supporters went ‘100% Zulu’ in their support for the man from KwaZulu-Natal – out of the window went the inclusive ethos of the ANC of old.

The DA is currently appealing to the Supreme Court of Appeal to have corruption charges against Zuma, which were dropped in 2009 on a technicality, revisited. If successful, Zuma, a standing president, may have to reappear in the dock.1

In the midst of the grinding poverty endured by the ANC’s bedrock constituency, levels of corruption, wastage of public resources and conspicuous consumption by elected officials have rocketed. The ANC in government appears to have made the mistake that all the failed African liberation movements have made – enriching the few, mostly those who are politically connected, rather than the poverty-stricken masses.

Increasingly, top leaders in the ANC are chosen by small cliques – and at lower levels on slates attached to the top leaders. Leaders are elected not on their holistic leadership merit, but for how best they can balance factional and patronage interests. This means that the most dynamic leaders are unlikely to reach the top.

Blade Nzimande, the general secretary of the SACP, and a close ally of Zuma, has said publically that leaders of the ANC, COSATU and his SACP are now regularly using money to buy votes in internal ANC elections. ‘It is blood money, often gotten corruptly. They go around buying delegates. If those people can capture our government they will sell this country to the highest bidder,’ said Nzimande.

COSATU General Secretary Zwelinzima Vavi has warned: ‘If we do not do something about corruption we will find ourselves in a predatory state, where the social order of feeding will be as it is alleged in Angola and Kenya.’ This was after a multibillion-rand ArcelorMittal deal in which family members and friends of President Jacob Zuma controversially received valuable shares in the Sishen mine. In such a predatory state, Vavi said, ‘the first family becomes the first to feed, followed by the cabinet and provincial leadership, and our people come last to find absolutely nothing – not even bones’.

In the past, genuinely democratic leaders have sprung up from within or come from outside to move the ANC back onto the right path. Recently, a number of new civil groups have been formed to try and do just this. Corruption Watch, launched last year by trade unions and civil groups, and the Council for the Advancement of the South African Constitution (CASAC), launched by such luminaries as the former speaker of parliament Frene Ginwala, are examples of two such organisations. But unless truly democratic groups take control of the ANC, and elect a better calibre of leaders, the ANC may lose its way completely.

ARISE magazine, March/April 2012