Читать книгу Terrain Exercises - William H. Waldron - Страница 22

The Director: “Before going further with the problem I want to explain to you what happens between the time the Captain issues his orders for the attack and the time that it starts.

“Having received and understood their orders, the platoon commanders go back and join their platoons. In doing so they select the route over which they are going to conduct their commands up to the line of departure for the attack.

“Each platoon commander conducts his platoon over to the right and gets it into approach formation directly in rear of and with its front as nearly parallel to the line of departure as possible. The proposition of bringing a platoon or any other unit up to a point immediately in rear of the line of departure in a column of files and making the deployment from that formation is fraught with great danger and is almost sure to result in confusion, losses and great consumption of time. The platoons must be gotten into an approach formation from which they can readily deploy on nearing the line of departure. Captain James, suppose you were commanding the first platoon. What formation would you take up in bringing your platoon up to the line of departure?”

Captain James: “I would form it in two lines or waves each consisting of one section. Each section would be in line of squad columns. From this formation I can readily deploy the leading wave in to a line of skirmishes covering the front allotted to the platoon and hold the rear wave in a line of squad columns or deploy it as the circumstances may require. In any event I have my platoon under complete control all the time.”

The Director: “I think we can all agree that your formation is correct.”

“Now, each platoon commander must get the orders to the men who are to make the attack. When the platoon arrives at a point in rear of the line of departure the platoon commanders will assemble their non-commissioned officers and scouts at a covered location near the line of departure where they can command a view of the front. Here he will explain the situation and give his orders for the attack. These orders will be issued in the regular five paragraph order form which I have already explained to you. The non-commissioned officers join their units. The leading wave is brought up and deployed on the line of departure. The scouts move out to the front. The second section is held in proper formation (line of squad columns or line of skirmishers) from 50 to 100 yards in rear of the leading wave. The platoon commanders signal Captain C that they are ready to launch the attack.

“The special weapons, machine guns and light mortars and the 37 mm. gun, are gotten to their respective firing positions and the unit commanders signal Captain C that they are ready to cover the attacking troops with their fire.

“The company support platoon is conducted to its position in rear of the second platoon and the platoon commander signals that he is ready.

“Captain C then signals the battalion commander that he is all ready to launch the attack. When he gets the signal from the battalion commander, he signals the supporting weapon commanders and the platoon commanders to proceed.

“Now, you may say that all of this sounds well in theory, but, you ask, how is it done in actual practice? What is the enemy doing all this time? I ask you to visualize the situation from the enemy point of view. What would you be doing if you were in his place? You occupy a strong point on the left of your line. You have been placed there to protect the flank and to bring machine gun fire to bear on our attacking troops to your right. The attack is progressing off to your right. The firing seems to be getting further and further to your rear. You have fears that the line is not holding. You have visions of being left to your fate. You get no information of what is taking place over there. In your own immediate front there is little doing. You see nothing to indicate what we are doing over here. You have no well defined target to fire on. A few scouts are seen off to the right oblique (scouts of Companies A and B). There is nothing in your front that would afford you a target. The scouts that you send out from the strong point run into our covering patrol and either become casualties or are driven back. Your strength does not permit sending out a reconnoitering party of sufficient strength to break through and get any real information of what is taking place in your front. You simply have to sit and wait for something to develop. I am sure if you will place yourself in the enemy’s position at this time, you must realize his situation and the conflicting thoughts that come across his mind. He is just a human as you are. He is just as much afraid. He has just the same feeling about the danger of the situation as you have, only his situation is worse than yours. He must sit and wait for something to happen while your activities and preparations occupy your thoughts and attention. You have the initiative, you lead and he must follow.

“When you consider all of these things you will see how it is possible to go about the preparation process in a comparatively deliberate manner. If you have fairly good cover from the fire and view of the enemy it is not at all difficult.

“The greatest danger in all of this is from our own side. From the impatience of our own higher commanders who think the preparations are taking too much time. Brigade and regimental commanders who are to the rear and cannot see what is going on get impatient with the apparent delays and demand that the attack be delivered at once. Even the battalion commander, who is up at the front and ought to know better, cannot see how you can possibly consume so much time getting ready.

“That is one of the valuable features of these Terrain Exercises. They illustrate and demonstrate to officers of all ranks that a certain amount of time must be allowed a combat unit to get ready to launch an attack and that they may as well sit down and take it easy until everything is ready. The war is not to be fought in a day.

“Let us take our problem as an example. Our Company (C) could be brought up and rushed into action in its attack on the enemy strong point. The rifleman would have fought it out with his bare hands, so to speak. There would be no supporting fire from machine guns, light mortars and one-pounders. It would have been a direct frontal attack, with no enveloping movement. The chances are that it would be a complete failure and the whole affair would have to be reorganized and done over again. Even if it were successful it would be accompanied by ruinous losses that would render the company totally ineffective for further combat service in the near future.

“By going about the preparations systematically, as we have done, the chances for success are infinitely greater, the losses will be very much smaller and in the long run, a lot of time saved. I hope you will all consider these things when you give orders to a unit under your command, be it a battalion or a small patrol, to embark upon a tactical undertaking. Give the commander time to perfect his preparations. Do not rush him into action until he is ready.”