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Those who seek to limit or suppress the national lives of others have not done so through mere love of cruelty; on the contrary, they believe themselves actuated by exceedingly creditable motives. Into that peculiar position they have been led by wrong doctrines preached since the days of nationality and, in modern times, fashioned into an ingenuous philosophy by Teutonic brains. That philosophy we must study if we would understand the situation in Ontario and Manitoba or, for that matter, wherever one national group is trying to break or bend another to its way of thinking. Everywhere the reasonings which urge the use of force as a means to homogeneity, are remarkably alike, and all built upon several cardinal errors which in due time we shall discover.

Since the war we have incorporated the words Prussian, Hun, and Boche into our vocabulary of bad men’s names, and habitually fling them—sometimes without much reason—at our opponents. But a bad name will not stick unless it is deserved; there must be adhesiveness in the object against which it is thrown. My unbacked assertion is not likely to go very far in convincing the world that German and Ontario minds have run through similar grooves in working out the problem of dual nationalities within a single State. The evidence must speak for itself. We have seen Britain’s way of dealing with a conquered nationality. From the exact words of Prussia and the exact words of Ontario, the reader may determine for himself whether Canada’s national problem is now being treated Britain’s way or the other.

The reasoning of the dominant nationality which would restrain by force the self-expression of a minor nationality, invariably begins with an effort to eliminate the moral factor. With morality out of the way, the arguments proceed rapidly and smoothly enough, until near the end, when another, and this time a supreme, difficulty arises in the shape of futility. In other words, the two things most wrong with Ontario’s reasoning—and Prussia’s—in forcing the culture of the dominant nationality upon the minor, are that it is morally wrong to try it, and impossible to do it. One would think that enough. But I am anticipating the argument; let us proceed by easier stages.

It is argued that since the State makes laws which define right and wrong for individuals, then the State, being the source of right and wrong, is above both. There are men who regard the State—the casing—as the highest human entity, and as a consequence of this reasoning the interests of nationalities—the encased—become of minor importance. Applying that principle to the Canadian situation, there was neither right nor wrong involved in the treatment to be accorded the French-Canadians at the Conquest: there was only political expediency; what was thought to be best for the State. And it has been contended time and time again by English-Canadians, and now and then by an Englishman of England—that such should have been the guiding spirit of the settlement.

Bismarck is supposed to have said: “Might before right.” Max Nordau, denying that Bismarck ever said it, stated that the principle “is perfectly accurate, not as a principle, according to which action should proceed, but as a statement as to the manner in which it does proceed.” The same doctrine is laid down in other words by the German philosopher Treitschke, whose teachings had a wide influence with the German people. “The State is Might. To maintain its power is the highest duty of the State; of all political shortcomings, weakness is the most abominable and most contemptible. It is the sin against the Holy Ghost of Politics.”

The pernicious doctrine of the divine right of might has extended beyond Germany and the Germans, has crossed the Atlantic, undermining our own sense of morality as applied to the State. The doctrine is the more pernicious because there is no one to protect the victims that fall within its path. Of course, in the New World we do not expound the doctrine as bluntly as did Treitschke, nor as frankly—for there is something to be said for the German’s claim that his race is Frank by origin. But there are men in Germany who preached it, as we do, in softer words. Nordau many years ago said: “Nowadays, of course, the cry of the common good is always raised, when the power of the State overrides the rights of subject or of neighbour weaker than itself. The method is the familiar one of identifying a supreme power in the State with the country, and the advantages of the ruler or ruling class with that of the people as a whole.”

The logical wind-up of the doctrine that the State is above both right and wrong, is an end to civilization; and doctrines sooner or later reach their logical ends, just as water reaches its level.

The subjection of one individual to another, is obviously immoral. The dictates of conscience tell the individual that it is wrong to rob his neighbor of property, of personality, wrong to rob him at all. But the State, having no conscience—or at the best, one which is very irresponsible—no fear of hell or any of the other things that usually restrain individuals, has only to consider the interests of the majority under democracy, and the ambitions or whims of dictators under autocracy. Nor has the State, as organized to-day, a capacity for seeking right merely for the sake of righteousness. Great Britain and France were the first to define the meaning and consequences of what we may call the Treitschke doctrine, and the first to repudiate it, and they were not without personal interest; for, obviously, if the State were right, always right, then the rights of nationalities became wrongs when they conflicted with the will of the State; if national interests within the State were not to be considered sacred by the State, were to be respected only so long as they did not conflict with the desires—invariably called necessities—of the State, then national interests without the State were equally unsafe. Reasoning thus, Germany became intolerable to civilization.

We have seen in Lord Thurlow’s words, the intention of the British statesman towards the conquered of Quebec, and in Mr. Tilby’s words the interpretation of the historian of what was actually done. Now let us have a concrete application of the Teutonic principle to a nationality incorporated into the German Empire by conquest. “We certainly do not wish to deprive the Pole of his mother-tongue,” said Prince von Bülow, “but we must try to bring it to pass that, by means of the German language, he comes to understand the German spirit. In our policy of settlement we fight for German nationality in the East; in our policy with regard to the schools we are really fighting for Polish nationality which we wish to incorporate in German intellectual life. Here, again, we cannot proceed without severity, and this will increase or be mitigated as the Poles increase or diminish their opposition.”

Which doctrine, the British or the German, has been applied by English-Canadians to the minor nationality in Ontario and Manitoba? With the introduction of self-government in this country, English-Canadians became the legatees of Britain’s responsibility. Have the English-Canadians of Ontario and Manitoba argued with Thurlow that humanity, justice, and wisdom, compel them to give the French-Canadians possession of all “customs and institutions” that do not relate to French sovereignty, or have they argued, in practically von Bülow’s words, that in their policy with regard to the schools, they are really fighting for the French-Canadian nationality which they wish to incorporate in English-Canadian intellectual life? Have the English-Canadians of Ontario and Manitoba accepted the British view that there is a morality above the written law, above the State, above their necessities or their desires, which protects the minor nationality in a land which was once theirs—or have they accepted the German view that, as a dominant majority possessing the State machinery, they may do as they please?

Human memory is short, and although the newspapers have been filled with explanations of Ontario’s position, it may be as well to have before our eyes the exact words in which they are expressed. I take them from a “Toronto Globe” editorial, May 27, 1916. “The Globe” says: “The people of Ontario do not seek to abolish the teaching of French in the schools in districts where French is either the prevailing language or the language of a large minority, as it is in the City of Ottawa. What they do insist upon is that, no matter what other language is given a place in the public-school course of study, English, the official language of the Province, shall be efficiently taught in all the schools of Ontario. More than that, they do not desire; with less the English-speaking majority—twelve times as numerous as the French-speaking minority—will not be satisfied.”

“We certainly do not wish to deprive the Pole of his mother-tongue,” Prince von Bülow said; “the people of Ontario do not seek to abolish the teaching of French,” said the editor of “The Globe”; and yet, on writing these words both must have known that the regulations were designed to abolish not only the Polish and French languages, but the Polish and French-Canadian peoples as well, since under the regulations of both countries it was forbidden to use Polish and French as languages of instruction, except under limitations which amount practically to prohibition. All geography, all mathematics, all the subjects on the school curriculum, are to be taught solely in German and English, and the Teuton mind would follow in one country and the English-Canadian in the other. The effect of Regulation 17 of Ontario’s Department of Education, is denationalisation; the object of Regulation 17, as expressed by its creators, is “to rescue this province from bi-lingualism” and dual nationality; and yet the “Globe” argues in words that might have been borrowed from von Bülow that the lingual rights of the minor nationality are preserved. As to the virtue of the business, it is mathematical: there are twelve English-Canadians and one French-Canadian; that settles the business, for, as the Germans put it, Might is Right. The application of mathematics as a test of national conduct, reminds me of a comment made on the subject by the Professor of History in Columbia, Charles D. Hazen, who in “Alsace and Lorraine Under German Rule,” says: “The spectacle of a nation which prides itself upon its exceptional enlightenment, waging war in the twentieth century upon a language which is the mother-tongue of twenty per cent. of the population of Alsace, is unworthy, as well as intolerable.” It must be remembered that Ontario and Alsace are alike in having once belonged to the men of the minority; although relatively to total population, there are slightly more French in Alsace than in Ontario, actually in numbers there are more French in Ontario than in Alsace. There is nothing in the atmosphere which makes the spectacle more tolerable in Canada.

The sovereign people, the English-speaking majority, know what is best for the French-Canadians, know the true interest of the French-Canadians, better than they know it themselves, it is argued. “Hands off Ontario,” say the Ontarians; “Hands off Manitoba,” cry the Manitobans. We are not oppressing the French-Canadians, Manitobans and Ontarians will argue; and with strange inconsistency add: It is for their own good that their national culture be not allowed free play for development. And the Germans have the same spirit. To quote Treitschke: “We Germans, who know both Germany and France, are better judges than the Alsatians, of their true welfare; better than the unfortunate folk who, by reason of their intercourse with France have lived in ignorance of the New Germany.” Are these not all but the identical words used by the press of Ontario in protest of outside interference on behalf of the French-Canadian minority? Writing of the bilingual question, the “Toronto Star,” of April 26, 1916, says: “We in Ontario are quite capable of settling it. It does not worry us.” The spring had been taken out of the French-Canadian year; the possession that mankind values most had been taken from the minor nationality, and yet the English-Canadian—at least “The Star” editor—was not worried. The English-Canadians were better judges than the French-Canadians of their true welfare. “We do not require any assistance from the Dominion Government or Parliament,” continues the editor. “We will do justice to all the residents of Ontario, of all races, and religions, and the less interference there is from outside, the better it will be for all concerned.” While the paper is before us, consider also this from the same source: “Of course, everybody in Ontario must know English. To deprive any child of the knowledge of English, would be like depriving it of the use of its eyes or its legs or its arms. That is a practical question. Why muddle it up with a lot of racial, sectarian, and constitutional rubbish?”

Here you have the substance of Ontario’s argument for limitation. Is there, I ask, anything of the spirit of Thurlow, anything of the philosophy of Toynbee, in this reasoning of the dominant nationality? In these words which I have quoted, and they are typical of Ontario’s position, the British principle of freedom for the minor nationality counts for nothing; the documents which set it forth are as so much “constitutional rubbish,” a forceful reminder of the “scrap of paper” phrase. In the unreasoning of Ontario and Manitoba, I can find only a clear-cut adherence to the German principle, a supreme egoism of Teutonic sort in exaggerating the necessity of the culture of the majority and disregarding the value of the culture of the minority, and above all the insistence that the dominant nationality—the twelve-to-one superiority—shall alone decide as to what is right. Not even Treitschke has phrased the doctrine of the supreme power of the State in bolder words.

The desire for homogeneity in Germany, requires explanation—as it does in Ontario. Behind these attempts to deprive the Slavs, the Danes, and the French, of their culture in Germany, and the French-Canadians of their culture in Ontario, will be found similar motives; and more than that, we shall find the motives entering, at least in German opinion, into the war issues. Charles P. Steinmetz, in “America and the New Epoch,” writing of Germany’s political ideals, says: “Thus by effective and liberal government old-age insurance, sickness insurance, and unemployment insurance, the three great fears which hung over the masses in all other countries, were eliminated, extreme poverty vanished, slums disappeared, and the condition of the masses became superior to that in all other countries, even in America, where the neglect of social legislation is gradually making itself felt now.” At first, one is at a loss to see what connection this program has to do with homogeneity, but, as Steinmetz explains: “co-operative industrial organisation presupposes racial unity.”

Now for an Ontario parallel, which ties race homogeneity into socialists’ ideals. There are several from which to select, but this one written while the grievances of the French-Canadians were discussed on the Lapointe resolution in the Dominion House of Commons, by the “Toronto Star,” May 18th, 1916, will do as well as any other: “If we are not trying to benefit our neighbour by legislation, we are apt to brood over some racial or religious difference which, as we fancy, divides us. If, on the other hand, we are devoting ourselves to plans for the improvement of the condition of working-men and working-women, we are not likely to be worried about the race or religious sect of these men and women. Social justice knows no racial or sectarian divisions. Justice is the same for all. It does not care whether the shop-girl is a Protestant or a Catholic, or to what race she belongs, so long as justice is done.” We cannot overlook the hypocrisy of such an answer to a people crying out for their mother-tongue in the land which was once theirs—the double iniquity of refusing to hear the plea and covering the refusal with phrases of cant. “Of all men whom we know, the Lacedaemonians are the most notorious for identifying what is pleasant with what is honorable, and what is expedient with what is just.” Not even a German—and in these days we regard him as the most heartless of men—would have given the “Star’s” answer to a people petitioning for the right to have their children instructed by means of their mother’s tongue. It is Prince von Bülow who says of the conflict between Teuton and Pole: “If the differences between the nationalities were thereby immediately intensified, it was certainly unfortunate, but it could not be avoided. In political life there are often hard necessities whose behests we obey with a heavy heart, but which must be obeyed in spite of sympathies and emotions. Politics is a rough trade, in which sentimental souls rarely bring even a simple piece of work to a successful issue.” Ontario politicians have seldom given the French-Canadians even these inadequate words of sympathy.

But the real pith of “The Star’s” reply—and it is not an unusual one in the Capital of Ontario—is that the interests of the minor nationality must give way before social reforms desired by the major nationality. It is perhaps wrong to say, “desired by the major nationality,” for it is not apparent that beyond Toronto there are many who believe that Canada, with millions of arable acres, unfarmed simply because men prefer town life, has reached the stage where measures for the relief of its self-constituted—and unduly large—industrial population are justifiable.

In both German and Ontario schools of socialistic thought, “racial homogeneity” is regarded as essential to their program. To get at the worth of this contention we English-Canadians have only to ask ourselves this question: Would we sell our birthright of language, of mentality, for a mess of social reform pottage? The test is surely a fair one; and, unless the answer is in the affirmative, then those who offer social improvement arguments as a reason for refusing recognition of the dual nationality, stand self-convicted of seeking their own material ends, by the sacrifice of the deepest spiritual feelings of their fellowmen.

I have said that Steinmetz carries this question of socialism to the root of the war. England has been individualistic; Germany, co-operative. That is in effect the argument. He says: “The present world’s war is the conflict between the passing era of individualistic industrialism and the coming era of co-operative organization, the former represented by England, the latter by Germany.” And Steinmetz’ statement is true—except his prophecy—in the sense that in England, the State exists for the man, and in Germany, man exists for the State; in England the thing most sought is the highest development of man, in Germany the highest development of the State. That is why, as we have seen, Germany regards human nationalities as so many hammers and anvils.

The Prussians, only a few hundred years removed from the armed camp into city, town, and civilisation, have the primary conception of the State as an army, and its citizens as soldiers. An impressionistic view of this conception is of men dressed alike in invisible grey uniforms, wearing identical helmets, moving with the same stiff, awkward but effective steps, and wheeling in identical manner at the State’s word of command. Some years ago, I watched men feed a huge machine with steel rods of varying lengths, and saw an incessant stream of horse-shoe nails pour forth, all of the same length, all of the same bright steely polish, all with the same peculiarly shaped head, the same sharp point, the same weight to the minutest part of an ounce, the same resisting power and strength. Such is the product of the doctrine of homogeneity. It is a mechanical thing, but it is effective—and so are horse-shoe nails—for a purpose.

German modern achievements in peace and war are successes of a sort; but they are the successes of a State, not of humanity. They are the successes of a colony of ants. The single ant is a weak creature; but ants as a colony, pursuing their own selfish economic and social ways, battle with insects many times their size; countless numbers are destroyed; but ants as ants are preserved. Here is success, but is it the kind of success we would imitate? Germans, like ants, allow nothing to stand in the way of their kind. All are swept along in the crowd. Collective psychology is little understood, but as M. Grau points out, Eucken and many other German philosophers whom we admired—before the war—lost their critical faculties when surrounded by the collective mind. The Slav in Poland, the Dane in Holstein, the French in Alsace-Lorraine, the Walloon and the Fleming in Belgium, all must be hacked down in the triumphant march of the Germans, inspired by their fanatical, collective self-worship. It is essentially a Prussian idea, but not exclusively Prussian; for others, including many English-Canadians, have accepted it.

Books of Reference

Charles Downer Hazen, Alsace-Lorraine Under German Rule.Holt.

Prince Bernhard von Bülow, Imperial Germany.Cassel.

Charles P. Steinmetz, America and the New Epoch.Harpers.

Max Nordau, Paradoxes.Heinemann.

J. M. Robertson, The Germans.Putnam.

Emile Hovelaque, The Deeper Causes of the War.Dutton.

L. T. Hobhouse, Questions of War and Peace.T. Fisher Unwin.