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PREFACE

As I am finishing up the final editing of this book in spring 2020, the world is confronted with the greatest threat to international security since World War II. The coronavirus pandemic threatens the lives and livelihood of millions—if not billions—of people across the globe. It builds on top of—and often exacerbates—the multiple security crises that endangered the international community well before the virus broke out. And it occurs before the background of a world that was already out of joint and characterized by growing uncertainty.

In fact, events are happening in the world that seemed impossible just a short time ago: The president of the United States, once the uncontested leader of the “free world,” is not only largely absent from the global response to the coronavirus crisis. He is also snubbing his closest allies, first by withdrawing from the Paris climate accord and the Iran deal signed after years of arduous diplomatic negotiations with the Americans, Europeans, Russians, and Chinese; and then, just a short time later, by honoring the North Korean dictator with a summit meeting at which the U.S. president made far-reaching concessions. And while he appears to get along wonderfully with Kim Jong-un, Donald Trump has recently been at odds with the United States’s closest partners and allies on trade issues. Thoughts in Washington have turned to more punitive tariffs. These could affect, for instance, German automobile manufacturers who export to the United States. Will our country become a target for Trump? What does this mean for the future of the transatlantic partnership and for the future of the West?

In Europe there are worries about the stability of the eurozone and the general development of the European Union—worries that are further amplified by the impact of the coronavirus pandemic. Many European countries have seen successful campaigns by parties that are critical of European integration. At home and abroad, populist voices are calling for more nation-state and less Europe. In some member states, fundamental European values and principles are being called into question. How is Europe supposed to function in the long term and become capable of formulating global policy?

In Moscow, Vladimir Putin continues his fourth term as Russian president. Under his leadership, the prospect of détente with the West seems dubious at best. Just recently he introduced new strategic nuclear weapons that the Russian military intends to deploy. At the same time, there is so far no progress on arms control—indeed, a new arms race is well under way. Since the Russian intervention in Georgia, the annexation of Crimea, and Russian interference in Eastern Ukraine, Germany’s allies in Central and Eastern Europe have become even more worried. Several hundred German soldiers have been stationed in Lithuania in order to emphasize our solidarity. But for some, this is not enough. The Polish ministry of defense, for one, announced that it would prefer to have an entire American division on its own territory. What do such developments mean for European security? Can we guarantee our own security without entering into a new, spiraling arms race, which could bring insecurity for all?

Indeed, we are once again facing fundamental foreign policy questions: How do we deal with Russia, a neighboring power that continues to violate the fundamental principles of the European security architecture and attempts to weaken liberal democracies? What does it mean for European security when Donald Trump openly questions core principles of U.S. foreign policy since 1945? And what conclusions can we draw from this? What are the prospects for the future of the European Union in the age of Brexit and populist movements in Europe? What do we mean when we say that Germany must take on more responsibility?

In Germany, debate on these fundamental foreign policy questions of our time is avoided rather than sought: Sure, addressing these issues can be awkward and exhausting. But considering the deteriorating state of global security, I do not believe that we can afford to remain passive. On the contrary, in the years to come, our country will be facing even greater foreign policy challenges, and we are not yet adequately prepared. And because there are no simple answers, it is all the more important that we discuss these challenges and how we can deal with them.

The German government has realized this, too, by the way, declaring in the coalition agreement of 2018 that, “in view of the international challenges,” Germany must “strengthen its capacities for strategic analysis and intensify its strategic communication.” The coalition agreement thus emphasizes the necessity of increasing investment “in expanding expertise on security policy and development policy” in Germany, expressly mentioning the role of organizations like the Munich Security Conference.

The Munich Security Conference, of which I have been chairman since 2008, has also made intensive efforts in recent years to open up to the general public. As at the time of its founding in the 1960s, the purpose of each annual conference is to bring together the most important decisionmakers and visionaries in order to discuss, and often argue about, contemporary security policy challenges. This is becoming ever more important, as evident in the vastly increased interest in our main event in Munich. However, by no means do these challenges concern only the political elite. This is why today, in contrast to the founding years, the Munich debates are televised so that they can be followed by livestream all over the world.

This book is a further contribution to an essential public debate that is more necessary than ever in these turbulent times. The book’s express purpose is not to address the experts among us. This is a book for anyone who wants to better understand what is going wrong in the world right now, what that means for us, and what we can and must do about it. If it also manages to offer insights into the world of diplomacy and some understanding of the complexity of foreign policy today, then it has achieved its goal.

All uncertainties and superficialities are my doing. I was not able to deal with all current security policy issues equally intensively. Some important topics, such as cybersecurity and the rapid rise of China in the international arena, could only be touched on briefly, in order to leave enough scope to deal with fundamental questions of war and peace, national responsibility, and discussion of our relations to Russia and the United States, which are currently subjects of intense debate in Germany. And while I wrote the book before the coronavirus pandemic struck the world, none of the dangers discussed in the pages that follow—from the serious straining of the transatlantic relationship to growing challenges to European integration and stability—will disappear with the pandemic. If anything, the pandemic will exacerbate these threats.

For their many ideas and suggestions, I would like to thank my friends and colleagues at the Federal Foreign Office, where I worked for nearly forty years. I would also like to thank fellow members of the world of diplomacy and the extensive international community of think tanks, as well as colleagues and friends at the Hertie School of Governance, where I have been teaching as a senior professor.

I also owe a warm thanks to both Strobe Talbott, who connected me to the Brookings Institution Press and whose members have done a marvelous job of editing the book. Special thanks also goes to Susan Richter, who did the lion’s share of translating the German version of this book into English.

Without the continual and critical support and backing of my team at the Munich Security Conference (MSC), I never could have completed the project alongside all of the conferences, lecture events, and publications on my agenda. I would like to thank Dr. Benedikt Franke, chief executive officer of the MSC, and the entire MSC staff in Munich and Berlin.

Special thanks are due to the Policy Team of the MSC in Berlin, for their intensive and critical advice, particularly Dr. Tobias Bunde (head of policy and analysis), Adrian Oroz (who has since left for a foreign office career), and Lisa Marie Ullrich (head of my office), as well as Jamel Flitti and Randolf Carr. Dr. Sophie Eisentraut played a particularly important role in editing, updating, and refining this current English language version.

Finally, my office staff bore a heavy workload, especially Pia Zimmermann and Amadée Mantz, who had their hands full even without the book.

And without Jutta Falke-Ischinger, who backed the project with a combination of marital forbearance and professional journalistic advice, none of it would matter anyway.

BERLIN, MAY 2020

Wolfgang Ischinger