Читать книгу Socratic Discourses - Xenophon - Страница 13

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Three dialogues of Socrates with Antipho. I. Antipho ridicules the poverty and frugality of Socrates, and his forbearance to receive pay for his instructions, sect. 1–3; Socrates replies that, by not receiving remuneration, he is more at liberty to choose his audience, 4, 5; that there are various advantages attendant on plainness of diet and dress, 6, 7; that the frugal man has the advantage over the man of pleasure in facilities for self-improvement, for doing his duty to his country, and for securing general happiness, 8–10. II. Antipho asserts that Socrates might be a just man, but was by no means wise, in accepting no payment, 11, 12; Socrates replies that to sell wisdom is to degrade it, and that more good is gained by the acquisition of friends than of money, 13, 14. III. Antipho asks Socrates why, when he trained others to manage public affairs, he took no part in public affairs himself; Socrates replies that he was of more service to his country by training many to govern it, than he could have been by giving his single aid in the government of it, 15.

1. It is due to Socrates, also, not to omit the dialogues which he held with Antipho the sophist. Antipho, on one occasion, wishing to draw away his associates from him, came up to Socrates, when they were present, and said, 2. “I thought, Socrates, that those who studied philosophy were to become happier than other men; but you seem to have reaped from philosophy fruits of an opposite kind; at least you live in a way in which no slave would continue to live with his master; you eat food, and drink drink, of the worst kind; you wear a dress, not only bad, but the same both summer and winter, and you continue shoeless and coatless. 3. Money, which cheers men when they receive it, and enables those who possess it to live more generously and pleasantly, you do not take; and if, therefore, as teachers in other professions make their pupils imitate themselves, you also shall produce a similar effect on your followers, you must consider yourself but a teacher of wretchedness.” 4. Socrates, in reply to these remarks, said, “You seem to me, Antipho, to have conceived a notion that I live so wretchedly, that I feel persuaded you yourself would rather choose to die than pass your life as I pass mine. Let us then consider what it is that you find disagreeable in my mode of life. 5. Is it that while others, who receive money, must perform the service for which they receive it, while I, who receive none, am under no necessity to discourse with any one that I do not like? Or do you despise my way of living, on the supposition that I eat less wholesome or less strengthening food than yourself? Or is it that my diet is more difficult to procure than yours, as being more rare and expensive? Or is it that what you procure for yourself is more agreeable to you than what I provide for myself is to me? Do you not know that he who eats with the most pleasure is he who least requires sauce, and that he who drinks with the greatest pleasure is he who least desires other drink than that which he has? 6. You know that those who change their clothes, change them because of cold and heat, and that men put on sandals that they may not be prevented from walking through annoyances to the feet; but have you ever observed me remaining at home, on account of cold, more than any other man, or fighting with any one for shade because of heat, or not walking wherever I please because my feet suffer? 7. Do you not know that those who are by nature the weakest, become, by exercising their bodies, stronger in those things for which they exercise them, than those who neglect them, and bear the fatigue of exercise with greater ease? And do you not think that I, who am constantly preparing my body by exercise to endure whatever may happen to it, bear everything more easily than you who take no exercise? 8. And to prevent me from being a slave to gluttony, or sleep, or other animal gratifications, can you imagine any cause more efficient than having other objects of attention more attractive than they, which not only afford pleasure in the moment of enjoying them, but give hopes that they will benefit me perpetually? You are aware of this also, that those who think themselves successful in nothing, are far from being cheerful, but that those who regard their agriculture, their seamanship, or whatever other occupation they pursue, as going on favourably for them, are delighted as with present success? 9. But do you think that from all these gratifications so much pleasure can arise as from the consciousness that you are growing better yourself, and are acquiring more valuable friends? Such is the consciousness, then, which I continue to enjoy.

“But if there should be occasion to assist our friends or our country, which of the two would have most leisure to attend to such objects, he who lives as I live now, or he who lives, as you think, in happiness? Which of the two would most readily seek the field of battle, he who cannot exist without expensive dishes, or he who is content with whatever comes before him? Which of the two would sooner be reduced by a siege, he who requires what is most difficult to be found, or he who is fully content with what is easiest to be met with? 10. You, Antipho, resemble one who thinks that happiness consists in luxury and extravagance; but I think that to want nothing is to resemble the gods, and that to want as little as possible is to make the nearest approach to the gods; that the Divine nature is perfection, and that to be nearest to the Divine nature is to be nearest to perfection.”

11. On another occasion, Antipho, in a conversation with Socrates, said, “I consider you indeed to be a just man, Socrates, but by no means a wise one; and you appear to me yourself to be conscious of this; for you ask money from no one for the privilege of associating with you; although, if you considered a garment of yours, or a house, or any other thing that you possess, to be worth money, you would not only not give it to anybody for nothing, but you would not take less than its full value for it. 12. It is evident, therefore, that if you thought your conversation to be worth anything, you would demand for it no less remuneration than it is worth. You may, accordingly, be a just man, because you deceive nobody from covetousness, but wise you cannot be, as you have no knowledge that is of any value.” 13. Socrates, in reply, said, “It is believed among us, Antipho, that it is possible to dispose of beauty, or of wisdom, alike honourably or dishonourably; for if a person sells his beauty for money to any one that wishes to purchase, men call him a male prostitute; but if any one makes a friend of a person whom he knows to be an admirer of what is honourable and worthy, we regard him as prudent: and, in like manner, those who sell their wisdom for money, to any that will buy, men call sophists, or, as it were, prostitutors of wisdom; but whoever makes a friend of a person whom he knows to be deserving, by teaching him all the good that he knows, we consider him to act the part which becomes an honourable and good citizen. 14. As any other man, therefore, Antipho, takes delight in a good horse, or dog, or bird, so I, to a still greater degree, take delight in valuable friends; and, if I know anything good, I communicate it to them, and recommend them, also, to any other teachers by whom I conceive that they will be at all advanced in virtue. The treasures, too, of the wise men of old, which they have left written in books, I turn over and peruse in company with my friends, and if we find anything good in them, we pick it out, and think it a great gain if we thus become useful to one another.” To me, who heard him utter these sentiments, Socrates appeared to be both happy himself, and to lead those that listened to him to honour and virtue.

15. Again, when Antipho asked him how he imagined that he could make men statesmen, when he himself took no part in state affairs, if indeed he knew anything of them, “In which of the two ways,” said he, “Antipho, should I better promote the management of affairs; if I myself engage in them alone, or if I make it my care that as many as possible may be qualified to engage in them?”