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The Boundary Approach to Ethnicity and Nationalism
In analyzing the shifting attitude of the Kurdish movement toward Islam in the past decades, this study utilizes the boundary approach as a main theoretical framework. As many studies also acknowledge, boundary making is an inherent part of ethnic or national group formation and identification, as well as of ethnic and nationalist movements. For instance, Nash (1989, 10) convincingly explains, “Where there is a group [ethnic group or movement], there is some sort of boundary, and where there are boundaries, there are mechanisms to maintain them.” Similarly, Wimmer (2013, 3) suggests, “Social and symbolic boundaries emerge when actors distinguish between different ethnic categories and when they treat members of such categories differently.” Regarding ethnic or nationalist movements, Conversi (1995) indicates that nationalism entails boundary creation and boundary maintenance processes. In the same way, Eriksen (2010, 10) remarks, “Like ethnic ideologies, nationalism stresses the cultural similarity of its adherents and, by implication, it draws boundaries vis-à-vis others, who thereby become outsiders” (see also Handler 1988; Cornell and Hartmann 2007). Hence, the boundary approach is a highly relevant theoretical tool for ethnicity and nationalism studies. As the current study shows, it is also highly useful in making better sense of the causes, mechanisms, and consequences of the recent shifts and transformations in Kurdish ethnopolitics (i.e., the Islamic opening of the secular, leftist Kurdish movement in the past decades).
This chapter first presents the main assumptions and arguments of the boundary approach and then draws some specific, exploratory hypotheses about ethnic boundary-making processes, particularly about the processes of (internal and external) boundary contestation.
Ethnic Boundary-Making Theory: Assumptions and Arguments
Boundary-making theory, which is primarily concerned with boundary-making or construction processes such as the demarcation, reproduction, and transformation of the boundaries of ethnic or national categories and of ethnonationalist movements, was first presented in the late 1960s in a collection of ethnographic studies edited by Fredrik Barth (1969a).1 Challenging the idea that stable and shared intrinsic, cultural features constitute ethnicity, this seminal work offers a more subjectivist, relational, processual, and interactionist approach to ethnicity and suggests that the focus of research should be on the dynamics of intergroup interactions, encounters, boundaries, and self-categorization or self-identification processes rather than on the “cultural stuff” that ethnic or national categories contain. For Barth (1969b), groups are the products of boundary production and reproduction during interactions between insiders and outsiders (see also R. Jenkins 2015, 20). As Brubaker (2009, 29) notes, “Barth was reacting against the static objectivism of then prevailing approaches to ethnicity, which sought to ground ethnicity in stable, objectively observable patterns of shared culture.” Along the same lines, Cederman (2002, 413) suggests, “Reacting to such reified conceptions of ethnicity, Fredrik Barth (1969) shifted the attention from cultural ‘essences’ to ethnogenesis through boundary formation.… According to this type of constructivist anthropology, groups do not consist of objective cultural traits but need to be viewed through the self-categorization of [their] members.” Similarly, R. Jenkins (2015, 14) notes, “[For] Barth, boundaries are produced and reproduced during interaction across them; thus group boundaries are osmotic, in that there is always traffic across them, in each direction. This interaction also produces and reproduces the groups on either side of the boundary. Which means that it is not what is within the boundary—the well-known ‘cultural stuff’—but the boundary maintenance processes that constitute and reconstitute the group; they are in many ways the group.”
Wimmer, who provides the most advanced version of the boundary-making approach in more recent literature on ethnicity and nationalism, defines its main features as follows:
[In the boundary-making approach] ethnic distinctions result from marking and maintaining a boundary irrespective of the cultural differences observed from the outside.… Researchers would no longer study “the culture” of ethnic group A or B, but rather how the ethnic boundary between A and B [is] inscribed onto a landscape of continuous cultural transitions. Ethnicity [would be] no longer synonymous with objectively defined cultures, but rather [would refer] to the subjective ways in which actors [mark] group boundaries by pointing to the specific diacritics that [distinguish] them from ethnic others. (2013, 22–23)
Thus, focusing on the role of intergroup processes and dynamics in the social construction (production and reproduction) of ethnic boundaries and so in ethnic-group formation, this approach provides a dynamic, practical, processual, and situational understanding of ethnicity and nationhood (Brubaker 2009). Therefore, this perspective treats ethnic or national boundaries as “fluid, policed, crossable, movable” (Lamont 2014, 815; see also Wallman 1978; Lamont 2000; Eriksen 2010). Sharing the Barthian framework, Wallman (quoted in R. Jenkins 1986, 175), for instance, notes that “ethnicity is the process by which ‘their’ difference is used to enhance the sense of ‘us’ for purposes of organization or identification.… Because it takes two, ethnicity can only happen at the boundary of ‘us,’ in contact or confrontation or by contract with ‘them.’ And as the sense of ‘us’ changes, so the boundary between ‘us’ and ‘them’ shifts. Not only does the boundary shift, but the criteria which mark it change” (see also Esman 1994; Terrier 2015).
The Notion of Boundary
Before going further, some discussion on the key term of this approach (i.e., the notion of boundary) will be useful. A boundary refers to “simultaneously where something stops and something else begins, and something that indicates where something stops and something else begins” (R. Jenkins 2015, 13–14). For Conversi (1999, 564), “The point of contact between different others, the domain—imaginary or real—where in-group and out-group meet and face each other is called boundary” (see also Wallman 1978, 206). Quite importantly, Conversi (1999, 564) warns against the interchangeable use of the terms boundary and border by noting, “the latter may simply refer to a line drawn between two spaces, whereas the former may be used to stress the binding quality of what, and who, is included on this side of the fence.”2
Boundaries serve key functions in sociopolitical life. As Tilly (2005, 133) suggests, social boundaries “interrupt, divide, circumscribe, or segregate distributions of population or activity within social fields.” Likewise, Conversi also lists several functions of social boundaries. A boundary, for Conversi (1999, 565),
does not simply refer to the outward-looking practice of delimitation, but also to the inward-looking process of self-definition. A boundary can encircle, enclose, contour, and outline, as well as frame, fix, set, assign, and establish. In other words, boundaries are made to bind.… And, although a boundary may be an hindrance or a barrier, it is also a tie and a connective liaison, its metaphorical next of kin being the bridge. Boundaries circumscribe separate realms, as well as delimit and mark out distinct values, behaviours, and laws. Their restrictive and exclusive power is compensated by their inclusive character vis-à-vis what and who lies within the boundary. Boundaries are normative insofar as they have the power to restrict, prescribe, and proscribe.
As this quotation also implies, other than separating in-group members from out-group members, boundaries also divide “the meanings that are attached to the identities on either side” (Cornell and Hartmann 2007, 84). In brief, the notion of boundary in this study does not refer to territorial, physical borders but rather to ideational, symbolic, and social structures, which “enclose, mark, and signal” belonging to an ethnic category or movement (Conversi 1999, 553).3
Symbolic and Social Boundaries
The boundary approach conceives ethnicity as an intangible, imagined, cognitive boundary with two main aspects or dimensions: symbolic and social (Lamont and Molnár 2002; Alba 2005, 22). Lamont and Molnár (2002, 168) define symbolic boundaries as “conceptual distinctions made by social actors to categorize objects, people, practices, and even time and space. They are tools by which individuals and groups struggle over and come to agree upon definitions of reality.… Symbolic boundaries also separate people into groups and generate feelings of similarity and group membership” (emphasis added). Social boundaries, on the other hand, are conceptualized as “objectified forms of social differences manifested in unequal access to and unequal distribution of resources (material and nonmaterial) and social opportunities” (Lamont and Molnár 2002, 168; emphasis added). The authors suggest that the former operates at the intersubjective level and the latter concerns groupings of individuals.4 These definitions imply that symbolic boundaries are more about the subjective, ideational components of an ethnic category (the ideas, values, norms, and/or symbols that constitute a particular ethnicity) because social boundaries are related to relatively more objective social interactions and encounters, such as the inclusion and exclusion of actors (who should belong to an ethnic group or movement, who is an in-group member, who is an out-group member).5 It is emphasized that both of these aspects are real, substantially shaping sociopolitical processes and outcomes (see also Fuller 2003).
As indicated previously, the earlier version of the boundary approach was more concerned with the impact of interactions and transactions on social boundaries, neglecting symbolic boundaries (i.e., the cultural content of ethnic categories). For instance, separating symbolic and social boundaries from each other, Barth (1969b, 15) suggests that the focus of investigation should be on “the ethnic boundary that defines the group” rather than “the cultural stuff that it encloses.”6 Thus, earlier versions of the boundary approach focused on “what goes on at the boundary” rather than “what is inside the boundary” (R. Jenkins 2015, 15). In other words, for the boundary approach, we should study the boundaries of ethnic groups from “the outside in” rather than “from the inside out” (Conforti 2015, 142). It was believed that developments and social interactions at and across boundaries have determining impacts on internal structures and dynamics (i.e., the cultural content of ethnic identity). Thus, in such an account, the “cultural stuff” becomes “an effect and not a cause of boundaries” (Eriksen 2010, 46). As R. Jenkins (2008, 13) observes, “Shared culture is, in this model, best understood as generated in and by processes of ethnic boundary maintenance, rather than the other way round: the production and reproduction of difference vis-à-vis external others is what creates the image of similarity internally, vis-à-vis each other” (see also Wallman 1978).
This orientation (i.e., focusing on social boundaries rather than ethnic substance or cultural contents), however, constitutes a major limitation. It makes sense to treat social boundaries and cultural content as analytically distinct dimensions of ethnic categories or movements; however, it is problematic to assume and focus on only a one-way relationship between them. Since shifts in symbolic boundaries (i.e., the substance and content of ethnicity) also directly affect social boundaries (see also Conversi 1995; R. Jenkins 2008), it is more realistic to assume a constant, mutual interplay between the symbolic and social boundaries. In other words, what goes on within the boundary also affects what goes on at and outside the boundary. As Jackson (2015b, 193) also notes, “The cultural content demarcated by different boundaries is manipulated and politicized in diverse ways and across contexts, in order to maximize, or in some cases reduce, the distinctiveness between different population categories.”
Given such a limitation of the earlier versions of the boundary approach (i.e., the tendency to disregard or neglect what exists or happens inside the boundary), more recent studies of ethnic boundary making pay greater attention to the contents of ethnic categories, or the “cultural stuff,” and so symbolic boundaries (e.g., see Nagel 1994; Conversi 1995, 1999; Cornell 1996; Cornell and Hartmann 2007; R. Jenkins 2008; Wimmer 2013; Jackson and Molokotos-Liederman 2015). As Jackson (2015a, 3) warns, “Studying ethnicity and nationalism through a boundary approach, while also accepting that the content of social categories informs how boundaries are drawn and vice versa, is vital.” Similarly, Conforti (2015, 142) cautions that “we must not downplay the value of the cultural elements as a central factor in defining the boundaries of ethnic groups.” The in-depth analysis of the Islamic opening of the secular Kurdish movement confirms that the cultural content of an ethnic identity or category does matter. For instance, empirical analyses show that the degree of ethnic-group heterogeneity and intragroup divisions and cleavages do shape boundary-making processes, such as ethnopolitical leaders’ boundary-making strategies and the processes of boundary contestation, particularly internal boundary contestation.
Like social boundaries, the symbolic boundaries of an ethnic category and of an ethnonationalist movement are mutable as well. Regarding shifts in the symbolic boundaries (or the “cultural stuff”), Nagel (1994, 162–163) identifies two types or forms of boundary work: “construction” (i.e., revisions of current culture and innovations such as the creation of new cultural forms) and “reconstruction” (i.e., revivals and restorations of historical cultural practices and institutions). The former occurs “when current cultural elements are changed or when new cultural forms or practices are created”; the latter takes place “when lost or forgotten cultural forms or practices are excavated and reintroduced, or when lapsed or occasional cultural forms or practices are refurbished and reintegrated into contemporary culture” (Nagel 1994, 162–163). Thus, with reconstruction, ethnopolitical actors might incorporate previously ignored or suppressed ideational elements (e.g., religion) into the ethnic category or movement and shift its symbolic boundaries.
The Kurdish case analyzed in this study constitutes a good example of the reconstruction of symbolic boundaries. With the Islamic opening in the post-1990 period, the Kurdish ethnopolitical leaders quit their anti-Islamic attitudes and instead developed an Islam-friendly approach. As a result, they have incorporated previously excluded Islamic ideas, values, and principles into their ethnonationalist discourses, strategies, and programs. By adopting a more religion-friendly notion of Kurdishness, Kurdish ethnopolitical leaders have remade the symbolic boundaries of the Kurdish ethnic category in their ethnonationalist outlook.
The shifts in the symbolic boundaries of an ethnic category or movement might have substantial impact on social boundaries and interactions across ethnic-group boundaries. Again the Kurdish case illustrates this point well. By developing an Islam-friendly attitude in the past decades, Kurdish ethnopolitical leaders have reconciled with Islam, expanding the symbolic boundaries of the movement. We see that such boundary work at the symbolic level resulted in rapprochements with certain groups but tensions with others. For instance, the empirical chapters of this study display that the Islamic opening of the secular Kurdish movement reduced the distance between itself and the conservative Kurdish masses, while it increased the tension with rival political actors with conservative or Islamic leanings, such as the AKP. Thus, this particular case confirms that there is a constant and mutual interaction between the symbolic and social boundaries of an ethnic category or movement.
Boundary-Making Strategies
As Terrier (2015, 47) succinctly states, “boundaries do not operate without human action.” Human agents consciously or unconsciously make and remake ethnonational boundaries. Both subjective (e.g., sense of belonging, myths, symbols) and objective (e.g., ancestry, ethnicity, language, territory) elements and features of ethnic and national identities or categories are subject to interpretation and reinterpretation by human agents. As Calhoun (1993, 223) notes, “ethnic identity is constituted, maintained, and invoked in social processes that involve diverse intentions, constructions of meaning, and conflicts. Not only are there claims from competing possible collective allegiances, there are competing claims as to just what any particular ethnic or other identity means.” Similarly, Segal and Handler (2006, 59) observe that “even when the existence of a nation is least contested, neither outside observers nor the nation’s most patriotic proponents are ever able to reach closure in their attempts to identify what trait, or trait-bundle, defines the shared national identity, or character, of the nation. Nationalist movements are instead engaged in a ceaseless politics of culture—an ongoing effort to identify, create, and maintain the purported common denominator of their national identity.” Such efforts to identify the constitutive elements of an ethnic or national identity should be interpreted as boundary making or boundary construction because determining what a particular ethnic category entails also means setting or demarcating its boundaries. As Conversi (1995, 77) also notes, all processes of identity construction (including nationalism) are simultaneously boundary generating and boundary deriving. Similarly, Jackson (2015a, 1) asserts that distinguishing the national or ethnic self from the nonnational or nonethnic other should be understood as a form of boundary making.
Cultural, intellectual, and political elites are the key actors in boundary-making processes. Operating like political entrepreneurs, ethnopolitical leaders not only identify what symbols, beliefs, ideas, values, principles, and traditions are associated with a particular ethnicity or nationhood but also play a substantial role in determining who belongs to an ethnic category and/or movement and who does not (see also Kasfir 1979; Conversi 1999, 564; Lecours 2000; Cederman 2002; Wolff 2006; Terrier 2015). In other words, beyond identifying group members and policing social boundaries, ethnic entrepreneurs define, maintain, or transform the symbolic boundaries of an ethnic category or movement as well. Such boundary works might involve tacit, unconscious and/ or deliberate, strategic processes (Fuller 2003).
In boundary-making processes (e.g., demarcating, maintaining, or demolishing symbolic and social boundaries of an ethnic category or movement), boundary makers might be motivated by diverse interests such as material (e.g., political or economic power and resources) and ideational (e.g., honor, prestige, recognition, dignity, belonging, legitimacy) expectations. In order to achieve those interests, ethnopolitical elites utilize a variety of strategies (see Fuller 2003; Wimmer 2013). Wimmer (2013, 44–79) presents a comprehensive list of boundary-making strategies. “Expansion,” as one form of boundary shift, refers to moving an existing boundary to incorporate certain other ethnic categories or groups. The second form of boundary shifting, “contraction,” means shrinking or narrowing ethnic boundaries, excluding certain groups.7 These definitions suggest that ‘boundary expansion’ and ‘contraction’ are more related to changing the topography or location of existing boundaries (Wimmer 2013, 49–56). And these two common strategies can take place at both social and symbolic levels. In other words, both symbolic and social boundaries might be expanded or contracted. As noted earlier, ethnopolitical elites and leaders might modify the “cultural stuff” of ethnic categories or movements (i.e., remaking symbolic boundaries) as well as redefining insiders and outsiders (i.e., remaking social boundaries). This study interprets the Islamic opening of the secular Kurdish movement in the past decades as a typical case of boundary expansion, taking place at both symbolic and social levels.
“Transvaluation” involves changing the meaning of an existing ethnic boundary to challenge the hierarchical ordering of ethnic categories. Wimmer identifies two subtypes of transvaluation: “normative inversion,” in which the members of an excluded or despised ethnic category challenge the symbolic ethnic category and claim moral and cultural superiority vis-à-vis the dominant group; and “equalization,” which refers to establishing moral and political equality (rather than superiority) with respect to the dominant ethnic category (see also Fuller 2003). Another strategy is “positional move” (boundary crossing and repositioning in the ethnic hierarchy), which might take place at either the individual or group level. Wimmer (2013, 58) states, “When transvaluation does not represent a valuable option, moving one’s own position within a hierarchical system of ethnic categories might represent a more appropriate strategy. One can either change one’s individual ethnic membership or reposition one’s entire ethnic category. As in transvaluation, the boundaries of ethnic categories are not contested. Unlike [in] transvaluation … the hierarchy is accepted, but not one’s own position in that system” (see also Zolberg and Woon 1999; Eriksen 2010). As noted earlier, boundary shifting (in the form of either contraction or expansion) involves changes in the topography of ethnic or national boundaries (i.e., boundary relocation). However, in the case of boundary crossing, actors move from one side of a boundary to another, without any major alteration in the definition of the boundary itself. As Loveman and Muniz (2007, 923) also state, “boundary crossing implies that categorical membership changes with the acquisition of new traits; the symbolic boundary presumably remains fixed, and reclassification reflects individual or intergenerational mobility across it.”
Finally, “blurring” refers to putting emphasis on shared or crosscutting, nonethnic social cleavages to decrease the significance of ethnicity as the foundation of categorization and social organization (see also Jackson 2015b, 209–210). Actors attempt to decrease the salience of ethnic categories by promoting nonethnic principles, ideas, values, and symbols.8 For instance, many conservative or Islamic circles in Turkey emphasize the notion of the “Islamic brotherhood” between ethnic Turks and Kurds in response to Kurdish ethnonationalist claims. By stressing Islam as a shared value between these two groups, Islamist circles attempt to deemphasize ethnic attachments and so blur ethnic boundaries (more on this in the conclusion).
Wimmer (2013) also lists several tools employed by boundary makers as they follow the foregoing boundary-making strategies: discursive and symbolic means (e.g., categorization and identification practices such as public ceremonies, rituals, and speeches; usage of visible cues such as somatic diacritics and dress patterns inscribing ethnic boundaries); discrimination against out-group members (formal discrimination through legal and institutional mechanisms and informal / de facto discrimination); peaceful or violent political mobilization (increasing the salience and relevance of ethnic divisions or reproducing and reinforcing group boundaries); and finally coercive and violent policies (e.g., assimilation, ethnic cleansing, resettlement laws). The case of the Islamic opening of the Kurdish movement, discussed in detail in the following chapters, displays that Kurdish ethnopolitical elites particularly utilize discursive and symbolic means (e.g., employing Islam-friendly discourse and increasing references to Islamic ideas, principles, and practices such as certain verses of the Koran and the Charter of Medina) and mobilization tools (e.g., organizing civilian Friday prayers, the Democratic Islam Congress, and commemoration ceremonies) as they try to reconcile with Islam and Islamic actors.
The Bounded Nature of Boundary Making
Do ethnopolitical elites make, remake, or unmake ethnic boundaries ad libitum? Definitely not. Agents are not that free in their boundary-making efforts, simply because boundary-making processes are nested within existing social, political, economic, and historical structures and conditions. Wimmer (2013) also acknowledges the constraining impact of structural factors on agency and pays particular attention to the influence of institutional structures (e.g., nation-state, legal structure), power hierarchies (i.e., distribution of political, economic, and symbolic power), and networks of alliances on boundary-making efforts and processes (e.g., the choice of boundary-making strategies and the kind of emerging boundaries). Wimmer (2013, 89) notes that “actors are constrained, enabled, and enticed, first, by the institutional environment that makes it appear more plausible and attractive to draw certain types of boundaries—ethnic, class, regional, gender, tribal, or others. Second, the distribution of power defines an individual’s interests and thus which level of ethnic differentiation will be considered most meaningful. Third, the network of political alliances will influence who will and who will not be counted as ‘one of us’” (see also Cornell 1996). Similarly, Lecours (2000, 121) warns against methodological individualism and states, “Social and economic structures provide the larger context for the behaviour of political actors.… The cultural make-up of a society presents specific options, and limitations, to political elites.” Likewise, Conversi (1995, 81) emphasizes structural constraints and draws attention to internal constraints on boundary-making efforts: “It is highly unlikely that nationalist leaders can manipulate their constituencies at their own discretion, as extreme instrumentalists insist.”
Drawing attention to the situational nature of boundary-making processes, Jackson (2015b, 193) also asserts that actors’ boundary work is “dependent on the social context in which it takes place, limited by the cultural repertoires and available categories that have been institutionalized as social boundaries over time.” In a similar vein, Lamont (2000, 7) suggests that boundary work is shaped by “the cultural resources that people have access to and the structural conditions in which they are placed.” Additionally, she remarks that “some patterns of self-identification and boundaries are more likely in one context than in another. This is not to deny the importance of individual agency but to stress the fact that it is bounded by the differentially structured context in which people live” (2000, 244). Cornell and Hartmann (2007, 208) also draw attention to the role of contextual factors in boundary processes by introducing the notion of “construction sites,” which refer to “arenas in which processes of identity construction occur.” They suggest that politics, labor markets, residential space, social institutions, culture, and daily experience constitute some critical construction sites, molding boundary processes.
Thus, since ethnopolitical actors are embedded in social and political systems, both historical contexts (legacies, traditions) and the larger social, political, and economic environments of ethnic categories and movements encircle boundary-making processes such as boundary-making strategies and styles. In addition, as the Kurdish case also indicates, the internal structures and dynamics of ethnic groups also fashion ethnopolitical leaders’ boundary-making efforts. Briefly, boundary-making processes are conditioned or bound by both internal (e.g., the structures of ethnic categories and movements) and external factors and dynamics.
External and Internal Boundary Contestations
Another important aspect of boundary-making processes is boundary contestation. Since boundary processes involve actors with different levels of power and authority and divergent views, interests, and strategies, boundary making is an inherently political process. As a result, as some of the existing studies also acknowledge, boundary-making processes might be highly contentious or conflictual (e.g., see Fuller 2003; Wimmer 2008a, 2008b, and 2013; R. Jenkins 2015, 14). For instance, Fuller (2003, 4) notes the following: “Because particular boundaries suit some purposes more than others, their meaning, placement, and structure may be highly contested, and boundaries are often a key site for struggles over social relations generally. Even the most institutionalized cultural boundaries can be (and are) plausibly redrawn as people struggle to enact, change, or dissolve distinctions in ways consonant with their wider purposes.”
Wimmer (2013, 25) concurs, stating that “ethnic categories might be contested rather than universally agreed upon. Such contestation is part of a broader politico-symbolic struggle over power and prestige, the legitimacy of certain forms of exclusion over others, and the merits of discriminating for or against certain types of people.”
Boundary contestations or struggles, however, remain undertheorized in the existing literature.9 Further in-depth analysis of boundary contestation would be invaluable for boundary approaches. In particular, we need to spend more time thinking about questions such as, how, when, and under what conditions do boundary contestations take place? And when are boundary contestations more likely to succeed? In this section, we attempt to provide some preliminary answers to such questions.
Boundary-making processes might involve external and/or internal struggles over ethnic boundaries. External boundary contestation simply refers to struggles and competition between insiders and outsiders over where symbolic and social boundaries should be drawn. Boundary workers’ efforts (e.g., expansion or contraction of symbolic and social boundaries of an ethnic group or movement) might threaten the ideational and/or material interests of out-group members. Being challenged by such efforts, outsiders (e.g., ruling state elites, political opponents, or members of other ethnic groups or movements) might try to prevent or delegitimize boundary workers’ efforts or initiatives. To achieve such goals, outsiders might employ various strategies such as expanding and/or contracting ethnic, religious, and ideological boundaries. Under the presence of ethnic competition and conflict (e.g., interethnic rivalry over scarce political, economic, and symbolic resources), such boundary struggles between insiders and outsiders might get quite intense.
External contestation might in turn have substantial impact on the boundaries of ethnic categories and of movements. To illustrate how external contestation might shape ethnic boundaries, we can utilize Richard Jenkins’s (2008) analytical distinction between “internal” and “external” ethnic identification, which are two mutually interdependent but analytically distinct processes. In the case of internal identification (also called “group identification”), “members of a group signal to fellow group members or others a self-definition of who they are, their identity” (R. Jenkins 2008, 55). Jenkins (55) explains that the internal definition of identity is necessarily interactional and social because such processes “presuppose an audience, without whom they make no sense, and a shared framework of meaning.” External identification (also called “social categorization” because it involves the identification of others as a collectivity), on the other hand, refers to “other-directed processes, during which one person or set of persons defines the other(s) as ‘X,’ ‘Y,’ or whatever” (55). Jenkins suggests that external identification might take a consensual or conflictual form. In the case of the consensual form, others validate or endorse internal definition(s) of themselves. Regarding the conflictual form, “there is the imposition, by one set of actors on another, of a name and/or characterization that the categorized do not recognize” (55).
Regarding the nexus between internal and external definitions (or between group identification and social categorization), Jenkins claims that these two processes are analytically distinct but not isolated from each other. As he notes, “each is chronically implicated in the other in an ongoing dialectic of identification. The categorization of ‘them’ is too useful a foil in the identification of ‘us’ for this not to be the case, and the definition of ‘us’ too much the product of a history of relationships with a range of significant others.… Ethnicity—the production, reproduction and transformation of the ‘group-ness’ of culturally differentiated collectivities—is a two-way process that takes place across the boundary between ‘us’ and ‘them’” (2008, 55). Similarly, Eriksen (2010, 77) asserts that “the Barthian view of ethnicity as a system of mutually exclusive self-ascriptions must be slightly modified: the ascription attributed by others also contributes to creating ethnicity, and may be of paramount importance.” Cornell and Hartmann (2007, 83) also acknowledge the impact of both internal and external construction processes and dynamics on group identity and boundaries:
Construction involves both the passive experience of being “made” by external forces, including not only material circumstances but also the claims that other persons or groups make about the group in question, and the active process by which the group “makes” itself. The world around us may “tell” us we are racially distinct, or our experience at the hands of circumstances may “tell” us that we constitute a group, but our identity is also a product of the claims we make. These claims may build on the messages we receive from the world around us or may depart from them rejecting them, adding to them, or refining them.
Returning to the impact of external boundary contestation on ethnic boundaries, we should acknowledge that it almost always involves processes of “external definition” or “social categorization.” As outsiders contest ethnic boundaries, they usually attempt to impose alternative categories or labels (usually disparaging ones in the case of conflictual situations) on the ethnic group or movement that they challenge. As the empirical chapters of this study illustrate, rival political movements with conservative or Islamic orientations constantly label the secular, leftist Kurdish movement as “infidels,” “heretical,” or “un-Islamic.”
Such attempts of external definition, however, might have major consequences for boundary processes. Facing challenge or threat by outsiders, group members are likely to become much more defensive about their ethnic identity. As a result, they are likely to put internal divisions or conflicts aside and be more assertive with respect to issues related to their group identities and boundaries. As R. Jenkins (2008, 59) suggests, “the experience of categorization may strengthen existing group identity through a process of resistance and reaction. Thus, the experience of being categorized as ‘A’ may, only apparently paradoxically, contribute to the reinforcement, or even perhaps the formation, of [the] group identity as ‘B.’” Likewise, Cornell and Hartmann (2007, 64) note, “Competition … often leads, via social closure, to an emphasis on ethnic or racial boundaries. It is thereby likely to reinforce and reproduce [these boundaries].” In the same way, Eriksen (2010, 81) remarks, “Conspicuous forms of boundary maintenance become important when the boundaries are under pressure.” Thus, contestation of group boundaries by outsiders is likely to solidify internal identification, group attachments, and cohesiveness (see also Hale 2004). In other words, rather than weakening or undermining ethnic boundaries, external contestation might empower or thicken them. In brief, given the dialectical relationship between external and internal identifications, external boundary contestation might lead to major consequences for ethnic identification. It might result in either boundary reinforcement or boundary shift.
The preceding explanations suggest that contestations of ethnic boundaries by out-group members should also be regarded as one form of ethnic boundary work. As indicated earlier, the notion of boundary by definition presumes two separate spheres (i.e., inside and outside). Since contestations stemming from outside the boundary are likely to affect (directly or indirectly) what goes on within the boundary, these should qualify as one type of boundary work by outsiders. To put it differently, external boundary contestation can also be interpreted as boundary work, which might lead to the construction or reconstruction of the boundaries of ethnic groups and of movements. As the empirical chapters discuss in detail, Islamic or conservative political actors have been trying to delegitimize the secular, leftist Kurdish movement in the eyes of the conservative Kurdish masses by externally defining or categorizing the movement as “Marxist,” “atheist,” “Satanic evil,” and “un-Islamic.” Such an external identification or social categorization by competing conservative or Islamic political actors was one of the triggering factors behind the Islamic opening of the secular Kurdish movement in the past decades.
Internal boundary contestation, on the other hand, encompasses conflicts over ethnic boundaries among insiders (i.e., in-group members or coethnics) and may be relatively more destabilizing. Although several conceptualizations assume or treat ethnic groups as unitary actors or highly homogeneous entities with a shared culture and identity,10 we should not exaggerate the internal homogeneity and cohesion of ethnic groups. Several studies even openly reject the idea that an ethnic group is constituted by a unique, common culture and shared identity. For instance, claiming that a common culture cannot be regarded as a defining feature of ethnic groups, Chandra (2012c) suggests that it is not realistic to expect all ethnic-group members to share all the same values, symbols, codes, and norms. Chandra (2012c, 88) suggests that instead of associating ethnic groups with a common culture by definition, we should take a common culture to be a variable: “Ethnic groups can vary in the degree to which they share a common ‘content’—of which culture can be one component.” Similarly, Brubaker (2009, 30) claims that “the strength, salience, content, and consequences of ethnic, racial, and national identifications are variable across time, contexts and persons.” In the same way, Wimmer (2008b, 981) also draws attention to ethnic-group heterogeneity: “[Several authors] assume, rather than demonstrate, that an ethnic category represents an actor with a single purpose and shared outlook. Such ontological collectivism overlooks, however, that ethnic categories may shift contextually and that there might be substantial disagreement among individuals over which ones are the most appropriate and relevant ethnic labels” (emphasis in original; see also Wimmer 2009, 245–246).
Ethnic-group heterogeneity might originate from several sources. For instance, group members might attribute quite different meanings to the cultural markers delineating ethnic boundaries, including relatively more objective markers or diacritics, such as shared ancestry, language, or region (see also Eriksen 2010). In addition, it is quite often the case that an ethnic category or movement might be divided along other dimensions, such as religion (e.g., Alevi Kurds vs. Sunni Kurds), class, ideology, and region. Hence, borrowing from Wallman (1978), an ethnic category or movement might involve “sub-boundaries” due to nonethnic divisions and cleavages. As a result, one can find quite diverse views and opinions within an ethnic group or movement about how and where symbolic and/or social boundaries should be drawn (see also Cornell and Hartmann 2007; Conforti 2015). Internal diversity or heterogeneity, in turn, creates a favorable environment for internal boundary contestation. The following section presents hypothetical expectations regarding internal and external boundary contestations.
Hypotheses
When and under what conditions do boundary contestations (internal and external) take place? This section proposes some exploratory hypotheses about the processes of boundary contestation. To begin with external boundary contestation, we note that electoral periods in polities allowing competitive politics increase the likelihood of boundary work and boundary struggles. External boundary contestation in particular becomes much more common during such periods. As Wallman (1978) suggests, the need for group definition facilitates the proliferation of boundary messages. During electoral periods especially, political elites feel the need to distinguish themselves (e.g., (re)iterating their own mission, programs, and policies) from those of competing groups. Such actions and statements occur because electoral politics involves intense elite competition for legitimacy and popularity in the eyes of potential voters. Political elites not only try to increase their appeal but also attempt to discredit or delegitimize their opponents.
A common strategy pursued by competing political actors is othering, which refers to identifying, categorizing, or treating certain actors as different from oneself or the mainstream. As one form of external identification or social categorization (see earlier), othering serves two main purposes: (1) marking and naming those who are thought to be different from oneself and (2) (re)constructing one’s identity in reference to others (Weis 1995; Jensen 2011). Actors involved in othering practices tend to declare or treat certain actors as different, marginal, unorthodox, inferior, incompetent, or illegitimate. Obviously, such discourses, attitudes, and actions constitute one form of identity formation and so boundary making (see also Lamont 2000; R. Jenkins 2008; Jackson 2015a).
Since political elites frequently resort to such discourses and actions during electoral periods, electoral competition involves the constant making, remaking, and unmaking of boundaries (ideological, ethnic, religious, moral, etc.). Hence, electoral periods provide great opportunity for researchers to investigate boundary processes (ethnic or nonethnic). Unfortunately, the study of elections tends to focus on political or economic issues. Such an orientation, however, is “unable to incorporate electoral politics based on identities, in which the competition is often over how politicians and voters define the identity categories to which they belong rather than their issue-positions” (Chandra 2012b, 44). Thus, we can put forth the following:
Hypothesis 1: Electoral periods increase the likelihood of boundary work in general and external boundary contestation in particular.
The Kurdish case appears to be quite useful to illustrate the plausibility of this hypothesis. As this book’s empirical chapters show, boundary work by competing elite groups (e.g., the secular Kurdish ethnopolitical elites and Islamist or conservative elites) gets rather intense during electoral periods. For instance, during the visits of conservative political elites to Kurdish areas while campaigning, they frequently label the secular Kurdish movement as “atheist” or “un-Islamic.” In other words, they attempt to contract religious boundaries to undermine the societal popularity and legitimacy of the secular Kurdish movement in the eyes of conservative Kurdish voters. Not surprisingly, such efforts trigger counter boundary work by Kurdish ethnopolitical leadership. As Watts (2010, 130) also observes, electoral periods provide “important means by which pro-Kurdish politician-activists could legally challenge official discourse, promote a pro-Kurdish political platform, publicize the parties, and appeal to different constituencies.”
Regarding internal boundary contestation, in the case of ethnic groups with a high degree of internal diversity or heterogeneity, boundary makers’ efforts might trigger reactions or resentments among coethnics (intraethnic dissension), paving the way for internal competition and tensions. For instance, as boundary makers attempt to expand symbolic or social boundaries to include new ideational elements or groups, some insiders might try to restore previous boundaries or even shrink them. Thus, as an exploratory proposition, we might put forward the following:
Hypothesis 2: In relatively more heterogeneous ethnic groups or movements, internal boundary contestation (struggle over boundaries among coethnics) becomes more likely.
This hypothesis appears to be quite relevant to the Kurdish case. A widely acknowledged feature of Kurdish society is its high degree of internal heterogeneity. Besides tribal differences, Kurds are divided into various linguistic (e.g., Kurmanji, Sorani, and Gorani), sectarian (e.g., Sunni-Shafi, Sunni-Hanefi, and Alevi) and ideological (e.g., nationalist, secular, Islamist) groups. Given such a heterogeneous group structure, it becomes highly likely that the ethnopolitical leadership’s boundary work would be contested by certain groups within the Kurdish ethnic category.
It is not surprising that power differentials might also condition internal boundary contestation. As Wimmer (2009, 258) also suggests, “the distribution of power between various participants in these struggles influences their capacity to shape the outcome.” For instance, in hierarchically organized ethnic groups, internal boundary contestations take place within the shadow of power hierarchies. This situation implies that opposition by subordinate coethnics to the boundary-making efforts of ethnopolitical leaders would more likely be suppressed in hierarchically organized ethnic groups or movements characterized by clear leadership and power relations. In other words, in hierarchical ethnic categories, boundary makers (i.e., superordinates, located at the top echelons of the power hierarchy) would face fewer overt internal challenges. Therefore, in the case of such ethnic groups and movements, boundary work would be relatively smoother. Thus, another hypothesis about boundary work could be the following:
Hypothesis 3: In hierarchically organized ethnic groups or movements, internal boundary contestation is less likely to succeed.
Again, the Kurdish case provides a quite useful context for investigating this hypothesis. As discussed in the following chapters, the Kurdish ethnonationalist movement is characterized by a highly centralized, hierarchical organizational structure. Thus, we might expect that coethnics’ contention of the boundary work initiated by the Kurdish ethnopolitical leadership would have limited impact on the leadership.
However, internal boundary contestation might be potentially more destabilizing in the case of strong divisions or cleavages at the elite level. Differences might emerge in the ruling cadre or among superordinates regarding where ethnic boundaries should be drawn. This situation would facilitate the efforts of boundary contesters or challengers. In the case of strong elite divisions, subordinate coethnics might find some allies at the elite level and so challenge more effectively the existing or redrawn boundaries defended by another elite faction. In other words, elite competition or rivalry would favor internal boundary contestation by opposing subordinate coethnics, increasing the likelihood of successful boundary contestation. Thus, we might postulate the following:
Hypothesis 4: In case of highly unified ethnopolitical leadership (i.e., absence or weakness of elite competition or rivalry), internal boundary contestation would be less likely to succeed.
This hypothesis should also hold in the Kurdish case because another defining feature of the Kurdish movement in the Turkish setting is a high degree of elite unity. Given the strong leadership cult and the tendency to associate any internal opposition with treason or betrayal to the leadership and the Kurdish cause, it would be quite difficult or highly costly to challenge the position of the leadership. Hence, the movement has not allowed any counterelites to emerge and gain power vis-à-vis the leadership. Such an organizational structure and culture would limit the chances of coethnics’ contesting ethnic boundaries successfully.
Conclusion
Since almost all ethnic and nationalist identifications and movements involve boundary processes (e.g., the creation, maintenance, and transformation of ethnic or national identities and boundaries), ethnic boundary-making theory emerges as a highly relevant and valuable theoretical device in ethnicity and nationalism studies. As Wimmer (2013, 3) also claims, “Focusing on social and categorical [symbolic] boundaries allows us to study the formation and dissolution of ethnic groups with more precision than standard sociological approaches that take the existence and continuity of such groups and categories for granted.”
