Читать книгу Napoleon's Russian Campaign of 1812 - Edward A. Foord - Страница 4

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The army with which Napoleon invaded Russia in 1812 was the largest which he had yet commanded, and almost certainly the largest that had ever been gathered for the purposes of a campaign under the leadership of a single man. None the less it was too small for its task, and when, on August 23rd, Napoleon left Smolensk on the last stage of the advance on Moscow, his communications were already inadequately guarded. A greater defect was its lack of homogeneity. Even in the nominally French regiments which formed the core of the vast host there were great numbers of troops drawn from the German, Dutch, Flemish and Italian provinces of the Empire. Round this nucleus were ranged masses of allies from almost every country in southern and western Europe.

The French Imperial Army in 1812 contained 107 regiments of infantry of the line and 31 of light infantry—138 in all. According to numeration there should have been 164, but 26 had disappeared from the roll for various reasons. During 1812 several new regiments were formed, chiefly from the conscrits réfractaires—men who had endeavoured to escape the remorseless conscription, and were confined and trained in special remote camps.

An infantry regiment comprised 1 depôt battalion and from 2 to 5 field battalions, each of 6 companies of 140 officers and men. One company consisted of Grenadiers and 1 of Voltigeurs; the former were chosen for height and strength, the latter, whose duties were those of skirmishers, for activity. All were, however, armed with the flintlock musket, though that of the Voltigeurs was of a lighter and improved pattern. Voltigeur sergeants carried a special carabine. Sappers were armed with a mousqueton or carbine. All these weapons were fitted with a triangular bayonet. Fire training was frequently of a very elementary character. The number of cartridges carried on the person was from 50 to 60.

Non-commissioned officers, Grenadiers and Sappers, were provided with a short sabre (sabre-bricquet) in addition to their fire-arms. Musicians also were armed with swords.

The total weight carried on the march, including weapons, ammunition, rations, kit, and share of camping essentials, was about 50 English pounds.

The line cavalry comprised 16 regiments of Cuirassiers and Carabiniers, 24 of Dragoons, 28 of Chasseurs-à-cheval, 11 of Hussars, and 9 of Chevau-légers. The last were special regiments designed to accompany the heavy Cuirassiers, who were ill adapted for performing scouting and outpost duty. Each cavalry regiment had, as a rule, 1 depôt squadron and 4 field squadrons, each of 2 companies of 125 officers and men, or a total of 1000 sabres. Chevau-léger regiments appear to have had only 3 field squadrons.

Cuirassiers were protected by steel helmets and cuirasses. The cuirass covered both back and breast, and weighed about 15 pounds. The breastplate was theoretically bullet-proof at a range of 40 metres, and really seems to have afforded fairly adequate protection, judging from the small proportion of killed and wounded among the cuirassier officers disabled at Borodino. Cuirassiers were armed with a long, straight sword and a pair of pistols. Dragoons carried in addition a carbine. Chasseurs-à-cheval and Hussars had carbine, pistol and a curved sabre. In the Chevau-léger regiments two-thirds of the troopers were armed with lance, sabre and one pistol; the remainder had, in place of the lance, a carbine in order to perform skirmishing and outpost duties.

The cavalry was largely mounted upon horses of German breed; but even so the supply was hardly adequate. Besides, many of the horses were too young, and the hardships of the war destroyed them at a rate which was steadily on the increase. The pace of the charges was never the wild gallop familiar to us from many a spirited but inaccurate painting. A trot was the best that Cuirassiers could usually do, and light cavalry was often little faster.

It has become a kind of legend that Napoleon's artillery was always his strongest arm, but this was by no means the case. In his earlier campaigns he was weak in artillery; in 1805 and 1806 he had but 5 guns to 3000 men. It is true that his gunners were generally better trained than their opponents; but at Eylau at any rate this hardly compensated for numerical inferiority, the French having only some 250 guns to oppose to 460 Russian pieces. At Aspern, again, Napoleon put only some 200 guns into the field against more than 300 admirably served Austrian cannon. His infantry also was evidently deteriorating in quality, and needed the moral as well as the physical support of powerful batteries. In and after 1809, therefore, Napoleon greatly augmented his field artillery. He also revived a practice of very doubtful utility in attaching to each regiment of infantry 2 or 4 light guns, served by a detachment of regimental gunners. The experiment had very qualified success; corps commanders were inclined to regard the regimental artillery as a mere nuisance. It would surely have been better to attach batteries of regular artillery to the regiments.

There were 9 22-company regiments of foot artillery, 43 companies of horse artillery in 6 regiments, and 27 6-company battalions of artillery train. The company of foot artillery consisted of 120 officers and men, that of horse artillery of 100. A battery consisted of a company of artillery and a company or half-company of train.

The field and horse artillery was armed with 12- and 6-pounder guns and 32- and 24-pounder howitzers. There were also some 4-pounders. A battery usually contained 4 or 6 guns and 2 howitzers. The regimental guns were light 3-pounders.

The quality of the artillery was high. Many of its officers had made a scientific study of their profession; and the force as a whole was highly trained. The material was good, but British officers considered it much inferior to that of their own army. Manœuvring was for the foot artillery a slow process, and for the rapid formation of his great preparatory batteries Napoleon was generally obliged to rely upon the horse artillery.

The technical troops were sufficient in number, admirable in quality, and directed by scientific officers. All through the Napoleonic wars the engineers did splendid service, and never was their skill and devotion more evident than in Russia. The construction and maintenance of the bridges of the Berezina, amid every kind of misery and disadvantage, is perhaps the fairest leaf on the crown of the French engineers.

Napoleon, realising that in thinly peopled Russia he could not wage war as in Germany, had made great exertions to organise a transport service, especially for the conveyance of food supplies. There were 26 battalions. Most of these had each 252 four-horsed waggons, each waggon with a load of 1500 kilogrammes. Four of them had 600 light carts, each with a load of 600 kilogrammes; and 4 were supplied each with 600 ox-waggons with a capacity of 1000 kilogrammes. The oxen were later to be killed and eaten—a foolish idea, which it is needless to say could not be carried out. Overworked draft cattle cannot be used for food. In practice the transport broke down hopelessly. Despite ruthless plundering in Prussia it was short of draft beasts from the outset. So, too, was the artillery, and it may be imagined that when horses were found the latter appropriated them as a matter of course. Forage was scarce. Finally there were hardly any roads which would bear the weight of the trains. They soon fell far to the rear, and from the first there was a shortage of supplies at the front.

Distinct from the army as a whole was the Imperial Guard. The inception of this force dated from 1800, when Napoleon formed a "Consular Guard" of 2 infantry and 2 cavalry regiments, selected from men who had served four campaigns. In 1806 and 1807 fresh regiments were raised on the same principle, and then numerous battalions of picked recruits. When Holland was incorporated in the Empire the Dutch Guards were also included.

The Old Guard comprised 3 regiments of Grenadiers (1 Dutch) and 2 of Chasseurs. The infantry of the New or Young Guard included 1 regiment of "Fusilier-Grenadiers" and 1 of "Fusilier-Chasseurs," formed in 1806, 6 regiments of Tirailleurs (Sharpshooters), 7 of Voltigeurs, and 1 of "Flanqueurs-Chasseurs." The last was a new regiment. The Voltigeurs and Tirailleurs had for the most part served two campaigns in Spain, and were seasoned troops. The 2nd and 3rd regiments of each arm remained in Spain, and the 7th Voltigeurs in France. All the other regiments went to Russia. They formed one division of the Old Guard and two of the Young Guard. The "Legion of the Vistula"—3 regiments of veteran Polish troops—was attached to the Guard on entering Russia. All Guard infantry regiments consisted of 2 field battalions, generally weaker than line units.

The cavalry included the two original regiments of the old Consular Guard, the Chasseurs-à-cheval and the Grenadiers-à-cheval, and a Dragoon regiment. These were French. There were also 2 Lancer regiments, 1 Dutch, 1 Polish. Guard cavalry regiments had 5 field squadrons. There were 2 squadrons of Gendarmerie d'Élite, and the celebrated Mameluke company—a troop of Oriental cavaliers.

The artillery of the Guard consisted of 10 foot and 4 horse artillery companies with their train. In August, 1812, the foot batteries were armed (apparently) with 32 4-pounder guns, 18 6-pounders, 24 12-pounders, and 14 32- and 24-pounder howitzers; the horse batteries with 16 6-pounder guns and 8 24-pounder howitzers. The Guard also possessed its own service of engineers, and eight companies of seaman for work on coasts or inland waters.

The pay of the Guards was higher than that of the troops of the line, and non-commissioned officers ranked with line subalterns. The Guards were envied and disliked by the line troops, who regarded them as a pampered corps. Napoleon certainly nursed them as far as possible, and in 1812 they were only in action, as a body, on a single occasion. The idea that they were the deciding factor in all Napoleon's great victories is without foundation.

Marshal Berthier, as Prince of Neufchâtel, was attended at head-quarters by a battalion of Guards raised in his own principality; and a troop of specially selected horsemen formed Napoleon's personal escort. During the campaign a battalion of Hesse-Darmstadt Guards, under Prince Emil, and a regiment of Portuguese light cavalry were also attached to head-quarters.

The higher organisation of the army was by brigades, divisions, and army corps of infantry or cavalry as the case might be. The strength of these units varied greatly. A brigade of infantry often consisted of a single large regiment; and divisions varied in the number of their battalions from 6 to 22. Compans' division of Davout's corps was equal in strength to the two Westphalian divisions taken together. The army corps also varied much in strength, owing to Napoleon's reasonable practice of entrusting specially talented generals with greater numbers than less able officers. The 1st Corps of the Grand Army in 1812 consisted of five large divisions, and totalled some 72,000 men; while the entire Westphalian Corps counted only 18,000.

The science of clothing soldiers simply and sensibly is so little understood even to-day that it can hardly be sought in 1812. There was less of polish and pipeclay in the French army than in that of Great Britain; but the uniforms were frequently as comfortless and awkward as they well could be. One wonders how the men could march and fight in them. The headgear was often especially clumsy and absurd. To deal with the many types of uniform would need a separate work. The infantry were generally attired in the blue uniform coat which had replaced the Bourbon white at the Revolution. Cuirassiers wore blue; Dragoons green; Chasseurs and Hussars green, with facings of every colour. In general it seems that there was a good deal of rather tawdry display about the uniforms of Napoleon's soldiers. Love of ostentation appears to be so deeply emplanted in the French character that at this day the abolition of the old glaring uniforms has been much delayed.

The soldier's daily rations consisted of, roughly, 28 ounces of bread, 4 ounces of vegetables or 2 of rice, 10 ounces of meat, and beer or wine according to the country. French soldiers, with their national genius for cookery, were adepts at making themselves comfortable; and when rations were regularly distributed they fared well enough. But Napoleon's system of subsisting his armies on the country would not work in Russia. Even in Germany in 1806, and still more in 1813, the troops were often in dire distress for food. In 1812 almost from the first it was impossible to keep up any regular distribution of rations. The soldiers were reduced to marauding for supplies, but in a poor country they were often not procurable, and the unfortunate men early began to feel the pinch of want. Napoleon did his best. He ordered the construction of bakeries at every halting-place; but orders can effect little without materials, and the latter were frequently lacking. The rye of Russia, also, did not suit the stomachs of men accustomed to flour ground from other grains; and the quality both of flour and bread was generally bad. Herds of beef-cattle were driven with the army, but their flesh rapidly deteriorated under the effects of bad fodder and fatigue. Generally speaking, the periods when the Grand Army was not living from hand to mouth were few, even on the advance. During the retreat it was half-starved at best.

DETAILS OF THE UNIFORMS OF THE INFANTRY OF THE FRENCH ARMY IN 1812

From "Uniformes de l'Armée française." By Lienhart and Humbert

In the disorganisation of the transport the hospital service fared badly. There was a fairly adequate staff of surgeons and medical officers; but their efforts—often devoted and persevering in the highest degree—could effect little when supplies of every kind were lacking. On the outward route, no less than the return, men died in thousands by the roadsides, uncared for and unnoticed. Nearly half the Bavarian Corps died or was invalided without seeing an enemy. The hospitals were inadequate and badly equipped from the outset; later on their condition became too frightful for words. All whom ill-fortune or duty brought into contact with them describe them in terms of horror. They eventually became mere charnel-houses, in which men were left to perish in thousands of every kind of misery.

The French army in 1812 was undoubtedly, from the military standpoint, the best organised in Europe; but its officers, as a whole, left much to be desired. The rapid increase of the numbers of the rank and file since 1806 had involved the improvisation of thousands of officers, often from doubtful material. The best of the regimental officers were those who united education to practical experience, but they were relatively few in number. The cadets of the military school were admirable material, but naturally lacked experience and, as De Fezensac adds, the physical strength which was so necessary. But besides those classes of educated officers there was a third composed of promoted sergeants, whose education was, as a rule, elementary. One of them, the worthy Staff-Captain Coignet, tells us in his delightful autobiography that he did not learn to write until he was thirty-three years of age! He was, indeed, a man of much natural sagacity, and keenly regretted his deficiencies; but it is obvious that these illiterate men can scarcely have made good company officers. The officers of the artillery and engineers were indeed generally excellent; but many of those of the cavalry, though dashing leaders on the field, possessed little solid knowledge of the duties of their arm, and the work of keeping in touch with the enemy was often very badly performed.

As regards their ideas of personal ease the French officers were no better than their opponents. Their private vehicles and baggage swelled the trains to gigantic dimensions—a fact which contributed much to the disasters of the retreat.

The quality of the rank and file was by no means what it had been in the great years of Austerlitz and Jena. The bloody campaign of 1807 had created gaps not easily to be filled at the time, and the Austrian and Peninsular wars deprived the army of the leisure necessary for it to repair its losses. The French divisions of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Army Corps contained many old regiments, but even in them there was a large proportion of recruits; and there were a number of regiments, belonging to newly annexed provinces, which were not altogether trustworthy. Their material—the sturdy peasantry of the Low Countries and North Germany—was excellent, and their conduct on the field usually irreproachable; but their administration and discipline left much to be desired. Their bad condition was continually exercising the soul of the order-loving Davout. In one despatch he describes the Dutch 33rd Léger as canaille, and declares in disgust that he can do nothing with it. Ney likewise complained of the 129th, and pointed out that it would have been better to draft the recruits of which it was composed into older regiments. It is probable that Napoleon's object in forming new units was to train as many officers as possible.

The deterioration of the troops rendered it necessary to employ deep tactical formations, with consequent risk of heavy losses. The usual formations for attacking infantry were (1) the "column of companies," in which each battalion advanced with its companies in three-deep line, one behind another, and (2) the "column of divisions," with a front of two companies instead of one. At best the front was narrow and the volume of fire proportionately weak, even when, as was usual, each battalion was preceded by a skirmishing line of Voltigeurs. Napoleon was fully aware of the fire weakness of these attack formations, and recommended as the ideal the ordre mixte in which battalions in column alternated with others in line. This order, like the others, failed hopelessly against the British two-deep line which brought every musket into action; and it is remarkable that able French generals continued to employ it when its inefficiency had been so clearly demonstrated. It is at least probable that the excitable and imaginative French soldiery could not advance steadily in line. At any rate, French tacticians trusted, to the end, in the thick skirmishing line which preceded the advance being able to clear a way for the masses behind. As the Russians, with less intelligent and (on the whole) worse trained troops, adopted similar tactics, the problems which troubled the French in Spain did not arise in Russia.

The French cavalry was excellent on the field, but otherwise often unsatisfactory. In scouting and outpost work it was inefficient; more than once during the campaign touch with the Russians was entirely lost. No doubt much of this inefficiency was due to the exhaustion of the horses. Forage was generally scarce, and to losses from fatigue and lack of food were soon added those in action. The men were frequently poor horse-masters. Murat took no care for the mounts, and over-worked his force from the first. When the central army began its retreat only 15,000 horsemen remained mounted, and none but the Guard regiments were really fit for service.

Concerning the internal condition of the French army something must be said. With the old soldiers devotion to their leader was still the watchword; but it would be a grave mistake to imagine that this sentiment was universal, especially among the better educated elements of the army. Yet the loyalty of the troops, as a whole, admits of no doubt. Sir Robert Wilson and De Fezensac are at one in bearing witness to this. The desire for plunder no doubt counted for something, but it was hunger rather than greed that made the French soldier a marauder. The spirit of brigandage was indeed rife in the army, and infected everyone from the commanders downward. On the whole, it may fairly be said that in the ranks the sense of loyalty was strong and the general spirit good, but that discipline was often badly maintained and naturally tended to become more and more relaxed as hardships increased. Further, it may be observed that while there were numbers of irreproachable men among the officers, there were also many greedy adventurers, besides those who were demoralised, like their men, by years of predatory warfare. Finally, there was, of course, in the army the ruffianly element, which is never absent. To this element must be attributed the commission of most of the atrocities which undoubtedly took place, and for which the whole army had later to suffer. One further point must be touched upon. The evidence as to the presence of women and children with the army, especially during the retreat, is abundant and overwhelming. This unhappy element consisted, in the first place, of female camp-followers—vivandières, cantinières and the like—mostly the wives of soldiers. Some of the officers, at any rate, were ill-advised enough to take their wives with them. The foreign population of Moscow mostly awaited the invaders, and fled with them in fear of Russian vengeance. Finally, the morals of the French army in sexual matters can only be described as low, at any rate from the British standpoint. Napoleon himself was not so much immoral as unmoral—not that there is any absolute proof that he gave way to his passions during the Russian campaign—and many of his officers followed his example. On the whole, it seems clear that for one reason or another the invading army was burdened with thousands of women and children, whose sufferings during the retreat constituted probably its most harrowing feature.

The troops of the allied states who accompanied and outnumbered the French were, generally speaking, the fair equals on the field of their comrades-in-arms. The Bavarians, Westphalians and Württembergers all behaved splendidly; and some of the finest fighting in the war was accomplished by the Berg and Baden regiments at the passage of the Berezina. The Italians fought admirably at the one general action at which they had the fortune to be present. The great Polish contingent performed splendid service for the man to whom Poland looked for its restoration to the roll of independent nations. Nor can any fault be found with the conduct in battle of the Spanish and Portuguese troops, though they were no better than prisoners, serving by compulsion. The Austrians and Prussians generally took no very prominent part in the campaign; but what they did was by no means to their discredit.

It was in administration rather than fighting quality that the allied troops fell below the French standard. They were also generally so badly supplied that the best administration could have effected little to improve their lot. The fine Bavarian and Württemberg troops wasted away by half before they had seen an enemy, and the Poles, to judge from Poniatowski's despatches, were often little better off. That the Spaniards and Portuguese supplied more than their proportion of deserters and pillagers is merely what might have been expected, and the same may be said of the Croats and Illyrians, whose interest in the war in which they were sacrificed was absolutely nil. Yet, on the whole, it cannot well be said that the foreign troops showed conspicuously worse discipline than their French comrades, though doubtless the general mixture of races and languages tended to lower the general standard.

As to the absolute quality of the allied troops it is very difficult to speak. The German and Swiss infantry were very solid and good, though of course the quality of the different contingents varied, and perhaps the Bavarians, Württembergers and Badeners rose above the general level. The Saxon cavalry were admirable, and probably the best in the entire Grande Armée. The German artillery also, especially that of Württemberg, was good.

The best of the Polish troops were very good indeed; but the regiments were largely composed of raw recruits, hastily raised for the great effort which, as the Poles of Warsaw fondly hoped, was to re-establish their national existence. The cavalry was good; the infantry less so. Discipline does not appear to have been very satisfactory; the officers included too many Pans, owing their commissions to their noble birth.

The Prussians were probably the best disciplined and best officered of all the allied troops. The general quality of the Austrians, also, was good.

Upon the whole, it cannot be doubted that the Grande Armée of 1812 was too heterogeneous, and that its quality was not of the best. Much of it had been hastily raised; and its enormous numbers merely added to the difficulty of provisioning it and, in consequence, to its misery and losses. General Bonnal thinks that Napoleon, when he collected the gigantic force, was more or less suffering from megalomania; and that he would have achieved more had he depended upon a Franco-Polish first line of about 250,000 troops, perfectly organised, disciplined and supplied. The point is certainly worthy of consideration.

Something must be said of the commanders who, under the direction of Napoleon, conducted the greatest of his armies during the most ambitious and disastrous of his campaigns.

For Napoleon himself a very few words must suffice. More has probably been written about him than of any other single figure in history. No good purpose can here be served by anything more than some brief animadversions upon the share which he himself had in the catastrophe of 1812.

Napoleon's position as the greatest military leader of modern times is as yet unchallenged; and it is needless therefore to discuss it. In 1812 he was, as far as years go, a comparatively young man. He was barely forty-three; his bodily energy and capacity of endurance were yet enormous. Nevertheless, he was not the Napoleon of 1800 and 1805. He had grown stout and somewhat unwieldy; and his gross habit of body must at times have affected his mind. Nor is it possible to ignore the first-hand evidence as to his indifferent health on more than one important occasion.

Napoleon's fierce and impetuous nature always made light of obstacles, and lack of patience was certainly a very pronounced feature in his character. Wellington is said to have remarked that it incapacitated the Emperor from defensive action in 1814, when circumstances imperatively demanded it.

Finally, Napoleon in 1812 was ruler as well as general; and political considerations probably had something to do with his adoption of courses of action indefensible from the military standpoint.

Napoleon's natural impatience, and his rage at being unable to strike a crushing blow, will probably explain the fatal rush in August past Smolensk on to Moscow. Bodily suffering appears to the author to account satisfactorily for his undoubted lack of energy at Borodino. The fatal delay at Moscow may fairly be attributed to a combination of political circumstances and not entirely unfounded optimism as regards the future.

For some of Napoleon's amazing blunders on the retreat reasons such as these will hardly account. The fatal dispersion of the marching columns along 60 miles of road, even after passing Smolensk, when the army was already worn down to a mere remnant; the unnecessarily slow pace of the march, the burning of the pontoon train previous to the passage of the Berezina, are cases in point; and can hardly be attributed to anything save declining intellectual powers.

On the whole, it seems difficult to deny that Napoleon, in 1812, had definitely entered upon his decline; that his perception was less clear than of old; that his bodily energy had decayed; that his genius, though still capable of burning brightly, now only blazed forth fitfully. Certainly there were times during the Moscow campaign when it appeared to be almost extinct.

Marshal Berthier, Prince of Neufchâtel, served in 1812, as in every campaign of Napoleon since 1796, as chief-of-staff. His methodical habits and untiring industry, coupled with his complete familiarity with Napoleon's character, rendered him indispensable to the latter. His military talents were not remarkable, and his general position was rather that of a confidential secretary than that of a modern chief-of-staff—for whom, indeed, there was no place near a man of Napoleon's essentially despotic temperament.

MARSHAL DAVOUT

Commander of the 1st French Army Corps

From the painting by Gautherdt at Versailles

Marshal Louis Nicolas Davout, Prince of Eckmuhl and Duke of Auërstadt, commander of the huge 1st Corps d'Armée, was probably the best of all Napoleon's generals, though he never had such opportunities of distinguishing himself in independent command as were granted to Masséna and Soult. He was a fine example of the modern scientific soldier, a stern disciplinarian and an admirable administrator, with a passion for order and method; and very careful of his men. The charges of cruelty brought against him do not appear to the author to have been satisfactorily made out—certainly not according to the standards of humanity generally accepted in Continental warfare. At the same time, there was undoubtedly a harsh and rough side to his character, and he seems to have lacked self-control and tact. Davout had excellent strategic insight, and his tactical ability and tenacity in action had been frequently and brilliantly demonstrated. He took a distinguished part in the first half of the campaign of 1812, but rather failed in the unaccustomed post of rear-guard commander. Men of his methodical habit of mind are probably ill-fitted to shine in such a turmoil of misery and disorder as the retreat from Moscow.

Marshal Oudinot, Duke of Reggio, was a hard-fighting veteran of the Revolution, who had received his bâton for services rendered in supporting Davout at Wagram. He was an excellent subordinate, but failed in separate command like so many of Napoleon's generals, though his action previous to the passage of the Berezina was highly meritorious.

Michel Ney, Duke of Elchingen, Marshal of France, reaped most of the credit gained by Napoleon's generals in 1812. Ney is commonly regarded as a mere hard fighter, but he was fairly well educated, and to all appearance a careful administrator. Among the papers of the French War Office relating to 1812 is an order in which he carefully instructs his suffering troops how to cook the unground grain which was their only food. As a strategist Ney did not excel, and he failed in independent command, but he was a fine tactician, and as a corps commander probably unsurpassed. His famous title "Le Brave des Braves" fairly sums up his character. His courage was indeed of that nobler type which rises to its height at the moment when that of meaner men declines.

Prince Eugène, Viceroy of Italy, son of the ex-Empress Josephine, was by virtue of his Imperial rank the commander of the army of Italy. He was brave, disinterested and devoted to his stepfather, but his military talents were not great, and he lacked experience. In 1809 he had been opposed to a commander even less capable than himself, and his officers and soldiers had helped him successfully out of his difficulties.

Prince Joseph Anthony Poniatowski, nephew of the last King of Poland, could hardly have been passed over in appointing a commander for the 5th (Polish) Army Corps; especially as he was Minister of War of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. He was brave and popular with his men, but possessed of no great capacity, and was indolent and pleasure loving.

General Gouvion St. Cyr, who was promoted Marshal for his victory over Wittgenstein at Polotsk in August, was a very capable though disaffected officer, who had, as far as good service counted for anything, won his bâton long before.

General Reynier, the commander of the Saxon 7th Corps, was a hard-fighting, experienced soldier of no special ability, and extremely unfortunate in war. Junot, who took over the Westphalian Corps from King Jerome, owed his position chiefly to Napoleon's friendship for him.

PRINCE JOSEPH ANTHONY PONIATOWSKI, NEPHEW OF STANISLAUS AUGUSTUS, THE LAST KING OF POLAND

Commander of the 5th (Polish) Corps of the Grand Army

From the painting by T.A. Vauchelet at Versailles

King Jerome Napoleon of Westphalia would probably have done well enough at the head of the troops of his own kingdom; his courage, as he showed at Waterloo, was beyond question. But to place him in command of three army corps, operating in a difficult country, and charged with a vitally important mission, was a gigantic blunder on the part of Napoleon. It is no especial discredit to Jerome that he failed so completely. General Bonnal observes that he cannot be blamed for transgressing military principles with which he had never been acquainted.

Marshal Victor, the commander of the 9th Corps, was an experienced officer, but had been very unfortunate in the Peninsula against the British.

Marshal Macdonald, commanding the 10th Corps, took a very small part in the campaign; and, unless he had special orders, cannot be said to have displayed much activity. He was a man of high personal character and a good hard-fighting corps commander, but of no eminence as a general.

Napoleon, during the latter part of his career, was repeatedly accused of placing his relations in positions for which they were not fitted. The case of King Jerome is one in point; so also perhaps, to a certain extent, is that of Napoleon's celebrated brother-in-law, Joachim Murat, King of Naples, commander of the Cavalry Reserves. Audacity and tactical ability on the field Murat certainly possessed, but he was hardly a great cavalry leader. His outpost and reconnaissance work was often very badly performed, and his impetuosity caused him to overwork and harass his men and horses. He lacked stability of character and steadiness in adversity, as he was soon to show. Yet as King of Naples he possesses more than one title to esteem, and in his character, amidst vanity and absurdity, there was much that was elevated and noble.

The commanders of the four corps under Murat's orders were all men of experience as cavalry leaders. The best of them, perhaps, was Nansouty, at any rate in his own estimation, but the name of Grouchy is better known in Great Britain. Montbrun and Latour-Maubourg had seen much service in Spain.

Marshal Lefebvre, Duke of Dantzic, commander of the Old Guard, was much attached to Napoleon, but otherwise merely a rough, honest old soldier of little strategic or tactical ability. His title was much better deserved by the brilliant engineer, General Chasseloup, who accompanied the army in 1812 as chief of his branch of the service.

Marshal Mortier, Duke of Treviso, commander of the Young Guard, was an excellent corps commander, as had been demonstrated in Spain.

Marshal Bessières, Duke of Istria, had been associated with the cavalry of the Guard since its formation. He was a fine cavalry leader, and a man of integrity and devotion to his chief, otherwise deserving of no special mention.

Generally speaking, Napoleon's commanding officers had one great defect. With few exceptions they had become so habituated to submission to the dominating personality of the Emperor that they had lost all power of initiative.

In an army so huge and of such experience there were naturally many officers who in a less warlike age would have been acclaimed as great generals. The majority of the divisional and brigade leaders were excellent, though some were already wearing out. Several of them—men such as Verdier—had had considerable experience in independent command, and some had acquired therein a by no means savoury reputation. Gudin, the leader of Davout's 3rd Division, was perhaps the most distinguished as a soldier, but his colleagues Friant, Morand, Desaix and Compans were all fine officers. Legrand, Merle, Verdier, Ledru, Marchand, Broussier, Pino, Bruyère, Sebastiani, St. Germain, Claparède, Tharreau, and others were men of considerable merit and experience.

Of the General Staff it may be said that it had scarcely any affinity with the board of specially trained officers which accompanies and assists a modern commander-in-chief. Napoleon's absorption, in his single person, of all military and administrative functions had reduced it to a position of complete insignificance. For all practical purposes it was nothing but a mass of orderlies, and though it contained many talented and meritorious officers they had small opportunity of distinguishing themselves so long as they remained members of it. Napoleon in one moment of exasperation declared that "the General Staff is organised in such a manner that nothing is foreseen." The remark was more or less true; but that such a state of affairs could exist is a very severe comment upon his methods. The invading host was, in short, the army of a despot who endeavoured to supervise everything himself and discouraged initiative in others, with the natural result that much that might have been done to minimise the catastrophe was not attempted.

The numbers of the invading army and its composition, according to the states and peoples who contributed contingents, are given in detail in Appendices A and B. Roughly it may be said that during the campaign Napoleon disposed of the following numbers:—

First Line

Head-quarters; Imperial Guard; }

1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 10th, Corps; } 449,000

Austrian Corps; Cavalry Reserve}

Second Line

9th Corps; Polish and Lithuanian levies; }

2 French Divisions; } 165,000

German Troops, Drafts, Parks, etc. }

Third Line

Drafts and organised troops in touch with }

Russians at close of campaign, including} 60,000

garrisons of Danzig and on Vistula }

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674,000

The composition by nations of the first two lines may be stated as follows:—

French and New French 302,000

Germans and Swiss 190,000

Poles and Lithuanians 90,000

Italians, Illyrians, Spaniards, Portuguese 32,000

————

614,000

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