Читать книгу Understanding Peacekeeping - Alex J. Bellamy - Страница 52

In November and December 1999, the UN issued landmark reports accepting responsibility and detailing the many failings that had led its peacekeepers to stand aside amid genocide in Srebrenica and Rwanda respectively. They were not, however, the first attempt to learn lessons from UN peacekeeping failures.

The first UN ‘lessons learned’ report was produced in February 1994 but not publicly released. The Commission of Inquiry created by the Security Council to investigate the armed attacks on UNOSOM II personnel in Somalia made two important observations and issued a damning recommendation that could be read as an endorsement of the retreat of peace operations. It argued that the mission failed principally because its different military components had no means of communicating with each other directly. A complex and slow process of decision-making was required for one contingent to request assistance from another (Commission of Inquiry 1994: 40). Second, the Commission noted that there was very little coordination at UN headquarters. The US component of UNOSOM II distanced itself from UN elements, creating a situation where information was not shared and common operating procedures and rules of engagement were not established. Importantly, the Commission concluded by insisting that ‘The United Nations should refrain from undertaking further peace enforcement actions within the internal conflicts of states. If the United Nations decides nevertheless to undertake enforcement operations, the mandate should be limited to specific objectives and the use of force would be applied as the ultimate means after all peaceful remedies have been exhausted’ (ibid.: 42). From the mid-1990s to around 2005, the UN tended to refrain from using enforcement measures in civil conflicts, leaving that to NATO, ECOWAS and other regional bodies. As chapter 5 demonstrates, however, from around 2005, UN peace operations gradually increased in size and used force in order to protect themselves and civilians under their care as well as to coerce ‘spoilers’.

With regard to Rwanda, the UN was slow to acknowledge its role in facilitating the 1994 genocide. In 1996, the newly created Lessons Learned Unit of the DPKO issued an internal report which attempted to exonerate the UN while blaming member states. ‘UNAMIR’, it found, ‘seemed always to be one step behind the realities of the situation in Rwanda.’ This was a product of operational problems such as the mission’s critical lack of transportation (of twenty-two armoured personnel carriers requested, UNAMIR received only eight – all seconded from other missions, and only five of which were roadworthy) and a breakdown of communication between peacekeepers on the ground, troop-contributing countries and UN headquarters in New York. The last encouraged ‘a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of the conflict [which] contributed to false political assumptions and military assessments’ (DPKO 1996: §3). According to the report, UNAMIR’s failure to prevent or halt the genocide, however, was also the fault of member states because, ‘at the height of the crisis, the unilateral decision of some Governments to withdraw their national contingents left the remnants of UNAMIR even more vulnerable and unable to provide protection to civilians at risk’ (ibid.: §2). Despite this, the report found, UNAMIR persevered and played a constructive role in Rwanda:

The United Nations and its family of agencies, although after some delay, did exert considerable efforts to assist the Rwandese people, particularly in the rehabilitation of the country’s justice system and to alleviate the very harsh conditions of many of the roughly 60,000 detainees in the prisons. UNAMIR itself was instrumental in restoring the telecommunications capabilities of the country, doing road and bridge repairs and rehabilitating basic infrastructure. (Ibid.: §3)

Although many of the report’s forty-three recommendations identified key areas in need of improvement (see table 4.3), they stopped short of assigning institutional responsibility or fault on the part of the UN’s agencies, officers and personnel. Moreover, although it identified key problems (e.g. the gap between mandate and means; late/non-deployment of troops), some of its recommendations were contradictory, and it omitted some important pieces of information.

One piece of now well-known information missing from this report is that, shortly before the genocide, one of Major-General Dallaire’s telegrams advised UN headquarters that he had received intelligence about preparations for mass killing. In it he asked for permission to seize arms caches belonging to militia groups. The telegram was passed to the deputy head of the DPKO, Iqbal Riza, who responded on behalf of Annan. Riza replied to the Secretary-General’s Special Representative (SRSG) in Rwanda (not Dallaire) that the peacekeepers should not act until given clear instructions from headquarters. The SRSG, Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh, replied that he had high-level political verification of Dallaire’s intelligence and that UNAMIR planned to act on it in the next day or two. Riza’s response was that UNAMIR did not have a mandate to seize weapons caches or protect civilians and must therefore refrain from doing so. UN headquarters would pass on the intelligence to the US, France, Belgium and the Rwandan government. Riza infamously ended his telgram by declaring that ‘the overriding consideration is the need to avoid entering into a course of action that might lead to the use of force and unanticipated repercussions’ (in Traub 2006: 52). Although the telegrams were all copied to the Secretary-General, the DPKO did not specifically bring the matter to Boutros-Ghali’s attention, nor did they ask the Secretary-General to alert the Security Council. The overarching concern in the wake of Somalia was to guard against overextension in a context where the US was actively arguing against UN peace operations. As Annan explained, ‘you can’t look at Rwanda without thinking of what happened in Somalia; in fact, they were happening almost simultaneously’ (ibid.: 53).

Table 4.3 Key DPKO recommendations from its Comprehensive Report on … UNAMIR (1996)

Recommendation	Description
1 Mandates should reflect realities on the ground and be matched with the means to implement them.	UNAMIR’s mandate and means were based on a misunderstanding of the conflict and a false assumption that parties supported the Arusha Accords.
3 Peacekeepers require intelligence.	UNAMIR and UN Headquarters lacked capacity to collect intelligence.
6 Requests for troops should focus on capabilities not numbers.	UNAMIR lacked logistical and communications capabilities.
7 Troops must deploy in a timely fashion.	Authorized expansion of UNAMIR in May 1994 was not translated into enhanced capacity due to late deployment and the unwillingness of non-Africans to contribute.
8 Contingents must be fully equipped.	Some African peacekeepers lacked basic equipment.
9 Unilateral troop withdrawals should be discouraged.	Belgian withdrawal was announced without consultation, which undermined the whole mission.
32 An effective political and humanitarian early warning system is needed.	Human Rights Commission reports of deteriorating situation were not circulated across the UN system.
34 Missions should have a joint civil–military operations centre.	There was little coordination of political, military and humanitarian agencies.
36 Protection of civilians is an important humanitarian contribution.	The UN should have had a human rights office in Rwanda working with UN police (CIVPOL).
37 Peacekeepers should strive to maintain impartiality in appearance and perception.	Negotiations with the Rwandan government and the RPF impaired UNAMIR impartiality.

This tendency to try to shield the UN from criticism over Rwanda persisted after the report. While member states must obviously shoulder the blame for providing inadequate support to UNAMIR and then withdrawing in the face of genocide, the DPKO’s report and Annan’s public statements failed to address equally troubling questions about the UN’s performance. For example, the Report of the Independent Inquiry in 1999 argued that, even given its limited size, UNAMIR should have been able to do more to prevent the genocide and protect civilians (Independent Inquiry 1999: 28).

Partly in response to mounting public criticism of the UN’s refusal to examine its mistakes in Rwanda properly, and partly in response to internal advice that a more critical examination was a prerequisite for regenerating UN peace operations, in 1999 Annan established an Independent Commission comprising the former Swedish prime minister Ingvar Carlsson, the former South Korean foreign minister Han Sung-Joo, and a retired Nigerian general, Rufus Kupolati, to investigate all aspects of the UN’s performance in Rwanda. When Annan received a draft copy of the report, his first inclination was to order its revision, believing that it was too critical of the UN. However, on the advice of senior advisers such as Mark Malloch Brown and the new head of the DPKO, Jean-Marie Guéhenno (2002: 72), who argued that only by reconciling fully with the past could the UN move forward and begin to rebuild credibility and support for peace operations among member states, Annan agreed to leave the text as written by the Inquiry.

The Report of the Independent Inquiry opened with a damning but general criticism, insisting that the Rwandan genocide resulted from the failure of the whole UN system. The ‘overriding failure’, it argued, was the lack of resources and lack of will to take on the commitment that would have been necessary to prevent the genocide and protect its victims. The lack of resources and will meant UNAMIR was not adequately ‘planned, dimensioned, deployed or instructed’ in a way that would have ‘provided for a proactive and assertive role’ in the face of the deteriorating situation in Rwanda (1999: 2). The mission was smaller than recommended by the DPKO, slow to deploy owing to the reluctance of states to contribute troops, and debilitated by administrative difficulties. When troops did arrive, they were generally inadequately trained and equipped.

Hence, when the genocide erupted, UNAMIR was not functioning properly and was mired in problems associated with dysfunctional command and control and a lack of military capacity. ‘A force numbering 2,500’ (UNAMIR’s strength at the time of the genocide), the Inquiry concluded, ‘should have been able to stop or at least limit massacres of the kind which began in Rwanda’ at the start of the genocide (1999: 2). That UNAMIR failed to do this was the result of ‘fundamental capacity’ problems. Among the report’s many criticisms and recommendations were ten points critical to improving future UN peace operations:

1 Inadequacy of the mandate: UNAMIR’s mandate was unsuited to the situation in Rwanda and lacked contingencies and fall-back positions. This was a product of a lack of will on the part of member states but also the UN’s failure to inform the Security Council accurately about the situation in Rwanda before the genocide.

2 Implementation of the mandate: UNAMIR’s mandate was implemented cautiously, focusing on preserving the appearance of neutrality under a traditional peacekeeping mandate that was unsuited to the context. UNAMIR should have done more to alert headquarters and the Security Council to the inadequacy of this approach.

3 Confusion over the rules of engagement: UNAMIR never received a response to requests for guidance about the rules of engagement, resulting in a critical lack of clarity regarding which rules were in force.

4 Failure to respond to the genocide: At the beginning of the genocide, UNAMIR failed to take steps – such as establishing roadblocks and protecting VIPs – to respond to the early massacres. It said that it would protect politicians and failed to do so; civilians who fled to UN compounds in search of protection were sometimes abandoned to their fate. This failure stemmed from poor intelligence and information and the inability of UNAMIR’s commander to exert practical command over his troops.

5 Inadequate resources and logistics: UNAMIR had only five roadworthy armoured personnel carriers, one helicopter and insufficient medical supplies for its personnel. Troops in Kigali reported that they had one to two days’ worth of drinking water, up to two days’ worth of food rations and two to three days’ worth of fuel reserves.

6 Inappropriate focus on ceasefire: Once the genocide had begun, UNAMIR and UN headquarters were focused more on negotiating a ceasefire than they were on protecting civilians. From the Secretary-General down, UN officials held meetings with those associated with the genocidaires in which they focused on securing a ceasefire rather than conveying outrage at the genocide.

7 Lack of analytical capability: UNAMIR lacked sufficient focus or the institutional capacity systematically to gather and analyse information in order to build an accurate picture of the situation or provide early warning.

8 Failure to protect: UNAMIR failed to protect political leaders, civilians and national staff even where promises to protect had been made or where people had gathered seeking the UN’s protection. ‘Tragically’, the report found, ‘the trust placed in UNAMIR by civilians left them in a situation of greater risk when the UN troops withdrew than they would have been anyway’ (1999: 43).

9 Flow of information: The flow of information was sporadic, resulting in critical information either being lost or not getting into the hands of appropriate decision-makers. Several members of the Security Council complained that they were not made aware of Dallaire’s now famous telegram.

10 Organizational problems: Poor personal relations and unclear lines of communication and authority within UNAMIR and between the Secretary-General, UN staff and the Security Council hindered the transfer of information.

The report concluded, therefore, that the UN’s failure in Rwanda was created largely by a critical disjuncture – endemic in many UN operations at the time – between the tasks given to the peacekeepers and their conceptual and material tools. For largely political reasons (the US would not support a large complex operation so soon after Somalia), UNAMIR was conceived in traditional terms, even though its operational context meant that the basic assumptions necessary for such peacekeeping were not in place (see chapter 8).

These conclusions echoed those of the UN’s report on the Srebrenica massacre, issued a month earlier. Unlike the Rwanda report, the UN’s report on Srebrenica was written by the UN Secretariat and issued in the name of the Secretary-General. What made this report different, however, was that it was not revised by political officers and senior officials. (Usually, UN reports are redrafted and the wording finessed as they make their way through the system.) The report argued that the collapse of Srebrenica was particularly shocking because the town had been designated a ‘safe area’ by the UN and thousands of civilians had fled there seeking protection. However, the Dutch peacekeepers were denied the resources, support and mandate necessary to protect Srebrenica.

In relation to resources, the ‘safe area’ was garrisoned by approximately 200 Dutch peacekeepers with limited mobility and armed only with light weapons. The peacekeepers were not regularly resupplied and confronted critical shortages of fuel, ammunition and other basic supplies. They faced approximately 2,500 Bosnian Serb soldiers equipped with heavy artillery. In relation to support, on at least three occasions the Dutch commander in Srebrenica requested aerial support – a request denied by UNPROFOR’s leadership (with the backing of UN headquarters) for mainly political reasons. In relation to the mandate, Dutch peacekeepers were not expressly authorized to use force to protect civilians in the safe area, and the commander was issued a directive to place force protection ahead of all other considerations (Annan 1999b: §§471–4). Annan conceded that ‘we were, with hindsight, wrong to declare repeatedly and publicly that we did not want to use air power against the Serbs’ (ibid.: §483).

The report found that, as in Rwanda, these operational problems were rooted in deeper political problems in the Security Council. Once again, the Security Council was focused on trying to keep the peace when there was no peace to keep (Annan 1999b: §488) and delivering humanitarian aid in the false belief that this would help remedy the situation. Moreover, decisions about the nature and direction of UNPROFOR were taken on the basis of false assumptions about Serbian war aims (ibid.: §§496–7). As a result, peacekeepers were put into situations where they might be required to use force but without the political support or resources to do so effectively and pursue the strategy through to its conclusion (see Goulding 1996: 15–17).

The report identified a series of lessons for the future, four of which are particularly important here. First, when missions are not supported by a unified Security Council, they are more likely to fail. Second, peace operations and war-fighting are distinct, and the former must only be deployed with clear mandates, support and adequate resources. As the report put it,

Peacekeepers must never again be told that they must use their peacekeeping tools – lightly armed soldiers in scattered positions – to impose the ill-defined wishes of the international community on one or another of the belligerents by military means. If the necessary resources are not provided – and the necessary political, military and moral judgments are not made – then the job simply cannot be done. (Annan 1999b: §498)

Third, while safe zones could play a useful role in protecting civilians, it was important to clarify the precise nature of the zone. ‘Protected zones’, ‘safe areas’ or ‘safe havens’ should fall into one of two types: either properly demilitarized zones created under the authority of international humanitarian law enjoying the consent of the belligerents; or safe areas that are not demilitarized or do not enjoy the consent of the belligerents that are ‘fully defended by a credible military deterrent’ (ibid.: §499). In Bosnia, however, ‘safe areas were established by the Security Council without the consent of the parties and without the provision of any credible military deterrent’ (ibid.). Several members of the Security Council and UN officials warned of this problem but were ignored.

The fourth and ‘cardinal’ lesson from Srebrenica was that a strategy of genocide and ethnic cleansing must be met ‘decisively with all necessary means, and with the political will to carry the policy through to its logical conclusion’ (Annan 1999b: §502). Ultimately, only the appropriate threat and use of military force is likely to deter attacks and protect the civilian population. UNPROFOR, like UNAMIR, was not equipped to fulfil this role.