Читать книгу The Children: Some Educational Problems - Alexander Darroch - Страница 8

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"Of all the animals with which the globe is peopled, there is none towards whom nature seems, at first sight, to have exercised more cruelty than towards man, in the numberless wants and necessities with which she has loaded him, and in the slender means which she affords to the relieving of these necessities. In other creatures these two particulars generally compensate each other. If we consider the lion as a voracious and carnivorous animal, we shall easily discover him to be very necessitous, but if we turn our eye to his make and temper, his agility, his courage, his arms, and his force, we shall find that his advantages hold proportion with his wants. … In man alone this unnatural conjunction of infirmity and of necessity may be observed in the greatest perfection. Not only the food which is required for his sustenance flies his search and approach, or at least requires his labour to be produced, but he must be possessed of clothes and lodging to defend him against the injuries of the weather: though to consider him only in himself, he is provided neither with arms, nor force, nor other natural abilities which are in any degree answerable to so many 'necessities.' 'Tis by society alone he is able to supply his defects and raise himself up to an equality with his fellow-creatures, and even acquires a superiority over them."[3] In these terms Hume draws the distinction between man and the animals, and if, for the term Society, we substitute the word Education, then we shall more truly describe the means by which man overcomes his natural infirmities and meets his necessities.

But we have to ask, Wherein does man differ from the animals? what power or faculty does he possess over and above those possessed by himself and the animals in common? and how does it happen that as his wants and needs increase and multiply the means to satisfy them also tend to increase? Now, the animal is guided wholly or mainly by instinct. In the case of many animals the whole conduct of their life from birth to death is governed by this means. In the case, indeed, of some of the higher animals, there is a limited power of modifying this government by instinct through the experience acquired during the lifetime of the individual. But man alone possesses the power or faculty of reason. And it is through the possession of this power that he alone of all creatures can be educated; it is the possession of this power which places him above the rest of creation, and it is in the possession of this power that the possibility of his greatness, and also of his baseness, lies. Now, an instinct may be defined as an inborn and inherited system of means for the attainment of a definite end of such a nature that once the appropriate external stimulus is applied the system tends to work itself out in an automatic manner until the end is attained, and independently of any control exercised by the individual. The working out of such an action may be accompanied by consciousness, but the power of memory would only be valuable in so far as the instinct was imperfect, and in so far as the better attainment of the end was fostered by direct individual experience. Thus the greater the range of instinct the less the scope of and the less the need for education—i.e., for acquiring experiences that will function in rendering more efficient future action; and conversely, the less the range of instinct the greater the need for education, for acquiring experiences that may function in the guidance and direction of future action.

Now, in man the range of instinct is small. In fact, it is questionable whether in the strict usage of the term he possesses any one perfect instinct. But to overcome this weakness of his nature he possesses the power or faculty of reason, and this consists in the ability to self-find, to self-adapt, and to self-establish systems of means for the attainment of definite ends. "Man's splendid power of learning through experience and of applying the contents of his memory to forecast and mould the future is his peculiar glory. It is this which distinguishes him from and raises him above all other animals. This it is that makes him man. This it is that has enabled him to conquer the whole world and to adapt himself to a million conditions of life."[4] This it is that also makes possible the education of the child, and raises the hope that by a truer and deeper conception of the process of education we shall be enabled to mould the character of the children to worthy ends.

But although man is pre-eminently the rational animal, yet reason only operates, and can only operate, in so far as it is called into activity by the need of satisfying some inborn or acquired desire. That is, man possesses not only reason, but also certain instinctive tendencies to action. In early life, the instincts of curiosity, of imitation, of emulation, and the various forms of the play instinct are ever inciting the child to action, and ever evoking his reason-activity to acquire new experiences which shall function in the more efficient performance of future action. At a later stage other instinctive tendencies make their appearance, as e.g. the parental instinct, and serve as motives for the further acquisition of new experiences—for the establishment of other systems of means for the attainment of desired ends. But as the child passes from infancy to youth and manhood, these instinctive tendencies, although ever present, alter their character, and acquired ends or interests become the motives of actions. But these acquired ends or interests are not something created out of nothing: they are grafted upon and arise out of the innate and inherited instinctive tendencies of man's nature. Thus, e.g., the instinct of mere self-preservation may pass into the desire to attain a certain standard of life, or to maintain a certain social status; the instinct of curiosity into the desire to find out and to systematise knowledge for its own sake. But for the realisation of these instinctive ends, whether in their crude or acquired forms, the finding and the establishment of systems of means in every case is necessary, and in order that they may be realised man must acquire the requisite capacities for action. In the case of the animal the instinct or impulse to action is inherited, but the capacity for action is also inborn or innate. Man possesses all the innate ends or interests which the animal possesses. Moreover, upon these innate ends or interests can be grafted ends or interests innumerable and varied in character, but in order that they may be satisfied he must through the evoking into activity of reason find and adapt means for their attainment. Thus the general nature of our conscious human life is that throughout we are striving to attain ends of a more or less explicit nature, and endeavouring to find out and to establish means for their attainment. Whether in the performance of some simple, practical act, or in trying to observe accurately what is presented to us through the senses, or in endeavouring to realise imaginatively something not directly presented to the senses, or in performing an abstract process of thought, the activity of reason in its formal aspect is ever one and the same. Hence in education we have not to do with the development of many powers or faculties but with the development or the evolution of the one power or faculty of reason, and the process of development in its general nature is always the same in kind—viz., the process of systematically building up knowledge which shall function in the future determination of conduct. What varies in each case, at each stage of development, is the nature of the material which goes to form this or that system, and the character of the identity or link of connection which binds part to part within any given system. A system of knowledge may be built up of perceptual elements, of ideas derived directly through the medium of the senses. Of such a character are the systems of knowledge possessed by the artist and the musician. Again, a system of knowledge may be composed wholly or mainly of images—of remembered ideas, so altered and so modified as to form and fit into a new whole. Lastly, the elements which go to form the component parts of the system may be of a conceptual character. Thus we may select the number aspect of things for consideration and treatment, and so build up and establish within the mind of the child a number system. But in each and every case the power at work is the activity of reason, and the end ever in view in the selection and in the formation of the system is the satisfaction of some end or interest desired either for its own sake or as a means to some further and remoter end.

Further, a system of knowledge may differ not only in the nature of the materials of which it is composed, but also in the mode of its formation; i.e., the nature of the identity which binds part to part within the system may vary in character. Now it is upon the nature of the systems which we ultimately form in the mind of the child and upon the method which we pursue in our process of system or knowledge making that the resultant character of our education depends.

A system of knowledge may be related as regards its parts by some qualitative or quantitative bond of identity. All sciences of mere classification are formed in this way, and the formation of such systems is in some cases a necessary preliminary to the evolution of the higher forms of system. But the important point to note is that all such systems are valuable only as a means to the further recognition, the further classification, of similar instances. An individual whose mind was wholly formed in this way might be compared to a well-arranged museum, where everything is classified and arranged on the basis of qualitative identity. But manifestly this mere arranging and classifying of knowledge has only a limited value. Such systems can never be used as means for the realisation of any practical need of life, can never by themselves lead us to intrinsically connected knowledge.

A second and higher form of system is established whenever the bond of connection between part and part is an identity of function or of law. All language systems are of this nature, and the more highly synthetic the language the more intrinsic the connection there is between the parts of the system. Further, it should be noted that systems of this character can be used for the attainment of other ends than those of mere recognition and classification. They, of course, can be used as instruments of intercourse, of culture, and of commerce. But they may further be utilised in education in the training of the pupil to self-apply a system of knowledge to the solution of relatively new problems, and it is for this reason mainly that the ancient languages possess their value as educational instruments.

Lastly, systems of knowledge may be formed in which the inter-relation of part to part within the system is that of identity of cause and effect. In the establishment of scientific knowledge the aim is to show the causal inter-relation of part to part within a systematic whole or unity. Hence also, as in the case of language systems, systems of this nature are capable of being used to train the pupil to self-apply knowledge in the solution of practical and theoretical problems, and in the realising of the practical ends of life. Once again it must be noted that in the establishment of the various systems of knowledge the one activity ever present is that of reason seeking ever to connect part to part in order that some end or interest may be attained. Moreover, we may misuse the power of reason, and employ it in the attainment of ends which are valueless in the sense that they further no real interest or end in life. This is done whenever knowledge is crammed, whenever the bond of connection between one part of knowledge and the other is extrinsic, and whenever facts are connected and remembered by bonds of a more or less accidental or factitious nature. And since such knowledge can further no direct interest or end in life, its acquisition must, as a rule, be motived by some strong indirect interest. As a consequence, whenever the indirect interest, whatever its nature may be—the fear of punishment, or the passing of an examination—ceases to operate, then the desire for further acquisition also ceases. Hence it follows that the establishment of any such system is of comparatively little value. It may pave the way at a later period for the formation of a system of intrinsically connected knowledge, but as a general rule such systems, because they cannot be used, tend soon to drop out of mind, and to be of no further consequence in the determination of conduct. But further, this misuse of reason, this inciting of the mind to memorise facts unrelated except by their mere accidental time or space relations, will if persisted in tend to render the individual dull, stupid, and unimaginative.

The systems of knowledge, then, of most value are those which establish intrinsic connections between part and part; for it is only by means of systems of this character that action can be determined and knowledge extended. In this sense we may agree with Herbert Spencer[5] that science or systematised knowledge is of chiefest value both for the guidance of conduct and for the discipline of mind. At the same time we must not fall into the Spencerian error of identifying science "with the study of surrounding phenomena," and in making the antithesis between science and linguistic studies one between dealing with real things on the one hand, and mere words on the other.

Further, since the establishment of a system of means is always through the self-finding and the self-forming of the system, this furnishes the key to the only sound method of education—viz., that the child must be trained in the self-discovering and the self-connecting of knowledge. This does not mean that the method should be heuristic in Rousseau's sense, that the child should be told nothing, but be left to rediscover all knowledge for himself. But it does mean that in the imparting of the garnered experience of the race the child must be trained in the methods by which the race has slowly and gradually built up a knowledge of the means necessary for the realisation of the many and complex ends of civilised life.

Before passing on to consider the ends at which we should aim in the education of the child, it may be well briefly to summarise the conclusions reached.

1. Man is distinguished from the rest of creation by the possession of reason: the animal life is mainly or wholly guided by instinct.

2. Man like the animals possesses instincts or instinctive tendencies, but for their realisation he must seek out and establish systems of means for their attainment. Bereft of these instinctive tendencies of his nature, man would have no incentive to acquire experiences for the more efficient guidance of his future conduct.

3. In the course of the development and extension of experience there gradually becomes grafted upon these innate instincts, interests or ends of an acquired nature, and one of the main functions of education is to create, foster, and establish on a permanent and stable basis, interests of ethical and social worth.

4. The power of reason is no occult power: it is simply the capacity for finding and establishing systems of means for the attainment of ends; or it may be defined as the power of acquiring experience and of self-applying this experience in the future guidance of conduct.

5. The evolution of intelligence in man is the evolution of this reason-activity to the attainment of new and more complex theoretical and practical ends or interests. At an early stage the systems of knowledge established are for the attainment of the relatively simple needs of life, and are composed of perceptual and imagined elements. At a later stage the systems formed may be of the most complex nature, and are composed of conceptual elements.

6. Man is the only being capable of education in the strict usage of the term. He alone must acquire the means for the realisation of the various desired ends of life.

7. The process of education is a process which, utilising as motives to acquirement the instinctive tendencies of the child's nature, seeks to establish systems of means for their realisation, and upon these innate or inborn instincts to graft acquired ends or interests which shall hereafter function in the attainment of ends of economic, ethical, and social worth.

8. The only truly educative method is the method which trains the pupil to find, establish, and apply systems of knowledge in the attainment of ends of felt value.