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SADF deploys liaison officers in Rhodesia

The Rhodesian Bush War was also known as the Second Chi­mu­renga7 and the Zimbabwe War of Liberation. This civil war lasted from July 1964 to December 1979.

On the one side of the conflict was Ian Smith’s Rhodesian government and later Bishop Abel Muzorewa’s Zimbabwe-Rhodesian government. On the other side of the spectrum were the opposing groups: Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (Zanla) and Joshua Nkomo’s Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (Zipra).

In March 1979 Lt. Gen. George Peter Walls GLM DCD MBE became commander of the Rhodesian armed forces. The Rhodesian Bush War was still in full swing. On the government’s side, it was organised and controlled from Combined Operations (COMOPS) that divided Rhodesia into seven operational areas. In each area a Joint Operational Centre (JOC) was established, which planned and controlled operations.

Gen. Magnus Malan, Chief of the SADF, and Walls had identified the need for a South African liaison officer to serve on Walls’ staff (he was then still commander of Combined Operations). Consequently, from June 1977 to August 1980 SADF liaison officers were deployed at regular intervals at COMOPS in Salisbury (today Harare). At the time of the deployment of the liaison officers, Col. Minnaar Fourie was already settled in Salisbury as military attaché. He had to keep Gen. Malan abreast of the military and political situation in the country.

The liaison officers’ duties involved personal liaison with Malan and Walls, as well as briefings regarding planned cross-border operations and air support for upcoming cross-border operations. They also had to take care of maritime support for east coast operations and the acquisition of special equipment for the Special Air Service (SAS), the Selous Scouts and the Special Branch.8 The liaison officers were at the same time closely involved with the provision of non-conventional weapons.

* * *

Col. Hans Möller, a paratrooper and former commander of 1 Parachute Battalion, was the first South African liaison officer to be deployed to Rhodesia. He was attached to Military Intelligence (MI) at the time. The liaison officers all stayed at the King George VI officers’ mess (KG VI) in the suburb of Borrowdale in Salisbury. Their accommodation was a secluded luxurious one-bedroom flat in the garden of the officers’ mess that was known as the ‘King George VI VIP Flat’.

For security reasons, Möller was kitted out in Salisbury in full Rhodesian uniform with the rank of colonel. His ‘new identity’ did not always pass muster, and once he was confronted head-on by a Rhodesian who inquired: ‘Colonel, who are you?’ to which Möller responded: ‘I am a Rhodesian officer on the staff of COMOPS.’ But the Rhodesian replied: ‘Sir, with respect, that’s not true because I know all the officers on the COMOPS staff and you are not one of them.’

Möller was part of the COMOPS planning team that crisscrossed Rhodesia and visited all the JOCs. The purpose of the visits was to determine the operational needs of each JOC as well as specific logistical needs with which the SADF could assist the Rhodesians.

The Combined Operations team sometimes also visited Special Forces bases, such as Fort Bendura and Fort Buffalo Range. The bases were manned exclusively by the Selous Scouts, and there they were briefed on operations, methodology, training, and success or failure with regard to ‘turning’ captured enemies. It would then also be established what support the SADF could provide and a shopping list would be handed to EMLC,9 a highly specialised and secret engineering company that supplied special equipment to Special Forces.

During one such visit Hans Möller talked to two Zipras ‘who had been turned. To my great surprise, I found myself sitting next to these two gentlemen on a flight to Pretoria. All I heard later was that they had been under way on a mission to “a foreign country”.’

Möller personally relayed Rhodesia’s requirements to Malan and Maj. Gen. PW van der Westhuizen, Chief of Staff Intelligence (CSI). These included weapons and ammunition and any other armaments the Rhodesians required for specific operations or for their war effort as a whole. Malan and his top structure would then approve or turn down the requests.

At COMOPS, the first briefing session in the morning was a general briefing about what had happened on the operational front over the past 24 hours. During the second session, too, general feedback was given, and depending on the morning session, future operations would be planned. The third session would take place on an ad hoc basis, and this was where special operations of a strategic nature were discussed. This type of operation was elaborated in the utmost secrecy, and the ‘need-to-know’ principle determined who was allowed to be present.

By virtue of his appointment as military attaché in Salisbury, Col. Fourie had access to intelligence sources that were not always accessible to liaison officers. Hence he was in a position to give valuable input with regard to requests for support in operations, which he did.

After a stint of about ten months (from June 1977 to March 1978) as liaison officer in Rhodesia, Möller was retransferred to South Africa and returned to his position at MI. Before long he was transferred to the Special Forces HQ in Pretoria as Senior Staff Officer Operations Army (SSO Ops Army). Here he served on the staff of the general officer commanding (GOC) Special Forces, Maj. Gen. Fritz Loots. Capt. (navy) Woody Woodburne was the SSO Ops Navy, and Col. Karel van Heerden the SSO Ops Air Force. Möller was the most senior of the three, and Gen. Loots employed him as his second in command (2IC) within Special Forces.

During Möller’s deployment at Special Forces, he was very closely involved in the planning regarding the organisation’s future. He was inter alia involved in the so-called Serfontein Commission (1977–1979) that had been appointed to investigate Special Forces’ structures and deployment and make recommendations. This was a very stimulating time for Möller, as he had a natural aptitude for and interest in organisational work and investigations of this kind.

He is remembered as a very popular officer who was universally liked. He excelled as a sportsman as well, and played wing for both Northern Transvaal and the Junior Springboks. On the rugby field he had the reputation of being one of the toughest players to bring down as he was an enormously strong runner and exceptionally firm on his legs. The highlight after many challenges in his military career was his appointment as officer commanding of Eastern Transvaal Command with the rank of major general.

* * *

Col. Ewald Olckers replaced Hans Möller as liaison officer in Rhodesia. He and his wife Isabel, along with her ginger cat Tau, flew to Salisbury with two suitcases filled with clothes on a South African Airways flight on 19 April 1978. On their travel documents, the purpose of their visit was merely stated as ‘on business’. Olckers had been given an undertaking by Gen. Loots that his deployment ‘would only be for a year’.

Like Möller, Olckers was a paratrooper and former commander of 1 Parachute Battalion. A year and ten months would go by, however, before he was relieved as liaison officer when Cmdt. André Bestbier, another paratrooper, took over from him on 22 February 1980. The functions Olckers and Bestbier performed in Rhodesia were similar to Möller’s. On the day of Olckers’ return to South Africa (with ginger cat and all), thousands of supporters were thronging the airport to await the arrival of Robert Mugabe.

Olckers recommended Bestbier to Gen. Loots as the appropriate person to replace him.10 He and Bestbier were good friends, had stayed together in the officers’ mess at Oudtshoorn, holidayed together, practised sports together, and on occasion served together as barmen.

Olckers has fond memories of the Rhodesian phase. ‘Besides the fact that I enjoyed the work, I met lots of people and learnt to speak English well into the bargain … which would later stand me in good stead in Durban. On Saturday afternoons, in a jacket and tie, I would go with Isabel to the Owners and Trainers VIP box at Borrowdale Race Course for diversion. It was also an institution to go for drinks at the Monomatapa Hotel.11 Because of the upcoming election, additional Recces were deployed under cover in Salisbury, and on more than one occasion I had to broker peace between the Recce operators and the Philistines.’12

On his return from Rhodesia, Col. Olckers was appointed as the SSO Ops Army at Special Forces. On 2 March 1981 he became the first commander of 1 Reconnaissance Regiment (1 RR), which originated from 1 Reconnaissance Commando (1 RC). He served as the commander until 30 March 1983.

Apart from his strong leadership qualities, Olckers would also be remembered by his men as the proverbial ‘man’s man’. At the Bluff in Durban he dived with them and joined them in fishing at the whaling station. He was an outstanding sportsman and even played rugby for the SA Army.

* * *

Cmdt. André Bestbier, Olckers’s successor as liaison officer, comes from a family with strong military ties. His father was a WO1 in the SADF and his elder brother, Frank, an infantryman and paratrooper who rose to the rank of brigadier general. On top of that, his youngest sister is married to a former paratrooper and commander of 5 Recce, Col. James Hills. Bestbier started his initial military training in 1964 at the then Army Gymnasium at Voortrekkerhoogte. After that he inter alia did duty in Walvis Bay, South West Africa, and at the Infantry School in Oudtshoorn. There he underwent a ‘recce selection’ under Jan Breytenbach and subsequently also completed the basic parachuting course in Bloemfontein.

His path was not always ‘strewn with roses’, and among other things he had a serious personal clash with Breytenbach, which, to his regret, caused a stiffness in their relationship. When he reported for the jump course in Bloemfontein, his reception at 1 Parachute Battalion was also by no means cordial. He nonetheless did his best to complete the course successfully, and passed it.

Moreover, the following year he was transferred to 1 Parachute Battalion. Once again he was given a chilly reception by the commander and some of his personnel. But Bestbier performed his tasks to the best of his ability in his respective roles as platoon commander, company 2IC, transport officer, and commander of the parachute training wing. Throughout, he was focused and determined to reach the highest level in his field.13

After he had completed the SA Army’s senior command and staff course in 1978, Gen. Loots informed him that he had to relieve Col. Olckers as liaison officer in Rhodesia. Until that happened, however, he first had to report to the Special Forces HQ to make the necessary preparations. He stayed in the KG VI officers’ mess, and Olckers briefed him on his tasks. These would mainly involve liaising with the chief of the Rhodesian armed forces, as well as with the chiefs of the army and the air force.

Bestbier was also introduced to the chief of the Special Branch, whom he experienced as an exceptional person and considered to be of inestimable value as a colleague prior to and after the first free election. Every morning Bestbier attended the operational briefings at COMOPS. Consequently, he could pass on all information to MI and Special Forces. He had free access to various units such as the SAS, the Selous Scouts and the Rhodesian Light Infantry (RLI) as well as the air force squadrons. This enabled him to facilitate the Selous Scouts’ and the SAS’s liaison with Special Forces (Recces).

In the lead-up to the first free election in Rhodesia-Zimbabwe, he could already draw up a contingency plan for rendering assistance if the new government should embark on retaliatory actions. Bestbier regularly flew to South Africa where he held discussions with generals Malan, Loots and Van der Westhuizen, Chief of Staff Intelligence (CSI). At the same time, he kept his personal planning up to date in case he were to be exposed as a representative of the South African security forces.

After the withdrawal of the South Africans – the Recces and air force pilots – Bestbier stayed behind in Rhodesia for a while and still attended the briefings at COMOPS. During his visits to South Africa in that period, his discussions focused specifically on how Special Forces could accommodate the Rhodesians – the SAS and the Selous Scouts in particular – in South Africa after independence.

It was decided to fly sensitive items and equipment out of the country from Fylde airbase. Four C-160 and C-130 cargo planes of the SA Air Force were used for this purpose. The Rhodesian personnel had to drive to South Africa under their own steam. Members of the Selous Scouts would go to 5 RC at Phalaborwa, while the SAS would be accommodated at 1 RC in Durban. The motivation for the removal of the sensitive items and equipment was to hamper the ‘new’ Rhodesian special forces – now Robert Mugabe’s defence force – in their deployment possibilities.

The Rhodesian conflict came to an end in December 1979 after constitutional negotiations between the Rhodesian government, Britain, Mugabe and Nkomo at Lancaster House in London. All the parties signed the Lancaster House Agreement, and Rhodesia was temporarily placed under the control of Britain and the Commonwealth.

Bestbier was still in Rhodesia at the time of the election in March 1980 that took place under the supervision of Britain and the Commonwealth. Following Zanu-PF’s election victory, Robert Mugabe was inaugurated as Zimbabwe’s prime minister on 18 April 1980. Mugabe called in all the senior officers, including Bestbier, and requested them to stay on and to support the country. Bestbier wore his full Rhodesian uniform every day and passed himself off as a Rhodesian.

Although South Africa had lent assistance during the first democratic election, the relationship with the RSA was very tense. The expectation in Rhodesia was that South Africa would intervene if the outcome of the election was not to their liking. This hostility had built up gradually and intensified after the election, with the result that the majority of South African citizens, as well as numerous Rhodesians, left the country. All these factors contributed to a further heightening of tension in the country.

Loots and Van der Westhuizen instructed Bestbier to be prepared ‘to withdraw at great speed’.

‘I carried enough money and my passport with me at all times,’ Bestbier recounts. ‘One morning in August 1980, just after the morning session at COMOPS, my friend at Special Branch phoned me. All he said was, “André, get out … Now!” I took my leave and said nothing further, only Gen. Walls knew. Apart from saying goodbye to me, he didn’t say anything. With my hand luggage, I rushed to the airport in Salisbury where I bought a ticket for an SAA flight. The passengers were already boarding. I was the very last person to board the plane.’

At the airport, Bestbier had hidden the keys of the liaison officers’ car – an old Peugeot14 that had been put at their disposal – under the seat. On landing in South Africa, he requested his contact at the embassy in Zimbabwe by phone to remove the car. He also contacted his secretary at COMOPS and learnt that 20 minutes after the plane had taken off, Mugabe’s new Special Branch had arrived at the office to arrest him. They had found out that Bestbier was a South African officer who had supported the old Rhodesia.

In Pretoria, he briefed the staff of CSI, Gen. Loots and Gen. Malan on the situation.

After his stint in Rhodesia, André Bestbier was deployed to the Special Forces HQ as SO1 Ops15 under Hans Möller (then the SSO Ops Army at the Special Forces HQ) in August 1980. This was where he was summoned to Gen. Loots’s office one morning in February 1981. Loots informed him that he had to go to 1 RC in Durban to take over the command of the Recces from Cmdt. Jakes Swart.16

Bestbier regards his transfer to 1 RC (and later 1 RR) as the best thing that could have happened in his life because it opened up completely new horizons for him. Two years later, on 30 March 1983, he took over the command of 1 RR from Ewald Olckers and was 1 RR’s commander for five years, until December 1988.

He excelled at organisational and management level. During his tenure as commander, there was a revolutionary change in the procurement of high-quality equipment as well as extremely advanced equipment for the Recces. He looked after the welfare of all levels of his staff, including signals, medical and maintenance staff and every other department in the unit. In his younger days, he also made his mark on the sports field by representing the Springboks and Free State as hooker.

During 1977 Bestbier’s predecessor as commander at 1 RC, Cmdt. Jakes Swart, was doing the SA Army’s senior command and staff course in Pretoria. As a result, he was not part of the initial planning process in respect of cooperation between 1 RC and the SAS. Hence he did not have contact with the SAS’s commander, Brian Robinson, or the Selous Scouts’ commander, Ron Reid-Daly, at the beginning. Swart did, however, have considerable contact with Lt. Gen. Walls, especially during Operation Bootlace/Uric that was executed in Mozambique’s Gaza province after his staff course (see part 1, chapter 7).

The SAS had a great shortage of manpower, and the deployments of 1 RC, 2 RC and 5 RC strengthened their hand in this regard. The Recces assisted with area operations; 1 RC operated in vast areas of responsibility in the Gaza province and dominated the areas that had been allocated to them. 1 Recce not only cooperated with the SAS in Gaza but also conducted quite a number of successful operations in support of the Mozambican resistance movement Renamo.