Читать книгу 1 Recce, volume 2 - Alexander Strachan - Страница 8

Operation Acrobat17

Aggressive action on the Russian Front

‘The terrs were walking on our tracks, and luckily we had made a dogleg before we lay up. One of the terrs’ gun barrels caught on a branch and the sound alerted us. We opened fire, and shot some of them dead and wounded a few.’

This is how SW Fourie recalls a fatal contact in early February 1978 when Lt. Kokkie du Toit’s team sabotaged the railway line in the vicinity of Madulo Pan in Mozambique’s Gaza province. Afterwards they moved to a drop zone (DZ) for a ration resupply. Near the DZ the team assumed an ambush position. Lt. Douw Steyn, the team’s demolition specialist, laid a few Claymore mines on their tracks and linked them with electrical cords to the firing device. A Frelimo group unexpectedly walked into the ambush position, and Steyn detonated the mines.

A fierce firefight ensued and once it subsided, Du Toit deployed his team in a formation to clear the killing zone. They swept the bush in an extended line in search of wounded Frelimo soldiers – but failed to spot one who had crawled under a bush.

‘When the fire stopped, Kokkie walked forward and returned with one of their AK-47s,’ recounts Fourie. ‘He showed me that a branch had broken off in the barrel – the terrs probably thought the barrel would explode in the face of anyone who fired it. Then Kokkie signalled that we had to get ready to move. We were lying behind a thick tree, and he moved round it on the left and I on the right. He gave another signal leftwards … it was for the guys to spread out because we were going to sweep the killing zone.’

The wounded Frelimo soldier under the bush easily identified Du Toit as the team leader since he gave the hand signals and controlled the team. The man fired a single shot at close range and hit him in the side. Kokkie du Toit died before his body struck the ground.

‘When Kokkie turned to the front, the wounded terr shot him. He spun around and fell behind me. We applied mouth-to-mouth resuscitation, but he was already dead. The bullet had gone through his right arm and heart, and I think it went out on the other side.’

Fourie suspected that the wounded Frelimo was the same one who had earlier spotted the wire of the Claymore mine on the ground. ‘The terr was between us and the Claymore, and he followed the wire all the way to the mine. When he reached it, Douw detonated the mine. The back-blast of the Claymore had injured him. After he shot Kokkie, Joe de Villiers instantly took him out with his weapon.’

The team then withdrew, carrying their fallen comrade’s body with them. A helicopter was not immediately available – with helicopters in short supply in the Rhodesian air force, they were constantly deployed. The team had no choice but to keep moving.

Fourie recalls how they struggled with the stretcher: ‘We had these primitive stretchers, so four guys had to carry Kokkie. It left us with only a few guys who could shoot effectively. In later years the medical equipment improved, and they designed a stretcher that could be carried by just two guys who were able to shoot at the same time.’

By late afternoon, a thick mist descended that made it impossible for a helicopter to collect Du Toit’s body. ‘We walked until dark and then took shelter against a koppie that was very bushy. None of us wanted to lie close to the body, and we went into all-round defence some distance away,’ Fourie relates.

Du Toit had always carried a bottle of rum in his backpack, and that evening in the lying-up position Steyn took out the bottle and everyone drank a tot to the memory of their fallen comrade. In the dark they concealed Du Toit’s body in the dense bush in case the team unexpectedly had to start running for their lives. True to Recce tradition, they would not allow his body to fall into enemy hands.

‘Willy Ward was the new team leader … The next morning we couldn’t find the body, seeing that we had arrived at the place in the dark. Eventually we located Kokkie’s body by means of the smell.’

The helicopter came in fairly early and landed close by. Du Toit’s body was airlifted out under enemy fire. Steyn, who was injured – during his tree landing after his parachute jump a branch had penetrated his boot and pierced his foot – was evacuated along with the body to the Tac HQ.

As Frelimo soldiers were still hot on their heels, the team immediately started running again after the helicopter took off. There were now too few of them left to take on the Frelimos’ superior numbers. Eventually the team was picked up and flown to the Tac HQ, where a debriefing took place under the command of Capt. Hannes Venter.

* * *

Since 1976–77 Robert Mugabe’s Zanla guerrillas had been infiltrating Rhodesia on a regular basis from Mozambique’s Tete and Gaza provinces. Zanla’s strategic plan also included sabotaging the logistics routes in southern Matabeleland to South Africa from the Gaza province. During the course of 1976 the Selous Scouts attacked Frelimo-Zanla logistics bases in the Tete and Gaza provinces. In addition, they demolished or damaged parts of the railway line between Malvernia and São Jorge do Limpopo.

Zanla assembled its troops at Xai-Xai on the Mozambican coast. After receiving training in Tanzania, the troops were transported along the coast to Xai-Xai. From there they were moved by road or by rail to Aldeia da Barragem, Frelimo’s brigade HQ in the Gaza province. As a result of the Selous Scouts’ actions, the Zanla guerrillas were forced to move to the Rhodesian border with Mozambique either by road or on foot.

During October 1977 the Selous Scouts handed over the responsibility for combating infiltrations from the Gaza province to the SAS Rhodesia. It was in this inhospitable operational area with little water and impassable sandalwood forests that South Africa’s Recces acted militarily against Frelimo and Zanla together with the SAS.

* * *

The Recces’ preparations and movement to Rhodesia would invariably take place in great secrecy.18 As soon as the group commanders received the instruction to deploy operators to Rhodesia, the preparations would start. Their kit, weapons and ammunition were packed in numbered crates. The group sergeant major compiled a contents list for each crate, after which the crates were weighed. Meanwhile the operators would check and prepare their personal combat gear for the deployment.

Operational security (OPSEC) was maintained, and no one in the unit would know where the group was headed – nor did anyone ask questions. Maj. Wessel Maree, 1 Recce’s logistics officer, remembers OPSEC as follows:

‘Due to the operators’ constant training, we as support personnel never knew if the training was for a specific reason (operational) or normal training. Certain operators would be in the unit at morning parade and then vanish for a certain period only to return weeks or months later. 1.1 Commando had their own storage facilities and storeman, and it was possible for them to deploy without the rest of the unit knowing. Nobody ever knew what exactly the operators’ programme and tasking would be from day to day.’

For security reasons, the movement to Rhodesia mostly took place at night, except for the first deployment, when it happened in daytime. In civilian dress, the groups would move to Durban’s military airport with all their gear. Dakota planes of the SA Air Force were used to fly the groups to Rhodesia. Once the pilots reported that they were in Rhodesian airspace, the operators would remove their Rhodesian combat uniforms from their carry bags and put them on. The civilian clothes would then be stored in the carry bags.

In the case of the first deployment, 1 RC’s Bravo Group under the command of Capt. Hannes Venter flew during the day in two Dakotas from Durban to the Buffalo Range airfield near Chiredzi in Rhodesia. After crossing the Limpopo River, the planes maintained an altitude of about 90 m above the ground, which was within range of AK-47 fire. The pilots were inexperienced and reckoned they were flying low enough. Moreover, they flew in formation, with the second Dakota flying a plane length diagonally behind the first one.

This made the planes very vulnerable, and Venter asked the commander of the Dakota, Capt. Jaap du Preez, to rather fly at tree-top level. Du Preez disregarded this request. On the return flight they followed the same route, and just before the Limpopo River they came under heavy AK-47 fire. Du Preez’s Dakota was riddled with bullet holes. Consequently, this was the last time the Dakotas did not fly at tree-top level.

After deployments the groups were picked up again in Rhodesia at the forward tactical airfield and flown to Durban’s air force base. As soon as the plane entered South African airspace, the operators would swap the Rhodesian uniforms for their civilian clothes. They generally arrived at Durban’s air force base during the night. Before sunrise, the operators would be back at their base on the Bluff – while the rest of the unit had not even reported for the day’s work.

Sometimes the Recce groups would fly directly from Durban to the forward tactical airfields such as Mabalauta, provided that the runways there were suitable for the Dakotas to land and take off with a heavy load.

Prior to the 1 Recce deployments, Venter and WO2 MJ (Yogi) Potgieter had visited the SAS, the Selous Scouts and the RLI to learn more about the Rhodesians’ operational methods, equipment, planning, execution and so on. During this three-week information tour they made use of the opportunity to visit the Tac HQs as well. While Venter was with the Selous Scouts, he moved around with their commander, Lt. Col. Ron Reid-Daly. Among other things they visited a Joint Operational Centre (JOC), and Reid-Daly told all and sundry that Venter was his adjutant and that he had recruited him from the reserves. It was an awkward situation, but everyone seemed to accept Reid-Daly’s explanation and no questions were asked.

From December 1977 to December 1979, groups from 1 Recce were deployed on an almost full-time basis in Mozambique’s Gaza province. Among the operators this region was known as the Russian Front on account of the large number of Russian and East German advisers who were deployed with the enemy forces. Operations were executed in Zambia and elsewhere as well, but on a smaller scale.

The Russian Front also owed its name to the harshness of the terrain and the aggressive Frelimo follow-up actions. During the Second World War the German soldiers had referred to the Eastern Front as the Russian Front, and it was considered a punishment to be deployed there. Likewise, the Rhodesians called Gaza the Russian Front in tongue-in-cheek fashion.

In the course of the two-year period, about 143 Recce operators from 1 RC, 2 RC, 4 RC and 5 RC were deployed in Rhodesia. From here they were deployed to Mozambique with a view to disrupting the enemy by means of fighting patrols and also obstructing their logistical support. In Gaza they concentrated mainly on the rail and power lines between Malvernia and Maputo and on the adjacent road. The Recces’ other targets were the armed observation and machine-gun posts that were deployed in an anti-aircraft role to attack Dakota infiltrations.

Drop zones for parachute landings were unmarked, and the jumpers usually landed in trees – it was actually miraculous how few injuries were sustained. One of the most serious was that suffered by Lt. Douw Steyn who fell through the trees in a sandalwood forest. During the landing, a dry branch penetrated his Waxie boot and stuck into his foot. The injury was of such a nature that he subsequently had to be evacuated.

During one of the parachute infiltrations in January 1978, Sgt. Jack Greeff landed among stones in the Lebombo Mountains and tore his ankle ligaments. But he held out and accompanied the team to their target, a railway line, and was only flown out later. Other parachuting injuries included that of Cpl. FL (Frik) Gouws, who suffered a branch through his thigh on landing and also had to be evacuated.

Recce and SAS teams were deployed without support for about seven to fourteen days and sometimes longer. They would then either be withdrawn or relieved by others, or resupplied for another seven to fourteen days. Their tactic was to lay mines on a road and attack the enemy by means of ambushes. It produced the desired results: when the enemy moved by road, their vehicles were protected by at least a company of infantry soldiers on foot. Consequently, the enemy always had to deploy a large number of troops along the road, which limited other deployments.

As a rule, there were casualties within the ranks of the enemy during contacts. The losses curbed their combativeness and speed, which then gave the Recces the opportunity to withdraw to a safer area. These were invariably high-risk deployments that were largely instrumental in securing south-eastern Rhodesia and the north-eastern border of South Africa.

During December 1977, members of Bravo Group 1 RC under the leadership of Capt. Hannes Venter commenced intensive training. The group was informed that they were preparing for an Eheke-type19 operation against Swapo in Angola. But that was yet another of the cover stories that were regularly concocted for the sake of secrecy.

To the group’s great surprise, on their arrival at Durban’s air force base they found two Dakota planes waiting to transport them. Normally, a C-130 or C-160 plane would be used for movement to South West Africa.

In the case of one deployment, for instance, the cover story was that the group had to go to the Oudtshoorn area for retraining. To lend more credence to the cover story, the big HF-radio antenna on the Bluff was even turned in Oudtshoorn’s direction by the signallers. Much effort went into making the cover stories seem completely credible in order to deflect attention (including that of their own personnel) from the real mission at hand.

The group took off from Durban’s air force base in the two Dakotas, and in the course of the flight they were ordered to change into other uniforms. Instead of the customary Swapo or Eastern Bloc uniforms, the familiar Rhodesian camouflage uniforms, which had been packed in sealed cardboard boxes, were distributed. For the first time it came home to the group that they were actually headed for Rhodesia. An oversight during the first deployment was that the men had not been issued with Rho­desian dollars, and they had to exchange rands for dollars in Rhodesia. In subsequent deployments, regard was specifically paid to this aspect.

During the flight Venter informed the group that they were to be deployed with the SAS and from now on had to speak only English for security purposes. Late that afternoon the two Dakotas landed at Buffalo Range, where they were immediately welcomed and briefed by the SAS intelligence officer and SAS commander. The Tactical HQs of 1 Recce and the SAS were at Buffalo Range, but they were moved to Mabalauta on the banks of the Nuanetzi River. This was mainly for security reasons and because the distances to the operational area were shorter and reaction times faster from Mabalauta.

Mabalauta was a semi-permanent tented camp from where the Recces and the SAS launched operations into Mozambique’s Gaza province. There were several trenches around the base. The tents stood under big trees, and a medical post had been set up in a tent of 4m × 4m. The smallish ablution block was a permanent structure.

The base was informally divided in two, with the Recces and the SAS each having their own section. Each group also had its own operations tent from where the operational commanders controlled the operations. The men mixed socially, however, and it was customary to gather at a mortar pit between the SAS and Recce sections of the camp after last light and sink a few beers.

The Nuanetzi River (today the Mwenezi River) was also a pleasant recreational spot, and the men would go to wash there towards late afternoon. Mabalauta was known for its beautiful sunrises and sunsets. It was as if the red-tinted western sky brought a great calm over the base in the evenings. Despite it being a dusty place, the base was nonetheless a very welcome sight when the helicopters dropped the operators there after deployments.

Recce teams operated independently and infiltrated by parachute, after which they were extracted by Alouette helicopters. The objective of the deployments was to attack the enemy with aggressive fighting patrols and disrupt their logistical support. Venter’s time was largely devoted to command-and-control. Hence he spent much of his day in a Rhodesian Lynx aircraft in which he criss-crossed the Russian Front. The Lynx, with its old-fashioned push-pull configuration, was extremely noisy. The pilots were always fresh and were constantly rotated after two weeks’ duty on the Russian Front.

Day after day, Venter flew Telstar20 to provide radio relay support and do reconnaissance. He provided top cover for Alouette helicopters and Dakotas when they flew in with paratroops and exfiltrated them again. The Lynx was armed with two .303 Browning machine guns that were mounted above the cockpit as well as with two 37-mm Sneb rocket launchers with four rockets on each wing. On a few occasions they attacked vehicles east of Mapai, and frequently provided air support during Dakota parachute infiltrations when the Dakotas drew fire.

Dakotas invariably drew fire over the Limpopo valley where Russian DShK 12,7-mm machine guns were deployed. The Lynx would then dive-bomb the artillery positions and bombard them with the ‘heavy’ weapons. This had the desired effect, as the Lynx would become the target and the Dakota could fly on in much less danger.

To provide top cover for the Alouette helicopters, Venter and the pilot had to evade the 23-mm anti-aircraft cannons that were deployed at the railway stations and at Mapai. They assisted the Alouette pilots with navigation because the latter only followed the railway line. When they neared a station, Venter and the pilot in the Lynx would guide the Alouettes around the station and back to the railway line once they had passed it.

The effective ceiling height of the 23-mm anti-aircraft cannons was 1 400 m, and the Telstar flew just above that. Almost every day they saw 23-mm warheads exploding around and below them, which was nerve-racking. In cloudy weather they would fly just below the clouds. As soon as they drew fire they would bounce up into the clouds, knowing full well that they were still within striking range.

In the Telstar, they wore very old parachutes and sat on the canopies. Venter was in full combat dress and had his AK-47 on his body, and he and the pilot were ready to jump if necessary. But he did not know how he would get out of the plane in such an event because of everything he had on his body. As a result of the many hours in the air, Venter was by this time capable of handling the plane himself if an emergency situation arose. According to him, he was able to control the plane up to the final approach run.

The pilots with whom he flew were young and daring. So, too, were the Alouette pilots, who were fearless and conducted emergency extractions under extremely dangerous conditions. They would sometimes run out of fuel and land in the bush without knowing exactly where they were. At times it could even be in Mozambique. The Lynx would then guide Alouettes with fuel to the stranded Alouette. Quite a few pilots and crewmen of the SA Air Force flew Alouette helicopters during the Rhodesian conflict. One of them was Capt. Dave Atkinson, who was awarded an Honoris Crux decoration – an intrepid pilot and old friend of 1 Recce who never thought twice about picking up Recce and SAS teams under enemy fire.

Capt. Arthur Walker was also deployed in Rhodesia as an Alouette pilot. He was later awarded the Honoris Crux Gold (HCG) for his bravery during an operation in Angola on 15 January 1981. Later that same year, on 29 December, he distinguished himself once again during an operation in Angola and was awarded the HCG Bar. Walker therefore received the HCG twice and was the most highly decorated soldier in the SADF.

Only six HCG decorations were awarded in South Africa. Another recipient of the HCG was an operator from 5 Recce, Cpl. Gabriel Fernando. Fernando received his (HCG no. 3) posthumously for his bravery in action on 1 August 1980. Walker received HCG no. 4 plus Bar as a member of the air force; the army received three HCG decorations and the navy one, which was awarded to Able Seaman Paul Burger Whiley. Because Walker received two, no. 5 was the last number of the HCGs that were awarded.

* * *

On 4 January 1978 lance corporals CF Mennigke and C de Wilzem were killed in an enemy ambush – the first operators from 1 Recce to die in Rhodesia. On 28 January 1978 Cpl. Manuel Ganhão, also from 1 Recce, died during an ambush set by the team under the leadership of Lt. Kokkie du Toit. Du Toit’s team had attacked a railway substation and the enemy had fled. Frelimo followed up quickly, and he decided to lay an ambush for them. Ganhão was fatally wounded in the fierce firefight. But Du Toit and his team were unaware that the Frelimos who had landed in their ambush were merely the reconnaissance team of a much larger follow-up force. In the subsequent skirmishes with the larger group, Du Toit and his group cut and ran while carrying out Ganhão’s body.

SW Fourie recalls that they were deployed in a big team of about ten men:21 ‘It was one of the first deployments of 1 RC. We jumped in at night, and as usual the landing was softer if you hit a tree. On the Russian Front I soon learnt that you hit a contact within two days. The terrs were good at tracking – in any case, we left such deep tracks in the soft sand that tackie boots were no use. I remember Kokkie woke me one night and told me I had to take my Puma hunting knife and Beta light and go sort out the frogs that had been croaking all night. We found out later that you had to walk for about 30 minutes before you reached the frogs.

‘As junior operator in the team, I had the “privilege” of carrying the Syncal 30/TR 48 radio. We were in the vicinity of the railway line, walking in formation, when we hit contact for the very first time. Just before the shots rang out, I heard a trumpeter hornbill calling – that grating sound would stay in my memory and remind me of that day for my rest of my life. It was also the first time in my life that I saw a terr. He had a yellow complexion and wore the olive-green cammies [camouflage wear]. That split second while I wondered why he was yellow nearly cost me my life. In the exchange of fire that followed, Manuel Ganhão was killed. Losing a buddy was very tough on us, and he had to be airlifted out by helicopter.’

But that was not the team’s last fatality. Shortly afterwards, in early February 1978, the attack on the railway line in the vicinity of Madulo Pan took place, and Lt. Kokkie du Toit was shot dead by a wounded Frelimo (the incident related at the beginning of the chapter).

In keeping with Recce tradition, they carried Du Toit out with great difficulty with a large group of Frelimos in hot pursuit.

One of the team leaders, Sgt. Louis Klopper, confirms that being chased by groups that far outnumbered them was the modus operandi during nearly all deployments on the Russian Front: ‘It was the pattern of the deployment … you would jump in with a team of six to eight men, execute the attack, and then be pursued almost immediately by a numerically superior Frelimo force – sometimes up to company strength – in follow-up operations.’

During the last deployment of Du Toit’s team, 1 Recce’s commander, Cmdt. Jakes Swart, visited the group at Buffalo Range. Swart was accompanied by Maj. Hennie Blaauw, Alpha Group’s commander, and Capt. Woody Woodburne, SSO Ops Navy. Blaauw had come to orient himself to take over command from Venter, and was in the Tac HQ when Du Toit’s team made radio contact and confirmed that they had just had a contact (this was the ambush).

A few minutes later Blaauw left the Tac HQ and as he stood talking to Swart and Venter some distance away, the signals officer, Lt. Bam de Wet, came rushing up to them. He had just received a report from Du Toit’s team that Du Toit had been fatally injured.

Lt. Kokkie du Toit’s death on Friday 11 February 1978 brought to four the number of outstanding soldiers 1 Recce had lost in the space of four weeks.

On the Sunday, everyone at the Tac HQ decided spontaneously to attend the service at the Methodist church in Chiredzi. According to Venter, their little group were the only men in uniform at the church: ‘I don’t think the congregation had seen soldiers in uniform at the church service before. Some of the churchgoers started talking to us, and an elderly man and his wife spoke to me in Afrikaans and thanked me that the South Africans had come to their aid. So the Recces’ cover was not watertight. But I don’t believe it had any repercussions in this case. The Recces did not look like Rhodesian soldiers, and the congregation noticed this but made no fuss about it.’

* * *

Hannes Venter and his counterpart in the SAS at Buffalo Range were now operating under enormous pressure. They deployed several teams on the Russian Front (in Gaza). The teams would parachute in, infiltrate to predetermined ambush positions and spring the ambush. They would then withdraw, move to the next ambush position and spring that trap too, after which large numbers of Frelimos would hunt the Recce and SAS teams of six to eight men. Two and sometimes more contacts per day were not uncommon; in fact, it was the norm.

The daily firefights with Frelimo and Zanla guerrillas were frequently without sustained close air support. Helicopters and attack aircraft were simply not available at all times. Nearly every day the deployed teams were engaged in escape-and-evasion procedures while the Frelimo patrols followed close on their heels. Occasionally some of the team members would be injured, and no helicopters would be available to evacuate the casualties. The Rhodesian air force flew continually, and problems on the ground were attended to in terms of priority. Consequently, the deployed teams had to wait their turn to receive air support.

Bravo Group was deployed for six weeks and had numerous contacts. Besides the four operators who lost their lives, there were injuries as well. The teams adapted quickly and did a good job in achieving their objective of disrupting the enemy. The use of the daily Telstar deployments gave everyone confidence, and the communication was excellent. It was, however, extremely stressful for one officer to sit in the Lynx plane on a daily basis while there was no support at the Tac HQ. To relieve the pressure, an operator officer was utilised as operational officer. Apart from manning the operations room, he also performed Telstar duties. This improved the command-and-control, and effective support was provided to the deployed teams.

Cmdt. Swart subsequently decided to replace Bravo Group with Alpha Group. On 13 February 1978 Hennie Blaauw returned to Durban in the plane that evacuated Kokkie du Toit’s body. He gave orders to his group, and a couple of days later he was back at Buffalo Range where he took over from Venter. The rotation of the two groups was wrapped up within a few days.